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I am currently researching one of The Second Sight's topical foci: the economic, technological, and contentual cross-fertilization between the media, entertainment and the defense sector. 

For a general description of the technological cross-fertilization between entertainment and defense please read the January 2008 post: Military Entertainment Complex - the U.S. Entertainment Superpower or my June 2006 post, Creatonomics.

For a look at the cultural significance and asset of U.S. economic dominance in content production and distribution, see the March 2007 entry  The Arab Media Revolution - War of Ideas.  As I wrote then, "Lest we forget, creative content has a social impact as well as an economic value. I have always argued on this site, that media and entertainment sectors are undervalued assets in the American consciousness (both in terms of the economy and in terms of their social benefit in a global war of ideas)."  In another August 2006 post,  Why the fractured Chinese Market will never Buy your Movie?: The cultural and geo-political benefit of U.S. dominance in content creation and distribution "reminds me of what Simon Cowell remarked to Larry King in March this year [2006] when asked about the prohibition of "American Idol" like shows in China.  Says Cowell:

"Well, because it's a democracy, isn't it? You know, I mean, it's the public voting. So you can understand why they're getting slightly nervous about it. Because it wasn't our show in China, it was the laughing cow, so-and-so, so-and-so competition. And the public got to vote. And suddenly there were demos, and it was democracy. And I think the government went, we don't want this. So then they put out a stupid comment like that. You know? It's that we must control the public. Crazy."

What is the nature of the so called 'military entertainment complex' (also known as 'miltary nintendo complex') and what drives its organization?  The answer to the latter question is found in the maintenance of U.S. global military hegemony.  If the U.S. military is the primary global military power, and this hegemony is based on the ability of the U.S. Navy to dominate the world's oceans, then the condition of hegemony is partially based on the superior numbers and technology of U.S. naval vessels and augmented significantly by U.S. dominance in space-based reconnaissance technology, made possible by entertainment software consumers and movie goers world-wide.  In other words, the mainenance of U.S. global military hegemony, requires the continued militarization of outer and cyberspace; and the pentagon's organizational evolution and strategic positioning against asymmetric threats. 

We are focusing in the next few weeks on cyberwarefare.  Cyberwarefare encompasses a lot of terrain: “from posting misinformation on a blog to crashing a national stock exchange." That means cyberwarefare also encompasses media strategy (the production, distribution, and marketing of cultural content and propoganda) along the organs of communication from traditional media and their hybrids to the internet. 

For example, in a 2006 analysis, Stratfor, a private intelligence service, posted that al Qaeda’s relationship with the media was evolving so that it increasingly relied on the internet to accomplish organizational objectives, including communication and recruitment.  Whereas bin Laden and al-Zawahiri relied on traditional Arabic media outlets to distribute message, al-Zarqawi use of the internet shows the evolving ‘informational wing’ and philosophy of the new generation of al Qaeda:

Within this vein, al Qaeda in Iraq has used the Internet in two very significant ways: to disseminate propaganda in real time, and to shape public perceptions and debate in both the Islamic and Western spheres. In other words, the Web has been a timely, efficient and effective tool for conducting information warfare, which is key for breaking the will of the enemy and in motivating one’s own forces.

Another parallel that Stratfor posits in the same 2006 report is how this newer generation of ‘dot com’ terrorists compares in operational efficiency to their silicone valley counterparts of a decade prior.

It is not yet clear what the future will hold for al-Zarqawi’s organization in, but for the evolving generation of jihadists as a whole, past could be prologue. Ultimately, the dot-com terrorists might learn the same lessons as the dot-com entrepreneurs of the 1990s: There is no “new paradigm” in their industry. The most successful militants have recognized all along that certain basic rules — and operational practices — still apply. And for those who fail to grasp that reality, there will be a painful winnowing.

Cyberwarefare's conspicuity in the minds of Pentagon and intelligence strategists is evident by their acknowledgement of its threat in the 2008 Annual Threat Assessment [Download PDF.]

The US information infrastructure—including telecommunications and computer networks and systems, and the data that reside on them—is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. Therefore, threats to our IT infrastructure are an important focus of the Intelligence Community. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move to networked operations, as our digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and service of information technology has moved overseas, our vulnerabilities will continue to grow.

Our information infrastructure—including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries—increasingly is being targeted for exploitation and potentially for disruption or destruction, by a growing array of state and non-state adversaries. Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more serious. The Intelligence Community expects these trends to continue in the coming year.

We assess that nations, including Russia and China, have the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the US information infrastructure and for intelligence collection.  Nation states and criminals target our government and private sector information networks to gain competitive advantage in the commercial sector. Terrorist groups—including al-Qa’ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah—have expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United States. Criminal elements continue to show growing sophistication in technical capability and targeting, and today operate a pervasive, mature on-line service economy in illicit cyber capabilities and services available to anyone willing to pay.

Each of these actors has different levels of skill and different intentions; therefore, we must develop flexible capabilities to counter each. It is no longer sufficient for the US Government to discover cyber intrusions in its networks, clean up the damage, and take legal or political steps to deter further intrusions. We must take proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions from whatever source, as they happen, and before they can do significant damage. (p. 16)

As did the Pentagon’s 2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China [Download PDF].

In the past year, numerous computer networks around the world including those owned by the U.S. Government were subject to intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC. These intrusions require many of the skills and capabilities that would also be required for computer network attack. Although it is unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC government, developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent with authoritative PLA writings on this subject.

In 2007, the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government agencies and departments, and defense-related think tanks and contractors experienced multiple computer network intrusions, many of which appeared to originate in the PRC (Sec 1:4)

"Non-Contact” Warfare: An example of China’s current thinking on asymmetric warfare is encapsulated by a military theory termed ”non-contact” which seeks to attain a political goal by looking for auxiliary means beyond military boundaries or limits. Examples include: cyberwarfare against civilian and military networks – especially against communications and logistics nodes; fifth column attacks, including sabotage and subversion, attacks on financial infrastructure; and, information operations. (Sec 1:21)

According to Stratfor, “The United States has a very impressive ability to function in and command cyberspace. But by no means does it enjoy the unquestioned military dominance it enjoys in so many other domains." Hence the creation of the Air Force Cyber Command and the organizational shift this asymmetric threat precipitates:

Mastery of cyberspace is essential to America’s national security. Controlling cyberspace is the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and operational domains—securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack.  (Air Force Cyber Threat Vision Statement [Download PDF], Sec 2: II)

The Association of Film Commissioners International released their 2006 US Incentives Report. I interviewed their president, Pat Kaufman, New York state Film Commissioner in January this year.

Download 2006 US Production Incentives [PDF]

Download 2006 International Production Incentives [PDF]

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION HOSTS LANDMARK FILMMAKING WORKSHOP IN CHINA [PDF]

Excerpt:

"Beginning, Sunday, March 19, the Motion Picture Association (MPA) will host an intensive filmmaking workshop aimed at helping encourage and refine the sills of 40 Chinese producers and screenwriters...'Our goal in organizing these workshops in Beijing is to work with SARFT to help the local film industry work toward realizing the potential of a successful, legitimate film market that to date, has largely remained untapped."

Download Press Release [PDF]

Excerpts:

Beginning on Tuesday, March 21 in Las Vegas, the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) will host a technology booth at TelecomNEXT, featuring several companies who will display some of the latest online distribution platforms and filtering tools which could assist the telecommunications industry and play an important role in the emerging legitimate digital content distribution markets. This is the first time that the MPAA has had a presence at this event which is important in bringing business and technology of communications and entertainment together.

Representatives from Audible Magic, BitTorrent Inc., CacheLogic, Peer Impact, Red Swoosh and Thomson Content Security will be on hand to demonstrate methods their companies have developed to facilitate legal online movie distribution and to protect copyrights in a digital environment.

2006 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY, SHOWEST, MPAA DAN GLICKMAN, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Las Vegas, March 14, 2006 [PDF]

Excerpts and Highlights:

MPAA U.S.Theatrical Market: 2005 Statistics[PDF]

Excerpts and Highlights:

In 2005, total domestic box office remained near $9 billion, a barrier broken in 2002 for the first time. Global box office remained steady at over $23 billion, just shy of the all time high in 2004 of $25 billion and 46% higher than the 2000 mark of $16 billion. U.S. theater admissions decreased 8.7% in 2005 to 1.4 billion.

The number of movies released remains on a growth trajectory, with total releases topping another all time high of 563 versus 528 in 2004, growth of 7%.

New releases by the major motion picture studios (MPAA members) grossed an average of $37 million in 2005, an increase of 7% over the past five years.

A major component of the annual box office was the performance of blockbusters, which remained comparable to prior years in total box office. A new all time high was set in 2005, with eight movies grossing over $200 million, three more than in 2004, and five more than 2000, a great milestone for the industry.

The average cost to make and market a film in 2005 remained under $100 million and dipped slightly to $96.2 million. Marketing costs were up 5.2% and production costs went down 4% from the previous year. MPAA member companies spent more on network television and Internet advertising and less on newspapers and local television.

Federal Trade Commission reports on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Technology: Consumer Protection and Competition Issues for June 2005.

Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Technology: Consumer Protection and Competition Issues [PDF]