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Dec 2010

late
2010
Department of State | State Department officials privately brief Congress on damage assessment from release of State Department Cables. 

"A congressional official briefed on the reviews said the administration felt compelled to say publicly that the revelations had seriously damaged American interests in order to bolster legal efforts to shut down the WikiLeaks website and bring charges against the leakers..."

'I think they just want to present the toughest front they can muster,' the official said...

But State Department officials have privately told Congress they expect overall damage to U.S. foreign policy to be containable, said the official, one of two congressional aides familiar with the briefings who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity...

'We were told (the impact of WikiLeaks revelations) was embarrassing but not damaging, said the official, who attended a briefing given in late 2010 by State Department officials...

'From our standpoint, there has been substantial damage...We believe that hundreds of people have been put at potential risk because their names have been compromised in the release of these cables,'State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told Reuters.

A spokeswoman for the office of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, which oversees all U.S. intelligence agencies, said, "The irresponsible and reckless behavior of WikiLeaks has of course caused damage and will continue to be damaging in the months and years to come."

But current and former intelligence officials note that while WikiLeaks has released a handful of inconsequential CIA analytical reports, the website has made public few if any real intelligence secrets, including reports from undercover agents or ultra-sensitive technical intelligence reports, such as spy satellite pictures or communications intercepts.". (Source: Reuters, U.S. Official: WikiLeaks Revelations 'Embarrassing But Not Damaging')

30 General counsel [WHO WAS THIS?] for ICE sends letter to David House noting his electronic devices have been returned but not indicating whether any information derived from those electronic devices had been copied, or what agencies or individuals were given copies, or whether such copies were destroyed

"23. In a letter to Plaintiff's counsel dated December 30, 2010, general counsel for ICE noted that the devices had been returned but did not indicate whether any information derived from those electronic devices had been copied, what agencies or individuals were given any copies made, and whether any such copies had been destroyed."" (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

30 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xxxi) 6 January 2011 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 30 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since last review and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

29 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning

"xxx) 29 December 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also stated, 'SND was evaluated by Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] on 23 December 2010, and although further mental evaluation was deemed necessary, SND was recommended to be removed from POI classification from a psychiatric standpoint.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

23 White House | Assistant to the President for Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security, John Brennan calls President Saleh of Yemen to express regret for WikiLeaks.

Assistant to the President for Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan called Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh on December 23 to emphasize the importance of taking forceful action against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in order to thwart its plans to carry out terrorist attacks in Yemen as well as in other countries, including in the U.S. Homeland. Mr. Brennan emphasized the need to strengthen the already close cooperation between Yemeni and U.S. counterterrorism and security services, as well as with other partner nations, including the timely acquisition of all relevant information from individuals arrested by Yemeni security forces. Mr. Brennan conveyed President Obama’s appreciation for the sacrifices of the Yemeni people in confronting al-Qa’ida and expressed regret for the recent actions by wikileaks. Mr. Brennan thanked President Saleh for his explicit commitment to ensure the full cooperation of the Yemeni Government and his pledge never to retreat in the face of al-Qa’ida’s murderous agenda.

(Source: White House)

23 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist, Captain Hocter, evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI, although further mental evaluation deemed necessary.

"xxx) 29 December 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also stated, 'SND was evaluated by Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] on 23 December 2010, and although further mental evaluation was deemed necessary, SND was recommended to be removed from POI classification from a psychiatric standpoint.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

22 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform | According to a Statement by Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight, Representative Darrell Issa who had sent an August 17, 2010 letter to General James [Jim] Jones, U.S.M.C, National Security Advisor to President Obama about WikiLeaks, the administration did not respond.

WASHINGTON, DC – Oversight and Government Reform Committee Ranking Member Darrell Issa today issued the following statement of support for a revised version of S. 372, The Whistleblower Protection Act:

“The Whistleblower Protection Act creates a framework for federal employees to report waste, fraud, and abuse and shields them from retaliation. I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill.

“I’m disappointed that the Administration has refused to answer questions from Congress about how it intends to address the situation with Wikileaks and prevent the reckless publication of sensitive national security information in the future. Had the Administration been more forthcoming, this bill could have advanced with more protections for federal employees who work on matters of national security. In the next Congress, I intend to continue the discussion about providing appropriate protections for federal employees who expose wrongdoing through legal and responsible channels.”

(Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform)

See See Representative Darrell Issa's August 17, 2010 letter to General James [Jim] Jones, U.S.M.C, National Security Advisor to President Obama about WikiLeaks

22 United Nations | United Nation's office of rapporteur on torture confirms it is looking into complaint made by Manning supporter

"The United Nations is investigating a complaint on behalf of Bradley Manning that he is being mistreated while held since May in US Marine Corps custody pending trial. The army private is charged with the unauthorized use and disclosure of classified information, material related to the WikiLeaks, and faces a court martial sometime in 2011.

The office of Manfred Nowak, special rapporteur on torture based in Geneva, received the complaint from a Manning supporter; his office confirmed that it was being looked into. Manning's supporters say that he is in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day; this could be construed as a form of torture. This month visitors reported that his mental and physical health was deteriorating."

(Source: The Guardian)

22 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning

"xxix) 22 December 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “overall, SND was respectful and cooperative during the interview.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

22 David House has his electronic devices returned to him by DHS CIS New York District, even though they were seized by R. Hart, SAC CHI ICE.

"22. On December 22, 2010, Plaintiff's electronic devices were returned to him by mail. Although Plaintiff had been informed they were taken into custody by 'R. Hart, SAC CHI ICE,' his electronic devices were sent to him from the 'DHS CIS New York District Office.' (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

21 ACLU faxes DHS, CBP, and ICE requesting David House's electronic devices be returned to him immediately. The letter also requests that House be provided with documentation of the chain of custody of any copies made of the information contained on his devices and documentation of their destruction

"21. On December 21, 2010, 48 days after the agents seized Plaintiff's electronic devices, the devices remained in the government's custody. On that date, Plaintiff, through counsel, sent a letter by facsimile to DHS, CBP, and ICE requesting that his electronic devices be returned to him immediately. He also requested that he be provided with documentation of the chain of custody of any copies made of the information contained on his devices and documentation of their destruction." (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

22 Senator Leahy remarks that WikiLeaks was a cyber attack when reintroducing the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act.

Senator Leahy's bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Subcommittee, Senate Judiciary Committee, Nutrition and Food Assistance, Sustainable and Organic Agriculture, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related, Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights Subcommittee, Homeland Security Subcommittee, Defense Subcommittee, Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee, Rural Revitalization, Conservation, Forestry, and Credit Subcommittee, Production, Income Protection and Price Support Subcommittee

"Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, as we approach the end of another year--and the end of the 111th Congress--millions of Americans continue to face growing threats to their privacy and security because of data security breaches involving their most sensitive personal information. Last year, I reintroduced the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act--a bipartisan and comprehensive bill that will better protect Americans from the growing threats of data breaches and identity theft. I am disappointed that the Senate will adjourn for the year without considering this important privacy legislation.

This long overdue privacy bill would establish a national standard for breach notification and requirements for securing Americans' most sensitive personal data. The bill--as improved by my manager's amendment--strikes the right balance to protect privacy, promote commerce, and successfully combat identity theft. I urged the Senate to consider and pass this important privacy legislation before we adjourn for the year. Despite its bipartisan approval by the Judiciary Committee, the ranking Republican is objecting and refusing to allow the Senate to proceed.

When I first introduced this bill 6 years ago, I had high hopes of bringing urgently needed data privacy reforms to the American people. I have worked closely with both Republican and Democratic Senators since to enact this important privacy legislation. Although the Judiciary Committee favorably reported this bill three times--in 2005, 2007, and yet again in 2009--it remains stalled on the Senate Calendar. While the Senate has waited to act, the dangers to our privacy, economic prosperity, and national security posed by data breaches have not gone away.

The recently reported cyber attacks in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures are fresh reminders of the urgent need to have national standards to protect the privacy of America's digital information. In June, the insurance company WellPoint, Inc., announced that 470,000 individuals who used the company's Web site to apply for insurance may have unwittingly exposed their Social Security numbers and other sensitive data to the public. Just last month, the University of Hawaii suffered a major data breach involving sensitive student data, including Social Security numbers, dates of birth, names, and grades. And a recent data breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs resulted in the unauthorized release of the Social Security numbers and other personal information of at least 180 of our veterans. These troubling data breaches are painful reminders of the need to enact comprehensive Federal data privacy legislation this year.

This bill offers meaningful solutions to the vexing problem of data security breaches. It requires that data brokers let consumers know what sensitive personal information they have about them and to allow individuals to correct inaccurate information. The bill also requires that companies that have databases with sensitive personal information on Americans establish and implement data privacy and security programs.

In addition, the bill requires notice when sensitive personal information has been compromised. The bill provides for tough criminal penalties for anyone who would intentionally and willfully conceal the fact that a data breach has occurred when the breach causes economic damage to consumers. Finally, the bill addresses the important issue of the government's use of personal data.

I am pleased that the Obama administration has recently issued two privacy reports that make recommendations to improve data privacy that are consistent with the approach adopted in my bill.

I drafted this bill after long and thoughtful consultation with many of the stakeholders on this issue, including the privacy, consumer protection, and business communities. I have also worked closely with other Senators, including Senators FeinsteinHatchFeingoldSpecter, and Schumer.

This is a comprehensive bill that not only deals with the need to provide Americans with notice when they have been victims of a data breach but that also deals with the underlying problem of lax security to help prevent data breaches from occurring in the first place. The House of Representatives has passed comprehensive data privacy legislation. The Senate should also pass comprehensive data privacy legislation and should have done so this Congress.

There has been ample time to resolve any concerns, but still there are those who are refusing to allow the Senate to act. We cannot afford to continue to wait to address this important privacy issue. The American people are suffering the consequences of that inaction." (Source: Congressional Record)

21 Department of Defense | Department of Defense reprints August 18, 2010 press release accusing WikiLeaks of not contacting them, in a press release called, "Defense.gov names its top ten press releases of 2010." [INSERT SOURCE OF WIKILEAKS CONTACTING AMERICAN EMBASSY AND BEING IGNORED]

Original August 18, 2010 press release

Press Release

"WASHINGTON, Dec. 21, 2010 – In 2010, Defense.gov published nearly 3,000 stories ranging from Tricare health care benefits to the status of gays serving openly in the military to the Defense Department budget. The top 10 stories most viewed on Defense.gov may surprise you.

The top 10 stories most viewed on Defense.gov this year are:

...

8. The Defense.gov story, “Wikileaks Has Yet to Contact ‘Competent Authorities,’” posted Aug. 18, provides an update on the website that published tens of thousands of classified documents."

21 Defense raises the conditions of PFC Bradley Manning's confinement conditions on multiple occasions with the Quantico confinement facility and the Army Staff Judge Advocate's (SJA) Office assigned to handle this case.

"Our efforts, unfortunately, have not resulted any in positive results. To its credit, the SJA office is attempting to correct this situation. However, given the fact that Quantico is a Marine Corps facility, it has similarly had no success." (Source: David Coombs, Article 13 and PFC Bradley Manning )

18 Bank of America says it will join MasterCard and PayPal in halting the processing of payments intended for WikiLeaks.

"Then, on Dec. 18, Bank of America may have antagonized Mr. Assange further when it said it would join other companies like MasterCard and PayPal in halting the processing of payments intended for WikiLeaks, citing the possibility the organization’s activities might be illegal." (Source: New York Times, Facing Threat From WikiLeaks, Bank Plays Defense)

17 Bank of America entities have agreed to pay a total of $137.3 million in restitution to federal and state agencies for its participation in a conspiracy to rig bids in the municipal bond derivatives market and as a condition of its admission into the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program.

(Source: Department of Justice Press Release)

WASHINGTON – Bank of America entities have agreed to pay a total of $137.3 million in restitution to federal and state agencies for its participation in a conspiracy to rig bids in the municipal bond derivatives market and as a condition of its admission into the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program, the Department of Justice announced today.

Bank of America entered into agreements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), and 20 State Attorneys General. The global resolution with these federal and state entities provides for payment of restitution to the IRS and to municipalities harmed by Bank of America’s anticompetitive conduct in the municipal bond derivatives market. In a related matter, Bank of America entered into a written agreement with the Federal Reserve Board to address certain remedial measures.

According to agreements announced today, Bank of America employees engaged in illegal conduct, including bid rigging and other deceptive practices, in connection with the marketing and sale of tax-exempt municipal bond derivatives contracts.

Bank of America was the first and only entity to come forward and report its wrongdoing to the Department of Justice before the department opened its investigation into anticompetitive conduct in the municipal bond derivatives industry. The department’s ongoing investigation has resulted in charges against seven executives and one corporate entity and guilty pleas by eight executives for antitrust and related federal crimes. The investigation remains active and ongoing.

"The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program is essential to our criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws," said Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. "Bank of America’s disclosure of wrongdoing and cooperation has led to an aggressive, ongoing investigation by the Department of Justice into anticompetitive activity in the municipal bond derivatives industry. The bank’s participation in the leniency program has also resulted in today’s resolution to address the harm caused by its wrongdoing. The Division’s investigation of this matter continues and the prosecution of anticompetitive conduct in the financial markets remains our highest priority."

As a condition of its admission into the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program, Bank of America was required to be the first entity to self report the anticompetitive conduct, acknowledge its wrongdoing, provide ongoing cooperation in the investigation and make full restitution to the victims of the conspiracy. Bank of America continues to provide significant cooperation to the federal and state enforcement officials in their ongoing parallel investigations in the municipal bond derivatives industry.

The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program is designed to deter and detect anticompetitive behavior. Through the Leniency Program, a corporation can avoid criminal conviction and fines, and individuals can avoid criminal conviction, prison terms and fines, if the corporation or individual is the first to report participation in a criminal antitrust violation and if other specified requirements of the program are met. The requirements of the program include self-reporting, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, full cooperation with the department’s investigation into the conduct, and payment of restitution to victims. The requirements provide the division with critical information to conduct investigations and enforce the criminal antitrust laws.

With the agreements announced today, Bank of America has met its obligation, under the Leniency Program, to pay full restitution to the IRS and municipalities based on anticompetitive conduct identified by these federal and state agencies. The bank’s agreements with the SEC, IRS, OCC and State Attorneys General represent the substantial benefits for victims that can result from the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program, and reflect Bank of America’s commitment to address the harm caused by the conduct it discovered.

As a result of its voluntary disclosure of its anticompetitive conduct and its ongoing cooperation, Bank of America will not be required to pay penalties as a part of the agreements reached today. Upon successful completion of cooperation and other requirements of the Leniency Program, Bank of America and its current employees who have cooperated with the ongoing investigation will not be prosecuted by the Antitrust Division for the reported conduct. The Antitrust Division’s investigation regarding other entities and individuals continues.

More information about the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Corporate Leniency Program is available at: www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.htm.

The Antitrust Division and other agencies involved in this matter are part of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information on the task force, visit www.StopFraud.gov.

17 Quantico brig psychiatrist, Captain Hocter, recommends ending Manning POI watch.

"The only exception to this was on December 10, 2010 when it was recommended that PFC Manning remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, the forensic psychiatrist [CAPT. HOCTER] once again recommended that PFC Manning be removed from POI watch. Despite these consistent recommendations, PFC Manning has remained on POI watch and in MAX custody."  (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody."  (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "xxviii) 17 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 17 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.'” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

17 In a Senate executive session on the START treaty, former Senator Dodd, and current CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America, says WikiLeaks represents the world becoming less stable and secure.

Former Senator Chris Dodds bio on lilsis.org

Now CEO and Chairman of the MPAA

Chris Dodd was a member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee and sub Security and International Trade and Finance Subcommittee, Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, European Affairs Subcommittee, Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Employment and Workplace Safety Subcommittee, Joint Committee on the Library, Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs , Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Securities, Insurance and Investment Subcommittee, Economic Policy Subcommittee, Financial Institutions Subcommittee, Children and Families Subcommittee, Housing, Transportation and Community Development Subcommittee

"Madam President, this treaty will ensure that we continue to build upon our close relationship with Russia as well--not an insignificant issue--in preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear weapons and creating a more stable and secure world at a time when we would all acknowledge it is becoming less and less so, as we have all painfully seen, even in things like the most recent WikiLeaks situation that occurred on cable traffic." (Source: Senator Dodd, Congressional Record)

16 White House | At a press conference with White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, and General Cartwright, Gibbs is asked for comment on Julian Assange being granted bail in London.

Q Any reaction from any of you to Julian Assange being granted bail in England?

MR. GIBBS: I’m not going to let anybody let me take that one. (Laughter.) Bill.

(Source: White House)

16 Assange wins appeal to be released from prison confinement, and is placed under house arrest while waiting a February hearing.

" 16 December 2010 Assange wins an appeal to be released from confinement while waiting for the February hearing. But the conditions imposed are unusually restrictive: Assange must observe a 10:00 p.m. curfew, report to a local police station every day and constantly wear an electronic ankle bracelet" (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

16 Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks, 10 a.m., 2141 Rayburn. 

Official Hearing Record

Excerpts:

"December 16, hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks, 9:30 a.m., 2141 Rayburn." (Source: Congressional Record)

"Committee on the Judiciary: Held a hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks. Testimony was heard from public witnesses." (Source: Congressional Record)

"Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks, 10 a.m., 2141 Rayburn." (Source: Congressional Record)

16 Cully Stimson, Former Asst. Deputy Secretary of Defense on Detainee Affairs and former Deputy Asst Homeland Security, Paul Rosenzweig discusses legal prosecution of Manning and Assange, and 'people associated with WikiLeaks' with a focus on "sources and methods" for Manning, and "aiding and abetting the enemy". He mentions need for a "thorough penetrating exhaustive investigation" of any and all statutes violated. Also says, 'less WikiLeaks looks like a media organization, less likely 1rst Amendment viable defense". 'US cannot fight wars in manner and method, without broad access to info.'

15 Rep Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee submits a resolution directing the Secretary of State to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of all classified Dept of State documents assessed to have been unlawfully disclosed to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Rep Ilena Ros-Lehtinen bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Foreign Affairs Committee 

"Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Directing the Secretary of State to transmit to the House of Representatives copies of all classified Department of State documents assessed by the Department to have been unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and public press outlets.

    Resolved, That the Secretary of State is directed to transmit to the House of Representatives, not later than 7 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution, copies of all classified Department of State documents assessed by the Department as of the date of the adoption of this resolution to have been unlawfully disclosed and provided to WikiLeaks and select public press outlets, as referenced in the November 27, 2010, letter by the Department of State Legal Adviser, Harold Hongju Koh, to Ms. Jennifer Robinson, attorney for Mr. Julian Assange, which notes the approximately 250,000 documents that have been provided to select press outlets by WikiLeaks."

15 Salon publishes Glenn Greewald's report about the mistreatment and torture of Bradley Manning at Quantico.

Bradley Manning, the 22-year-old U.S. Army Private accused of leaking classified documents to WikiLeaks, has never been convicted of that crime, nor of any other crime. Despite that, he has been detained at the U.S. Marine brig in Quantico, Virginia for five months — and for two months before that in a military jail in Kuwait — under conditions that constitute cruel and inhumane treatment and, by the standards of many nations, even torture. Interviews with several people directly familiar with the conditions of Manning’s detention, ultimately including a Quantico brig official (Lt. Brian Villiard) who confirmed much of what they conveyed, establishes that the accused leaker is subjected to detention conditions likely to create long-term psychological injuries.

...

From the beginning of his detention, Manning has been held in intensive solitary confinement. For 23 out of 24 hours every day — for seven straight months and counting — he sits completely alone in his cell. Even inside his cell, his activities are heavily restricted; he’s barred even from exercising and is under constant surveillance to enforce those restrictions. For reasons that appear completely punitive, he’s being denied many of the most basic attributes of civilized imprisonment, including even a pillow or sheets for his bed (he is not and never has been on suicide watch). For the one hour per day when he is freed from this isolation, he is barred from accessing any news or current events programs. Lt. Villiard protested that the conditions are not “like jail movies where someone gets thrown into the hole,” but confirmed that he is in solitary confinement, entirely alone in his cell except for the one hour per day he is taken out.

...

In sum, Manning has been subjected for many months without pause to inhumane, personality-erasing, soul-destroying, insanity-inducing conditions of isolation similar to those perfected at America’s Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado: all without so much as having been convicted of anything. And as is true of many prisoners subjected to warped treatment of this sort, the brig’s medical personnel now administer regular doses of anti-depressants to Manning to prevent his brain from snapping from the effects of this isolation.

UPDATE: I was contacted by Lt. Villiard, who claims there is one factual inaccuracy in what I wrote: specifically, he claims that Manning is not restricted from accessing news or current events during the prescribed time he is permitted to watch television. That is squarely inconsistent with reports from those with first-hand knowledge of Manning’s detention, but it’s a fairly minor dispute in the scheme of things.

(Source: Glenn Greenwald, Salon)

14 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xxvii) 14 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 10 December 2010 and recommended to remain on POI. (The Brig noted that this was the first time since 27 August 2010 that Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended PFC Manning remain on POI. His main criteria was that it seemed PFC Manning was not doing well). SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

14 Former Senator Kit Bond, member of the Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee, and Senate Appropriations Committee remarks that WikiLeaks scandal "shown us what damage the Internet can do to our diplomatic efforts as well as the safety of those in dangerous places with whom we have worked."

Former Senator Kit Bond bio on lilsis.org

Committee memberships:

Senate Appropriations Committee  (was ranking member), Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related, was VC of Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee (part of the House Appropriations Committee), and Defense Subcommittee (a part of the House Appropriations Committee), Senate Appropriations Committee and sub Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee and sub State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Subcommittee and sub Energy and Water Development Subcommittee and sub Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration..., Senate Environment and Public Works Committee

"As a final thought on intelligence, however, the recent WikiLeaks scandal has shown us what damage the Internet can do to our diplomatic efforts as well as the safety of those in dangerous places with whom we have worked. The even greater threat we see is the continuing cyber attack on military intelligence and private sector critical infrastructure. With my colleague from Utah, Orrin Hatch, we have introduced a cyber security bill which will establish a cyber defense alliance to allow private sector entities to cooperate with government agencies to protect our critical financial systems, our utilities and, most of all, our communications systems from attack. The battle is underway, and we will need every effort to stay ahead of the developing attacks as well as helping the private sector protect their information." (Source: Congressional Record)

14 Julian Assange is granted bail on condition he provides a security of £200,000 to the court, with a further £40,000 guaranteed in two sureties of £20,000 each. He will remain in prison till December 16, pending an appeal against the bail decision lodged by Swedish prosecutors and the raising of bail, half of which his lawyer, Mark Stephens said has been raised.

"But he will remain in prison pending an appeal against the bail decision lodged by Swedish prosecutors.

...

Mr Assange was granted bail on condition he provides a security of £200,000 to the court, with a further £40,000 guaranteed in two sureties of £20,000 each.

Mr Stephens said almost half the bail money had been raised and he was confident they would have all the cash before the appeal hearing." (Source: BBC)

14 US Magistrate Judge, Theresa Buchanan, of the Eastern District of Virginia approves the Department of Justice application under Title 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) for Twitter, Inc. to hand over records of Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, Jacob Appelbaum, and Rop Gonggrijp for the time period November 1, 2009 to the present. The order is then faxed the same day to Twitter, Inc. by US Assistant Attorney said to lead the WikiLeaks Grand Jury, Tracy McCormick.

"According to people familiar with the grand jury’s proceedings, the Department of Justice prosecutor in charge of the case is Tracy McCormick of the Eastern District of Virginia, whose background is in prosecuting child molester cases.  This likely due to the fact that such cases usually involve computer forensics, and gives an indication that the government’s case against Manning will likely come down to what they can find on Manning’s hard drive." (Source: Fire Dog Lake)

Copy of the Order (Source: web-archive.org)

"Twitter has declined to comment on the original subpoena order and the company’s fight to get it unsealed. What we do know is that it was faxed to Twitter on December 14. On January 5, the same magistrate who signed the first order, signed a new one, ordering the first to be unsealed. And on January 7, Twitter sent notifications to at least several of the holders of the accounts listed on the subpoena order, telling them the company would respond to the request in 10 days, unless “we receive notice from you that a motion to quash the legal process has been filed or that this matter has been otherwise resolved.”

It’s reasonable to assume that Macgillivray is the person who either led or played a significant role in the thinking that resulted in the decision to challenge the secrecy aspect of the order." (Source: Fast Company)

"What hasn’t been reported is that the Subpoena served on Twitter — which is actually an Order from a federal court that the DOJ requested — seeks the same information for numerous other individuals currently or formerly associated with WikiLeaks, including Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Julian Assange.  It also seeks the same information for Bradley Manning and for WikiLeaks’ Twitter account." (Source: Glen Greenwald)

"The Order was signed by a federal Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Virginia, Theresa Buchanan, and served on Twitter by the DOJ division for that district. " (Source: Glen Greenwald)

Images from archived PDF of Secret Order (Source: web-archive.org):

 

 

Fax Cover Sheet

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia
Justice W. Williams United States Attorney's Building
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-5794
(703) 299-3700

Date: 12/14/10
To: Twitter Attn: Trust & Safety
Phone:
To Fax No: (415) 222-9958
Sender: Vivian Ha, Assistant to Tracy McCormick
Sender's Phone No: (703) 299 - 3859
Sender's Fax No: (703) 299 - 3981
Number of Pages: 4 *Not Including Cover Page*

Level of Transmission:

Limited Official Use (LOU)

 

United States District Court For the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 2703(d)

MISC No. 10GJ3793
Filed Under Seal

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court pursuant to an application under Title 18,. United States Code, Section 2703, which application requests the issuance of an order under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d) directing Twitter, Inc., an electronic communications service provider and/or a remote computing service, located in San Francisco, California, to disclose certain records and other information, as set forth in Attachment A to this Order, the Court finds that the applicant has offered specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records or ether information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

IT APPEARING that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation, and that prior notice of this Order to any person of this investigation or this application and Order entered in connection therewith would seriously jeopardize the investigation;

IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d) that Twitter,Inc. will, within three days of the date of this Order, turn over to the United States the records and other information as set forth in Attachment A to this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall provide the United States Attorney's office with three (3) certified copied of this application and Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the application and this Order are sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court, and that Twitter shall not disclose the existence of the application or this Order, or the existence of the investigation, to the listed subscriber or to any other person, unless and until authorized to do so by the Court.

[Signed By] Tracy Buchanan
United States Magistrate Judge
12/14/10

[SIGNED BY INDECIPHERABLE]
Deputy Clerk

 

Attachment A

You are to provide the following information, if available, preferably as data files on CD-ROM, electronic media, or email ([email protected]) or otherwise by facsimile to 703-299-3981:

A. The following customers or subscriber account information for each account registered to or associated with WikiLeaks; rop_g; ioerror; brigittaj; Julian Assange; Bradley Manning; Rop Gongrijp [sic]; Birgitta Jonsdottir for the time period November 1, 2009 to present:

1. subscriber names, under names, screen names, or other identities;
2. mailing addresses, residential addresses, business addresses, e-mail addresses, and other contact information;
3. connection records, or records of session times and durations;
4. length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
5. telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporary assigned network address; and
6. means and sources of payment for such (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records.B. All records and other information relating to the account(s) and time period in Part A, including:

1. records of user activity for any connection made to and from the Account, including the date, time, length, and method of connections, data transfer volume, user name, and source and destination Internet Protocol address(es);


2. non-content information associated with the content of any communication or file stored by or for the account(s); such as the source and destination email addresses and IP addresses.

3. correspondence and notes of records related to the account(s).

14 Department of Defense press release announces that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Mike Mullen will meet with Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter, and other U.S. and Pakistani leaders. "The two military leaders will discuss the continuing problem of militants along the Afghan-Pakistani border and the problems associated with Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, the chairman said. The stolen classified materials published on the WikiLeaks website may complicate the situation, Mullen acknowledged, but he said he is comfortable his relationship with military leaders in Pakistan can handle any awkward issues. They will discuss hard issues, and his relationship will allow that, he said."

13
-
17

Banking Blockade | London Metropolitan Police investigate DDOS attacks against Paypal, Mastercard, and Visa.

(Source: Financial Times)

12

Banking Blockade | Prof Udo Helmbrecht, executive director of ENSIA, calls for global co-operation to tackle internet security threats such as the leakage of sensitive documents and DoS attacks.

Prof. Udo Helmbrecht is the Executive Director of ENISA since the 16th of October 2009.

(Source: Financial Times)

13 Remarks by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Iraq says WikiLeaks is one of the challenges he will bring up in his discussions in Pakistan the following day, because as a reporter had asked "cooperation that has been going on, for example, with special forces because these things were talked about openly that it's going to make that backtrack."

Full speech and transcript

Excerpts:

Q: What's your goal for tomorrow in Pakistan?   

ADM. MULLEN: Well, sustain – you know, continued engagement. Certainly address – continue to address the difficult – you know, the difficult issues that we have. Also, listen to kind of get a, you know, an update certainly from them on how they see the world, specifically – I mean, see us and where we are, overall, in the overall campaign, if you will, the region. And I mean that's – it's more just the constancy of engagement than anything else and as many times as I've visited there's always something new. I mean, or an update.   

Q: Is that going to cause you problems? WikiLeaks?

ADM. MULLEN: I don't know. I don't know. You mean tomorrow?

Q: Yeah. I mean, in terms – there's been stories that some of the cooperation that has been going on, for example, with special forces because these things were talked about openly that it's going to make that backtrack?

ADM. MULLEN: I hope to have a discussion – excuse me, part of my discussion certainly will be an update on the challenges that we have and I wouldn't be surprised if WikiLeaks were in there but I have – that's part of why I go. It's one thing to have everybody talk about it publicly but I'm anxious –

(Cross talk, laughter.)

ADM. MULLEN: No, no, no.  I'm just anxious to hear from him.  I haven't talked to him since then so we'll do that.

11 White House | President Obama calls WikiLeaks 'deplorable' in a telephone calls to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Mexican President Felipe Calderon

"President Barack Obama told Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Mexican President Felipe Calderon in phone calls on Saturday that WikiLeaks' actions were "deplorable" and the leaders agreed it would not hurt ties with Washington, the White House said." (Source: Reuters)

10

Office of the Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) | Some federal agencies are asked to respond to an ONCIX "Request for Information on Classified Networks and Systems" dated December 10,2010, in support of National Security Staff tasking, according to a memo from the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), William J. Bosanko, and the Information Security Oversight Office, National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), Robert M. Bryant - within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

[Tags: Office of the Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)]

10 Quantico brig psychiatrist, Captain Hocter, recommends Manning remain on POI watch for one week. First time since, 27 Aug 2010, that Captain Hocter, recommends that Manning remain on POI.

"The only exception to this was on December 10, 2010 when it was recommended that PFC Manning remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, the forensic psychiatrist [CAPT HOCTER] once again recommended that PFC Manning be removed from POI watch. Despite these consistent recommendations, PFC Manning has remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody."  (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: " The suicide risk means that I sit in my cell for 24 hours a day. I am stripped of all clothing with the exception of my underwear. My prescription eyeglasses are taken away from me. I am forced to sit in essential blindness with the exception of the times that I am reading or given limited television privileges. During those times, my glasses are returned to me. Additionally, there is a guard sitting outside my cell watching me at all times".  (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "xxvii) 14 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 10 December 2010 and recommended to remain on POI. (The Brig noted that this was the first time since 27 August 2010 that Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended PFC Manning remain on POI. His main criteria was that it seemed PFC Manning was not doing well). SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

10 Secretary Gates en route to Andrews Air Force Base from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates remarks on WikiLeaks and Yemen and US military operations there.

Full Transcript

Q:  Mr. Secretary, on Yemen, is there anything that you are asking some of the countries in the region to do?  Is it funding?  Is it training?  And what more can -- specifically can the U.S. do there other than just spend more money?

                SEC. GATES:  Well, I think that as in -- and I kind of hinted at this at the embassy yesterday in Kabul, the key is getting in there before there’s a crisis with economic assistance, with building partnership capacity.  And I think that both the UAE and Oman are engaged in these activities, these development projects.  Other countries are as well.  The United States has some efforts ongoing in this respect, particularly in building partnership capacity.  So I think it’s that kind of thing.  And I actually think that there are a number of countries that are trying to help. 

MR. GEOFF MORRELL (Pentagon Press Secretary):  We have time for one or two more.

                Q:  WikiLeaks -- now that WikiLeaks has come out with -- has made public some of the U.S. military action there, can you be more open and do you feel freer rein to do more of that now that it’s out in the open?

                SEC. GATES:  Well, I never talk about military operations.  I think we can be very open about the economic assistance and development work that we’re doing there.

                 (Cross talk.)

                MR. MORRELL:  The last two.

                Q:  There was this Taliban impostor incident and then occasionally we’ve heard --

                SEC. GATES:  Sorry?

                Q:  There was this whole incident with the Taliban impostor came to -- and also there’s so much speculation and discussion -- sorry -- about reconciliation and the state of it.  Is there a danger that the U.S. or the Afghan government will look too eager for peace talks or some kind of reconciliation talks?  And second of all, does that impostor incident suggest a problem generally that’s been pointed out before that our intelligence picture is flawed, that we don’t really understand what we need to understand about Afghanistan?

                SEC. GATES:  Well, I think we have a pretty good idea.  It’s not perfect by any means.  I actually think that being open about reconciliation is different than looking eager.  And as long as we have agreed criteria for what reconciliation means and stick to those criteria, I’m not worried about looking too eager.

9 Louis B Susman, US Ambassador to the UK and former Vice Chairman of Citigroup Corp. & Investment Banking, also former member of the Citigroup International Advisory Board writes an article in the Guardian says WikiLeaks "put innocent lives at risk and damaged US national security."

Louis B Susman's bio on lilsis.org

Business Positions: Embassy of the United States: London, UK, Citigroup Vice Chairman

"...The deplorable WikiLeaks disclosures put innocent lives at risk and damage US national security interests. And to what purpose?

WikiLeaks styles itself a whistleblowing organization. This is not whistleblowing. There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people. There is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.

But it is central to diplomacy, and this breach in confidentiality – even if it did not come from the state department – shows a disregard for the wellbeing of countless individuals.

Who are these individuals? They are human rights activists, journalists, faith leaders and civil society representatives. They are politicians, government officials, candidates for office, community leaders and volunteers. They are academics, think tank representatives, students. They are business leaders, inventors, scientists. In fact they are people from every walk of life around the world who engage with US diplomats in good faith every day.

Our diplomats use these encounters to observe and gauge developments abroad, and present and defend the US view, all the while looking for common ground on difficult issues. Their frank assessments of people, policies and action – the raw material of diplomacy – inform the policies decided by the president and the secretary of state. Nothing, even in an age of Wikipedia and global news, can replace informed observers reporting from the field.

WikiLeaks seems indifferent to the damage it has caused to these relationships. We cannot be so sanguine. There is too much work that needs to be done for us to be sidetracked. Reinvigorating America's relationships around the world has been a top priority of president Obama and secretary Clinton. That will not change. We will not alter our commitment to working with our friends and allies on building a more peaceful and prosperous world.

A world in which diplomats cannot operate with discretion and trust is a more dangerous world for all of us. We are improving our systems to protect the confidential information that is essential to US diplomacy. We will hold accountable those who are responsible for the compromise that led to these disclosures.

And as US diplomats work on the many pressing issues before us, central to those efforts will be our uniquely productive, close and strong relationship with the UK. I appreciate the support given us by prime minister Cameron, his government, the diplomatic community and others. The prime minister says these reckless disclosures have not changed the "fundamentals" of the special relationship. I couldn't agree more." (Source: The Guardian)

9 Representative Ron Paul remarks in the Congressional Record that on WikiLeaks "Lying is not patriotic."

"Mr. Speaker, WikiLeaks' release of classified information has generated a lot of attention worldwide in the past few weeks. The hysterical reaction makes one wonder if this is not an example of killing the messenger for the bad news.

Despite what is claimed, information so far released, though classified, has caused no known harm to any individual but it has caused plenty of embarrassment to our government. Losing a grip on our empire is not welcomed by the neoconservatives in charge.

There is now more information confirming that Saudi Arabia is a principal supporter and financier of al Qaeda, and this should set off alarm bills since we guarantee its sharia-run government. This emphasizes even more the fact that no al Qaeda existed in Iraq before 9/11, and yet we went to war against Iraq based on the lie that it did.

It has been discharged by self-proclaimed experts that Julian Assange, the Internet publisher of this information, has committed a heinous crime, deserving prosecution for treason, and execution or even assassination.

But should we not at least ask how the U.S. Government can charge an Australian citizen with treason for publishing U.S. secret information that he did not steal? And if WikiLeaks is to be prosecuted for publishing classified documents, why shouldn't the Washington Post, the New York Times, and others that have also published these documents be prosecuted? Actually, some in Congress are threatening this as well.

The New York Times, as a result of a Supreme Court ruling, was not found guilty in 1971 for the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Daniel Ellsberg never served a day in prison for his role in obtaining these secret documents.

The Pentagon Papers were also inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator Mike Gravel with no charges being made of breaking any national security laws. Yet the release of this classified information was considered illegal by many, and those who lied us into the Vietnam War and argued for its prolongation were outraged. But the truth gained from the Pentagon Papers revealed that lies were told about the Gulf of Tonkin attack, which perpetuated a sad and tragic episode in our history.

 Just as with the Vietnam War, the Iraq war was based on lies. We were never threatened by weapons of mass destruction or al Qaeda in Iraq, though the attack on Iraq was based on this false information.

Any information that challenges the official propaganda for the war in the Middle East is unwelcome by the administration and supporters of these unnecessary wars.

Few are interested in understanding the relationship of our foreign policy and our presence in the Middle East to the threat of terrorism. Revealing the real nature and goal of our presence in so many Muslim countries is a threat to our empire, and any revelation of this truth is highly resented by those in charge.

Questions to consider:

No. 1, do the American people deserve to know the truth regarding the ongoing war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen?

[Page: H8279]  GPO's PDF

No. 2, could a larger question be how could an Army private gain access to so much secret information?

No. 3, why is the hostility mostly directed at Assange, the publisher, and not our government's failure to protect classified information?

No. 4, are we getting our money's worth from the $80 billion per year we spend on intelligence gathering?

No. 5, which has resulted in the greatest number of deaths: Lying us into war or WikiLeaks' revelations or the release of the Pentagon Papers?

If Assange can be convicted of a crime for publishing information that he did not steal, what does this say about the future of the First Amendment and the independence of the Internet?

No. 7, could it be that the real reason for the near universal attacks on WikiLeaks is more about secretly maintaining a seriously flawed foreign policy of empire than it is about national security?

No. 8, is there not a huge difference between releasing secret information to help the enemy in a time of declared war, which is treason, and the releasing of information to expose our government lies that promote secret wars, death, and corruption.

No. 9, was it not once considered patriotic to stand up to our government when it's wrong?

Thomas Jefferson had it right when he advised, ``Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.'" (Source: Congressional Record)

9 Department of Defense press release on deputy secretary of defense for cyber and space policy says, "WikiLeaks posting of stolen classified information has highlighted the tension between the strategy of 'share to win' and the necessity to enforce “need to know.”

Press Release

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9, 2010 – Commanders in the field understand the advantage that comes from sharing intelligence and information and they do not want to give up that capability, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber and space policy said in an interview here today.

Robert J. Butler said sharing information within the military, with coalition partners and even with outside agencies will continue, but there will be more controls placed on the information.

The WikiLeaks posting of stolen classified information has highlighted the tension between the strategy of “share to win” and the necessity to enforce “need to know.”

Share to win refers to the idea of getting information and intelligence out to the personnel who need it.

“Commanders in the field recognize … it’s really about coalition war-fighting, and it’s about sharing information with partners,” Butler said. This is true whether the military is involved in humanitarian operations or warfighting.

Sharing information can range from the intelligence and information sharing the United States has with traditional military allies to non-governmental agencies.

“They are part of the fight, they are part of the recipe for success,” Butler said.

Need to know is the shorthand for how the department thinks about security, Butler said. “It’s about how information is shared, who has the information, for what purposes and for what period of time,” he said.

Butler does not see share to win and need to know as mutually exclusive. “We need to share information to win and we also have to be conscious of the need to know,” he said.

Afghanistan is an example of both concepts. There are 48 countries in the coalition under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. The United States has the largest number of troops in the country and the largest intelligence/information-sharing network. “We share information at different levels, based on the need,” Butler said.

Information sharing networks range from local to national in Afghanistan, he said. All are governed by policies that seek to balance share to win with need to know.

“Based on our agreements with countries and their mechanisms for how they control information, we look for ways we can bridge accountability within their workforce and commanders with what we’re doing,” Butler said. “In Afghanistan, where we have a joint task force and we’re working on common objectives, it’s clear what information needs are. Those needs are transmitted down to subordinate units and those will include coalition partners with information requirements that need to be satisfied.

“We need to link the effects we want to achieve with an information-sharing approach,” he added.

The future will be more of the same, Butler said. “What I see happening is an absolute recognition that we have to share information, and at the same time recognizing an increasing challenge from the cyber threat,” he said.

DOD is taking near-term steps to address that threat. Some of those steps include examining the content on the networks and examining the tactics, techniques and procedures used. “A broader and longer-term perspective is an education program –- one that helps them understand what classification means, how information is classified,” he said. “Beyond the classification scheme, who has access to information?”

Butler also spoke about role-based access.

“You have this position, you have this mission, and we expect your access to stay open through this time,” he said. “There are re-visit decision points and there is accountability up the chain [of command].

“There are also ways to look for anomalies,” Butler continued, “so if something happens and we expect this individual to have access to this information and that person is looking at something else, that should set off a flag to look at the situation. There may be a perfectly valid reason for the anomaly. But it could be another WikiLeaks situation.”

DOD is closing the window against potential threats and potential adversaries, Butler said, through technical retro-fitting, and through educational and accountability programs.

“This is part and parcel of what it means to be a soldiers, sailor, airman or Marine in the field protecting yourself, your comrades and your entire operation,” he said.

9 State Department appears before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, executive, briefing on Update on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures, 1 p.m., 304-HVC.  [NEED TRANSCRIPT/VIDEO] [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

"However, shortly after stories about the cables first began to appear in the media, State Department officials were already privately playing down the damage, the two congressional officials said." (Source: Reuters, U.S. Official: WikiLeaks Revelations 'Embarrassing But Not Damaging')

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

"BRIEFING--WIKILEAKS UPDATE Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Met in executive session to receive a briefing on Update on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures. The Committee was briefed by departmental witnesses." (Source: Congressional Record PDF)

8 Mr. Peter King of New York (for himself, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, and Mr. Latham) introduced the Shield Act which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Peter King bio on lilsis.org

Peter King is a member of the following committees: House Homeland Security Committee; Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee; Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee; Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee; Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology Subcommittee; Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response Subcommittee; House Financial Services Committee; Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee; Housing and Community Opportunity Subcommittee; Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee; Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee

Mike Dennis Rogers bio on lilsis.org

Mike Dennis Rogers is a member of the following committees: Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee House Armed Services Committee Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Subcommittee House Agriculture Committee Conservation, Credit, Energy, and Research Subcommittee Readiness Subcommittee Strategic Forces Subcommittee Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee House Homeland Security Committee

Thomas Latham bio on lilsis.org

Thomas Latham is a member of the following committees: Legislative Branch Subcommittee Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Subcommittee Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee House Appropriations Committee

(Source: thomas.local.gov)

H. R. 6506


    To amend section 798 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain intelligence activities of the United States, and for other purposes.


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
December 8, 2010

    Mr. King of New York (for himself, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, and Mr. Latham) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary


A BILL

    To amend section 798 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain intelligence activities of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

This Act may be cited as the “Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act” or the “SHIELD Act”.

SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) In General.—Subsection (a) section 798 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting “or transnational threat” after “foreign government”;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking “or” at the end;

(3) by re-designating paragraph (4) as paragraph (6); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

“(4) concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government;

“(5) concerning the identity of a classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United States; or”.

(b) Definitions.—Subsection (b) section 798 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(b) Definitions.—In subsection (a):

“(1) CIPHER, CODE, CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM.—The terms ‘cipher’, ‘code’, and ‘cryptographic system’ include in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications.

“(2) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term ‘classified information’ means information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.

“(3) COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE.—The term ‘communication intelligence’ means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.

“(4) FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘foreign government’ includes in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States.

“(5) HUMAN INTELLIGENCE.—The term ‘human intelligence’ means all procedures and methods employed in the collection of intelligence through human sources.

“(6) INFORMANT.—The term ‘informant’ has the meaning given that term in section 606 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426).

“(7) TRANSNATIONAL THREAT.—The term ‘transnational threat’ means—

“(A) any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United States; or

“(B) any individual or group that engages in an activity referred to in subparagraph (A).

“(8) UNAUTHORIZED PERSON.—The term ‘unauthorized person’ means any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsection (a), by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence or human intelligence activities for the United States.”.


8 Frederick Hitz, University of Virginia Center for National Security Law, Senior Fellow, and former Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), on various legal issues surrounding the Wikileaks case and the prospects for the prosecution of the site's editor-in-chief, Julian Assange, by the U.S. government.

"Since 1998, Professor Hitz has also been lecturing in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. From 1967-1998, Mr Hitz served extensively in the Central Intelligence Agency, in the CIA's clandestine service, as Legislative Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence, and as Deputy Director for Europe in the Directorate of Operations. Mr. Hitz was appointed the first statutory Inspector General of CIA by President George H.W. Bush. He served in that capacity from 1990-1998 when he retired. He was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal by the Director of Central Intelligence in 1998 and received a Resolution of Commendation from the US Senate upon the fifth anniversary of his tenure as CIA Inspector General in 1995. Among the many investigations he led at the CIA was the Aldrich Ames betrayal." (Source: virginia.edu)

8 Pentagon Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and President Karzai from Kabul, Afghanistan jokes and laughter about WikiLeaks. All is well between US and Afghanistan.

Full Transcript

Excerpts:

Q:  Thank you.  Yes, President Karzai has been described in a trove of secret diplomatic American cables as erratic, problematic; and by -- and described by the American ambassador as not a reliable ally.  Are those assessments incorrect?  And how embarrassing is this for the United States?

                SECRETARY GATES:  Well, I would say that the WikiLeaks and -- leak -- revelation of all of these documents is extraordinarily embarrassing for the United States.  But at the end of the day, nations make -- and leaders make decisions based on their interests.  And I would say that America’s best partners and friends -- and I include among them President Karzai -- have responded to this, in my view, in an extraordinarily statesmanlike way.  And I’m deeply grateful.  And frankly, I think the American government will not forget this kind of statesmanlike response.

                I think I also could say, with great confidence, President Karzai and I have been meeting together privately now for four years, and I don’t think either of us would be embarrassed to have a single thing we have said to each other made public. 

                So this relationship will go on, because it’s in our interests, and we have a shared vision for this country.

...

Q     As Secretary Gates indicated, U.S. and Afghan officials have both said that the training of Afghan security forces over the past year has gone better than projected.  Does this mean that the government of Afghanistan could possibly take primary responsibility for its security before the end of 2014?

                And President Karzai, could you explain further why you chose 2014 as a transition date?  To what degree did this have any -- was this done to de-emphasize President Obama’s promise to begin withdrawing U.S. forces this July?

                SECRETARY:  Well, first of all, I would say -- I think there’s a certain misimpression that the transition to Afghan lead across the country will only take place at the end of 2014.  First of all, this is a process that has already begun.  The Afghan government and security forces already have the primary responsibility for security here in the Kabul area.  And we expect to begin that transition, as NATO said, early next spring in other areas. 

                So this will be a process that spreads nationwide over time and will lead to a drawdown over that period of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Afghans are able to take increasing lead.  It will be gradual and it will be -- it will depend on the conditions on the ground.

                But this is a process that will go on throughout this period, that’s already begun, and that will conclude at the end of 2014.  It isn’t something that happens just at the end of 2014.

                PRESIDENT KARZAI:  (In English.)  With regard to the abilities of the Afghan army and police, with regard to the training of the Afghan army, the number of soldiers that we have, the number of young officers under training and the older generation of officers, the country’s doing very, very well.

                Having said doing very, very well, we should not be misled by the facts today.  Afghanistan would continue to require much more training, especially where we absolutely need to turn our army into an institution that can stay beyond the direct engagement of the international community, that can sustain itself as an institution, that has an officers cadre that is intellectually well equipped, that is -- that has settled down as an institution, like you have in the United States or Britain or India or, for that matter, Pakistan, as well.

                Now, adding to this, of equal importance, I believe, is the equipping of the army.  Right now we are equipped with vital weapons and the other day General Petraeus showed me in our regular weekly security meetings.  I don’t know, is that a secret, or is that supposed to be -- (laughter) -- okay -- showed me --

                SECRETARY:  Not anymore.  (Laughs; laughter)

                PRESIDENT KARZAI:  Not anymore.  Not anymore.  Well, they shouldn’t share things like that with presidents, you know.  We are WikiLeaks -- we --.  (Laughter.)  That the Afghan army will be given thousands of armored vehicles and personnel-carrier vehicles.
                Of course, for us to be a fundamentally strong country with an army that can defend itself and that can be an ally with you in the United States, we would require much more:  a proper air power, proper mobility of our forces and an equipment that will be good enough to sustain our country as far as security is concerned.

                On the 2014 date, this wasn’t designed to preempt any other date.  This was talked of as being the proper date by which we would have trained ourselves and equipped ourselves; proper enough so to take on the responsibility for securing our country.

                (Cross talk.)

...

 Q:  (Through translator.)  From Bakhtar TV, my question is to Mr. Secretary.

                You have -- you said the fight will be tough ahead and the next years you’ll be fighting a tough war.  But you said -- you’ve made progress, but you said difficult days are lying ahead, and after 2014, when the war would be tough, while Afghans wouldn’t be ready by then completely, it’s believed.  Do you think that the Afghan forces would be able to reach that level of providing for its own capacity to stop any of those threats that could turn out to be a threat against the U.S.?

                And Mr. President, in the WikiLeaks it’s been said that as your chief of staff has admitted and has acknowledged receiving bags of cash from Iran, and they might have influenced even the parliament to change their subject of discussions as well.

                SECRETARY:  Well, first of all, I think that we have to understand that the future here is not just about military operations.  It’s about economic development, and it’s about political reconciliation, at the end of the day.

                We think, based on the progress that’s been made over the past year, that the Afghan security forces are making extraordinary strides.  And it’s not just in the added numbers, but it’s in the increased quality of our partners that we gain increased confidence.

                As President Karzai said, over the next several years we need to work together in terms of properly equipping the Afghan forces so they will be able to sustain themselves.  But I think -- I think the important thing -- first of all, I think we’re -- we believe that the security situation will be improved to the extent that in 2014 the Afghan security forces will be able to have the lead, as they do here in Kabul, across the entire country.

                I made reference in my prepared remarks to the "vision 2015" agreement that we’re working on.  The United States intends to continue to be a partner and ally of Afghanistan beyond 2014.  We expect the same kind of normal security relationship that we have with many countries in terms of providing training and in terms of equipping and so on.  So the United States is -- while we will draw down our security forces over the years to come, we intend to be here and be a long-term friend and ally to this country.

                PRESIDENT KARZAI:  I didn’t understand your question very well on -- (inaudible) -- contributions or cash.  After Mr. Daudzai I admitted there were other reports that -- without the cash that your office admitted.  There were other also cash assistance from Iran trying to influence the agenda -- the overall agenda in Afghanistan, including that in the parliament to raise subjects of and to -- (inaudible) -- subjects.

                So it is -- is that -- are you talking about the other money that we said we had received?  Okay.  I don’t think Mr. Daudzai, my chief of staff, has said anything like that.  This is not true.  There’s no truth in this.  Because Iran, as we said, once a year and recently twice a year, made some cash assistance.  And no extra cash was made.  If there was made any, we would certainly let you know.  But no, it was just that. 

                And on the reports or your question about their assistance to the Afghan parliament, we have no official confirmation of such reports, I believe.  And we treat them as rumors, and there is nothing -- no truth about whatever they have done to the president’s office. 


8 Manning Defense Files for Discovery Request. We know that the discovery motion included a request for that results of any investigation or review concerning the alleged leaks in this case by Mr. Russell Travers, National Security Staff s Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8]. Defense also made a discovery request for all documentation from Quantico pertaining to PFC Manning.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

See also Def. Motion to Compel Discovery, dated 10 May 2012:

Interagency Committee Review. The results of any investigation or review concerning the alleged leaks in this case by Mr. Russell Travers, National Security Staff s Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy. Mr. Travers was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this case. See Defense Discovery Request Dated 8 December 2010 and 13 October 2011 within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8]; (Source: Defense Discovery Request No. 2 of May 10 2012)

We also know that:

In the fall of 2010, the Defense raised the issue of unlawful pretrial punishment with the Government. On 8 December 2010, the Defense made a discovery request for all documentation from Quantico pertaining to PFC Manning. (Source: David Coombs, Defense Motion for Continuance, July 27, 2012)

9

Banking Blockade | Dutch police arrests a 16-year-old boy for online DDOS on MasterCard and PayPal

Dutch public prosecutor said in a statement that its national high-tech crime team in the Hague had remanded a boy in custody, after it discovered that some of the attacks had originated in the Netherlands. The individual, who prosecutors said had confessed to denial-of-service attacks on the payment processors, will appear in court on Friday. The Dutch authorities said that it had confiscated computer equipment and that they were continuing investigating the larger group of hackers they suspected were behind the attacks.

(Source: Financial Times)

9

Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security | Department of Justice, US Attorney General, Eric Holder; Secretary Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano; and their European counterparts Principal Vice President European Union Viviane Reding and Minister European Union Council for Home Affairs, Annemie Turtleboom; Justice Minister European Union Council, Steefan de Clerck; Cecilia Malmstrom Commissioner EU responds re Sweden; and Minister Hungary, Public Administration, Tiborspeak Navracsics meet to discuss counterterrorism, cybercrime, following the EU-US Summit in Lisbon two weeks prior.

Eric Holder says, "We had, I think, informal conversations about the WikiLeaks matter," and "I think that the release of this information has put at risk American National Security, and whatever is to come I think we will not in any way...will be consistent with the concerns that I have expressed"

Cecilia Malmstrom EU Commissioner says, "The Swedish Judicial Apparatus is totally independent and doesn't take any order from my...Swedish politicians or Americans authorities.

Janet Napolitano, Secretary Department of Homeland Security says, "Our discussions with the EU today were to follow up the the agreement made by our leaders in Lisbon two weeks ago: to formulate a US EU Cyber Working Group and to really focus on issues about intrusions into critical infrastructure, into financial markets and into other areas that are cyber dependent. So, that Working Group has already begun, and I think we will see some important measure that will come out of that that will be between the United States and the EU."

BBC reports that the Obama administration contacted Paypal.

Full Video

Video 1

Transcript:

Questioner

You mentioned that cyber security was discussed. On the subject of WikiLeaks what discussions did you have, and specifically the Attorney General, what type of pressure have you applied on companies such as Mastercard and Paypal in terms of trying to suspend accounts?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

I am not going to talk about the ongoing investigation that I have described I guess over the course of the last week or so, other than to say again that we have an active ongoing serious investigation of that matter. We had, I think, informal conversations about the WikiLeaks matter. The concern that it has raised in the minds of all of us. And, the hope here in the United States is that the investigation that we are conducting will allow us to hold accountable the people responsible for that unwarranted disclosure of information that has put at risk the safety of the American people and people who work on behalf of the United States.

Questioner

[MISSED] any of these companies? Paypal was saying yesterday that it had received letters from the administration?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

I am not going to comment on any of the investigative steps that we have taken.

Questioner

Related to that, as part of this Operation Payback that some are calling a cyberwar with computer intrusions into Paypal, attacks against Amazon.com and other sites, have you directed the FBI to look at these incidents and is there any investigation into...?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

We are aware of the incidents that you have described and we are simply say that we are looking into it.

Questioner

Do you believe that you have identified all the people who are responsible for giving WikiLeaks the latest stash of documents?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

The investigation is ongoing.

Video 2

Transcript:

Questioner

Mr. Attorney General did you and your colleagues in your meetings today reach any agreement about uniform approach on WikiLeaks?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

I was going to say that we didn't talk about WikiLeaks in any formal way.

Video 3

Transcript:

Questioner

Do you have...have certain countries been the focal point of the WikiLeaks research or investigation...like Iceland...with connections that Iceland has to WikiLeaks?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

As I indicated before I really don't want to go into any specifics of the ongoing investigation.

Questioner

Address maybe the...someone had suggested maybe the response by those who support WikiLeaks to attack Amazon and other companies...is basically a cyberwar...between the two sides...that is proliferating across boundaries and what you all are doing at DHS, since cyber issues are in your purview, to address that or mitigate that?

Janet Napolitano, Secretary Department of Homeland Security

I think the Attorney General has always said that he doesn't want to comment on any ongoing investigations or activities with respect to WikiLeaks. All I will say is with respect to the protection of the private sector we are working or do work very closely with him on variety of matters, involving cyber, cyberattacks, cyber intrusions and the like. I think your question raises the importance of cyber. That is why, our discussions with the EU today were to follow up the the agreement made by our leaders in Lisbon two weeks ago: to formulate a US EU Cyber Working Group and to really focus on issues about intrusions into critical infrastructure, into financial markets and into other areas that are cyber dependent. So, that Working Group has already begun, and I think we will see some important measure that will come out of that that will be between the United States and the EU.

Questioner

Reports are suggesting that the next release of documents from WikiLeaks could be confidential threat assessments of detainees at Guantanamo. Are you concerned that sources and methods information may come out as a result of that and also are you concerned there could be some additional questions from the Hill and elsewhere regarding whether some detainees who have been release have gone back into the battlefield and become recidivists?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

I am concerned about, I think we are all concerned about certainly the United States Government concerned about the nature of the release, as I have indicated...I think that the release of this information has put at risk American National Security, and whatever is to come I think we will not in any way...will be consistent with the concerns that I have expressed.

Video 4

Transcript:

Questioner

...aware that US authorities are trying to get their hands on Julian Assange and your Government is trying to get its Government on Julian Assange?

Cecilia Malmstrom EU Commissioner

Ah, the Swedish Judicial Apparatus is totally independent and doesn't take any order from my...Swedish politicians or Americans authorities. And the crimes he is accused of, if he is being sent to Sweden will be processed accordingly. So, I have absolutely no comments to that. I am not part of the Swedish Government, I am commissioner of the European Union based in Belgium.

Department of Homeland Security Press Release

Readout of Secretary Napolitano's Meetings with European Counterparts in Washington

Release Date: December 9, 2010

For Immediate Release

Office of the Press Secretary

Contact: 202-282-8010

WASHINGTON—Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano today joined U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to host the biannual U.S.-European Union (EU) Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial to discuss ongoing and future international initiatives to protect against terrorism and transnational crime with EU Vice President for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship Viviane Reding and EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström.

“In our increasingly interconnected world, international collaboration and information sharing have never been more critical to protecting the United States from terrorism and transnational crime,” said Secretary Napolitano. “The United States is committed to working closely with our European partners to develop innovative and effective ways to ensure our mutual safety while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens.”

In today’s meeting, Secretary Napolitano commended the launch of negotiations on the U.S.-EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement—reiterating her commitment to ensure the safety and security of the traveling public through information sharing, while protecting the privacy of passengers.

She also highlighted the United States and the European Union ongoing, coordinated efforts to protect vital cyber networks from attacks through the U.S.-EU Cyber Working Group—formalized by President Obama in the Nov. 20 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration—which facilitates the continued sharing of cybersecurity best practices and security standards and enhances collaboration on public-private partnerships; cyber incident management; public awareness; and combating cyber crime.

Secretary Napolitano also reiterated the United States and the European Union’s shared commitment to bolstering the security of the international aviation system, noting the key role that US-EU collaboration played in the adoption of the historic Declaration on Aviation Security by the 190 countries at the International Civil Aviation Organization Triennial Assembly in October 2010, which forged a new global framework for aviation security that will better protect the entire global aviation system from evolving terrorist threats and make air travel safer and more secure than ever before.

She also underscored the extensive and ongoing collaboration between the U.S. and the EU on cargo security efforts following the thwarted terrorist plot to conceal and ship explosive devices on aircraft traveling through Europe and bound for the United States in October 2010.

See also:

8 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign

7 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at FOB Connolly, Afghanistan remarks on WikiLeaks, editor in chief's arrest at the end of a press briefing, saying, "I hadn't heard that, but that sounds like good news to me. "

Full Transcript

"Q:  Any response to the arrest of the founder of Wikileaks Julian Assange?

SEC. GATES:  I hadn't heard that, but that sounds like good news to me. 

STAFF:  Thanks, guys.

Q:  Thanks. "

7 Financial blockade against WikiLeaks by Bank of America, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal and Western Union commences. [NEED OTHER SOURCES]

"Since 7th December 2010 an arbitrary and unlawful financial blockade has been imposed by Bank of America, VISA, MasterCard, PayPal and Western Union. The attack has destroyed 95% of our revenue. The blockade came into force within ten days of the launch of Cablegate as part of a concerted US-based, political attack that included vitriol by senior right wing politicians, including assassination calls against WikiLeaks staff. The blockade is outside of any accountable, public process. It is without democratic oversight or transparency. The US government itself found that there were no lawful grounds to add WikiLeaks to a US financial blockade. But the blockade of WikiLeaks by politicized US finance companies continues regardless.

For information on the banking blockade against WikiLeaks please visit our banking blockade page." (Source: wikileaks.org)

7 Rep Candice Miller, member of the House Homeland Security Committee and the Unmanned Systems Caucus U.S. (House caucus for drones & other unmanned systems) calls Assange a "terrorist" and WikiLeaks a "terrorist organization" in the Congressional Record. Also, calls for Assange to be "charged now."

(Source: Congressional Record)

Representative Candice Miller bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and sub Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee, and sub Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and sub Highways and Transit Subcommittee and sub Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee, Unmanned Systems Caucus  

"Mr. Speaker, since WikiLeaks has begun releasing American top secret information that it obtained illegally, there has been a debate about how our Nation should respond to this. I believe that the actions of WikiLeaks provide material support to our terrorist enemies, so it should be treated as a terrorist organization. Others have argued that WikiLeaks is simply a media organization and, therefore, it is protected under the First Amendment.

Well, consider for a moment the most recent statements by Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, which I believe show exactly what he is—a terrorist. Assange has spread across the world an encrypted document which he claims has even more vital national secrets that he is going to release.

Assange calls this file his ‘‘insurance’’ file, and he has threatened to release this information if he is captured or if he is charged with any violation of law.

Those, Mr. Speaker, are not the actions of a journalist. Those are the actions of a terrorist.

Even President Clinton recently said that lives will be lost because of the release of this information. But still, Mr. Speaker, we still have not heard anything on this issue from our current Commander in Chief, President Obama.

The silence from President Obama, our Commander in Chief, is absolutely baffling."

7 State Department appears before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

"However, shortly after stories about the cables first began to appear in the media, State Department officials were already privately playing down the damage, the two congressional officials said." (Source: Reuters, U.S. Official: WikiLeaks Revelations 'Embarrassing But Not Damaging')

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)


Need transcript.

7 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning.

"xxvi) 7 December 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry also noted,'“[d]uring the interview SND was courteous and well spoken and he maintained good eye contact. SND‟s mood and character were consistent with his normal character.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

7 Rep Candice Miller, member of the House Homeland Security Committee and the Unmanned Systems Caucus U.S. (House caucus for drones & other unmanned systems) calls Assange a "terrorist" and WikiLeaks a "terrorist organization" in the Congressional Record. Also, calls for Assange to be "charged now."

(Source: Congressional Record)

Representative Candice Miller bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and sub Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee, and sub Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and sub Highways and Transit Subcommittee and sub Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee, Unmanned Systems Caucus  

"Mr. Speaker, since WikiLeaks has begun releasing American top secret information that it obtained illegally, there has been a debate about how our Nation should respond to this. I believe that the actions of WikiLeaks provide material support to our terrorist enemies, so it should be treated as a terrorist organization. Others have argued that WikiLeaks is simply a media organization and, therefore, it is protected under the First Amendment.

Well, consider for a moment the most recent statements by Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, which I believe show exactly what he is—a terrorist. Assange has spread across the world an encrypted document which he claims has even more vital national secrets that he is going to release.

Assange calls this file his ''insurance'' file, and he has threatened to release this information if he is captured or if he is charged with any violation of law.

Those, Mr. Speaker, are not the actions of a journalist. Those are the actions of a terrorist.

Even President Clinton recently said that lives will be lost because of the release of this information. But still, Mr. Speaker, we still have not heard anything on this issue from our current Commander in Chief, President Obama.

The silence from President Obama, our Commander in Chief, is absolutely baffling."

7 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign

7 Julian Assange announces his intention to resist extradition and to turn himself into a London police station. There, Julian Assange reads for the first time a detailed description of the accusations against him in his native language, English. At Swedish prosecutor Ny's request, district judge Howard Riddle refuses bail for Mr Assange and he was remanded in custody until 14 December. Julian Assange is placed in solitary confinement.

" 7 December 2010 Having announced his intention to resist extradition to Sweden, Assange turns himself into a London police station and for the first time gets to read a detailed description in his native tongue of the accusations against him. They turn out to be false and distorted accounts of his consensual sexual encounters with Anna Ardin and Sofia Wilén. The most serious accusation is that he raped Ms. Wilén by penetrating her while she "due to sleep, was in a helpless state". In fact, she was sufficiently awake to converse with Assange and indicate her consent (see 16 August). At prosecutor Ny's request, Assange is jailed pending an extradition hearing. He is placed in solitary confinement with limited access to his lawyers, television, the library, telephones and the Internet." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

[Image of district judge Howard Riddle]

"24 February 2011 Howard Riddle, a hostile judge, rejects Assange's appeal against the European Arrest Warrant and extradition to Sweden. It was Judge Riddle who had jailed Assange the previous December." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

"But district judge Howard Riddle refused bail for Mr Assange and he was remanded in custody until 14 December.Judge Riddle said he believed Mr Assange might flee and he also feared he 'may be at risk from unstable persons'." (Source: BBC)

More sources.

6

Department of Justice Attorney General Eric Holder says there are "there were significant things that I personally authorized" regarding Wikileaks last week at a press conference. He describes the actions coming from the "highest level involvement in the Unites States Department of Justice" and that the DoJ is doing everything to both "hold people accountable, and to minimize the harm that will befall American people." He goes on to say, the DoJ is looking at "all the things" they can do to try to "stem the flow of this information." Holder says, that the Espionage Act of 1917 is "certainly something that might play a role, but there are other statutes, other tools that we have our disposal."

[These could refer to the DoJ recommendations Bank of America about Hunton and Williams or the empaneling of the a Grand Jury in the Eastern District of Virginia by US District Attorney, Neil McBride.]

Video 1

Transcript:

Questioner

The daily question, WikiLeaks apparently today released what is described as a treasure trove of infrastructure targets around the world, which of course could be damaging not only to those countries but to US interests. Why hasn't the Government just gone ahead and shut down the site? Or shut down the dissemination of his information? Why can't you do that?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

Well, let me condemn in the strongest terms the leaks of information that have come as a result of the actions that you have just reference. National security of the United States has been put at risk, the lives of people who work for the American people has been put at risk. The American people themselves have been put at risk by these actions which are, I believe, arrogant, misguided, and ultimately, not helpful in any way. We are doing everything that we can. We have a very serious, active ongoing investigation that is criminal in nature. I authorized just last week a number of things to be done so that we can hopefully get to the bottom of this and hold people accountable, as they should be.

Questioner

What are the things that can be done? And has the Government explored the ability to be able to seize the sites. Last week you were before us saying look at all the Web sites we seized and shit down. But, you can't do that in this case. What are the parameters that are limiting that? And, what are some of the actions that you did authorize to go forward?

Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice

It is an ongoing investigation. I don't want to get into exactly what I authorized, but I can say that I personally authorized a number of things last week and I think that is an indication of the seriousness with which we take this matter and the highest level involvement in the Unites States Department of Justice. With regard to all the tactics that we can do or can use to ameliorate the consequences of these actions I don't want to get into those as well, but we will do everything that we can both to hold people accountable, and to minimize the harm that will befall American people.

Video 2

Questioner/

Mr. Attorney General, going back to WikiLeaks for a minute. Can you help us understand, going back to Jason's question for a minute, why you can't shut these sites down? Is there something within the law? Is there something missing within the law that prevents you from doing that?

Eric Holder, US Attorney general, Department of Justice

Well as I said, I don't want to get into what our capabilities are. At this point I will simply say what I have just said. We have a very serious criminal investigation that is underway, and we are looking at all the things that we can do to try to stem the flow of this information.

Questioner

Several members of Congress from both political parties have offered to produce legislation to close gaps and vague issues in the Espionage Act and elsewhere. Are you working with the Hill to do that at this point, or is that not necessary?

Eric Holder, US Attorney general, Department of Justice

Well it is certainly something that we need to look at to see exactly the Espionage Act as everyone knows is something that is pretty old. There have been subsequent Court decisions that cast some doubt on on at least some provisions in the Act, but I think people should also understand that is not the only tool that we have to use in the investigation of this matter. Now I don't what to get into specifics here but people would be have a misimpression if the only statute you think we are looking at is the Espionage Act. That is certainly something that might play a role, but there are other statutes, other tools that we have our disposal.

Questioner

In terms of the things that you authorized last week, are you talking about search warrants, FISA applications? Can you be a little more specific?

Eric Holder, US Attorney general, Department of Justice

All I would say is that there were significant things that I personally authorized.

Full Video

(Source: CSPAN)

6 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign

6 Congressional Research Report published on the Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information. [This report was originally published on December 2, 2010 for WikiLeaks and updated on June 26, 2010 for other leaks, including those alleged by the Obama administration and currently being investigated by two special prosecutors appointed by Eric Holder, US Attorney General.]

6 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xxv) 6 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 2 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on [no date given] and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

3

White House | Press conference with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes en route Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan are questioned about how WikiLeaks revelations have or will affect the U.S. relationship with President Karzai. Rhodes responds, "There have been books, there have been previous WikiLeaks revelations related to Afghanistan. So we’ve weathered those kinds of revelations before as it relates to our relationship with President Karzai and the Afghan government"

Full Transcript

Q Before we were leaving there were more disclosures from WikiLeaks about President Karzai, about the strains in the relationship there. Do you think that that comes at an awkward time? Do you think that that may add to some of the tensions in the relationship as the two leaders talk?

MR. RHODES: I think -- I don’t think so. I think we’ve had -- we’ve dealt with a series of public discussion around some of the challenges in Afghanistan. There have been books, there have been previous WikiLeaks revelations related to Afghanistan. So we’ve weathered those kinds of revelations before as it relates to our relationship with President Karzai and the Afghan government.

I think we’re all well aware that there are serious challenges in Afghanistan. It’s a tough fight. It’s a country that is trying to recover from many, many years of war, predating even 9/11. So we’ve had ups and downs in terms of the kind of public revelation of information associated with the challenge of Afghanistan. But I think precisely the fact that we’ve dealt with some of the very specific stories associated with the latest WikiLeaks disclosure -- and through these WikiLeaks disclosures and through these books and articles -- I think it allows us to be able to weather this and continue to move forward.

What we’re focused on is making sure that our two governments are aligned behind the strategic objective, which, again, is breaking the Taliban’s momentum, building up Afghan capacity, and undertaking a transition that both ensures that there’s never a safe haven for terrorism in Afghanistan as it was before 9/11 and that the Afghan people can control their own future.

MR. GIBBS: Let me add, as Ben said, the challenges on either the security side or the governing side are not new and they’re certainly not unknown. What unites both sides is, what Ben just alluded to, which is our goal of providing safety and security, our goal of ridding the Taliban, al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates from the ability to use Afghanistan as a safe haven to plan attacks on our country.

So the challenges are known; the goals are known. And we are pleased to be making progress.

(Source: White House)

3 Department of Defense | Department of Defense publishes press release and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen remarks on WikiLeaks.

Press Release

Excerpt of Press Release:

Leaks of classified information place lives at risk, and that has already happened, the chairman said.

WikiLeaks’ posting of classified documents demonstrates “little care for those lives, and little care for the responsibilities that come with focusing on those lives, or the kinds of engagements that we have diplomatically,” he said.

At the same time, he said, leaked documents reveal how deeply the United States is engaged around the world.

“Often times, we focus heavily on trouble spots, because they’re the most dangerous,” Mullen said. “We are a country that really tries to solve those problems.”

He said the United States has been, and continues to be in many ways, indispensable in its leadership to “move these problems to a place where they can be solved.”

“Do we always get it right? No. Do we make mistakes? Certainly, on occasion,” Mullen said. “But I think by and large what you’re seeing is the U.S. as it always has been -– heavily engaged, working to lead, and trying to solve some very, very complex, difficult, and dangerous problems, and we’ll continue to do that.”

3 Library of Congress | Library of Congress statement confirms it is blocking WikiLeaks because of White House’s Office of Management and Budget Statement the same day. See OMB Memo dated December 3, 2010.

The news media are reporting today, accurately, that the Library of Congress is blocking access to the WikiLeaks site across its computer systems, including those for use by patrons in the reading rooms.

I wanted to provide here the same statement we’ve been giving to reporters and patrons who are asking about it:

“The Library decided to block WikiLeaks because applicable law obligates federal agencies to protect classified information.  Unauthorized disclosures of classified documents do not alter the documents’ classified status or automatically result in declassification of the documents.”

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget today provided the guidance that “[f]federal agencies collectively, and each federal employee and contractor individually, are obligated to protect classified information pursuant to all applicable laws, as well as to protect the integrity of government information technology systems.” (Source: Library of Congress)

3 Office of Management and Budget General Counsel sends a memo to government agencies instructing them they are obligated to protect classified information pursuant to all applicable laws."

(Source: PDF of Memo via TPM)

"From:: OMB General Counsel's Office XXXXXXXXXX
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 12:21 PM
To: XXXXXXXXXX
Subject: FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION AND PROMPT ACTION: WikiLeaks: Model Agency Notice to Employees

The recent disclosures of US Government documents by WikiLeaks has resulted in damage to our national security. Federal agencies collectively, and each federal employee and contractor individually, are obligated to protect classified information pursuant to all applicable laws, as well as to protect the integrity of government information systems. It is a function of agency leadership to establish a vigilant climate that underscores the critical importance of the existing prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements regarding the safeguarding of classified information.

According, agencies are requested immediately to send a notice to all agency employees and contractors reminding them of their obligations to safeguard classified information. A model notice, for use of adaptation by each agency, is attached to this memorandum. Agencies are responsible for communicating this notice promptly to their employees and contractors. If an agency has a legitimate need for personnel to access classified information on publicly available websites, the agency head shall ensure that such access is managed in a manner that minimizes risk to government information technology systems and adheres to established requirements.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Attachment (Model Agency Notice)"

3 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning.

"xxiv) 3 December 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

3 Hunton and Williams meets with Bank of America about WikiLeaks.

"The law firm had a meeting with Bank of America on December 3. To prepare, the firm emailed Palantir and the others asking for “…five to six slides on WikiLeaks - who they are, how they operate and how this group may help this bank.”

Hunton and Williams were recommended to Bank of America’s general counsel by the Department of Justice, according to the email chain viewed by The Tech Herald. The law firm was using the meeting to pitch Bank of America on retaining them for an internal investigation surrounding WikiLeaks.

'They basically want to sue them to put an injunction on releasing any data'” an email between the three data intelligence firms said. 'They want to present to the bank a team capable of doing a comprehensive investigation into the data leak.'

Hunton and Williams would act as outside counsel on retainer, while Palantir would take care of network and insider threat investigations. For their part, Berico Technologies and HBGary Federal would analyze WikiLeaks.

'Apparently if they can show that WikiLeaks is hosting data in certain countries it will make prosecution easier,' the email added.

In less than 24-hours, the three analytical companies created a presentation filled with publicly available information and ideas on how the firms could be 'deployed' against WikiLeaks 'as a unified and cohesive investigative analysis cell."' (Source: Tech Herald, Data intelligence firms proposed a systematic attack against WikiLeaks)

3 Newt Gingrich says that Assange should be treated as an 'enemy combatant' and that the NSA should close down WikiLeaks.

(Cue to 2: 32) "What we should do is treat Assange as an enemy combatant. Information warfare is warfare. The National Security Agency should close down that site, keep it closed down. Every time they try to reopen it under a new name, they should close it down. We should wage active information warfare against any effort to release American secrets." (Source: Newt Gingrich, thenewamerican.com)

2 Senator Ensign introduces a the Shield Act for himself , Senator Lieberman, and Senator Brown of Massachusetts "to amend section 798 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain activities and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary."

Actions and Votes for the Shield Act
Lieberman Press Release

"By Mr. ENSIGN (for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN, and Mr. BROWN of Massachusetts):

[Image left Senator Brown of Massachusetts]

Senator Brown of Massachusetts bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, Chair, Subcommittee on Jobs, Rural Economic Growth, and Energy Innovation, Subcommittee on Nutrition, Specialty Crops; Food and Agricultural Research, Subcommittee on Commodities, Markets, Trade, and Risk Management, Appropriations » Subcommittee on Agriculture & Rural Development, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, Subcommittee on Labor, HHS, & Education Subcommittee on Legislative Branch, Subcommittee on State & Foreign Operations, Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Chair, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation and Community Development , Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance, Select Committee on Ethics, Veterans' Affairs


[Image left, Senator Lieberman]

Senator Lieberman bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Disaster Recovery (Ad Hoc) Subcommittee, Private Sector and Consumer Solutions to Global Warming..., State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration (Ad Hoc) , Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and ..., Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal ..., Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Investigations Subcommittee, Airland Subcommittee, Public Sector Solutions to Global Warming, Oversight, and Children's..., Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee, Personnel Subcommittee, SeaPower Subcommittee, Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee,Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee

[Image left, Senator Ensign]

Senator Ensign bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Social Security, Pensions and Family Policy Subcommittee, Science, Technology, and Innovation Subcommittee, Senate Budget Committee, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Health Care Subcommittee, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Energy, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure Subcommittee, Senate Finance Committee, Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee, Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism Subcommittee

"S. 4004. A bill to amend section 798 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain intelligence activities and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise today to address a new and very serious threat to our national security.

In July of this year, the organization known as WikiLeaks , led by an Australian citizen named Julian Assange, published 90,000 classified intelligence documents related to our efforts in the ongoing war against the Taliban insurgents and al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

 In October, WikiLeaks dumped 400,000 classified documents that revolved around the efforts of our Nation and our coalition partners to bring democracy, peace, and stability to the people of Iraq.

Now, just a few days ago, WikiLeaks has dumped another 250,000 documents that reveal private, often personal, communications between diplomats and heads of state--communication that is necessary for the critical discourse that occurs between governments on the many relevant and challenging international issues of our day [NOTE WikiLeaks did not release all 250,000 cable at this time].

In light of the damage that has already been done and the continuing threat posed by WikiLeaks , I am here to introduce a bill that will help defend our national interests, protect our troops, and provide assurance to our friends and allies that what they say to us in private will stay with us, and that there will be consequences for the reckless actions taken by WikiLeaks , or others, who may attempt to do what they have done--consequences that are consistent with our values and with our first amendment.

Let me spend a few moments examining the nature of this threat and some of the serious implications.

After WikiLeaks dumped 400,000 classified documents concerning our efforts to promote democracy in Iraq, Pentagon spokesman Geoffrey Morrell stated the Department of Defense had to scramble to notify 300 Iraqis because we were immediately concerned about their safety. He went on to say that as many as 60,000 Iraqis could possibly be identified in these leaked documents.

Let us consider the plight of those Iraqis just for a moment. These individuals came forward to us with information that they felt would help their government deal with the insurgency and terrorist presence that has been an impediment to peace and stability within their nation. Yet this despicable character, Julian Assange, has rewarded their bravery by naming them to their enemies. This puts their very lives and the lives of their families in jeopardy. This discourages other Iraqis from coming forward and standing up for freedom.

This, in turn, jeopardizes the lives of our American troops and harms our efforts to provide stability in Iraq to the point where we can withdraw our troops.

Unfortunately, if Iraqis become afraid to speak out against the terrorists in their midst for fear of being named by Julian Assange, succeeding becomes that much more difficult.

Let's turn to Afghanistan. Back in July, I read in the Times of London a very interesting assessment about the implication of Mr. Assange's actions. Let me quote:

Hundreds of Afghans' lives have been put at risk by the leaking of 90,000 intelligence documents because the files identify informants working with NATO forces.

Let me quote again from the Times:

In just two hours of searching the WikiLeaks archive, the Times found the names of dozens of Afghans credited with providing detailed intelligence to U.S. forces. Their villages are given for identification and also, in many cases, their fathers' names.

To the credit of the Times, they cited examples to back up their claims. But as any responsible media organization should, they at least, in their report, took the steps of hiding the names of the villagers who came forward with information to assist their government and NATO.

Madam President, just as WikiLeaks recklessly dumped the leaked intelligence on Afghanistan, a Taliban spokesperson gave an interview in which he said:

We are studying the report. .....We will investigate through our own secret service whether the people mentioned are really spies working for the U.S. If they are U.S. spies, then we know how to punish them.

I don't think I need to elaborate on how the Taliban punishes their enemies.

Now we have this latest dump of classified State Department cables and information. I applaud our former colleague, Secretary Clinton, for the excellent remarks she has made on this issue. She pointed out that the leaks have put people's lives in danger, threatened our national security, and undermined our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems.

An essential dialog takes place between nations--a dialog that has existed since nations first began. With that dialog, diplomats need to be able to express their views candidly and, yes, privately. This is how a lot of problems are solved.

Our Nation is working toward international solutions to some very complex problems. The Government of Yemen is fighting terrorists that reside within their own borders. The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the threat of long-range missiles in North Korea are problems that require multilateral international engagement.

Secretary Clinton made another point I will focus on for a moment. Assange didn't just leak classified details about meetings between diplomats. Our diplomats overseas meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others--people with unique insight into a wider range of issues.

Unfortunately, we live in a dangerous world where revealing the identity of someone fighting for social issues, such as women's rights or children's rights or the identity of an advocate for religious freedom could have serious repercussions that include imprisonment, torture, or even death.

I wonder if WikiLeaks understands if Afghan villagers or activists fighting for human rights under oppressive regimes are killed as a result of being named in these leaks, the blood of these good people is on their hands.

Before I proceed with an examination of the bill that I have crafted to address this threat, let's be clear about some things. No one should do Julian Assange any credit by referring to him as a journalist or as part of the news media. He is a computer hacker and an anarchist.

True to his hacker roots, he has devised a portal through which he hopes members of our government will anonymously and surreptitiously provide him unfettered access to our closest secrets.

Make no mistake, these actions have harmed our friends and helped our enemies in a manner prejudicial to the safety and national interest of the United States.

So with this threat in mind, a threat that the Founders could have never seen coming, we have crafted a bill that amends the Espionage Act, specifically Title 18, Section 798.

Under current law, it is a criminal act for someone who knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, publishes, or otherwise makes available to any unauthorized person any classified information concerning the communication intelligence activities of our United States of America.

My bill, which we are introducing today, extends this protection currently afforded to the communications intelligence to human intelligence, known as HUMINT. This bill protects human intelligence sources and methods. I want to be very clear. It is my opinion that we can go after Julian Assange under the current statute. But what our legislation does is updates this decades-old statute to address this evolving threat prospectively.

I have no doubt that Assange is going to put out another document dump on
[Page: S8400]  GPO's PDF
his Web site and another one after that. Once he does, this bill would give the administration increased flexibility to deal with him and potentially other copycat organizations that aspire to his likeness.

There are a couple of concerns I want to address. First, one might wonder how this bill stands with our first amendment. While I hope we can all agree that Julian Assange is no journalist, some might wonder if the amended law that would result from this bill could be applied to the news media. It is pretty frustrating for the intelligence community when communications intelligence sources and methods are blown.

When this happens, sources of vital intelligence dry up or become inaccessible, and potentially millions of defense dollars go down the drain. However, despite the serious consequences associated with losing a communications intelligence source or method, and the damage that does to our national security, no Presidential administration has ever prosecuted a member of the news media under the existing statute, which has been on the books since 1951.

Let's face it, leaks do happen. As Secretary Gates stated just a few days ago, regrettably, our government leaks classified information like a sieve. This bill does not stop anybody from publishing leaks, but it does provide legal incentive to Julian Assange to do what Amnesty International has repeatedly asked him to do: be more responsible about how classified leaks are handled by not revealing the identity of these classified human intelligence sources.

Let me be clear. This bill doesn't target journalists. Instead, it provides flexibility for the Attorney General with a targeted solution and increased flexibility to deal with WikiLeaks .

Some might be wondering whether Julian Assange, who is a foreign citizen, can be prosecuted under the Espionage Act. In fact, the courts long ago established that he can be prosecuted under these statutes.

I am not a lawyer, but if you study the United States v. Zehe from 1986, it becomes immediately clear that Assange can be prosecuted under the Espionage Act.

That said, my concern is that our existing laws may have some loopholes through which he can escape. In fact, just a few days ago in the Washington Post, I read where Attorney General Holder said:

To the extent that there are gaps in our laws ..... we will move to close those gaps.

Well, I submit that the bill I am introducing today, with a couple of others, will do just that. It closes a gap in our laws and it moves to protect vital human intelligence sources and methods consistent with the manner in which current law communications intelligence is already protected.

I thank Senators Lieberman and Brown of Massachusetts for joining me in this important legislation and for the input Senators Lieberman and Brown of Massachusetts have given me on this important legislation.

I hope we can take up this bill, consider it, work with the administration, work with the House, and pass this important legislation so the next time, and we know there will be a next time, that Julian Assange and his associates leak classified intelligence that puts people's lives in danger, we can actually have another tool in the arsenal so our Department of Justice can go after these despicable people."

(Source: Congressional Record)

2 Rep Lamar Smith of Texas, member of the House Judiciary Committee; House Homeland Security Committee; and Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee, remarks on WikiLeaks and the New York Times in the Congressional Record.

(Source: Congressional Record)

Rep Lamar Smith introduced SOPA.

Rep Lamar Smith bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Judiciary Committee and sub Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee, House Homeland Security Committee, House Science and Technology Committee

"Madam Speaker, the New York Times recently decided to print classified State Department documents obtained illegally by WikiLeaks. But one year ago, The Times declined to print information released during the ClimateGate scandal that showed scientists were hiding contradictory temperature data.

Regarding its decision to print the WikiLeaks documents, The Times wrote: ‘‘For The Times to ignore this material would be to deny its own readers the careful reporting and thoughtful analysis they expect when this kind of information becomes public.’’

In contrast, The Times said they did not publish the ClimateGate documents because, ‘‘The documents appear to have been acquired illegally and contain all manner of private information and statements that were never intended for the public eye, so they won’t be posted here.’’

There is no better example of a double standard."

2 Department of State | State Dept. holds two separate briefings for both the house of Representative and the Senate. Reportedly State Department privately plays down WikiLeaks damage on Capitol Hill. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

"However, shortly after stories about the cables first began to appear in the media, State Department officials were already privately playing down the damage, the two congressional officials said." (Source: Reuters, U.S. Official: WikiLeaks Revelations 'Embarrassing But Not Damaging')

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State) Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

2 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xxv) 6 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 2 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on [no date given] and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

1 Department of State | At the daily press briefing, a reporter asks State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley, if WikiLeaks has actually helped "by showing Iran what all of its neighbors think of it."

QUESTION: (Inaudible) out of Iran – the Iran talks next week. What are your expectations for these talks? I mean, are there any indications that Iran is coming – ready to negotiate with you? And do you think the Wikileaks could actually help by showing Iran what all of its neighbors think of it?

MR. CROWLEY: (Laughter.) Let me take the first thing first. We would like to see Iran engage in a real process. I think I quipped last year: What’s our objective for the first meeting? A second meeting. But that would signal Iran is ready to answer the questions that the international community has. I mean, Iran is alone in the fact that it is unable or unwilling to answer the questions that have arisen about the nature of its nuclear program. But these are not impossible questions to answer. We will come next week prepared to engage on the nuclear issue, engage on other topics of interest with Iran. We hope that they will come to this meeting with the same seriousness of purpose. We’re under no illusions here. We understand that this may be difficult and we understand that Iran may not come prepared to engage constructively. But we’re showing that we’re willing to offer this – continue to offer this engagement and we hope that we will have a productive meeting next week.

(Source: Department of State)

1 Department of Defense | Department of Defense mentions WikiLeaks in a press release about NATO cyber security featuring Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis. He refers to WikiLeaks as a "type of crisis" that occurs. Stavridis remarks on Article 5 cyber attacks and Article 4 cyber attacks, which he says, include DDos attacks.

Press Release

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1, 2010 – NATO is working to have the right balance between ensuring intelligence gets to those who need it most and the need to protect that information, the alliance’s supreme allied commander for Europe said this week.

In a Nov. 29 interview, Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis said cybersecurity is a priority within the alliance, and member nations are taking steps to both improve distribution of intelligence and protect its networks.

Cyber attacks have occurred, and the threat is growing. The attacks are often tough to attribute, can cause immense damage and can be launched by nations, terrorists, criminal gangs or individuals. NATO has to find the balance between “share to win” and “need to know,” Stavridis said.

“Life is not an on or off switch,” he said. “In other words, we can’t just open everything up or shut everything down –- although that is the tendency in moments of crisis.” The WikiLeaks releases are that type of crisis, he added, and it is tough to know where to set the dial.

“As a result of WikiLeaks, we will move that dial back a bit, more to the ‘protect’ side, but I think it is very important that we don’t overreact to it and simply shut down into international enclaves and cut off sharing,” he said. “It would be massively counterproductive.”

NATO needs to put in place technical means to protect information and networks, the admiral said.

“We’ve got to use all the technical means at our disposal to protect ourselves from something like WikiLeaks or any other attempt to intrude, manipulate, move data or reveal classified secrets,” Stavridis said. “There’s a policy side to it, which is deciding where the dial goes, and there’s a technical side to it, and we’re very working very hard to put those in place.”

The admiral said he believes a cyber attack could trigger a response in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which states that an attack on any alliance member is an attack on all alliance members.

Cyber attacks can run the gamut from low-level observation to denial-of-service attacks, and from espionage and intrusion to actual kinetic effects, Stavridis said.

“When you come into my networks and are manipulating my air traffic control data, and you are causing airplanes to be unable to land and they crash and people die,” he added, “that’s an attack.”

But for the most part, the admiral said, cyber attacks on alliance nations would be handled as something less -- probably under Article 4, which states that alliance nations will consult together whenever any of them believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.

These are questions NATO is focusing on at the Center for Excellence for Cybersecurity in Tallinn, Estonia, an apt location, because Estonia was the victim of a cyber attack in 2006.

“The alliance has to define this [threat of cyber attack] and understand the policy questions raised by this,” Stavridis said.

When diplomats negotiated the NATO pact in the late 1940s, they never envisioned a cyber world, the admiral noted. “That’s what we will do now that we have the focus that’s afforded by the strategic concept,” he said.

Although NATO is not yet looking to establish a counterpart to U.S. Cyber Command, that will be one of the questions officials ask as the process moves forward, Stavridis said.

“I could envision within the NATO alliance an operational command that focuses on cyber,” he said. “At the moment, that work is imbedded in several of the NATO agencies. But I think we are seeing this as an operational task, so I will be advocating putting more of this on the operational side.”

1 Rep Candice Miller, member of the House Homeland Security Committee and the Unmanned Systems Caucus U.S. (House caucus for drones & other unmanned systems) calls Assange a "terrorist organization" and WikiLeaks.org a "terrorist organization". Calls for Attorney General Eric Holder to "shut it down."

Representative Candice Miller bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and sub Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee, and sub Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and sub Highways and Transit Subcommittee and sub Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee, Unmanned Systems Caucus  


"Mr. Speaker, we saw again this week the organization WikiLeaks release hundreds of thousands of classified documents which threaten to undercut American foreign policy as well as our national security. The person who has been accused of releasing this sensitive information is an American PFC, who is now facing charges that could lead to 52 years in prison if he is convicted. These penalties are too lenient because this PFC has not just violated orders; he has committed treason.

I think that WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, should be facing criminal charges; and his Web site, which he uses to aid and abet our terrorist enemies, should also be shut down to defend our national security. Attorney General Eric Holder held a press conference the other day, proudly announcing that the Federal Government had shut down several Web sites for selling knock-off purses and other items. Well, I have an idea for Attorney General Holder: shut down

WikiLeaks, which represents a far greater threat to our national security than the sale of fake Louis Vuitton bags.

It is time that the Obama administration treats WikiLeaks for what it is—a terrorist organization, whose continued operation threatens our security. Shut it down. Shut it down. It is time to shut down this terrorist organization, this terrorist Web site, WikiLeaks. Shut it down. It is time

to shut down this terrorist organization, this terrorist Web site, WikiLeaks. Shut it down, Attorney General Holder." (Source: Congressional Record)

1 Sen. Joseph Lieberman issues statement on WikiLeaks and Amazon.

“This morning Amazon informed my staff that it has ceased to host the WikiLeaks website. I wish that Amazon had taken this action earlier based on WikiLeaks' previous publication of classified material. The company’s decision to cut off WikiLeaks now is the right decision and should set the standard for other companies WikiLeaks is using to distribute its illegally seized material. I call on any other company or organization that is hosting WikiLeaks to immediately terminate its relationship with them. WikiLeaks’ illegal, outrageous, and reckless acts have compromised our national security and put lives at risk around the world. No responsible company – whether American or foreign – should assist WikiLeaks in its efforts to disseminate these stolen materials. I will be asking Amazon about the extent of its relationship with WikiLeaks and what it and other web service providers will do in the future to ensure that their services are not used to distribute stolen, classified information.” (Source, lieberman.senate.gov)

1 WikiLeaks ousted from Amazon servers.

Content.

1 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 1, executive, briefing on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, 11 a.m., 304-HVC. 

(Source: Congressional Record, Congressional Record)

"BRIEFING--WIKILEAKS
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Met in executive session to receive a briefing on WikiLeaks Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information. The Committee was briefed by departmental witnesses." (Source: Congressional Record)

1

White House | At a press conference with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs responds to questions about the FACT SHEET: U.S. Government Mitigation Efforts in Light of the Recent Unlawful Disclosure of Classified Information

Full Transcript and Video

Q Robert, what have you done on this WikiLeaks review panel that's reported on the wires?

MR. GIBBS: I believe there’s something that's going to go out --

Q It’s already out.

MR. GIBBS: -- see, that was fast -- (laughter) -- on different procedures, and we’ll get you some more information if you have questions on that.

...

Q We just got your fact sheet this morning about everything the White House and the State Department is doing in response to the leaks by WikiLeaks. And I’m just curious why it is that we’re just hearing about these remedial efforts now or in the last couple of days when you guys have known about the leaks since at least July when Bradley Manning was arrested. Why did it take so long to try to implement new procedures? And I think you're just starting to examine --

MR. GIBBS: Well, I’d point you to DOD and to State on some of the particulars on that. Obviously, look, this is the same -- working through the same databases and systems that have existed across administrations.

Q But why start months and months after this leak was well known?

MR. GIBBS: I don't think it’s accurate to say that we somehow read the paper over the weekend and started to do this. I just think that's --

Q So you guys were working on this for months?

MR. GIBBS: This is an ongoing effort to -- as we talked about here on Monday, to ensure that we have the type of information-sharing that we understand is important.

Again, look, some of the initial stuff that came out of these leaks was battlefield assessments and battlefield intelligence that are used by those on the ground in particular places in Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's important that they have access to that. But at the same time -- I said earlier this week -- we have to balance the need to know and the need to share with appropriate oversight. And that's what we’re working on doing.

(Source: White House)

1

White House | White House releases "FACT SHEET: U.S. Government Mitigation Efforts in Light of the Recent Unlawful Disclosure of Classified Information":

"As part of an integrated federal government approach to respond to the unlawful and irresponsible disclosure of classified information by WikiLeaks, the National Security Staff has been coordinating an interagency effort to examine the policies and practices surrounding the handling of classified information, and to put in place safeguards to prevent such a compromise from happening again."

As part of this initiative, the White House appoints RUSSELL TRAVERS, to serve as the National Security Staff's Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy, to lead a comprehensive effort to identify and develop the structural reforms needed in light of the WikiLeaks breach

The President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) will take an independent look at the means by which the Executive Branch as a whole shares and protects classified information.

The Executive Office of Management and Budget, the Information Security Oversight Office, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will stand up processes to evaluate, and to assist agencies in their review of security practices with respect to the protection of classified information

At the Department of State:

"The Secretary of State has commissioned a review of State Department security procedures.  The Under Secretary for Management has assembled a team of senior management professionals in all related areas to conduct a thorough review of current policies and procedures to ensure that they are fully abreast of the challenges faced.  Their efforts will be coordinated with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to ensure that a measures taken strike the correct balance between the critical need to protect classified information and the equally compelling requirement to ensure that it is shared with those who need it in their work to advance our national security."

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is working as part of the integrated whole of government approach to assist agencies in their review of security practices. In coordination with the larger OMB effort, ODNI is developing recommendations to enhance security within the Intelligence Community (IC)

[Tags: Russell Travers, National Security Staff's Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy; President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB); Executive Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); James Clapper, Director of the National Intelligence; Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO); State Department; Under Secretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy; Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State; Department of Defense]

As part of an integrated federal government approach to respond to the unlawful and irresponsible disclosure of classified information by Wikileaks, the National Security Staff has been coordinating an interagency effort to examine the policies and practices surrounding the handling of classified information, and to put in place safeguards to prevent such a compromise from happening again.
 
The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath revealed gaps in intra-governmental information sharing.  During the past decade, departments and agencies have tried to eliminate those gaps, resulting in considerable improvement in information-sharing.  At the same time, federal policies underscore the importance of the existing prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements regarding the safeguarding of classified information.  Our national security requires that sensitive information be maintained in confidence to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland and our partners.  Protecting information critical to our nation’s security is the responsibility of each individual and agency granted access to classified information.
 
NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF INITIATIVES
 
On December 1, 2010, the National Security Advisor named Russell Travers to serve as the National Security Staff’s Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy.  Travers will lead a comprehensive effort to identify and develop the structural reforms needed in light of the Wikileaks breach.  His responsibilities will include:

  • Advising the National Security Staff on corrective actions, mitigation measures, and policy recommendations related to the breach.
  • Facilitating interagency discussions and developing options for Deputies, Principals, and the President regarding technological and/or policy changes to limit the likelihood of such a leak reoccurring.

 
Additionally, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) will take an independent look at the means by which the Executive Branch as a whole shares and protects classified information.  While the PIAB’s traditional mandate is the examination of intelligence issues, the members’ requisite security clearances, deep understanding of the wider United States Government national security mission and appreciation of the scope and complexity of classified government computer networks, make it particularly well-suited to immediately undertake this U.S. Government-wide review. As a part of this undertaking, the PIAB will:

  • Work with departments and agencies across the government to ensure they gain a comprehensive appreciation of all relevant challenges and requirements necessary to safeguard classified information and networks.
  • Examine the current posture of the whole of government with regard to leaks of classified information.
  • Examine the balance between the need to share information and the need to protect information.
  • Review the degree to which the government is organized to achieve information handling goals, consistent with our interests in security, information sharing, and transparency.

 
These efforts by the NSS and the PIAB will complement actions being taken across the Federal Government.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has directed each department or agency that handles classified information establish a security assessment team consisting of counterintelligence, security, and information assurance experts to review the agency’s implementation of procedures for safeguarding classified information against improper disclosures.  The OMB has directed that each review should include (without limitation) evaluation of the agency’s configuration of classified government systems to ensure that users do not have broader access than is necessary to do their jobs effectively, as well as implementation of restrictions on usage of, and removable media capabilities from, classified government computer networks.  The OMB, the Information Security Oversight Office, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will stand up processes to evaluate, and to assist agencies in their review of security practices with respect to the protection of classified information.
 
Prior to the issuance of this OMB Directive, several agencies had proactively initiated measures to further safeguard classified information and networks. The following are examples of the numerous mitigation efforts underway across the interagency.
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INITIATIVES
 
The Secretary of State has commissioned a review of State Department security procedures.  The Under Secretary for Management has assembled a team of senior management professionals in all related areas to conduct a thorough review of current policies and procedures to ensure that they are fully abreast of the challenges faced.  Their efforts will be coordinated with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to ensure that a measures taken strike the correct balance between the critical need to protect classified information and the equally compelling requirement to ensure that it is shared with those who need it in their work to advance our national security.
 
This review has already reaffirmed the Department’s policy of deploying “thin client” computer units without removable media options and limiting the ability to download material from classified terminals to only approved and controlled circumstances.
 
The Department will also deploy an automated tool that will continuously monitor the classified network to detect anomalies that would not be readily apparent.  This capability will be backed up by a professional staff who will promptly analyze these anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.
 
The mandatory annual training and recertification requirement that all employees must satisfy is being reviewed to see if additional material needs to be added to bolster this on-going effort.
 
In the interim, the Department has suspended access to the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database of diplomatic reporting , and its classified “ClassNet” web sites and SharePoint sites previously accessible through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), while retaining access via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System..
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INITIATIVES
 
On August 12, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates commissioned two reviews to determine what policy, procedural and/or technological shortfalls contributed to the unauthorized disclosure to the Wikileaks website. He specifically directed an assessment to determine if the DoD had appropriately balanced restrictions associated with information security and the need to provide our front-line personnel with the information needed to accomplish their assigned missions.
 
As a result of these two reviews, a number of findings and recommendations are in the process of being assessed and implemented, including the following:

  • Disabling and controlling use of removable storage media on DoD classified networks to prevent download from classified networks.
  • Developing procedures to monitor and detect suspicious, unusual or anomalous user behavior (similar to procedures now being implemented by credit card companies to detect and monitor fraud).
  • Conducting security oversight inspections in all Combatant Commands.
  • Undertaking vulnerability assessments of DoD networks.
  • Improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures. Specific examples being undertaken at the Combatant Command level include:
  • Increased “insider threat” training focusing on awareness of associated activity.
  • Multi-discipline training between traditional security, law enforcement and information assurance at all echelons.
  • The establishment of “Insider Threat Working Groups” to address the Wikileaks incident and prevent reoccurrence.
  • Component-determined restricted access to the Wikileaks site to prevent further dissemination or downloading of classified information to unclassified DoD networks.
  • Restating of policy to all personnel regarding restrictions on downloading to government systems and cautionary advice regarding personal IT systems.

 
Individual DoD components are taking additional action as relevant and appropriate, ranging from random physical inspections to enabling new security features on networks. Leadership reinforcement of workforce responsibilities and new initiatives to safeguard information are key components of DoD’s mitigation efforts. Department-wide, the Pentagon is accelerating its publication of policy issuances related to the information security program as well as focusing increased attention on detecting potential insider threats.
 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI) INITIATIVES
 
The ODNI is working as part of the integrated whole of government approach to assist agencies in their review of security practices.
 
In coordination with the larger OMB effort, ODNI is developing recommendations to enhance security within the Intelligence Community (IC), to include:

  • Insider Threat Assessment Inspections:  Departments and Agencies will establish inspection teams, with assistance provided by ODNI/ONCIX, consisting of Counterintelligence (CI), Security, and Information Assurance (IA) experts to identify removable media policies and their implementation.
  • Enhanced Automated, On-Line Audit Capability:  Systems will monitor user activity on all IC classified computer systems to detect unusual behavior.  Additionally, a fully staffed analytic capability will put a human eye on the suspect activity.
  • Removable Media Policies Review:  Department and Agencies will review current policies and procedures to reduce risk posed by removable media within each organization.
  • Policy Compliance Action Plan: Departments and Agencies will assess the level of compliance with existing CI, Security, and IA policies to identify discrepancies and will establish a plan to track and report improvements.
  • Information Assurance Training: Departments and Agencies will conduct mandatory regular trainings for all employees on the handling of classified information.
  • Review Secure Device Settings: Departments and Agencies will mandate a compliance review of secure system configuration settings.

(Source: White House)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Nov 2010

30

Department of State | At a press briefing, a reporter uses WikiLeaks release of State Department cables to quiz State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley on the State Department's vision of a viable Palestinian state.

Full Transcript

QUESTION: (Inaudible) as to what constitutes a viable Palestinian state? Because it seems that in Mr. Netanyahu’s mind, a Palestinian state is completely demilitarized, it should not have control over its airspace, it should not – according to WikiLeaks. So does the State Department, does the Government of the United States, have a clear definition as to what constitutes a viable Palestinian state? MR. CROWLEY: We share the goal of the Palestinian Authority that there needs to be a Palestinian state and the borders of that state need to be viable. That has been our position. But that’s why we’re encouraging the parties to resume negotiations, because absent a negotiation, you cannot get to a viable state with recognized international borders. There’s only one way to do this and that’s through the direct negotiation that we continue to encourage both sides to resume as soon as possible. QUESTION: But surely after like, 19 years of direct negotiations under the auspices of the United States, since 1991, you must have a picture of what this viability should look like. MR. CROWLEY: Well, there’s been a lot of work done here. I think we have a broad understanding of what this might look like. But ultimately, this is why the two sides have to sit down into a negotiation. Palestinians have their views, the Israelis have their views. The United States and others, we’ve done a lot of work on this. There have been negotiations in the past that enable us – will inform negotiations should we get the parties back together again. But through this negotiation, that’s how you get to a viable Palestinian state. If there are no negotiations, then we’re not going to see a Palestinian state emerge.

(Source: Department of State)

30 Bank of America late night conference call followed by email to Hunton and Williams about WikiLeaks

"On January 2, The New York Times wrote about a late night conference call held by Bank of America executives on November 30. The reason for the call was to deal with a statement given by WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange on November 29, where he said that he intended to “take down” a major American bank. The country’s third largest financial institution needed to get the jump on WikiLeaks, so they started scouring thousands of documents, and auditing physical assets.

Shortly after the late night conference call, the email from Hunton and Williams was sent. Booz Allen Hamilton, according to the Times, was the firm brought in to help manage the bank’s internal review." (Source: Tech Herald, Data intelligence firms proposed a systematic attack against WikiLeaks)

Forbes Interview with Julian Assange

30 Rep Franks says Assange, Manning, and WikiLeaks have provided aid and comfort to enemies of the US, and that they should be prosecuted. Rep Lamborn says this admin is not doing enough re WikiLeaks and national security issues. Rep King says Assange wants to destroy Western Civilization, pulls out Constitution and says Assange has committed treason, calls for new legislation like 2011 NDAA that would hold Assange in ex-judicial detention, and that a court that needs to be created for GTMO detainees would put Assange there.

(Source: Congressional Record)

"Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I know that it comes as no surprise to this House that I have been one very critical of this administration's policies on a number of different fronts, and I suppose that will be no different tonight. But Mr. Speaker, I guess I wanted to start out tonight by addressing the WikiLeaks issue. I know that a lot of people across America have looked upon this with interest, and I guess it's significant in my mind that what we've seen on the WikiLeaks issue is really more confirmatory than it is anything that's informative. In many ways what the WikiLeaks information has demonstrated is that this administration has practiced for a long time a foreign policy of appeasement, and I think it has been a disaster for our country, Mr. Speaker.

I suppose it goes without saying that the most pressing question is how a 22-year-old private first class in a remote location in Iraq could have gained access to so many of these documents, especially since they are far outside his scope of responsibilities. It represents, really, a glaring failure on parts of the State Department and even some parts of the Defense Department. And some of these commonsense security measures could have been implemented prior to this. The Pentagon has since announced that it will be implementing new policies, including a technology that makes it impossible to copy classified documents to portable storage devices. Now the fact is that it has taken too long for such a commonsense policy to sink in, and this administration certainly had lead time to consider this long before now, but I guess it is, in a sense, indicative of why bureaucracies are so inefficient most of the time. It took the leak of hundreds of thousands of sensitive documents before this government decided to get up to speed with the unique risks posed by one of the most basic modern conveniences, that being the computer.

Private Bradley Manning, the U.S. Army soldier suspected of leaking the documents, and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange hid behind the claim that the government's so-called ``lack of transparency'' is unjustified. This is their main reason for justifying their own actions, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, in that process they have provided a wealth of aid and comfort to groups that are at war with the United States of America. Of course Mr. Assange claims to be fighting for truth and transparency. The reality is that his desire to promote himself has outweighed his concern for scores and perhaps hundreds of innocent lives that he has endangered with his reckless publicity in this kind of a stunt in the guise of some greater cause.

But Mr. Speaker, it's telling that the foreign media sometimes is almost more comforting to justice than the American media sometimes. The American media willingly complied in disseminating this information and they are complicity, in my judgment, in any harm that will come to American service members or American personnel across the country as well.

Just to give you an example, Mr. Speaker, the same New York Times that was reticent to cover the story that's often referred to as ``Climategate'' willingly ran the WikiLeaks cover story on the front page of their newspaper. Now this is a hypocrisy, Mr. Speaker, that I think is absolutely astounding. In other words, just to put it in perspective, I will just read what one of the bloggers there of The New York Times said. Andrew Revkin of The New York Times, he is actually a reporter, was one of the first ones to cover Climategate. And in his first story only a matter of a few hours after Climategate's blog posted, in his story he states, ``The documents''--this is the Climategate documents, Mr. Speaker--``appear to have been acquired illegally and contain all manner of private information and statements that were never intended for the public eye, so they will not be posted here.'' Well, how gallant, how noble of Mr. Revkin to want to protect some of his perhaps liberal friends from being exposed in some of the over-hyped notion of global warming, but yet when people's lives are at stake, when American national security is at stake, then all of a sudden The New York Times is all too willing to publish the WikiLeaks information in the interest of full disclosure and grand journalism, and I find that unbelievable, Mr. Speaker. If the Times reporters had felt such urges of chivalry when it comes to protecting the men and women who give up their lives so that we can all sleep peacefully at night, it's just a strange time for them to do that. And to cap it all off, Mr. Speaker, it is rumored that the leading candidate for Time magazine's ``Man of the Year'' now is none other than WikiLeaks' Julian Assange.

Mr. Speaker, before I yield to one of my colleagues here, I would just like to say that, unlike authoritarian regimes across the world, democratic governments like ours hold secrets largely because citizens agree that they should in order to protect legitimate policy and national security. But this massive breach of our national security has endangered our ability to build trust and cooperation with our allies, it has certainly not served the public's interest, and most of all, it has strengthened and emboldened our enemies. Mr. Assange and WikiLeaks should be profoundly ashamed, and I think they should be pursued with whatever legal actions can be brought, and of course The New York Times, for their complicity in this effort, should be ashamed beyond measure.

   With that, I would like to yield to my good friend, Congressman Lamborn from Colorado, to see if he has any thoughts.

   Mr. LAMBORN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

   Let me point out that, to its credit, The Wall Street Journal did not accept

[Page: H7744]
the offer to disseminate these WikiLeaks latest round of documents from the diplomatic arena, and I think that that is to their credit. Unfortunately, The New York Times did not have the same scruples, which is extremely disappointing to me.

Representative Franks, as we look at some of the reports of what were contained in these diplomatic leaks, there are some really troubling national security implications that arise. One is that we find, for instance, that it is confirmed that Iran has received 19 advanced missiles from North Korea. Now we have long suspected that there have been ties on a covert basis between those two countries, we have some evidence of that; this just makes it more of a glaring issue. And our administration needs to be doing more, not just to stop WikiLeaks in the future from revealing our national secrets, but in stopping Iran and North Korea from the propagation of deadly nuclear and missile technology that they seem to be doing. The fact that Iran has received 19 advanced missiles from North Korea, each of which is capable of reaching Western Europe or even Moscow, is very troubling to me. These are our NATO allies that we are bound to defend if they are attacked, and I don't think our administration is doing enough to stop the propagation, the dissemination of deadly technology from North Korea to other countries.

   When we are done talking about WikiLeaks, Representative, I would like to make sure we talk more about some of these national security implications as well.

   I would like to yield back at this time.

   Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Well, thank you, Mr. Lamborn. It is my judgment that this would probably be a good time to transition to that. And we would also like to hear from Congressman STEVE KING from Iowa. STEVE, do you have any thoughts about this? Because some of these national security issues I know DOUG and I are kind of obsessed with them--for good reason, but we know that they care about national security in Iowa as well.

   

[Time: 21:00]

Mr. KING of Iowa. I thank the gentleman from Arizona for yielding and for managing this Special Order here tonight and for bringing this issue, Mr. Speaker, before the American people.

This is a critical national security issue. And I'm so grateful that we have individuals here in this Congress, as intended by our Founding Fathers, that focus on a variety of issues that could clearly see and be focused on the intelligence that can bring this before the American people in such a way that they can understand, Mr. Speaker, that you will turn your focus hopefully on this subject matter.

There has been a lot of discussion across the country now and in the news media about the WikiLeaks issue. And I look at this, and I think Julian Assange, an Australian citizen, a person who made his living as a hacker, a person who is proud of being able to crack anybody's security code and get in there and pull that information out and then dump it into the public arena, into the public media sphere. For what purpose? What possible constructive purpose could be achieved by an individual who is a product of Western civilization pouring forth state secrets from Western civilization itself? It has to be for either self-aggrandizement, for that or the combination of undermining Western civilization. An enemy, an enemy of the things that we believe in.

And I don't stand here with the intent to indict the Aussies. I love the Australians. They are a free spirited, strong free market, free will group of people. They had to also take a continent and settle a continent about the size of the United States itself and make a living down there in an environment that's sometimes beautiful and sometimes harsh. They have a spirit of their own. They remind me that in every conflict that the United States has been in they got there first, and some of them they've been in all of them. It's a pretty good thing to say about the relationship between the United States and Australia.

There's not much to say about their citizen--whom I wish today were an American citizen, and at that point I think he might be subject to charges of treason against the United States.

So as I listened to the speakers here, I reached into my dog-eared Constitution and took up this definition, the constitutional definition of treason, and it says--and I know that some have called for charges of treason to be brought against Mr. Assange. I know they apply to an American citizen. But this says, Article III, section 3: Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies--which certainly al Qaeda and the Taliban and the enemies of the terrorists who are lining up against us are our enemies--and giving them aid and comfort, giving aid and comfort to the enemies.

Well, Mr. Speaker, I think it's a subject that we wouldn't have much debate on here in this Congress that Mr. Assange has given aid and comfort to the enemy. He's empowered the enemy. He's put Americans at risk. He's put the allies of Americans at risk. And in this precarious situation around the globe, in this geopolitical-military-economic chess game that goes on constantly on the entire planet, he's taken away some of our advantage and he's given it to our enemies.

And I wish and I hope that there's a way that we can find a way to prosecute a man like that, that we can protect ourselves. And if we fail to do that, or even if we're successful in that and it exposes some other vulnerabilities, I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that this Congress take a look at some new legislation, a new structure of law, that's really not brought about because of the actions of Mr. Assange but brought about because of the actions of our enemies, our terrorist enemies.

And I have come to realize, and I think that there will be a significant number of Members of Congress that have come to realize, that we don't have the tools to fight these enemies; that the idea that we could catch terrorists like, for example, Osama bin Ladin's chauffeur, and we can't find a way to try that chauffeur and put him on trial with legitimate expectations of an effective prosecution and a conviction and a penalty.

We have Khalid Sheikh Mohammed sitting down in Guantanamo Bay yet. Two years into the Obama Presidency, when President Obama said he was going to close Guantanamo Bay and try these terrorists in civilian courts, and now we found out what happens when you try these terrorists in civilian courts--a whole bunch of evidence that's essential to the conviction has been left out of the prosecution, and they were not successful in an effective prosecution and conviction of the last terrorist that was tried in civilian court.

So I look at this and I make the charge that I think our military tribunals are a useful way to do this and Guantanamo Bay is the best place on the planet to keep them. But we don't quite have the legislative tools. We don't have the judicial tools.

I'm hopeful that this Congress will consider a proposal that's rooted in this thought; that we will set up a special court like a FISA court, or perhaps even the FISA court, and ask them to immediately adjudicate when we catch somebody that's working against the United States, that's perpetrating terrorism against the United States, and be able to process them immediately through a special court, and have that court be able to rule that this was an attack against Americans or whether it was an attack against America's civilization that was designed to spread terror and fear here rather than a crime that was committed against individual Americans, and be able to rule that that individual then fit within the category of an enemy of the United States, an enemy in this war on terror that we have, and then instantly move them off of the shores of the United States and down to Guantanamo Bay or another jurisdiction that's even further removed from these courts, and under Article III, section 2, strip these Federal courts from the jurisdiction of ruling upon these decisions of terrorists that are attacking America.

If we do that--and it's a pretty sticky constitutional question on how we would deal with American citizens in that category, but it's not when we deal with someone like Julian Assange. An Australian citizen could be put into that category, moved over to a place offshore of the United States outside of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, the civilian Federal courts in the
[Page: H7745]
United States, and adjudicated under a military tribunal in a fashion that was designed by this Congress and directed by this Congress. That's what I'm hopeful that we'll be able to do.

Mr. LAMBORN. I think this recent civilian trial of the person formerly who was in Guantanamo Bay, who was tried in New York City, I believe, who was found not guilty of about 250 counts of murder--although that's about how many people were killed in the terrorist attack on the embassy in Africa--but was found only guilty of conspiracy to destroy government property when over 200 people were murdered in that terrorist attack shows the weakness of using civilian trials to try these terrorists who are committing acts of war against our country.

And the WikiLeaks documents, getting back to those, show that this administration has been trying to place these Guantanamo detainees in other countries around the world, like Saudi Arabia. They are offering them money. They are offering them concessions if they'll take some of these people off of our hands so that the President can move closer to his goal of closing Guantanamo Bay. But that is a misguided policy from day one.

These people should not be released. I think Saudi Arabia said in one of the cables that was disclosed, or they said later on, that they would just release the people eventually if they were sent to their country and they would ultimately, as we know from cases in the past, many of them would find their way back to the battlefield where they would kill Americans or American allies.

So I think that the whole misguided policy of Guantanamo Bay being closed is exposed by some of these WikiLeaks documents. But still, these should have never been disclosed in the first place. This administration needs to find a way to punish those involved and make sure it never happens again.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I guess, Mr. Speaker, I would like to agree with the gentleman from Colorado because, you know, many of us, including the gentleman from Colorado, including the gentleman from Iowa, were very vociferous in saying that there would come a time where it would be obvious to the world that these civilian trials wouldn't work for enemy combatants that are terrorists that were taken off the battlefield in Afghanistan or Iraq or wherever it might be, because we knew that this would give al Qaeda and other terrorist groups a perfect opportunity, a staging ground, as it were, to be able to manipulate our system.

Not only does it give them the ability to have discovery where they are able to potentially undermine our security apparatus and gain information that is critical to protecting our agents in the field, but this also gives them the ability to claim all kinds of things before the world. And of course you know the security elements of it are astonishing. And of course they use our own court system and our own court rules to make it very possible for them to escape justice.

I thought, to paraphrase President Bush, he said something like this. He said, We should not allow our enemies to use, to destroy liberty by using the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself. And the reality is is that sometimes we can become victims of our own ostensible decency.

And this administration, in its kowtowing to terrorists, has been more committed to protecting terrorist rights than it has been to protecting the lives of American citizens. And I think that is profound beyond anything I could suggest.

   

[Time: 21:10]

Because it just tells me that somehow the administration has a philosophical bent that is going in a way that I think endangers American freedom and future generations. And I am hoping that somehow they will wake up in time. But yes, the gentleman is correct that WikiLeaks, among other things, has exposed once again this administration's effort to try to put these combatants in different countries to try to avoid the trap that they have set for themselves in America by insisting that this be done in civilian trials.

 And again, it is a disgrace beyond words that this man that was instrumental in the murder of about, I think it was 224 people, Mr. Lamborn, and yet he gets conspiracy to destroy government property. And that is unfortunately--you know, sometimes the administration thinks of these things always in sort of academic terms. But this is real life. And national security in the 9/11 age is something we should all be focused on. And this administration seems to be asleep at the wheel. And I just wonder if my colleague from Iowa might have any thoughts on that.

Mr. KING of Iowa. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. And I reflect upon a trip that I made down to Guantanamo Bay I believe it was a year ago last Easter. And the trip was designed to fill me and a handful of other members on the Judiciary Committee in on the practices and the facilities that they had at Guantanamo Bay. And I think this is something that the American people have not had an opportunity to witness or actually hear about within the news, that there is a facility that's perfectly structured for the job that we have, which is to bring these terrorists to a location and legitimately try them and give some resolution to their circumstances.

And I don't remember the exact number of inmates that they had down there at the time, but it was down to the hard core of the hard core. They had already released those that could be released. And the rest of them were a danger to Americans, a danger to free people everywhere, and a danger if they were released to come back, and as Mr. Lamborn said, to attack Americans again, but also NATO troops and other people that represent the free world.

And as we are looking at that facility, oh, it's a pretty wonderful facility if you want to be in a jail and be a Muslim, for example. And you walk into these cells, first of all the temperature is set at 75 degrees. Seventy-five. My house is a lot warmer than that in Iowa in the summertime. Because 75 degrees, they argued, was their cultural temperature. And I don't know that that's true. I would think 140 degrees is more likely some of their cultural temperature. But in any case it's set at 75.

And you open the door on any of the cells, and they have their own personalized cells, there is an arrow there that points towards Mecca. So they never have to guess which direction that they are praying. Every one of them gets a nice fancy prayer rug that's all embroidered. It takes a lot of hand work. It's a beautiful piece of work. And they get a little skullcap that's also hand-worked and done. And the Korans that they get are carried in a ziplock bag so they are nice and protected and never touched by the hands of an infidel, because that might anger the inmates at Gitmo. And they had their nice television and a little break room that they got together. And here is this flat screen TV. And that went on pretty fine for a while.

Oh, by the way, their meals, they get a choice out of nine selections a day of Islamicly approved meals. And they can pick three squares out of the nine every day that fit within their cultural heritage in their way. It isn't like Americans are serving them ham and beans like they would give me or you or anybody else that was in there. They get to select from this special menu, a special menu for special people that get a special rug and a special skullcap and a special ziplock bag-delivered Koran that is never touched by an infidel.

And they have as many as 20 attacks on Americans a day at Guantanamo Bay. About half of them are physical attacks, where they try to get one of our guards down, usually Navy personnel, and get their handcuffed chains around their throat and try to strangle them, attack them with the metal that's part of their restraints. And the other half are throwing human feces in the face of our troops. What is the punishment for that? If it happened to be a domestic prisoner in a domestic prison, if you continued with that you would find yourself in solitary confinement. And eventually, the punishment would go to the point where you would be locked up in prison for life. Eventually.

But what we do is nothing. There is no penalty. If Khalid Sheikh Mohammed attacks the guards every day, several times a day, the worst thing we can do to him is cut his outdoor exercise down to 2 hours a day. Two hours a day outdoors. The rest of the time

[Page: H7746]
you are in 75-degree air conditioning with your own selected meals, three out of the nine that are the choice of the menu there, on your own specialized prayer rug with your own Koran. And there was one inmate that wanted a Bible in Gitmo. He converted to Christianity. But it was verboten to bring a Bible into Guantanamo Bay because it would set the inmates off, the other inmates off who thought that a Bible was an insult and affront to them.

And they were watching their flat screen TV in their little break room, and a lady came on to do a commercial, and she had a short-sleeved shirt on and showed her elbow. Showed her elbow. I don't get really all that worked up over an elbow. But they got all worked up over the elbow and trashed the room, tore up the furniture, broke the flat screen TV, scattered it all. It was like a little riot in their little break room. What's their punishment for that? New furniture, new flat screen TV. We coddle these prisoners. We don't even have a punishment for those that attack our American guards.

And we set up the trial room so that there are microphones, a sound system, places for witnesses to sit, places for family members to observe, a sound-proof glass that's there. And when it gets down to the critical component of the testimony, we have an officer that is assigned with the job to cut off the testimony until such time as the witnesses that don't have access to classified are marched out of the witness chamber, and they pick up the testimony.

This facility is laid out for the purposes of trying people where national security is an issue. And if we had been trying the individual you talked about, Mr. Lamborn, I believe he would have been convicted in Guantanamo Bay. Because the evidence that was necessary to convict him would have been used rather than held back for fear that it becomes a spillage of a national secret that becomes the subject here of the WikiLeaks.

So those are things that go across my mind. We have got to do a lot more. We have got to be a lot smarter about this. What would be very helpful is if we had a Commander in Chief who was making the ask of this Congress rather than us trying to push that chain uphill, having a President that would actually be pulling it in that right direction. I yield back.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Thank you, Mr. King. You know, I suppose that there are a lot of different issues we could talk about with the WikiLeaks situation here. But I would point out that probably one of the big things that it showed is that just our appeasement toward our enemies. And I think probably one of the most dangerous areas there has been is just the passive nature that this administration has shown toward North Korea.

North Korea is one of the most dangerous police states in the world. And they have shown time and again that they are not interested in becoming a stable diplomatic partner really to any member of the international community for that matter, but certainly not the United States.

And a recent time line of North Korea's blatant provocations would probably be worth looking at here. Just to give you an example, in March of 2010 they were involved in the sinking of a South Korean submarine. It killed 46 sailors. In November of 2010, U.N. Security Council reports revealed that North Korea has been passing, as Mr. Lamborn said, forbidden nuclear technology to state sponsors of terror. I know Mr. Lamborn mentioned the missile technology, which is more recent, but also nuclear technology to sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and Syria. Of course the Syrian plant was almost a mirror image of the one in North Korea. And fortunately our friends in Israel were able to make sure that that one didn't work so well any more. And they did the world a great favor in that regard. Because nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran or Syria would be a great danger to the human family to say the very least.

In November of 2010, North Korea shelled the Yeonpyeong Island, a group of South Korean islands, and it claimed the lives of two South Korean marines. Two civilians I believe were also killed. It wounded somewhere around 15 marines and three other civilians. And of course this administration, while they have some shows of resolve here lately, a lot of these things have occurred because they have stood by and let North Korea get away with this so long. And really in a sense North Korea sometimes does this to get attention, and they have no respect for innocent human life. So blowing up a few people to try to get one of the Democrat administrations to give them more money is something that they don't hesitate to do. And they have done this on a regular basis.

The U.S., Mr. Speaker, must move to re-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and call on all responsible nations to adopt tough new sanctions on the North Korean regime. The North Korean regime will collapse on itself if China and other countries in the world do not continue to prop them up.

   

[Time: 21:20]

China should be especially called upon to stop enabling this regime and to join responsible nations in sending an unequivocal message to North Korea, abandon your aggressive agenda now. And, of course, you know it shouldn't come as a surprise to us, but China's objections kept us from seeing a U.N. Security Council report revealing that North Korea has been passing banned technology to nations like Syria and Iran, and they delayed that for 6 months.

In other words, because of China, because of their commitment to delay this, Iran was given 6 additional months to work on advancing their nuclear capacity without public scrutiny. And there is no telling how far they were able, willing to go, really, to advance this effort. But they were eventually forced to see this information like the rest of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I just have to say that, you know, weakness and passiveness is provocative. It invites aggression, and it is time that this administration and the United States embark on one singular goal for North Korea, and that is to see that North Korean Government fall and North Korea be reunited and somehow, some semblance of freedom come to that people and that this country, like many of its people, would like for it to be reunited with the world community in a responsible way.

To pursue a lot of diplomacy with North Korea is wasted effort, and we should be pursuing now the effort to see a North Korea and South Korea reunited under a free government like South Korea.

I wonder if my friend from Colorado would have any comments on that?"

30 Rep Ted Poe remarks on "unconscionable revelations of classified information in the past few days by WikiLeaks."

Representative Ted Poe's bio on lilsis.org.

Committee Memberships: House Foreign Affairs Committee , Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Europe Subcommittee, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Aviation Subcommittee, Highways and Transit Subcommittee, Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee

"The unconscionable revelations of classified information in the past few days by WikiLeaks have nonetheless opened our eyes to the full extent of the North Korean cooperation with the little tyrant from the desert, Ahdmadinejad, and the Iranian regime on missile technology. Thanks to Pyongyang's proliferation, Iranian warheads, possibly carrying a nuclear payload, can now reach American allies in the Middle East and even as far away as Europe.

   We have also learned that Air Iran transports landed at a Beijing airport to carry missile equipment from North Korea to Iran. There is indeed a North Korean-Iranian axis of evil with malice toward mankind. Its linkage runs right through the heart of Beijing, China.

   Does China, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, have no guilt or have no shame when it blatantly disregards the Security Council's resolutions directed at both Pyongyang and Tehran?" (Source: Congressional Record)

30 Senator Nelson of Florida, member of the Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, and the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Committee remarks on WikiLeaks in the Congressional Record

(Source: Congressional Record)

Senator Nelsons info on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Senate Foreign Relations Committee  and sub International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and Human and sub Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, Senate Armed Services Committee and sub Strategic Forces Subcommittee and sub African Affairs Subcommittee and sub SeaPower Subcommittee and sub Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Senate Special Committee on Aging, Senate Budget Committee,, Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee,Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and sub Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee and sub Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee and sub Space, Aeronautics, and Related Agencies Subcommittee and sub Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Subcommittee


"Mr. President, America’s secrets are not what are at risk with the exposure of thousands and thousands of documents of classified cables. America’s friends and allies are at risk and, therefore, America’s national security is at risk.

When classified cables identify certain people who have helped us from around the world as we advance the interests of the free world, defend our national security, and the safety of all humankind—when those people are exposed, there are a lot of bad people out there who want to get rid of those kind of people. When sources of information—I will dress it up and tell you exactly what it is; it is called intelligence—when sources of intelligence are betrayed by being made public, by the disclosure, indiscriminately, of thousands and thousands of cables that were marked ‘‘Top Secret’’ or marked ‘‘Secret,’’ then what we have done is we have started to shackle our arms behind ourselves in our ability to defend ourselves.

Why do I say that? Well, look at all the recent attempts at a terrorist act. We were able to avert the terrorist

striking because we got the information that he was going to strike before he struck. Where did that source of information come? Often that source of information comes from far corners of the globe because we have a relationship with people who are giving us information that we then track down and find that, in fact, it is true and stop the terrorist from doing their dastardly deed upon innocent humans.

Since 2001 and the September 11th bombings and the September 11th crashes of the airliners, over and over again the newspapers of this country have chronicled terrorist plots that have been thwarted for the reasons I have just said. Now along comes someone who, for whatever reasons of being a misfit, wants to disgorge thousands of classified cables that start to betray our sources of information to protect ourselves and protect others—not even necessarily our allies—but other innocent victims in other countries with whom we may not even have a relationship.

This is the height of dishonoring our country and our people and all humankind, and it is the height of traitorous activity. It has to stop. We cannot continue to thwart these terrorist acts if we do not have reliable sources of information in order to disrupt the terrorist plots. Do you know what? The newspapers have chronicled, since the attempt, for example, of blowing up FedEx and UPS—and, by the way, those packages also were carried on commercial airliners with passengers on them—you know what the newspapers have chronicled? They have pointed out how the terrorist organizations are crowing about how little it costs them and how they will find another way in order to do this. As the newspapers reported, we found out and stopped that plot by long-distance sources of information that came to us.

To betray those sources, to now put their lives in jeopardy by the indiscriminate turning over to an organization called WikiLeaks that suddenly puts all of this up on the Web, is the height of irresponsibility, an act against humanity, and it has to be stopped."

30 Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, DoD Press Briefing, discusses information sharing environment, says: "Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on.  I think -- I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.  Many governments -- some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us.  We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us.  They will continue to work with us.  We will continue to share sensitive information with one another.   Is this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.  Consequences for U.S. foreign policy?  I think fairly modest."

Mullen says he spoke to General Kayani in Pakistan about WikiLeaks releases.  

The Department of Defense also published an audio press releases. "Five cuts on this posting including the first public reaction by Secretary Gates to the publishing of secret State Department cables by the whistleblower website Wikileaks." Audio Press Release

Press Release

Full Transcript

Excerpts:

                Q:  WikiLeaks.  Post-WikiLeaks reaction.  What's your sense on whether the information-sharing climate and environment created after 9/11 to encourage greater cooperation and transparency among the intelligence communities and the military led to these three massive data dumps?  

                And how concerned are you now there may be an overreaction to clamp down on information dispersal because of the disclosures?  

                SEC. GATES:  One of the common themes that I heard from the time I was a senior agency official in the early 1980s in every military engagement we were in was the complaint of the lack of adequate intelligence support.  That began to change with the Gulf War in 1991, but it really has changed dramatically after 9/11.  

                And clearly the finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote/unquote, "connecting the dots" led to much wider sharing of information, and I would say especially wider sharing of information at the front, so that no one at the front was denied -- in one of the theaters, Afghanistan or Iraq -- was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them.  Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide.  There's no reason for a young officer at a forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the START negotiations.  And so we've taken a number of mitigating steps in the department.  I directed a number of these things to be undertaken in August.  

                First, the -- an automated capability to monitor workstations for security purposes.  We've got about 60 percent of this done, mostly in -- mostly stateside.  And I've directed that we accelerate the completion of it.  

                Second, as I think you know, we've taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to direct that all CD and DVD write capability off the network be disabled.  We have -- we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies -- wherever you can move information from a classified system to an unclassified system, to have a two-person policy there. 

                And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can -- and, first of all, in which we can identify anomalies, sort of like credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally, efforts to actually tailor access depending on roles.  

                But let me say -- let me address the latter part of your question.  This is obviously a massive dump of information.  First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it's Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.  

                But let me -- let me just offer some perspective as somebody who's been at this a long time.  Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time.  And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases.  And this is a quote from John Adams:  "How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not."  

                To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel."  

                When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-'70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress.  Those fears all proved unfounded.  

                Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on.  I think -- I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.  Many governments -- some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us.  We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.  

                So other nations will continue to deal with us.  They will continue to work with us.  We will continue to share sensitive information with one another.  

                Is this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.  Consequences for U.S. foreign policy?  I think fairly modest.  

                Q:  And on that same subject.  On that same subject.  Did either of you reach out to any of your counterparts in advance of this leak and warn them, or even apologize in advance for what might come out?  

                SEC. GATES:  I didn't.  

                ADM. MULLEN:  I did.  

                Q:  Who was it?  

                ADM. MULLEN:  To General Kayani in Pakistan.  

               ...

[Speaking about Repealing Don't Ask , Don't tell.]

                SEC. GATES:  I think that -- in my view -- one of the things that is most important to me is personal integrity.  And a policy or a law that in effect requires people to lie gives me -- gives me a problem. And so I think it's -- I mean, we spend a lot of time in the military talking about integrity and honor and values.  

                Telling the truth is a pretty important value in that scale. It's a very important value.  And so for me, and I thought the admiral was -- that Admiral Mullen was eloquent on this last February -- a policy that requires people to lie about themselves somehow seems to me fundamentally flawed.  

30

White House | At a press conference, concerning Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent comments about WikiLeaks, Press Secretary Robert Gibbs says:

"The President, to my knowledge, has not made -- not made any calls on this. Again, I think this continues to be handled at the State Department at the foreign minister level. And I would say -- I would reiterate largely what we said yesterday. Our foreign policy is far stronger than one website."

Full Transcript and Video

Q Since Secretary Clinton’s strong message yesterday regarding the WikiLeaks, has the President felt compelled to call any of his -- any of the leaders -- for example, Prime Minister Cameron or anyone else?

MR. GIBBS: The President, to my knowledge, has not made -- not made any calls on this. Again, I think this continues to be handled at the State Department at the foreign minister level. And I would say -- I would reiterate largely what we said yesterday. Our foreign policy is far stronger than one website.

(Source: White House)

29 Department of Justice | U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder confirms the existence of a Grand Jury investigation into disclosures by WikiLeaks.

Neil MacBride, US Attorney for United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia , states in his opposition filed February 4, 2011 to the motion to unseal twitter records and February 15, 2011 hearing: "The Attorney General publicly confirmed the existence of an investigation into disclosures of classified information by WikiLeaks on November 29, 2010." (Source: Response in Opposition by USA to Motion for Immediate Unsealing of Motions and Upcoming Hearings)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Justice Department will prosecute anyone found to have violated U.S. law in the leaks of classified government documents by online whistleblower WikiLeaks, Attorney General Eric Holder said Monday.

“This is not saber-rattling,” said the attorney general, who declared that the Obama administration condemns the leaks.

Holder said the latest disclosure, involving classified State Department documents, puts at risk the security of the nation, its diplomats, intelligence assets and U.S. relationships with foreign governments.

“To the extent that we can find anybody who was involved in the breaking of American law, who put at risk the assets and the people I have described, they will be held responsible; they will be held accountable,” Holder said at a news conference on another topic. He called the WikiLeaks probe “an active, ongoing criminal investigation.” (Source: AP)

"Holder emphasized that his office, along with the Department of Defense, is conducting an 'active ongoing criminal investigation.'" (Source: Observer.com)

"To the extent that we can find anybody who was involved in the breaking of American law, and who has put at risk the assets and the people that I have described, they will be held responsible,” Holder said at a press conference this morning. “They will be held accountable.” (Source: Observer.com)

"“To the extent there are gaps in our laws, we will move to close those gaps,” he said. “Which is not to say–which is not to say–that anybody at this point because of their citizenship or their residence is not a target or a subject of an investigation that is ongoing.”"
(Source: Observer.com)

29 Sarah Palin writes on her Facebook page that Assange is an 'an anti-American operative with blood on his hands' and questioned why the US authorities were not looking for him in the same way that it had hunted suspected terrorists

"She accused the Obama administration of "incompetence" and a "strange lack of urgency" in not stopping the release of 250,000 leaked diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, given that it had already published sensitive information about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The former Governor of Alaska and vice-presidential nominee suggested that "cyber tools" should be used to shut down the whistle-blowing website permanently. It has twice been the subject of targeted attacks by hackers to bring it offline this week."

"Writing on her Facebook page on Monday, Mrs Palin questioned why the US authorities were not looking for him in the same way that it had hunted suspected terrorists."

(Source: telegraph.co.uk)

29 Forbes published interview quoting Julian Assange as saying he intended to "take down" a major American bank and reveal an "ecosystem of corruption".

"A day earlier, on Nov. 29, the director of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, said in an interview that he intended to 'take down' a major American bank and reveal an 'ecosystem of corruption' with a cache of data from an executive’s hard drive." (Source: NelsonSchwartz, The New York Times, Facing Threat From WikiLeaks, Bank Plays Defense)

29

Department of Defense | Department of Defense press release quotes Clinton saying, "puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems...So let’s be clear. This disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign-policy interests..'It is an attack on the international community, the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity." The Press release also outlines actions by Department of Defense and CENTCOM since August.

Department of Defense Press Release:

By Jim Garamone and Lisa Daniel
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 29, 2010 – The WikiLeaks release of classified State Department documents over the weekend constitutes an attack not only on America, but also on the international community, as diplomats around the globe try to solve the world’s most complex problems, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said today.

Clinton said the publication “puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems.”

U.S. diplomats focus on advancing American national interests, Clinton noted, and work with representatives around the world to handle everything from economic issues and recovery to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

“So let’s be clear. This disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign-policy interests,” she said. “It is an attack on the international community, the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.”

The United States regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or diplomats’ personal assessments and observations, she added.

Clinton stressed that U.S. official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but in Washington.

“Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world,” she said.

This is the third set of documents WikiLeaks has released. The first set was military reports from Afghanistan, and the second release was military documents from Iraq. Officials of the website have said they will release more classified documents in the future.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government is taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information.

“I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere, to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again,” Clinton said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered two reviews of information and intelligence sharing in August. The reviews called on DOD systems officials to disable all “write” capability for removable media on classified computers to mitigate the risks of personnel moving classified data to unclassified systems. He also directed DOD organizations to have a limited number of systems authorized to move data from classified to unclassified systems, and to implement two-person handling rules for moving data from classified to unclassified systems.

More than 60 percent of DOD’s classified net is now using a host-based security system -– an automated way of controlling the computer system with a capability of monitoring unusual data access or usage. The department is speeding deployment to the rest of the classified system, officials said.

In addition, the department is conducting security oversight inspections in forward-deployed areas, undertaking vulnerability assessments of DOD networks, and improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures.

U.S. Central Command, for example, has increased insider threat training for its intelligence professionals and has started multidiscipline training for traditional security, law enforcement and information assurance personnel at all echelons.

Centcom also has established insider-threat working groups to address the WikiLeaks incident and prevent reoccurrence.

“Previously, oversight was done by humans and, clearly, there were failures there,” Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters today.

While “there are some valid reasons” to remove large amounts of information from classified computers, Lapan said, officials are putting obstacles in place to mitigate the leaking of such information. “It will be monitored much more closely,” he said.

In making the changes, defense officials are working toward Gates’ call for a balance between security and information sharing, the colonel said. To prevent leaks, he added, government officials are focused on procedures and technical systems, not who obtains clearances.

Lapan also addressed the vulnerability of the DOD system to future leaks of classified information. “I wouldn’t say it is vulnerable,” he said, “but I can’t say it won’t ever happen again. There are safeguards in place, but it’s up to individuals to follow them.”

The WikiLeaks postings have caused a chilling effect on who may cooperate with government officials in the future, Lapan said. Defense officials know that WikiLeaks still has some 15,000 sensitive documents related to the war in Afghanistan that they have yet to release, he said.

29

White House | White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on WikiLeaks release of US State Department Cables says, "the stealing of classified information and its dissemination is a crime," and that "WikiLeaks and people that disseminate information to people like this are criminals, first and foremost. And I think that needs to be clear."

Gibbs also says, "But understand that, first and foremost, those that have been involved in the stealing of and the dissemination of this information are criminals."

In answer to a questions as to whether the administration will take legal action against WikiLeaks, Gibbs says, "Obviously there is an ongoing criminal investigation about the stealing of and the dissemination of sensitive and classified information. Secondly, under the administration -- or I would say -- should say administration wide, we are looking at a whole host of things, and I wouldn’t rule anything out."

Gibbs says that that the leak of State Department cables is "it’s a serious crime, first and foremost" and that the disclosure is "a serious violation of the law. This is a serious threat to individuals that both carry out and assist in our foreign policy. "

Gibbs says, the "documents are classified a certain way based on the information that is in them and there are very specific rules and laws that have to be followed in handling that information and disseminating and talking about it. And that’s -- those are laws that everybody is compelled to and should follow."

Full Transcript

Full Transcript

MR. GIBBS: Yes, ma’am.

Q Thanks. We have the statement that you put out yesterday condemning the WikiLeaks release, but what was the reaction from the President when someone informed him yesterday that these documents had come out and reports were coming out about the contents of the documents?

MR. GIBBS: I was not in the PDB [President's Daily Brief] when the President was directly briefed on this. This would actually not have been yesterday, but would have been sometime last week when -- after we became aware of the upcoming release. The President was briefed by those in his daily intelligence briefing on the size the scope of the information that was to become public. And obviously, the Secretary of State and the State Department at a foreign minister level have been very active in discussions with our allies and our partners around the world about what is in these documents.

I think it is safe to say that the President was -- it’s an understatement -- not pleased with this information becoming public. As you saw during the presidential campaign and during his time in the White House, open and transparent government is something that the President believes is truly important. But the stealing of classified information and its dissemination is a crime.

Q Have any world leaders called him to talk about the release or to complain about the contents of --

MR. GIBBS: The calls have originated -- the calls that our government has made have originated from the State Department and the Secretary of State, so I would refer you more specifically to them. The President has not been on the phone around this.

Q Will he speak on this at all? Will he speak -- will he comment publicly on this issue?

MR. GIBBS: There are no plans for him to talk about this today, no.

Q Robert, I know administration officials have been out there today talking about ways to tighten up the procedures --

MR. GIBBS: Yes.

Q -- or handling this material.

MR. GIBBS: Yes.

Q But why was the information so vulnerable to being stolen in the first place?

MR. GIBBS: Well, I think we have for -- and I speak a little bit for previous administrations, as well -- there is always the balance of need to know and need to share. If you look at one of the main critiques in the pre-9/11 intelligence world was a difficulty in information-sharing about threats up and down and across different government platforms. That is something that I think each and every administration struggles with.

Understand that we want soldiers on the front lines of battle to have the most up-to-date intelligence that's possible about the enemy that they face, the tactics that they use. That's important. It is obvious, though, that serious controls and oversight have to be in place in order to balance, as I said earlier, the need to know and the need to share.

Specifically the Department of Defense has made it much more difficult for somebody to get access to and to copy and move both this type and this volume of information, disabling the ability to, for instance, plug in a thumb drive or a CD and copy vast amounts of information; limiting the access to certain documents based on rank; greater oversight.

All of those things as well as -- I don't know if you all heard the statement that the Secretary of State just made where she announced a similar review at the State Department, as well as Jack Lew’s memo to agencies reminding them of how one handles sensitive and classified information, and to convene groups to ensure that the best practices are being used, and to evaluate whether those practices are sufficient to ensure that this type of information isn’t released.

...

Q Is the President worried because of the WikiLeaks disclosure that other countries will no longer be candid with American diplomats? And is the President worried that countries like Yemen or the Gulf states will now be forced into a position where they are publicly not cooperating with American efforts either against AQAP in Yemen or against Iran’s nuclear program?

MR. GIBBS: Well, I think for obvious legal reasons I don't want to get into the specifics of these purported cables. I will say that while we -- and you’ve heard the statement that we released from me yesterday, the statement from the Secretary of State and from our Ambassador at the United Nations -- obviously a breach of these type of discussions is decidedly not good. That does not, however, change the fact that we have a series of problems that have to be addressed on the world stage, and that without -- it is hard to imagine progress on those issues without American leadership moving those forward.

You mentioned Iran. I think it’s important to -- let’s focus on that for a second. Iran is not a threat because we have said to other countries it is a threat and you should treat it as such. I think it is obvious that countries throughout the world, countries in North America, countries in Europe, countries in the Middle East all understand the threat that a nuclear Iran poses, again, not because we said it was a threat but because they recognize, either for regional stability or overall global stability, that dealing with their pursuit of a nuclear weapons program is a grave concern not just to us but also to them.

I do not believe that the release of these documents impacts our ability to conduct a foreign policy that moves our interests forward and addresses both regional and global concerns about the issues that threaten this world.

Q Is the administration considering taking legal action against WikiLeaks itself?

MR. GIBBS: I would say two things. Obviously there is an ongoing criminal investigation about the stealing of and the dissemination of sensitive and classified information. Secondly, under the administration -- or I would say -- should say administration wide, we are looking at a whole host of things, and I wouldn’t rule anything out.

...

Q You called the leak of this classified information “not good,” but how does the White House view it? Is it more of a headache than it is anything of a serious nature?

MR. GIBBS: Well, Dan, I don’t -- I think obviously it is a very serious -- it’s a serious crime, first and foremost. It is -- I don’t think anybody would stand here and tell you this isn’t a concern about security. This is a concern that, as you heard the Secretary of State discuss, some of these -- some of this information could contain names of people that are working with our government to help on issues like human rights, on issues of democracy, in places where those aren’t so easy to work on.

So, again, I don’t think anybody would stand up here and tell you that this isn’t a serious concern. At the same time, I do not believe it does and I do not believe we could ever afford to let it greatly impact our ability to pursue a foreign policy that's in our interest and in the interest of the world. And I think we have touched on and we have talked about several issues -- counterterrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons, a whole host of things -- that demand our attention, demand our engagement, and we’ll continue to receive it.

Q These documents also purport to highlight discussions about North Korea, the collapse of North Korea, reunification of the Peninsula. How do you think this kind of information could impact the tense situation in that region?

MR. GIBBS: I’m going to break these issues slightly apart. Obviously for the first reason, Dan, in order to handle sensitive and classified information as government, I’ve got to sign an oath. There's a safe in my office in the event that I keep any of that information. I’m not going to break the law and discuss openly what may or may not be in sensitive or classified cables.

We are working -- there have been meetings throughout the weekend, meetings again here today to discuss the ongoing situation on the Korean Peninsula. We continue to urge China to use its influence and persuasion with the North Koreans to address their behavior and to address the serious problems that arose last week.

The information that may or may not be on the Internet doesn’t affect our ability to continue to focus on that. As obviously you heard the President say there's not a stronger ally in that region of the world than the Republic of Korea.

...

Q Robert, you said earlier that you have to balance the need to know and the need to share. You talked about after 9/11, one of the big problems was there wasn’t enough sharing of information and also that troops in the field need all the information that they can get. Are you suggesting that in a free society, if you have a bad actor someplace, perhaps a threat -- that these things are simply going to happen and you simply can’t stop it from happening?

MR. GIBBS: Well, no. I think two things, Chip. First of all, obviously there are -- regardless of the walls that you set up, there are certainly going to be occasions in which people do not take their oath to their country seriously about protecting the access that they have or the information that they’re given that is either sensitive or highly classified. I think that's been true for the history of our country.

The responsibility that our administration and every administration has, though, is to ensure that legitimate safeguards are put in place in order to ensure that the access that is provided is warranted based on your ability to get that information and what’s your ability to take that information off of a website and copy it, or copy it thousands, tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of times. I think those are the types of things that can, should, and must be put in place to ensure that while there is access for information for those decision-makers and soldiers and such that need it, while ensuring some protection for the public good.

Q You also said earlier that the President is not making any calls; the calls are being made at State. But some of -- a lot of these leaks have to do, pertain directly to leaders -- Putin and Berlusconi, for example, and Medvedev and Sarkozy and King Abdullah. Isn’t he going to have to address them directly, personally, at some point?

MR. GIBBS: I don't doubt that -- look, first and foremost, I think what is being conveyed by the Secretary of State and by those at the State Department is -- are directly the messages from the President of the United States. They are his partners in carrying out our country’s foreign policy.

And I don't doubt that if world leaders are here or if he has occasion to speak to them, that he won't reassure our partners and our allies of our common goals, our common security and our common efforts to seek both of those. I was just simply saying, Chip, that the President has not up to this point made a series of proactive calls. Those calls are being handled at State.

Q Would it be fair to say that -- not that you're downplaying the story exactly, but you're not using words like “outraged.” You're using words like the President was “not pleased,” this release is “not good.”

MR. GIBBS: I think in one of those I said that I thought this was a pretty broad understatement. Look, I think if --

Q What would be the non-understatement?

MR. GIBBS: I think that this is a serious violation of the law. This is a serious threat to individuals that both carry out and assist in our foreign policy. And again, I'm not here to downplay the overall seriousness of information that, again, is classified for a reason. But I'm also, Chip, here to say that the problems that the world has -- be they countries that seek nuclear weapons, be they non-state actors that seek to do our country and other countries in the world harm -- that simply the release of these documents does not change our posture and our effort in seeking to contain that terrorist threat, in seeking to continue to make progress on non-proliferation, to address the threat that those countries pose that seek nuclear weapons outside of the responsibilities that they have signed up for.

We will continue to, and our diplomats who do great work all over this world will continue to work each and every day to further the interests of this country, to further the interests of our people, and to further the interests of global security.

Q Robert, is there some thought that the President doesn’t want to speak about WikiLeaks publicly perhaps because you don’t want to elevate the leaker, you don’t want to elevate WikiLeaks itself, or perhaps even inspire a potential future leaker by making this a bigger a deal?

MR. GIBBS: Mike, look, I think this is a sufficiently big enough deal that the President has been briefed on this, it has been a cause and concern for many here at the White House over the past many days. It’s garnered the attention of both the State Department and the Defense Department. I think it’s -- suffice to say I think this administration thinks it’s a big deal.

Q But, I mean, you don’t want to inspire more leaks by making it even more famous by having the President of the United States come out and speak?

MR. GIBBS: I think there’s probably less “strategery” around that than you might think.

Q You talked a little bit about the need to know, need to share. Is something like WikiLeaks the unfortunate outgrowth of a need-to-share intelligence culture?

MR. GIBBS: I think we should be clear here. WikiLeaks and people that disseminate information to people like this are criminals, first and foremost. And I think that needs to be clear.

We balance, as I said and you mentioned back to me, the need to share and the need to know because they're important. Again, we want to ensure that a patrol in Afghanistan has the very best intelligence, the very up-to-date operational knowledge for what they're walking into. But I do not think that we should -- this is not -- these are some of the challenges that we deal with. But understand that, first and foremost, those that have been involved in the stealing of and the dissemination of this information are criminals.

...

Q First on WikiLeaks. You’ve used “purported” cables; Secretary Clinton used “alleged” cables. Is it fair to say no administration person is going to confirm these on the record? Is that --

MR. GIBBS: That is -- I can on the record confirm that that’s likely to happen.

Q -- why this language is going to be used and it’s going to be used from here? Fair enough. You seem to imply -- and maybe I misheard -- that the leaks were a threat to national security, but that it would not impact foreign policy.

MR. GIBBS: Well, I said it is a threat to -- it’s a threat to those that are mentioned in the cables. There's a -- look, there's a security breach involved. Again, I think -- I'd point you to the Secretary of State --

Q I guess I want you to go to the second part, which is this idea that it won’t impact foreign policy.

MR. GIBBS: Well, again, I use the example of Iran. Again, they’re a threat to our security; they’re a threat to Middle East stability; they’re a threat to countries throughout the world not because our diplomat told some other country’s diplomat, hey, Iran is a threat. Iran is a threat because of their pursuit of not a peaceful nuclear power program but an elicit nuclear weapons program. That is -- those are common interests that we share in ensuring that a country like that doesn’t have the ability to make progress on that program.

Q But on Yemen?

MR. GIBBS: On what?

Q On the cables about Yemen?

MR. GIBBS: Again, I’m not at liberty to legally discuss --

Q You just went on and on about Iran, saying that this is not --

MR. GIBBS: Chuck, Iran --

Q -- that the cables are proof that this is not a U.S. --

MR. GIBBS: No, no, Iran is a -- I think you can look at your outlet or almost any outlet in this room and figure out that there is a common concern about nuclear proliferation in Iran. I can discuss Iran and the threat that it poses without ever talking about a purported cable.

Q Then I guess to go back -- not impacting foreign policy, WikiLeaks is going to damage our foreign policy with -- our interactions with the country of Yemen, is it not?

MR. GIBBS: I will say that without, again, getting into the specifics of Yemen, that it is not just this country alone that shares a great concern about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the actors that are involved in that organization, and the harm and threat that they seek to export on a daily basis. Those are common concerns. They’re common counterterrorism threats that will be met with a sense of common purpose in dealing with worldwide.

Q Did the President know about the State Department-approved -- or reported or alleged State Department-approved spying on United Nations individuals?

MR. GIBBS: I think I addressed that earlier and I would point you to what Susan Rice said that we -- our diplomats are diplomats. We’re very proud of the work that our diplomats do in furthering our interests, in furthering the interests of the world, and I’d leave it at that.

Q So there’s no other -- should there be an investigation? Are you guys going to be looking into any --

MR. GIBBS: I don’t have --

...

MR. GIBBS: Jonathan, I think on a daily basis we anger many people. That comes with the job of governing. The President makes a series of decisions that he thinks are in the best interest of the country and I think, as he said today, not focused on the next election, but focused on the next generation. That's why the President made the decision that he made with the deadline that we had -- not as a bargaining chip or a bargaining tool, but because it was the right thing to do.

...

Q And your quarterback should really win the Heisman. Back on the leaked cables, is the U.S. considering moving anyone out of the field out of concern for their safety, either U.S. -- someone part of the diplomatic corps or people you’ve cooperated with --

MR. GIBBS: I would point you over to the State Department on the specifics of that answer.

Q And also, in terms of conversations that are taking place between this government and foreign governments, can you say anything about how other countries have reacted to this?

MR. GIBBS: Again, I’d also -- since those calls have happened at State, I’d point you to State on that.

...

Q Second question. On the -- there aren’t many jokes available. (Laughter.) On the WikiLeaks, there’s some information -- you mentioned that these are criminal acts. Is there anything to this notion that some of the disclosures, while clearly obtained through -- or allegedly obtained through a criminal act, actually help policymakers and the American people make better decisions? For instance, there’s a disclosure about a high-ranking Afghan official having $52 million in his possession. And as we know in the two previous document dumps, there were disclosures about civilian casualties. Do you think there is any good done by any of these three document dumps?

MR. GIBBS: Well, look, again, I’m not going to get into discussing the specifics of what might be in those reported documents. I think we have -- our administration has sought through executive order on classification, through a series of transparency moves, sought to involve the American people in the decision-making of government. And that’s something that is very important this President and to this administration.

I think, again, I’d point you to what the Secretary of State said. There is a need to have confidential and private discussions with a whole host of people when you’re conducting a robust foreign policy. That is important and that will always be important. I think the President believes there can be and should be a balance to that.

But at the same time, documents are classified a certain way based on the information that is in them and there are very specific rules and laws that have to be followed in handling that information and disseminating and talking about it. And that’s -- those are laws that everybody is compelled to and should follow.

...

Q Thanks. So beyond the guidance we got from the Pentagon yesterday on classified information and sharing information and stuff, are there any additional executive orders or memoranda that President Obama has signed while in office that are now in and of themselves going to be rescinded, tweaked, looked at?

MR. GIBBS: Can you -- give me a couple of examples.

Q Well, I don't know. There were like five or -- I went through yesterday and started looking at them. And I just wasn’t sure whether the release from the Pentagon covered everything or whether there is additional stuff --

MR. GIBBS: Let me take that and check with NSC [National Security Counsel] and get you --

Q Can I also ask --

MR. GIBBS: Yes.

Q Thanks. So as a matter of course, the President is not making calls on WikiLeaks to leaders.

MR. GIBBS: Right.

Q Does that mean that as a matter of protocol, he will not discuss WikiLeaks with leaders? Like, for example, next time he talks to a leader of Pakistan, is it just not coming up? Just everyone has decided it’s not going to be discussed?

MR. GIBBS: As I said earlier, I don't doubt that -- my answer to the earlier question was based more on whether or not he had been making those calls, and that those were being handled at State through the Secretary of State and at the foreign minister level. I do not, though, doubt that it’s a topic that could come up, and if it does come up in his dealings next with foreign leaders, that he certainly will address it. I don't doubt that.

I think ensuring with our allies and our partners around the world that listening to whatever -- listening to their concerns and ensuring that confidential conversations are handled responsibly and confidentially is important to -- not just to those countries, but also to this President.

All right? Thanks, guys.

Q Thank you.

(Source: White House)

29

Department of State | At a press briefing with State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley talks about the State Department Task Forces, including the WikiLeaks 24/7 Task force. Crowley says that the State Department has known about the impending State Department Cable release by WikiLeaks and has stood up a group to handle the release when it was published, because the State Department considers a "crisis" on a "global scale".

We have had conversations with news organizations that are in receipt of documents. We have expressed our concerns about the welfare of particular individuals who are cited in documents. We have outlined for news organizations the national interests that are potentially compromised by this release. But we continue to underscore that this release is damaging and does put individuals at considerable risk.

When asked why the State Department did not take WikiLeaks up on Mr. Assange's offer to redact sensitive national security information, despite the State Department's repeated statement's that the release put people's lives at risk, and the fact that Crowley admitted that the State Department did work with other news organizations, like the New York Times: "Look, I’m not going to – I’m not going to debate this. We provided our perspective to Mr. Assange on – in Harold Koh’s letter."

When asked whether or not the State Department, which was a partner in the ongoing investigation intended to charge Julian Assange, WikiLeaks, or other media organizations, Crowley responded, "We are treating this seriously. We see it as a crime. But the disclosure, unauthorized disclosure of information, in and of itself is not a terrorist act."

Full Transcript

Full Video

MR. CROWLEY: Good afternoon and welcome to the Department of State. Obviously, I’m sure the Secretary of State answered all of your questions on that particular subject. Let me mention just briefly a couple of other things before coming back to the issue that I’m sure you’re focused on today.

The Secretary this morning had a very productive session with Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu. They did talk about the WikiLeaks issue, and the foreign minister appreciated the direct and candid comments that the Secretary provided.

...

With that –

QUESTION: P.J., just a couple short things on the whole WikiLeaks fiasco. One, have you gotten any formal complaints or protests from foreign governments about this? I realize it wasn’t you that released them, but are you aware of any formal (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: I am confident that from embassies first and in succeeding days, we will hear reaction from various governments to bring you to the present point. The Secretary made a number of calls over the weekend to her counterparts. And from Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg, Under Secretary Bill Burns, the assistant secretaries, ambassadors, we did everything we can to reach out to governments in advance of the anticipated release of these documents. We will be doing follow-up calls during the course of the week.

We’re conscious of the fact that probably the stories that we’ve seen today are not the last ones to be reported on this subject, so we are going to continue this diplomatic outreach for as long as it takes. But I would expect that we will be having feedback from governments during the course of this process. I’m just not aware of any particular feedback at this point. Obviously, the Secretary had a chance to talk to Foreign Minister Davutoglu, as she indicated when she met with you earlier. She will have a number of conversations this week with her counterparts and other leaders during the OSCE Summit. So we’ll be getting some feedback.

QUESTION: Okay, and then the second thing is that do you – there is a lot of stuff in these cables that talks about the – what diplomats report back.

MR. CROWLEY: That’s a diplomatic term, “stuff.”

QUESTION: Yeah. (Laughter.) Talks about what diplomats – what American diplomats are expected to report back to Washington about their host government or foreign – other foreign leaders. There’s been a lot of handwringing, at least in Europe, about this kind of – about some of this kind of reporting in terms of the German political scene and the candid assessments of foreign leaders as well as this intelligence-gathering or gathering of biometric data at the UN. Will any of that change or are these going to continue to be kind of standard operating procedure for diplomats abroad? Or are you --

MR. CROWLEY: Well, and I’ll just establish the principle up front that we’re not going to talk about any particular cable.

In our conversations with our counterparts around the world, I think there is, in diplomatic circles, an understanding that this is what diplomats do. We have our diplomats posted around the world, many in challenging circumstances. They are trying – they’re interacting with government officials; they’re interacting with members of civil society; they’re trying to interpret events on the ground. These events are increasingly at a more rapid pace than perhaps might have occurred in the past. They report back what they see, what they hear to the State Department here in Washington and to other agencies across the government. Many of these reports are raw, unvarnished. They provide on-the-ground perspective. They inform policies. They inform actions.

But as the Secretary made clear, policies are set here in Washington. The information that is collected and provided is useful. In some cases it’s accurate. In some cases it’s not. In some cases it might be a vantage point from one foxhole that might – may or may not necessarily represent a broader perspective.

But this is what diplomats do. We’ve very proud of what our diplomats do. We will learn from this experience. As the Secretary has said, we’ve already made adjustments in how we – the access that we provide to our reporting documents. But we will not change how we do diplomacy around the world.

QUESTION: So the answer – the short answer to my question was no, it’s not going to change anything?

MR. CROWLEY: I liked my answer better.

QUESTION: Well, is that --

MR. CROWLEY: No. I mean we --

QUESTION: No. You --

MR. CROWLEY: It’s a very valid point. As the Secretary said, in some cases people leak information because they think there’s been wrongdoing. This is information that helps people understand how we conduct the foreign policy of the United States day in and day out in difficult assignments around the world. We’re very proud of our diplomats. We do – we think they do an excellent job of helping inform policy. We’re not going to change what we do.

QUESTION: Okay. So their instructions from Washington won’t change. And then the corollary to that is that – are you concerned at all that some people might water-down or be less candid in their appraisals of people because of this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I think the Secretary last night sent a message to the troops, if you will. And we’ll be making clear that we value the diplomatic work that is done at posts all over the world. We’ll – we are going to – we have already and we will continue to look to see how information is stored, who has access to that information, both within our department and across the government. But certainly, without getting into any specific cable, what you see here is information that is very, very important to the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States.

Jill.

QUESTION: P.J., specifically on that question of how this information is stored, the understanding that we seem to have is that post 9/11, in an effort to avoid stove-piping, they brought a lot of this information together under the DOD. Does the Secretary have a view at this point – I know Jack Lew said each organization, agency, now has to study, put together a team. But does the Secretary believe that it is a good idea for State Department cables and other communication to be in a system along with DOD?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we have stood here and we’ve talked about whole-of-government efforts on our policy. There’s a great deal of interaction between the State Department and the Defense Department and across other agencies of government. So you do have to share information to be able to have a common perspective on the development and execution of both a foreign policy that includes a military dimension and a civil dimension. So the sharing of information is vitally important to the coordination and conduct of our national security policies. That should not change.

I think the other phenomenon – one phenomenon, of course, is the imperative after 9/11 of a need to share. And we will evaluate that imperative against the need to protect or the need to know. And so this will be something that we will be reviewing, and there is obviously tension between those two approaches.

I think the other thing we’ve learned here is that it is not just the greater coordination and interaction across agencies, but it’s also the digitization of the information that is – comes into the State Department. If you go back probably 25 years, these were done by paper and teletypes and so on and so forth. We do have a digitized system that allows us to report in real time. That has great value and benefit.

But we have taken steps to review who has access to the networks and the databases on which our information and the information of other agencies is resident, and we will tighten up those access standards as we go forward. But we are – have been for many months reviewing the implications of this expected release.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: P.J. --

MR. CROWLEY: Yeah. Charlie.

QUESTION: With all respect, you didn’t answer Matt’s question about whether the language – whether you expect that the language from people reporting from the field to change – or I’ll use the word to soften, but that’s my word – or do you expect them to be as frank as they have been in the past?

MR. CROWLEY: I thought I did answer that question, which is we value the perspective that diplomats provide. We value the fact that they can have a wide range of contacts. We do understand that when we have a conversation with a diplomat and report on that conversation, that conversation is based on trust and confidence that the information will be protected.

And the real damage here is not that necessarily things will change inside the Department of State. We obviously are cognizant of the fact that the release of this information, which we condemn, violates the trust and confidence that we – with which we carry on our daily duties. We are going to have to reassure our contacts, other government officials, members of civil society, that in the future we will protect the information and confidences that they provide us, and we’re determined to do that.

QUESTION: P.J., the only people that seem to be happy or not embarrassed by the leaks are the Israelis. In fact, they feel that they are vindicated, because it shows that there are countries who want to strike Iran far more emphatically than they do. Any comment on that?

MR. CROWLEY: I don't think anybody is happy that this information has become publically [sic] available.

QUESTION: P.J., did you hear any angry words from any diplomat or from any country? And if Secretary has spoken with --

MR. CROWLEY: Goyal, that question has already been asked. We will continue our diplomatic outreach. We do expect, unfortunately, more information to come forward in the coming days. So we were going to continue our conversations and we will – we’re determined to make sure that the protagonists here are not successful in undermining the international system through which we collaborate and help to collectively solve global challenges.

As the Secretary said, this is really an attack on the system through which we are in daily contact with other countries, we identify common interests, we work through difficult issues, and we help solve these issues for the benefit of our people and the people around the world.

QUESTION: There is some information – can I just follow up --

MR. CROWLEY: Mary Beth.

QUESTION: Excuse me.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Is it correct that the State Department has set up sort of a war room or some crisis room or something like that to deal with this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we – as with any major event, whether it’s an earthquake on the one hand or something of a global scale like the release of these documents, we have set up a working group or a task force, if you will, and we are in continual contact with our posts around the world, assessing what is happening, reporting back on follow-up conversations that we are having with governments and with members of civil society. We took, we thought, aggressive action in anticipation of the release to warn our contacts of what was coming, and we’ll continue to have an ongoing dialogue with them as we manage this.

QUESTION: And is this like a 24/7 type --

MR. CROWLEY: Yeah, we –

QUESTION: -- war room sort of thing?

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, you’ve been around the State Department. We frequently put together these kinds of operations when you have crises that are going to endure for a period of time.

QUESTION: P.J., wasn’t that task force set up more than a week ago, or aren’t there several?

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the preparations were made several days ago when we had an understanding of what was coming. I believe it went into force on Friday.

[*****]

QUESTION: P.J., you mentioned all material that comes in that is generally opinion, but – the Secretary addressed that, as you have now. But what about the information that goes out from the State Department? Is that not policy? A message that goes out under the name of the State Department to the diplomats in the field, such as at the United Nations, is that not the very policy that you are talking about that is being made here in Washington?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, not every document that leaves the State Department is a policy statement. In some cases, it might be seeking information from a particular post.

QUESTION: But even when it’s allegedly titled “Policy Statement?”

MR. CROWLEY: Hang on, let me – I should establish a point since you mentioned this issue. We have hundreds of thousands of cables that go out from the State Department every single year. By tradition, any cable that leaves the State Department goes out under the name of the Secretary of State. That doesn’t mean that the Secretary of State is the author of each one of these cables.

Courtney.

QUESTION: So a couple of things. You just said that you established task force and working groups like this in the event of crises. Just to be clear, so the State Department considers this release of documents a crisis?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, this is a significant challenge. We’ve – it has global significance. We will do everything we can to make sure it does not undermine the close cooperation that we have with many, many countries, the alliances that we have with partners and friends around the world. We take this seriously because it has real-life ramifications, as the Secretary outlined.

[******]

QUESTION: She also --

MR. CROWLEY: We – go ahead.

QUESTION: She also outlined that there – that she assured the American people that there would be aggressive action against people who were responsible for leaking this information, these documents. Is there consideration at this point for some – charging the WikiLeaks people or charging the news organizations who put this information out --

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: -- as opposed to the (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: There – as I think the Attorney General has said today, there is an ongoing investigation. We’re supporting that investigation. We will hold the people responsible for this action accountable, and that investigation continues.

QUESTION: A follow-up. Did you see any country --

QUESTION: A follow-up, a follow-up.

MR. CROWLEY: All right. Hold on, Goyal. Goyal.

QUESTION: A follow-up on her thing. The Secretary said that this information was stolen. So are you pursuing this as a crime, as a thievery of some sort?

MR. CROWLEY: This information was stolen.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. CROWLEY: And the provision of classified information to someone who is not authorized to have it is, in fact, a crime. And we are treating it as such.

QUESTION: So in this case, would, let’s say, WikiLeaks be accused of robbery or something like this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, don’t – let’s not get ahead of the investigation. Someone within the United States Government with access to this information downloaded it and provided it to parties outside of the U.S. Government. We believe that is a violation of regulations, that’s a compromise of information, and that is a crime. And we are investigating it as such and we are prepared to prosecute if we can build a case. And that is an effort that is ongoing.

QUESTION: Congressman King has also said that he’d like to see WikiLeaks declared a terrorist organization. Is that a discussion that’s taking place at State right now?

MR. CROWLEY: We are treating this seriously. We see it as a crime. But the disclosure, unauthorized disclosure of information, in and of itself is not a terrorist act.

QUESTION: P.J., you just said someone within the U.S. Government with access to the information downloaded it. Are you referring to Bradley Manning? And are you ruling --

MR. CROWLEY: I’m not referring to anybody. I’m just saying that --

QUESTION: And are you ruling out that – anyone outside of the government?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, I’m not – there is an ongoing investigation. What you do know, what we do know is that this information was resident inside a U.S. Government database, on a U.S. Government network. It was downloaded and then released to somebody who was not authorized to have it. That is a crime, we – and we are investigating and we are prepared to hold anyone responsible for this accountable.

QUESTION: But P.J., do you see any outside hand --

MR. CROWLEY: All right. Goyal --

QUESTION: On this, you just mentioned about you are going to hold them accountable. All the WikiLeaks articles which are appearing in the media are not coming from the WikiLeaks site itself. They are coming from New York Times and other media which are also releasing. And are you planning anything – because the Secretary said it’s stolen – so are you planning anything against the media?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, I’ve gone as far as I’m going to go on this particular line of questioning. We are investigating aggressively, and we will hold those responsible accountable.

QUESTION: And about – in India there is this one news that has come out is about that Secretary Clinton said that the G-4 countries are self-proclaimed seat-grabbers for UNSC. Would you like to comment?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, I’m not going to comment on the contents of any cable.

QUESTION: P.J., could you just give us a rundown of who the Secretary has called? And did she call anybody else today or was it all previous to the release?

MR. CROWLEY: I’m not aware that she’s had any calls today. She had a number of calls over the weekend. I think we’ve got a list. I’ll give it to you.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that --

MR. CROWLEY: Yeah.

QUESTION: How many reset buttons State Department is going to (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: We don’t think that we have to reset anything here. We have relations with many, many countries around the world. We have – and these relationships are based on mutual interests, mutual respect. We cooperate and collaborate with friends and partners on a range of issues. What you see here is the breadth of our engagement around the world and the breadth of the foreign policy of the United States. Where we do have tensions or differences, we engage and work through those wherever we can. We’re not going to change our policy as a result of this and we’re not going to change our commitment to engage the world both in the pursuit of our interest and the pursuit of common interests.

QUESTION: P.J., were you under immense pressure by the Saudis and the other GCC countries to pursue a more vigorous and more aggressive posture towards Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: We continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and a range of countries in the region. We all see a danger with the direction that Iran is on. We want to see Iran change direction and play a more constructive role in the region and around the world --

QUESTION: So they are --

MR. CROWLEY: -- and live up to its international obligations.

QUESTION: They are pressuring you to take more aggressive action toward Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: We are fully engaged with Saudi Arabia and many other countries. We all see the danger posed by Iran in a similar way.

QUESTION: WikiLeaks in their tweet to reply to the Secretary’s comments just now has said Hillary says U.S. taking in course aggressive steps against us, take some yourselves. What exactly they mean by that?

MR. CROWLEY: I have no idea. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: P.J., what I was asking just quickly, one, you still have not repaired from the last leak and now comes this statement – State Department leak and what – where are we heading next? And second, if Secretary has spoken with anybody in India or Pakistan because some information is there between the two countries?

MR. CROWLEY: We have had multiple conversations with officials in India. And like India and other countries, we’ll continue those conversations in the coming days.

QUESTION: And finally, do you see any outside hand? You said somebody in the U.S. Government, but is there an outside --

MR. CROWLEY: Goyal, again, we are investigating all of these issues.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

QUESTION: Can I just have – kind of not related to WikiLeaks, but --

MR. CROWLEY: Hold on. Are we done with WikiLeaks?

QUESTION: No, hold on, hold on.

QUESTION: No, just one more.

MR. CROWLEY: Darn. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: P.J., you spoke generally about the role of diplomats overseas providing candid information to Washington. Is part of that role to gather personal information on the people and sources they come in contact with?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I think as Ambassador Rice emphasized and the Secretary emphasized, diplomats are diplomats, and they are not intelligence assets. But by the same token, and this is something that our diplomats do and the diplomats of many, many other countries do, in the course of the normal conduct of their duties they come across information. And if that information is useful and valuable, they provide it to the appropriate people within the United States Government.

QUESTION: So would it be inappropriate if State employees gathered personal information, say, frequent flyer number of a government official, and then passed it on? Would that be wrong?

MR. CROWLEY: I’m – you’re now into a particular document that I won’t discuss.

QUESTION: The Secretary said that she’s directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department in addition to the DOD actions. What are those specific actions?

MR. CROWLEY: We’ve reviewed, in light of this, who has access to our documents and we’ve reviewed the networks on which these documents are available. I can’t go any further than that.

QUESTION: When did that review start?

MR. CROWLEY: It started weeks ago when we first learned of this.

QUESTION: The October – so it started after the October WikiLeaks release, but before this one? Or did it – was it --

MR. CROWLEY: Again, we’ve known about this for some time. We’ve been investigating and cooperating in trying to first assess the potential impact of this and how it happened and what we should do to prevent a reoccurrence. And we’ve taken steps and will continue to work across the government, as we need to, to protect the information that is important to us.

QUESTION: How long have you known about this? How long have you known about (inaudible)?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, the compromise happened months ago. And we have been working diligently with other agencies of government to assess the impact, understand what might have been downloaded and provided outside of the government. And we’ve been prepared for this day for some time.

QUESTION: Change of topic?

QUESTION: No, no, no.

QUESTION: Have you got an idea of exactly what is in the documents with the relation to the region of India and Pakistan, that area?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, I don’t think I can answer that question without getting into the contents of documents, which we won’t do.

QUESTION: No, but the Secretary’s talking to the counterparts. On what basis she is talking?

MR. CROWLEY: As a colleague --

QUESTION: Just sweet --

MR. CROWLEY: -- friend and --

QUESTION: No, like sweet nothings.

MR. CROWLEY: Hmm?

QUESTION: Is she saying hello, hi, bye?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, we have called governments to warn them about what was happening, and we will continue to answer any question that they have as this continues.

QUESTION: No. I just want to know what exactly has the State Department spoken with Delhi, with New Delhi.

MR. CROWLEY: We’ve had multiple conversations through Ambassador Roemer. I think Under Secretary Burns and others have been in touch with their counterparts in India.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on an earlier question, is it your belief that all of the gathering of biometric data is legal on the part of diplomats?

MR. CROWLEY: Diplomats – we both promote democracy, the rule of law, and we obey United States law.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: International law – also there’s international law --

MR. CROWLEY: Again, our diplomats don’t break the law.

QUESTION: Okay. Hmm. (Laughter.) I’m not sure about that. I think diplomats have in the past --

MR. CROWLEY: Endorsed by the Associated Press.

QUESTION: I think they have in the past broken the law.

MR. CROWLEY: You’re --

QUESTION: Maybe not on instruction from Washington, but diplomats are like everyone else and they do break the law.

MR. CROWLEY: And if and when those rare occasions occur, they are dealt with appropriately.

QUESTION: Right. And on Saturday night, you released this letter that Harold Koh had written to Mr. Assange, which said that you would not cooperate with WikiLeaks in redacting or identifying, or I think his term was nominating, any specific people or places, things that should be removed or redacted from these documents.

One, have you had any – has there been any further contact with Mr. Assange on this since his letter – his reply to Harold Koh through the U.S. Ambassador in London on Sunday?

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: Okay. And secondly, it’s my understanding, or at least The New York Times says that it did cooperate with the State Department in removing, redacting some information that was deemed to put people at risk. Is that correct?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, let me – there are two issues there. First, obviously, Mr. Assange made an offer to the State Department after releasing information to other organizations, who, like Mr. Assange, did not have authorization to have this information. So if he was truly interested in the welfare of ordinary people and sources of information that are now at risk because of this release, he could have done this several months ago.

[*****]

We have had conversations with news organizations that are in receipt of documents. We have expressed our concerns about the welfare of particular individuals who are cited in documents. We have outlined for news organizations the national interests that are potentially compromised by this release. But we continue to underscore that this release is damaging and does put individuals at considerable risk.

QUESTION: Right. But – so my question is why, since you just said that you did cooperate with news organizations, or at least point out to them stuff that they should redact, and I think in many cases they did do that, why cooperate with them and not with WikiLeaks itself? It seems to me that if you were truly concerned about these people at risk, you would have told them they’re going to publish everything online, whereas the newspapers and magazines are going to select what they want to --

MR. CROWLEY: Well, as --

QUESTION: So --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean --

QUESTION: Isn’t it better late than never?

MR. CROWLEY: Mr. Koh delivered the bottom line of the United States Government, which is that this information should not have been released and should be returned to the United States.

QUESTION: All right. Well, that’s trying to put the horse back in the barn.

MR. CROWLEY: It is our information, it’s our property, and that is our position. And he came to us at the eleventh hour and made an offer to address concerns, but that is after he had already released information to entities that themselves were not authorized to have it.

QUESTION: Right. But I guess my point is that if you are still concerned that people are at risk, why not accept that offer to put – to eliminate that risk rather than just saying no, we’re not going to --

MR. CROWLEY: Matt, I think our Legal Adviser’s letter answered your questions.

QUESTION: Well, no, actually, it didn’t answer the question.

QUESTION: Matt, I’m not – (inaudible).

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, Matt’s question, that by saying – denying this, saying no, aren’t you okaying the release?

MR. CROWLEY: No, we abhor this release. We decry this release. This release has put lives at risk. That has been our clear, compelling position of the United States Government throughout this unfortunate process.

QUESTION: Well, Mr. Assange says that in response to – in response to Harold Koh’s letter, he said that your refusal to cooperate indicates that your security fears are fanciful – his word, and by not cooperating with him and thereby allowing or thereby giving him – not giving him the opportunity to redact this sensitive information, aren’t you complicit in it yourself?

MR. CROWLEY: No. Well, we’re --

QUESTION: I mean, you had the chance to take people’s names out and --

MR. CROWLEY: Look, I’m not going to – I’m not going to debate this. We provided our perspective to Mr. Assange on – in Harold Koh’s letter.

...

QUESTION: Have you replied to the letters from the U.S. Congressman to the Secretary? The latest is from the Republican Peter T. King.

MR. CROWLEY: We have his letter.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. CROWLEY: Thank you.

(Source: Department of State)

29

Department of State | Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton says, "The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people’s lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems...this disclosure is not just an attack on America’s foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community – the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity."

Clinton also says, "I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department"

Clinton also says, "Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends...There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases."

Full Transcript

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon. Do we have enough room in here? I want to take a moment to discuss the recent news reports of classified documents that were illegally provided from United States Government computers. In my conversations with counterparts from around the world over the past few days, and in my meeting earlier today with Foreign Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, I have had very productive discussions on this issue.

The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people’s lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems. This Administration is advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America’s national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy, to thwarting international terrorism, to stopping the spread of catastrophic weapons, to advancing human rights and universal values. In every country and in every region of the world, we are working with partners to pursue these aims.

So let’s be clear: this disclosure is not just an attack on America’s foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community – the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.

I am confident that the partnerships that the Obama Administration has worked so hard to build will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority – and we are proud of the progress that they have helped achieve – and they will remain at the center of our efforts.

I will not comment on or confirm what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or our diplomats’ personal assessments and observations. I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world.

I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again.

Relations between governments aren’t the only concern created by the publication of this material. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person’s identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.

So whatever are the motives in disseminating these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to the very people who have dedicated their own lives to protecting others.

Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.

There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases. In contrast, what is being put on display in this cache of documents is the fact that American diplomats are doing the work we expect them to do. They are helping identify and prevent conflicts before they start. They are working hard every day to solve serious practical problems – to secure dangerous materials, to fight international crime, to assist human rights defenders, to restore our alliances, to ensure global economic stability. This is the role that America plays in the world. This is the role our diplomats play in serving America. And it should make every one of us proud.

The work of our diplomats doesn’t just benefit Americans, but also billions of others around the globe. In addition to endangering particular individuals, disclosures like these tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.

People of good faith understand the need for sensitive diplomatic communications, both to protect the national interest and the global common interest. Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view – but this is not unique to diplomacy. In almost every profession – whether it’s law or journalism, finance or medicine or academia or running a small business – people rely on confidential communications to do their jobs. We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off for it. And so despite some of the rhetoric we’ve heard these past few days, confidential communications do not run counter to the public interest. They are fundamental to our ability to serve the public interest.

In America, we welcome genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. We have elections about them. That is one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. It is part of who we are and it is a priority for this Administration. But stealing confidential documents and then releasing them without regard for the consequences does not serve the public good, and it is not the way to engage in a healthy debate.

In the past few days, I have spoken with many of my counterparts around the world, and we have all agreed that we will continue to focus on the issues and tasks at hand. In that spirit, President Obama and I remain committed to productive cooperation with our partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for all.

Thank you, and I’d be glad to take a few questions.

MR. CROWLEY: We’ll begin with Charlie Wolfson of CBS in his last week here covering the State Department.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Where are you going, Charlie?

QUESTION: I’ll (inaudible) into the sunset, but let me get to a question.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, sir. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, are you embarrassed by these leaks personally, professionally? And what harm have the leaks done to the U.S. so far that you can determine from talking to your colleagues?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Charlie, as I said in my statement, and based on the many conversations that I’ve had with my counterparts, I am confident that the partnerships and relationships that we have built in this Administration will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority, a real centerpiece of our foreign policy, and we’re proud of the progress that we have made over the last 22 months.

Every single day, U.S. Government representatives from the entire government, not just from the State Department, engage with hundreds if not thousands of government representatives and members of civil society from around the world. They carry out the goals and the interests and the values of the United States. And it is imperative that we have candid reporting from those who are in the field working with their counterparts in order to inform our decision-making back here in Washington.

I can tell you that in my conversations, at least one of my counterparts said to me, “Well, don’t worry about it. You should see what we say about you.” (Laughter.) So I think that this is well understood in the diplomatic community as part of the give-and-take. And I would hope that we will be able to move beyond this and back to the business of working together on behalf of our common goals.

MR. CROWLEY: Kim Ghattas of BBC.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Kim.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, I was wondering whether you could tell us what you think your upcoming trip is going to look like. Presumably, a lot of the people who have been mentioned in those alleged cables are going to have conversations with you. Do you think it’s going to cause you discomfort over the coming week as you engage in conversations with those leaders?

And I know you don’t want to comment on the particulars of the cables, but one issue that has been brought up into the daylight is the debate about Iran. What do you think the impact is going to be of those documents on the debate about Iran in the coming weeks and months?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Kim, you’re right. And I don’t know if you’re going on this trip or not, but we will be seeing dozens of my counterparts in Astana, and then as I go on from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and then ending up in Bahrain for the Manama dialogue. And I will continue the conversations that I have started with some in person and over the phone over the last days, and I will seek out others because I want personally to impress upon them the importance that I place on the kind of open, productive discussions that we have had to date and my intention to continue working closely with them.

Obviously, this is a matter of great concern, because we don’t want anyone in any of the countries that could be affected by these alleged leaks here to have any doubts about our intentions and our about commitments. That’s why I stressed in my remarks that policy is made in Washington. The President and I have been very clear about our goals and objectives in dealing with the full range of global challenges that we face. And we will continue to be so and we will continue to look for every opportunity to work with our friends and partners and allies around the world and to deal in a very clear-eyed way with those with whom we have differences, which of course brings me to Iran.

I think that it should not be a surprise to anyone that Iran is a source of great concern not only in the United States, that what comes through in every meeting that I have anywhere in the world is a concern about Iranian actions and intentions. So if anything, any of the comments that are being reported on allegedly from the cables confirm the fact that Iran poses a very serious threat in the eyes of many of her neighbors, and a serious concern far beyond her region.

That is why the international community came together to pass the strongest possible sanctions against Iran. It did not happen because the United States went out and said, “Please do this for us.” It happened because countries, once they evaluated the evidence concerning Iran’s actions and intentions, reached the same conclusion that the United States reached – that we must do whatever we can to muster the international community to take action to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

So if anyone reading the stories about these alleged cables thinks carefully, what they will conclude is that the concern about Iran is well founded, widely shared, and will continue to be at the source of the policy that we pursue with likeminded nations to try to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

MR. CROWLEY: We’ve got to let the Secretary get to her airplane and get to her trip. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I will leave you in P.J.’s very good hands. Thank you.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, did you talk to anyone in Pakistan or India?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you all.

QUESTION: Thank you, Madam. (Inaudible).

MR. CROWLEY: What we’ll do is we’ll take, say, a 30-minute filing break, and then we’ll reconvene in the Briefing Room and continue our discussion.

(Source: Department of State)

28 Department of Defense | Department of Defense publishes press release entitled, "Officials Condemn Leaks, Detail Prevention Efforts"

Press Release

"By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28, 2010 – Government officials condemned the publication of hundreds of thousands of sensitive, classified State Department cables by WikiLeaks today.

The website published the documents that detail private U.S. diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. The cables are candid reports by diplomats and, seen by themselves, can give an incomplete picture of the relationship between the United States and the foreign governments, White House officials said.

The cables are not expressions of policy, nor do they always shape final policy decisions. “Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only U.S. foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world,” White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a press release.

“To be clear, such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government,” he continued.

The release of the documents may risk the lives of diplomats and friends living under repressive regimes. The United States stands for responsible, open government at home and around the world, Gibbs said.

“This reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal,” he said. “By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.”

Today’s posting is the third WikiLeaks publication of sensitive U.S. documents. The last publication included military and intelligence reports from Afghanistan, and another contained similar documents from Iraq. Newspaper and magazine journalists in the United States and Europe received and reviewed the documents from WikiLeaks and have written stories on their content.

The Pentagon has put in place methods to minimize such thefts of classified materials.

“It is now much more difficult for a determined actor to get access to and move information outside of authorized channels,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said in a written statement following publication of news articles on the documents today.

The theft of the materials traces to the lack of sharing of information and intelligence prior to and after the Sept.11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The commission studying the environment at the time found that agencies weren’t sharing enough information with each other. While stopping short of saying better sharing could have prevented the attacks, the 9-11 Commission pointed this out as a weakness that needed to be closed.

Federal officials responded by working to push out more information and intelligence in an effort to strike a balance between the “need to know” and the need to “share to win.”

“Departments and agencies have taken significant steps to reduce those obstacles, and the work that has been done to date has resulted in considerable improvement in information-sharing and increased cooperation across government operations,” Whitman said.

The effort backfired in that it made it easier for individuals or groups inside the process to steal the information. DOD responded by putting in place policies to prevent such occurrences, while still giving information and intelligence to the people who need it most – those confronting the realities of terrorism.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered two reviews of information and intelligence sharing in August.

The review called on DOD systems to disable all “write” capability for removable media on classified computers to mitigate the risks of personnel moving classified data to unclassified systems, Whitman said.

The reviews also direct DOD organizations to have a limited number of systems authorized to move data from classified to unclassified systems, he said.

DOD organizations are also implementing two-person handling rules for moving data from classified to unclassified systems to ensure proper oversight and reduce chances of unauthorized release of classified material, Whitman said.

DOD is also taking a page from credit card companies which monitor patterns and detect suspicious or anomalous behavior. Some 60 percent of DOD’s classified net is now using a host-based security system – an automated way of controlling the computer system with a capability of monitoring unusual data access or usage. The department is speeding deployment to the rest of the classified system, Whitman said.

In addition, the department is conducting security oversight inspections in forward-deployed areas, undertaking vulnerability assessments of DOD networks and improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures.

U.S. Central Command, for example, has increased insider threat training for its intelligence professionals and
started multidiscipline training between traditional security, law enforcement and information assurance at all echelons.

The command also has established insider threat working groups to address the Wikileaks incident and prevent reoccurrence. "

28 White House Executive Office of Management and Budget | Jacob Lew Director of the Office of Budget and Management published his "Memo for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies regarding WikiLeaks - Mishandling of Classified Information", saying, "significant irresponsible disclosure by WikiLeaks has resulted in significant damage to our national security." Memo (M-II-06)

(Source: Jacob Lew, White House, PDF)

He writes, "Each department or agency that handles classified information shall establish a security assessment team consisting of counterintelligence, security, and information assurance experts to review the agency’s implementation of procedures for safeguarding classified information against improper disclosures. Such review should include (without limitation) evaluation of the agency’s configuration of classified government systems to ensure that users do not have broader access than is necessary to do their jobs effectively, as well as implementation of restrictions on usage of, and removable media capabilities from, classified government computer networks.

The Office of Management and Budget, the Information Security Oversight Office, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will stand up processes to evaluate, and to assist agencies in their review of, security practices with respect to the protection of classified information.

See also

28

White House | The official statement by the White House Press Secretary on the WikiLeaks release of State Department cables states: "releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information."

Despite saying on November 29, 2010 in a press conference that WikiLeaks release of State Department cables does not have an impact on U.S. foreign policy, in this statement, one day prior, Gibbs says the release of private conversations with foreign governments and opposition leaders "deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world."

We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world. [GIBBS SAYS IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THE NEXT DAY, NOV. 29, 2010 THAT THE RELEASE WILL NOT AFFECT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY] To be clear -- such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.

(Source: White House)

28 Department of State | State Department creates a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues by the release of documents. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

28

Department of State | State Department suspends SIPRNet access to Net Centric Diplomacy Database (SIPRNet is a Department of Defense network).

Department suspends access to the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database of diplomatic reporting , and its classified “ClassNet” web sites and SharePoint sites previously accessible through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), while retaining access via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.

[Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

"Department has suspended access to the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database of diplomatic reporting , and its classified “ClassNet” web sites and SharePoint sites previously accessible through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), while retaining access via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System."

(Source: White House Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet "U.S. Government Mitigation Efforts in Light of the Recent Unlawful Disclosure of Classified Information")

28 Department of State | State Department creates a group to review potential risk to individuals. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department WikiLeaks Working Group, 24/7 WikiLeaks Information Review Task Force]

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

28 Department of State | State Department Establishes 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials throughout State Department, notably regional bureaus. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Information Review Task Force]

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

28 WikiLeaks starts publishing US State Department Cables.

"WikiLeaks began on Sunday November 28th 2010 publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain. The documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US Government foreign activities. (PDF)

The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February 2010, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. 15,652 of the cables are classified Secret." (Source: wikileaks.org)

28 WikiLeaks moves servers to Amazon.

Need sources.

28 WikiLeaks publishes "all released leaks archive".

All released leaks archive

"Due to recent attacks on our infrastructure, we’ve decided to make sure everyone can reach our content. As part of this process we’re releasing archived copy of all files we ever released - that’s almost 20,000 files. The archive linked here contains a torrent generated for each file and each directory." (Source: wikileaks.org)

28 Lieberman staffers call Amazon. Amazon responds they have kicked them off the servers.

"Committee staff had seen news reports yesterday that WikiLeaks was being hosted on Amazon’s servers, a committee spokeswoman told TPM. The service, we should note, is self-serve; as with services like YouTube, the company does not screen or pre-approve the content posted on its servers.

Staffers then, according to the spokeswoman, Leslie Phillips, called Amazon to ask about it, and left questions with a press secretary including, “Are there plans to take the site down?”

Amazon called them back this morning to say they had kicked WikiLeaks off, Phillips said. Amazon said the site had violated unspecified terms of use." (Source: TPM, How Lieberman Got Amazon To Drop WikiLeaks)

pre
28
Department of State | State Department sends e-mail to Capitol Hill "predicting dire consequences"

"Shortly before WikiLeaks began its gradual release of State Department cables last year, department officials sent emails to contacts on Capitol Hill predicting dire consequences, said one of the two congressional aides briefed on the internal government reviews." (Source: Reuters, U.S. Official: WikiLeaks Revelations 'Embarrassing But Not Damaging')

27 Rep Kucinich remarks about WikiLeaks in Congressional Record.

"Mr. KUCINICH. Wake up, America. WikiLeaks' release of secret war documents gave us 92,000 reasons to end the wars. Pick one.

Wake up, America. Main Street is falling apart, businesses have closed, bankruptcies abound, people are losing their jobs, their homes, losing their retirement security, the middle class is falling apart, workers' rights are not being protected, the government's out of money. There's not even money for childhood nutrition.

Wake up, America. There's unlimited money for war, money for a corrupt government in Afghanistan. When U.S. money is not going to the Karzai mob's personal use, it goes to help the Taliban kill our troops. There's money for a corrupt government in Pakistan, which helps the Taliban in Afghanistan kill our troops. Meanwhile, our troops are committing suicide in record numbers.

Wake up, America. How can we solve the world's problems if we can't solve our own problems here at home?"
(Source: Congressional Record)

27
-
28
Department of State | Secretary of State makes telephone calls to counterparts about the upcoming WikiLeaks of U.S. State Department Cables.

MR. CROWLEY: The Secretary made a number of calls over the weekend to her counterparts. And from Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg, Under Secretary Bill Burns, the assistant secretaries, ambassadors, we did everything we can to reach out to governments in advance of the anticipated release of these documents. We will be doing follow-up calls during the course of the week.

QUESTION: P.J., could you just give us a rundown of who the Secretary has called? And did she call anybody else today or was it all previous to the release?

MR. CROWLEY: I’m not aware that she’s had any calls today. She had a number of calls over the weekend. I think we’ve got a list. I’ll give it to you.

(Source: Department of State)

27 Department of State | State Department Legal Adviser, and strong proponent of targeted drone killing, Harold Hongju Koh, sends a letter to Ms. Jennifer Robinson, attorney for Mr. Julian Assange, which notes the approximately 250,000 documents that have been provided to select press outlets by WikiLeaks.

Harold Hongju Koh bio on lilsis.org

NB It appears, Mr. Koh is a former director of Human Rights First AND strangely a strong proponent of targeted drone killing "in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries included by the U.S. government as being within the scope of the war on terror."

"...letter by the Department of State Legal Adviser, Harold Hongju Koh, to Ms. Jennifer Robinson, attorney for Mr. Julian Assange, which notes the approximately 250,000 documents that have been provided to select press outlets by WikiLeaks." (Source: thomas.local.gov)

26

Department of State | According to P.J. Crowley, while the WikiLeaks 24/7 Task Force was stood up prior to its launch, because the State Department had intelligence that WikiLeaks was in possession of its cables, the State Department's 24/7 WikiLeaks Task Force was officially launched.

The State Department WikiLeaks 24/7 Task Force handled the WikiLeaks release of cables as a "crisis" on a "global" scale and were primarily concerned with press coverage of the cables, because the Secretary of State was traveling.

Even before the WikiLeaks 24/7 Task force launched State Department Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg, Under Secretary Bill Burns, the assistant secretaries, ambassadors, reach out to governments in advance of the anticipated release of these documents.

[Tags: WikiLeaks 24/7 Task Force]

P.J. Crowley: Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg, Under Secretary Bill Burns, the assistant secretaries, ambassadors, we did everything we can to reach out to governments in advance of the anticipated release of these documents. We will be doing follow-up calls during the course of the week.

P.J. Crowley: We’re conscious of the fact that probably the stories that we’ve seen today are not the last ones to be reported on this subject, so we are going to continue this diplomatic outreach for as long as it takes.

...

QUESTION: Is it correct that the State Department has set up sort of a war room or some crisis room or something like that to deal with this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we – as with any major event, whether it’s an earthquake on the one hand or something of a global scale like the release of these documents, we have set up a working group or a task force, if you will, and we are in continual contact with our posts around the world, assessing what is happening, reporting back on follow-up conversations that we are having with governments and with members of civil society. We took, we thought, aggressive action in anticipation of the release to warn our contacts of what was coming, and we’ll continue to have an ongoing dialogue with them as we manage this.

QUESTION: And is this like a 24/7 type --

MR. CROWLEY: Yeah, we –

QUESTION: -- war room sort of thing?

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, you’ve been around the State Department. We frequently put together these kinds of operations when you have crises that are going to endure for a period of time.

QUESTION: P.J., wasn’t that task force set up more than a week ago, or aren’t there several?

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the preparations were made several days ago when we had an understanding of what was coming. I believe it went into force on Friday.

(Source: Department of State)

23 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xxiii) 23 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 19 November 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

21-27 White House | US President is briefed by James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) about the upcoming release of State Department Cables in his daily intelligence brief.

  • "MR. GIBBS: I was not in the PDB [President's Daily Brief] when the President was directly briefed on this. This would actually not have been yesterday, but would have been sometime last week when -- after we became aware of the upcoming release. The President was briefed by those in his daily intelligence briefing on the size the scope of the information that was to become public. And obviously, the Secretary of State and the State Department at a foreign minister level have been very active in discussions with our allies and our partners around the world about what is in these documents."

    Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 11/29/2010

  • The calls have originated -- the calls that our government has made have originated from the State Department and the Secretary of State, so I would refer you more specifically to them.  The President has not been on the phone around this. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 11/29/2010

20 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign

20 Swedish prosecutor Marianne Ny issues a European Arrest Warrant for Assange, and authorizes an Interpol Red Notice concerning him. She ignores arranging an interview with Julian Assange via Mutual Legal Assistance, an established mechanism for international co-operation. Marianne Ny states that it is not possible under Swedish law to interview Julian Assange in English, which is not true.

"20 November 2010 Prosecutor Ny issues a European Arrest Warrant for Assange and authorizes an Interpol Red Notice concerning him. In doing so, she ignores the less drastic alternative of arranging to interview him via Mutual Legal Assistance, an established mechanism for international co-operation. Ms. Ny states that it is not possible under Swedish law to interview him in England. That is an outright lie; there is no such law." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

20

EU-US Summit, Lisbon | EU and US leaders met on Saturday 20 November in Lisbon, Portugal, for their yearly summit. The EU was represented by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, assisted by High Representative Catherine Ashton. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht was also attending.

The US was represented by President Barack Obama assisted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

"Recognizing this, as well as the growing challenge of cyber-security and cyber-crime, we established an EU-U.S.Working Group on Cyber-security and Cyber-crime, which will address a number of specific priority areas and will report progress within a year. We welcomed the successful negotiation earlier this year of an agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme."

Source: eeas.europa.eu

"Recognizing this, as well as the growing challenge of cyber-security and cyber-crime, we established an EU-U.S.Working Group on Cyber-security and Cyber-crime, which will address a number of specific priority areas and will report progress within a year. We welcomed the successful negotiation earlier this year of an agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme." (Source: Results of the Summit." (PDF)

19 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xxiii) 23 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 19 November 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review.'"[WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

18 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign calls Julian Assange a "fugitive"

17 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning.

"xxii) 17 November 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry also noted that 'during the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND‟s attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and stated that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

17 Senator Bond remarks in the Congressional Record about his tenure on the Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, pre NDAA, FISA, Patriot Act, "Culture of Disclosure", GTMO and WikiLeaks

Former Senator Kit Bond bio on lilsis.org

Committee memberships:

Senate Appropriations Committee  (was ranking member), Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related, was VC of Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee (part of the House Appropriations Committee), and Defense Subcommittee (a part of the House Appropriations Committee), Senate Appropriations Committee and sub Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee and sub State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Subcommittee and sub Energy and Water Development Subcommittee and sub Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration..., Senate Environment and Public Works Committee

"Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning business for up to 15 minutes, with the time to be charged against the debate post cloture.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVES

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have had the distinct privilege over the past 8 years of serving on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, serving as the committee's vice chairman for the past 4 years. In this role I have been privy to our Nation's deepest secrets, including great successes and some failures. Unfortunately, the failures usually get leaked to the media while most of the successes go unheralded. While I am not at liberty to discuss those successes here, I can witness to the fact that we have an outstanding fleet of intelligence personnel who selflessly sacrifice their time, and sometimes their lives, to protect our great Nation. Those professionals deserve our undying gratitude, and we all can be proud of their service. It has been a distinct privilege to me to oversee their work, and for their dedication to our Nation, I am ever grateful.

As I leave the Senate, having served in this privileged capacity as vice chair of the Intelligence Committee, I leave for my colleagues some thoughts, and recommendations on improvements that can be made on intelligence matters going forward, which I believe will enhance our national security.

First, let me start with the Congress. Members of Congress often like to criticize the executive branch, as is appropriate, but Congress needs to get its own house in order as well. I joined the Select Committee on Intelligence in 2003, and during the past 8 years the committee has had three chairmen: Senators Roberts, Rockefeller, and Feinstein; and two vice chairmen: Senator Rockefeller and me. It has been a challenging time, and we have had our highs and our lows. After December 2004, the committee failed to pass an annual authorization bill that could become law for almost 6 years; this was due purely to politics in the Congress.

Although the committee was able to pass unanimously results from an investigation on pre-Iraq war intelligence failures, it was by and large hindered by political infighting for several years. In 2003, a memo was found written by a committee staffer that advocated attacking intelligence issues for political gain to damage the Republican administration and the Republican majorities. That memo was ultimately discredited by my friends on the other side of the aisle, but it marked a low point in the committee's history, and it should never happen again. Chairman Feinstein and I have worked hard to bring the committee back into bipartisan operation of intelligence oversight. We hope that the Intelligence Authorization Act that the President signed into law recently has helped in getting the committees back on track.

One area where I strongly believe the Congress has yet to heed the warnings of the 9/11 Commission and other study groups is in reforming its approach to appropriations for intelligence. That is why in 2008, the SSCI passed a resolution to establish an appropriations subcommittee on intelligence, something the full Senate had already passed in 2004. Yet the Appropriations Committee has failed to act. I continue to believe this is vital to improving oversight and funding of our Nation's intelligence, and I urge the Senate in the next Congress to make this happen.

The past 8 years have been ground-breaking years in Intelligence, particularly as the war on terrorism has played out in Afghanistan and Iraq. As I speak today, U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan continue to fight terrorists--al-Qaida, the Taliban, Haqqani, and others who threaten the stability and future of the region. They fight not only to bring stability to the region but to disrupt the sanctuaries and dismantle the organizations that can and do facilitate terrorist attacks against the United States at home, our troops in the field, and our allies abroad.

My profound respect and gratitude goes out to those serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the globe. We have asked so much of them and their families. They have made enormous, in some cases ultimate, sacrifices, and our Nation is forever in their debt.

As we learned in Iraq, fighting the enemy is not enough. A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is required. It must combine kinetic power--military attacks against terrorists and insurgents--with ``smart power''--the development of host nation capabilities and infrastructure, and a sensible mix of economic, development, educational, and diplomatic strategies. We know that understanding the complexities of the region and the forces at play puts additional burdens on the resources and capabilities of the intelligence community. But we also know that without a viable and appropriately resourced counter-insurgency strategy, we will not see success in Afghanistan, and the future of Pakistan will remain in doubt. Driving terrorist safe havens out of Afghanistan is crucial but insufficient if al-Qaida and Taliban militants continue to find sanctuary in the remote border regions of western Pakistan.

Eliminating the terrorist threat to the United States that emanates from terrorist sanctuaries in the region is our No. 1 goal. A U.S. withdrawal, in whole or in part, from Afghanistan in the near term would be a tacit, yet unambiguous, approval for the return of Taliban control of Afghanistan. In turn, this would lead to the establishment of more safe havens for many of the world's most violent and feared terrorists.

But what happens when our forces eventually pull back? Replacing those sanctuaries with secure environments and stable governance is the key to ensuring that terrorists do not gain another foothold in the future.

As we have fought this war in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we have learned a lot about al-Qaida, terrorism, and our own intelligence capabilities. On July 9, 2004, the committee unanimously issued its phase I report on the prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. I view this truly bipartisan effort as one of the committee's most successful oversight accomplishments.

The comprehensive 511-page Iraq WMD report identified numerous analytic and collection failures in the intelligence community's work on Iraq's WMD programs. These underlying failures caused most of the major key judgments in the Iraq WMD National Intelligence Estimate to be either overstated or not supported by the underling intelligence reporting. In turn, American policy makers relied, in part, on these key judgments in deciding whether to support the war against Iraq.

The committee's Iraq WMD Report served as a valuable ``lessons-learned'' exercise. It has had a profound impact on the way the intelligence community does business and interacts with Congress and the White House. It also set the standard for future committee reviews. In my opinion, the committee members and staff who completed the project performed a great service to our Nation.

At the end of 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The Governmental Affairs Committee had the lead on this bill, and the act implemented a number of recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

After 6 years, the jury is still out on the ODNI. Some have argued the office is an unnecessary bureaucratic layer. Others have said the office is too big and needs to be downsized. Still others are concerned that the DNI's authority is being undermined by decision makers in the White House and the Department of Justice--a point with ample evidence over the past several years. While these observations have some merit, I believe the ODNI serves an important leadership function within the intelligence community and should not be abandoned.

There is, however, room for improvement, so I sponsored a number of legislative provisions that should enhance the DNI's authorities with respect to accountability reviews and major system acquisitions. While some of these

[Page: S7935]
provisions were recently signed into law, more will need to be done to strengthen the effectiveness of the ODNI.

Turning to battlefield intelligence, the committee has spent a considerable amount of time conducting oversight of the CIA's detention and interrogation program. Intelligence from detainees has proven to be a most effective source of intelligence to protect the Nation. That is why we must capture the enemy if at all possible, instead of just killing them. I am concerned lately that due to our lack of effective detention and interrogation policies today our operators in the field feel compelled to kill vice capture. This is understandable, for unless you are in Iraq or Afghanistan, where would you detain enemy combatants to the United States? More troubling to me, we seem to be releasing a number of individuals whom we have already detained, only to see more than 20 percent of them take action against us on the battlefield again. I have a comprehensive approach to this issue that I have been working on with other members that will be introduced on the floor.

Regarding the CIA's interrogation program, I believe the program produced valuable intelligence information. My opinion is not a partisan one. Recently, we learned that the Obama Justice Department and Judge Kaplan, a U.S. district judge for the Southern District of New York, agree with my assessment. Judge Kaplan is presiding over the Federal trial of Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged member of al-Qaida indicted on charges of participating in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa. Last July, Judge Kaplan agreed with the Department of Justice and found that ``on the record before the Court and as further explained in the [classified] Supplement, the CIA Program was effective in obtaining useful intelligence from Ghailani throughout his time in CIA custody.''

In March 2009, the committee began a bipartisan review of the CIA's interrogation program, based upon carefully negotiated terms of reference. Unfortunately, later that year, the Attorney General decided to re-open criminal investigations of the CIA employees involved in the CIA's detention and interrogation program. I believed then that the Attorney General's decision would impede the committee's ability to conduct interviews of key witnesses, thereby diminishing the value of the review. As a result, I withdrew minority staff from the committee's review. The majority pressed ahead and has refused to comply with committee rules to keep the minority fully and currently informed, but it soon ran into the obstacles I foresaw, with CIA personnel declining to speak with them based on the advice of counsel. And who would blame them?

The majority has spent valuable time and resources on this matter, and the CIA has conveyed that it had to pull personnel off current mission requirements to support their effort. I believe that limited committee and government resources would be better spent on topics of oversight interest on programs that are in operation today.

One of the most disturbing leaks that I have witnessed during my tenure on the committee occurred in December 2005, when the New York Times published a story describing the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP. Some view the leakers as heroes. I do not share that view. In fact, intelligence operators in the field at the time told me that their ability to gain valuable information was reduced dramatically. Michael Hayden, then Director of the CIA, stated that we had begun to apply the Darwinian theory to terrorism because from then on we would only be catching the dumb ones. Frankly, I am amazed the Department of Justice has yet to prosecute Thomas Tamm, a DOJ attorney who openly bragged in a Newsweek article that he intentionally revealed information about this highly classified and compartmented program. Tamm and his fellow leakers are traitors who have done serious damage to our national security. Yet this administration refuses to prosecute this open and shut case. Why?

In order to ease concerns of critics, the President's TSP was submitted to and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Unfortunately, in May 2007, this new arrangement started to unravel when the FISA Court issued a ruling that caused significant gaps in our intelligence collection against foreign terrorists.

Although DNI Mike McConnell pleaded to Congress for help, the Congress failed to respond. Under the looming pressure of the August recess, Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and I cosponsored the Protect America Act which Congress passed in the first week of August 2007.

The act did exactly what it was intended to. It closed the intelligence gaps that threatened the security of our Nation and of our troops. But it was lacking in one important aspect. It did not provide civil liability protections from ongoing frivolous lawsuits to those private partners who assisted the intelligence community with the TSP.

Following the passage of the Protect America Act, I worked to come up with a bipartisan, permanent solution to modernize FISA and give those private partners needed civil liability protections. The committee worked closely for months with the DNI, the Department of Justice, and experts from the intelligence community to ensure that there would be no unintended operational consequences from any of the provisions included in our bipartisan product.

In February 2008, after many hearings, briefings, and much debate on the Senate floor, the Senate passed the FISA Amendments Act by a strong, bipartisan vote of 68-29. The Senate's bill reflected the Intelligence Committee's conclusion that those electronic communications service providers who assisted with the TSP acted in good faith and deserved civil liability protection from frivolous lawsuits. The Senate bill also went further than any legislation in history in protecting the potential privacy interests of U.S. persons whose communications may be acquired through foreign targeting.

After months of protracted and difficult negotiations with the House, Congress finally passed the FISA Amendments Act on July 9, 2008, and the President signed it into law the very next day. The final law achieved the goals of the original Senate bill, albeit less elegantly. While the act is more burdensome than I would prefer, we did preserve the intelligence community's ability to keep us safe, and we protected the electronic communications service providers from those frivolous lawsuits.

I consider my involvement in the passage of the Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments Act to be two of the highlights of my legislative career. There is, however, still work to be done. A number of provisions in the FISA Amendments Act are set to sunset at the end of next year. Also, there are three additional FISA provisions related to roving wiretaps, business records court orders, and the lone wolf provision, that are set to expire on February 28, 2011. I urge Congress and the President to work closely together to ensure that the provisions are made permanent, without adding unnecessary requirements or limitations that will hamper our intelligence collection capabilities.

I mentioned earlier that recently the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 was signed into law. When I became vice chairman of the committee in 2007, my top priority was to get an intelligence authorization bill signed into law, and I am thankful that with the leadership of Senator Feinstein, we finally met that goal. The 2010 intelligence authorization bill, while light on authorization, was heavy on legislative provisions. I am pleased that a number of good government provisions which I sponsored were included in the bill.

The law imposes new requirements on the intelligence community to manage better their major systems acquisitions. Too often, we have seen IC acquisitions of major systems, i.e., over $500 million, balloon in cost and decrease in performance. These provisions will operate together to address the long-standing problem of out-of-control cost overruns in these acquisitions. Modeled on the successful Nunn-McCurdy provisions in title 10 of the United States Code, these provisions encourage greater involvement by the DNI in the acquisitions process and help the congressional intelligence committees perform more effective and timely oversight of cost increases.

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Another good government provision established a requirement for the intelligence community to conduct vulnerability assessments of its major systems. A significant vulnerability in a major system can impede the operation of that system, waste taxpayer dollars, and create counterintelligence concerns. This provision requires the DNI to conduct initial and subsequent vulnerability assessments for any major system, and its items of supply, that is included in the National Intelligence Program. These assessments will ensure that any vulnerabilities or risks associated with a particular system are identified and resolved at the earliest possible stage.

   A third good government provision gives the DNI the authority to conduct accountability reviews of intelligence community elements and personnel in relation to their significant failures or deficiencies. It also encourages IC elements to address internal failures or deficiencies, something they at times have been reluctant to do. In the event these elements are reluctant or unable to do so, this provision gives the DNI the authority he needs to conduct his own reviews.

Finally, my future budget projection provision requires the DNI to do what every American family does on a regular basis--map out a budget. The DNI, with the concurrence of the Office of Management and Budget, must provide congressional Intelligence Committees with a future year intelligence plan and a long-term budget projection for each fiscal year. These important planning tools will enable the DNI and the congressional intelligence communities to ``look over the horizon'' and resolve significant budgetary issues before they become problematic.

As I leave the Senate and contemplate what I have learned during my service in Congress and on the Intelligence Committee, I have a number of recommendations for future members and leaders of the committee.

One of the intelligence community's greatest failures was its complete waste of billions of dollars spent to develop satellites that never took a single picture. Senator FEINSTEIN and I have strongly voiced our abiding concern to all four DNIs that the Intelligence Community is still spending far too much money on imagery satellites that are too big, too few, and too costly. We have put forth solid alternatives that would produce more satellites at far less cost, be less fragile, and perform as well or better than the unaffordable plan in the President's budget.

Just this month, an independent analysis by some of the country's very best astrophysicists confirmed that such an alternative, based on a combination of commercial and classified technologies, was essentially as capable, but about half as expensive as the administration's program. Sadly, our ideas have met with ``NIH'' resistance--``not invented here.''

Even worse, it appears that this resistance has been based in part on the NRO's unhealthy reliance upon, and apparent subordination to, the contractor that builds these incredibly expensive satellites. In spite of this resistance, Congress saw fit to appropriate over $200 million to explore a better path forward, and I urge my colleagues in both Houses of Congress to sustain that effort. I also urge the new DNI, in the strongest terms, to reconsider this issue afresh, and with an open mind. Our committee recommended his confirmation on the hope and expectation that he would do so.

The committee has been following the cyber threat issue for a long time. Cyber attacks happen every day. Our government, businesses, citizens, and even social networking sites all have been hit.

In an ever increasing cyber age, where our financial system conducts trades via the Internet, families pay bills online, and the government uses computers to implement war strategies, successful cyber attacks can be devastating. Unless our private sector and government start down a better path to protect our information networks, serious damage to our economy and our national security will follow.

Senator HATCH and I introduced a legislative proposal that takes the first step by creating a solid infrastructure that is responsible and accountable for coordinating our government's cyber efforts. The bill is built on three principles. First, we must be clear about where Congress should, and, more importantly, should not legislate. Second, there must be one person in charge--someone outside the Executive Office of the President who is unlikely to claim executive privilege, but who has real authority to coordinate our government cyber security efforts. Third, we need a voluntary public/private partnership to facilitate sharing cyber threat information, research, and technical support.

We believe that once this infrastructure is established, the assembled government and private sector experts will be able to provide guidance on the next steps--including any further legislation--needed to enhance our our cyber safety.

In the aftermath of 9/11, we captured hundreds of al-Qaida terrorists and associates. Many of these could be called low-level fighters--of the same type as the 9/11 hijackers but no less dangerous to our security. Others, such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and senior al-Qaida operative Abu Zubaydah, were identified as high-value detainees and placed in the CIA's interrogation and detention program.

After details about the program were leaked in the Washington Post, the President announced, in September 2006, that these high-value detainees would be transferred to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. Since 2002, Gitmo has housed terrorists picked up on the battlefield or suspected of terrorist activities. Today, 174 detainees remain at Gitmo.

In 2008, in a sharply divided opinion and despite clear language from Congress to the contrary, the Supreme Court gave Gitmo detainees the constitutional right to challenge their detention in our courts. Since then, 38 detainees have successfully challenged their detention.

With the recidivism rate for former Gitmo detainees at over 20 percent, Congress must step in once again and draw some boundaries. We cannot afford to let more potentially dangerous detainees go free. We need a clear, consistent framework for these habeas challenges with a standard of proof that takes into account the wartime conditions under which many of these detainees were captured. It is unreasonable to hold the government to the standards and evidentiary tests that apply in ordinary habeas cases. There is nothing ordinary about war and our habeas laws must reflect that.

Now that the President has abolished the CIA's program and ordered the closure of Gitmo, we need clear policies for holding and questioning suspected terrorists, especially overseas. We must abandon the automatic impulse to Mirandize terrorists captured inside the United States. Prosecution can be a very effective response to terrorism, but it must never take precedence over getting potential lifesaving intelligence.

I have been working with several of my colleagues on legislation that would set clear lines for law of war detention and habeas challenges. Our Nation should not risk another Gitmo detainee rejoining the fight. We cannot risk losing more and timely intelligence because we have no system for detaining and interrogating terrorists. These are critical national security issues and Congress's voice must be heard as soon as possible.

Last December, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight as it headed to Detroit. Shortly after the failed attack, al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula claimed responsibility. AQAP counts among its senior leadership and members former Gitmo detainees who have returned to their old ways. As the Christmas Day attack reminded us, rising recidivism rates for Gitmo detainees are more than just a statistic and claims that a 20-percent recidivism rate ``isn't that bad''--as one senior administration official put it--must be challenged.

As part of its goal to close Gitmo, the administration continues its efforts to persuade other countries to accept detainees. Whatever one's views on closing Gitmo, we all have an interest in making sure that no former Gitmo detainee kills or harms us or our allies. As these transfers continue, the Intelligence Committee--and Congress--must pay close attention to these and earlier transfer decisions.

[Page: S7937]

As part of the committee's oversight responsibilities, staff have been traveling to those countries that accepted detainees under the current and previous administrations. They have also been reviewing assessments prepared by the intelligence community and the Guantanamo Review Task Force and other documents. A lot of work has been done, but there is more to do.

Thus far, our review has raised some significant concerns. We all know that transfers to Yemen are a bad idea, but other countries may not have either the legal authority or capability to keep track of these detainees effectively. Still others simply view these former detainees as being free.

If we do not know what these detainees are doing, we end up relying on luck that we will catch them before they act.

Having luck on your side is always a good thing, but it stinks as a counterterrorism policy. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to pay close attention to this issue. Unfortunately, it is one that I think will continue to be around for a very long time.

I hope these reflections, observations, and recommendations will be of use to the members of the next Congress. I have been deeply honored to serve on the Intelligence Committee with my distinguished and talented colleagues. I also salute the fine men and women of the intelligence community who have given so much for the safety of our country. I wish them all well in their future endeavors.

In addition, I wish to address an obvious problem--leaks. I have already made reference to some of the more disastrous leaks that occurred during my tenure, but unfortunately, these were just the tip of the iceberg. There are simply too many to list. I shudder to think about the sources and methods that have been disclosed, and the lives that will likely be lost, as a result of the obscene amount of classified information compromised by WikiLeaks. Of course, to call this a leak case is gross mischaracterization; it is more like a tidal wave.

We are blessed with our open society and our many freedoms. However, our ability to protect these freedoms and preserve our national security depends upon our ability to keep our secrets safe.

This problem needs a multifaceted solution. We must first deter and neutralize the leakers. There should be significant criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that can be imposed on leakers. Leakers should face significant jail time, pay heavy fines, forfeit any profits, lose their pensions, and be fired from their jobs. We should also not allow the first amendment to be used as a shield for criminal activity. It should be a crime to knowingly solicit a person to reveal classified information for an unauthorized purpose or to knowingly publish or possess such information. Leaks will not stop until a significant number of leakers have been appropriately punished.

   Other steps may lessen the problem. Government agencies in possession of classified information should ensure that information is properly classified in the first instance and that their employees are thoroughly trained in security procedures. Also, we should explore technological solutions for tracking classified documents and establishing singular audit trails.

On a related issue, we also need to ensure that the security clearance process is repaired. An excellent interagency reform process has applied more resources and better processes to increase the efficiency of the system, eliminate backlogs, and in many cases, shorten the time required to process a security clearance. Although significant progress has been achieved in recent years, there is still a lot of room for improvement. We must continue to use technology to wring more efficiency from the security clearance system, and make it less of an obstacle to success for our intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Just as importantly, we must modernize the security clearance system to make it a more useful measure of suitability for serving in sensitive government positions. The interagency security clearance reform process is studying a new process, called ``continuous evaluation,'' which seeks to use automated records checks and other similar processes to assess risk in populations of cleared personnel on a regular basis, rather than waiting five years to conduct a reinvestigation, as we currently do.

The devil will be in the details, but I believe a ``continuous evaluation'' system could be much more effective than our current practices in detecting security threats in our agencies before they become a problem.


The use of biometrics--fingerprints, DNA, facial recognition scans, and the like--has yielded dramatic dividends on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and is a vital tool for detecting terrorist threats before they arrive on our shores. Biometrics help us separate the good guys from the bad guys on the battlefield, and can ensure that we know that the foreign tourist, businessman, or student who wants to visit the United States is not actually a dangerous terrorist.

We have made significant progress in the collection and use of biometric data in the last decade, but there are still too many policy and procedural obstacles to sharing biometric data between U.S. Government agencies. Moreover, far too much of the funding for these important biometric efforts is contained in supplemental funding requests.

We need to continue breaking down the barriers to sharing biometric data. We need a roadmap in the base intelligence budget for the permanent sustainment of our biometric efforts in the decades to come. Biometrics must remain an important tool for dealing with national security threats well beyond the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The committee spent much of 2005 and 2006 working on legislation related to the expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. We held numerous hearings and reported out a bill that contained a number of provisions that were ultimately included in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act.

Among other things, the act made permanent 14 of the 16 USA PATRIOT Act provisions that were set to expire at the end of 2006. It extended the sunsets of three FISA provisions--roving wiretaps; business record court orders; and lone wolf--until the end of 2009. Also, it created a new National Security Division within the Department of Justice, supervised by a new assistant attorney general, with the goal of ensuring that the information sharing walls that existed prior to 9/11 are never reconstructed.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the size and budget of the intelligence community has nearly doubled, and much of that growth has been in the IC's analytic community. Even as we hire more and more analysts to focus on national intelligence priorities, most of them work on current and tactical missions--answering questions and giving briefings on near-term issues--without ever producing a deep understanding of longer term critical issues.

Furthermore, the intelligence community continues to operate as a loose confederation, with no universal standards for analytic training, tools, technology, and personnel policies. These issues, coupled with a lack of a federated community-wide analytic work plan, often result in redundant or conflicting analyses, and in some cases, a major gap in coverage or understanding of issues of significant concern. It is time for the ODNI to bring analytic direction and standards to the IC so that the analytic community can become a true community of analysts.

I have often voiced my concern about the abysmal state of the intelligence community's foreign language programs and the slow pace of progress in correcting deficiencies. The collection of intelligence depends heavily upon language, whether information is gathered in the field from a human source or from a technical collection system.

More than 9 years after 9/11, and more than a year after a major shift in focus in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the cadre of intelligence professionals capable of speaking, reading, or understanding critical regional languages such as Pashto, Dari, or Urdu remains in critically short supply. In spite of significant congressional interest and funding, progress has been disappointing.

Persistent critical shortages in some languages could contribute to the loss of intelligence information and affect the ability of the intelligence community to exploit what it does collect. I

[Page: S7938]
encourage IC leaders to make foreign language learning and maintenance a priority mission and a ``must fund'' for resource allocation."
(Source: Senator Kit Bond, Congressional Record)

15 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

15 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xxi) 15 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 13 November 2010 and recommended to ... [be removed from] POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 5 NOV 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

13 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] evaluated Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xxi) 15 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 13 November 2010 and recommended to ... [be removed from] POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 5 NOV 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

12 Department of Justice | David C. Kernell, 23, today was sentenced to one year and one day in prison for intentionally accessing without authorization the e-mail account of former Alaska governor Sarah Palin and obstruction of justice.

(Source: Department of Justice Press Release)

WASHINGTON – David C. Kernell, 23, today was sentenced to one year and one day in prison for intentionally accessing without authorization the e-mail account of former Alaska governor Sarah Palin and obstruction of justice, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney William C. Killian for the Eastern District of Tennessee. U.S. District Judge Thomas W. Phillips also imposed a three-year term of supervised released. In imposing the prison sentence, Judge Phillips recommended service at Midway Sanction Center, but noted that the Bureau of Prisons would decide where Kernell would serve his sentence.

On April 30, 2010, after a week-long trial, a jury found Kernell guilty of one count of misdemeanor unauthorized access to obtain information from a computer and one count of obstruction of justice. The jury found Kernell not guilty of wire fraud. The jury could not reach a verdict on the identity theft charge and the judge declared a mistrial as to that charge.

According to evidence presented at trial, on Sept. 16, 2008, Kernell, a resident of Knoxville, Tenn., obtained unauthorized access to former Gov. Palin’s personal e-mail account by resetting the account password. Evidence showed that after answering a series of security questions that allowed him to reset the password and gain access to the e-mail account, Kernell read the contents of the account and made screenshots of the e-mail directory, e-mail content and other personal information. Kernell posted screenshots of the e-mails and other personal information to a public website. Kernell also posted the new e-mail account password that he had created, thus providing access to the account by others.

Evidence at trial showed that Kernell became aware on Sept. 16, 2008, after the illegal entry into the email account, of a possible FBI investigation. Evidence showed that Kernell began a series of deletions of records and documents with the intent to impede an anticipated FBI investigation.

The case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Krotoski currently detailed to the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) and Assistant U.S. Attorney Greg Weddle of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Tennessee. CCIPS Trial Attorney Josh Goldfoot provided significant assistance. The case was investigated by the FBI’s Anchorage, Alaska, and Knoxville field offices.

9 Department of Justice | Regarding destroyed CIA Interrogation Tapes, Department of Justice, Matthew Miller, Director, Office of Public Affairs says, "In January 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to investigate the destruction by CIA personnel of videotapes of detainee interrogations. Since that time, a team of prosecutors and FBI agents led by Mr. Durham has conducted an exhaustive investigation into the matter. As a result of that investigation, Mr. Durham has concluded that he will not pursue criminal charges for the destruction of the interrogation videotapes."

5 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xx) 5 November 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and found fit to be removed from prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.' Finally, the entry notes, 'During the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND appears to be in high spirits and have a positive attitude. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xxi) 15 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 13 November 2010 and recommended to ... [be removed from] POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 5 NOV 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

4 WikiLeaks Press Conference on Iraq War Logs at Geneva Press Club, Geneva.

3 David House and his girlfriend are met and examined in the concourse of Chicago O'Hara by customs agents, who extensively search their bags. They are detained for questioning by two men, Marcial Santiago and Darin Louck, who identified themselves as Homeland Security Agents. House subsequently learned from Agent Santiago that although Agent Louck identified himself as a Homeland Security agent, he is, in fact, with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. House's electronic products were seized at a "border search" see image below. Acceptance/CHAIN of CUSTODY includes Special Agent, R. Hart,of Chicago, ICE.

"Last Wednesday, November 3, David House, a 23-year-old researcher who works at MIT, was returning to the U.S. from a short vacation with his girlfriend in Mexico, and was subjected to similar and even worse treatment.  House’s crime:  he did work in helping set up the Bradley Manning Support Network, an organization created to raise money for Manning’s legal defense fund, and he has now visited Manning three times in Quantico, Virginia, where the accused WikiLeaks leaker is currently being detained (all those visits are fully monitored by government agents).  Like Appelbaum, House has never been accused of any crime, never been advised that he’s under investigation, and was never told by any federal agents that he’s suspected of any wrongdoing at all." (Source: Glenn Greewald)

"Last Wednesday, House arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, and his flight was met in the concourse by customs agents, who examined the passports of all deplaning passengers until they saw House’s, at which point they stopped.  He was then directed to Customs, where his and his girlfriend’s bags were extensively searched.  After the search was complete, two men identifying themselves as Homeland Security officials told House and his girlfriend they were being detained for questioning and would miss their connecting flight.  House was told that he was required to relinquish all of his electronic products, and thus gave them his laptop, cellphone, digital camera and UBS flash drive.  The document he received itemizing his seized property is here [ NO LONGER AVAILABLE, WEB ARCHIVE].  He was also told to give the agents all of his passwords and encryption keys, which he refused to do." (Source: Glenn Greewald)

"House was then taken to a detention room by two armed agents and on his way there, he passed by a room in which several individuals were plugging various instruments into his laptop and cellphone.  The two agents, Marcial Santiago and Darin Louck, proceeded to question him for 90 minutes about why he was visiting Manning in prison, what work he did to support the Manning campaign, who else was involved in the Manning support group, and what his views were on WikiLeaks.  He was told that he would not receive his laptop or camera back, and the agents kept it.  To date, he has not received them back and very well may never.  When he told them that he had roughly 20 hours of source code work in his laptop and would like to save it or email it to a saved site, they told him he could not do that.  He subsequently learned from Agent Santiago that although Agent Louck identified himself as a Homeland Security agent, he is, in fact, with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force." (Source: Glenn Greewald)

Copy of Border Search List of Items of David House Seized (Source: web-archive)

Customs Form 6051D (11/01)
SIGNED BY] Darin A. Louck 11/3/2010

Acceptance/CHAIN of CUSTODY R. Hart, SA CHI ICE

"Coming into Chicago O'Hara Airport...stopped immediately after getting off the plane...passports were checked...people checking our passports ran ahead and kinda prepped the customs area...went to the bag search area...went through all of our belonging very thoroughly...asked my girlfriend at length about the book Hackers...why she was reading it...leaving border search area...approached by two individuals...identified themselves initially as DHS agents...told me I was compelled to surrender all of my belongings including my electronic belongings...took my belongings to the back...lead my girlfriend and I back to and interrogation area...we were interrogated for about an hour....missing our connecting flights...asked to surrender my password to computer as well as any encrypted media...a request which I refused...their questions primarily focused on the the Bradley Manning Support Network...seemed like I was being targeted for my activism for Bradley Manning" He indicated that others computers have been seized. He has been asks questions repeatedly by agents at the border. (Source: democracynow.org)

See also May 11, 2011 lawsuit:

"15. On November 3, 2010, following a vacation in Mexico, Plaintiff arrived at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport where he was to take a connecting flight to Boston. He was carrying his laptop computer, a USB storage device, a video camera containing a memory storage device, and a cellular phone. Upon arrival, Plaintiff passed through a passport control station, collected his baggage, and proceeded to customs, where a CBP officer advised him that his belongings would be searched. The officer examined Plaintiff's computer and noted that it was warm but did not attempt to open it. Plaintiff was then told that he was free to leave.

16. After entering the terminal and starting to walk toward his connecting domestic flight, Plaintiff was stopped by two government agents who stated that they were with the Department of Homeland Security. The agents' name-tags identified them as Darin Louck and Marcial Santiago. Agents Louck and Santiago stated that Plaintiff was being detained and would miss his connecting flight. The two agents did not explain the reason or the authority for detaining Plaintiff.

17. Agents Louck and Santiago told Plaintiff that he would have to give them any electronic devices he was carrying. Plaintiff surrendered his computer, USB storage device, video camera, and cellular phone. Plaintiff was not asked for his consent and was not presented with a search warrant. Nor was he provided with any explanation of the purpose or authority for taking his property. The agents took Plaintiff's devices and directed him to be seated and wait. When the agents returned a short time later, they were no longer in possession of the items they had taken.

18. Plaintiff was directed to accompany the two agents to an interrogation room, where he was initially asked a series of questions concerning the security of his computer. He advised the two agents that the computer's hard disk was not encrypted, but that the computer was password protected. When asked, he declined to give them his password, explaining that the password itself would have allowed direct and unauthorized access to research on his employer's server.

19. Agents Louck and Santiago detained Plaintiff for questioning for an extended period. They questioned Plaintiff regarding his association with Bradley Manning, his work for the Support Network, whether he had any connections to WikiLeaks, and whether he had been in contact with anyone from WikiLeaks during his trip to Mexico. Plaintiff was asked no questions relating to border control, customs, trade, immigration, or terrorism, and at no point did the agents suggest that plaintiff had broken the law or that his computer contained any illegal material. Plaintiff answered their questions truthfully and to the best of his ability.

20. When Plaintiff was finally allowed to leave, only his cell phone was returned to him. The other items which had been taken, specifically his laptop, USB device, and video camera, were not returned. Plaintiff was given a receipt listing the items that had been seized, indicating that "R. Hart, SAC CHI ICE" had taken custody of them. He was told that his devices would be returned by FedEx within a week." (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

See also update in time line December 21, 2010 and December 22, 2010.

2 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xix) 2 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 22 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

... Manning under MAX Custody and POI watch at Quantico against recommendations by two separate forensic psychiatrists.

"Over the course of the following three months, two separate forensic psychiatrists consistently stated that there was no medical reason for PFC Manning to be under POI watch." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Due to my improvement and adjustment to confinement, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended on 27 August 2010 that I be taken off of POI watch and that my confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)...Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

... Troy Bettencourt, Army CID, government expert forensics for civil, criminal interaction joins Manning investigation in November 2010 until December 2011 as special agent on the intrusion team, according to his testimony at Bradley Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Two, 12/17/11

See Transcript for Bradley Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing

Prosecution: What kind work?

Special Agent Troy Bettencourt : Forensics for civil, criminal interaction. I was an Army CID prior to my current position...from November 2010 to December 2011 and then previously from 2001 to 2005.

Prosecution: What was your job?

Special Agent Troy Bettencourt : I was a special agent on the intrusion team assigned to this.

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Oct 2010

29 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November 2010, 8 December 2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January 2011, 16 February 2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October 2011, 15 November 2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

29 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] evaluates Manning and recommends that he is removed from POI.

"xix) 2 November 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 22 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xx) 5 November 2010 Entry:'“SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and found fit to be removed from prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.' Finally, the entry notes, 'During the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND appears to be in high spirits and have a positive attitude. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

28 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning.

"xviii) 28 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 15 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 8 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.' Another entry on this date notes that 'SND was evaluated by the the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 22 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 15 October and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

26 Department of Defense | Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn remarks on WikiLeaks on a visit to Iraq calling the disclosures stolen property.

Press Release

Excerpt:

Regarding the Wikileaks story, Lynn told reporters here that the 400,000 documents posted on the Web are stolen material.

“We don’t think it should have been released,” he said. “We’re disturbed about the implication, particularly with the volume of it in that it gives insight to potential adversaries to how we operate, how we interact.

“Indeed,” he continued, “there are groups out there who say they are mining this data to use against us. We think it’s problematic in that sense.”

The Wikileaks situation presents some hard choices for the U.S. military, Lynn said. In the first Gulf War, commanders wanted more real-time intelligence. The way the system worked then intelligence was sent to Washington, where it was analyzed and sent back to commanders in the field. Often it was out-of-date by the time it arrived.

Lynn said part of the problem back then was the Internet wasn’t developed or robust enough to send the massive numbers of electrons needed to constitute real-time information.

The Internet is much more mature today, he said, noting “the idea [now] is to get as much of the relevant intelligence out to the field as possible. We tried to change the process so the intelligence is available to warfighters, when they need it. We don’t want to change that. It’s an important element in the success we’ve had.”

Still, there must be a better way to protect information, so this type of massive loss doesn’t reoccur, he said. One way, is to more closely monitor the actions of intelligence specialists, for example, to see what type and amounts of classified documents are downloaded.

There may be a good reason for downloading classified documents, “but you do like the credit card companies do and notify officials of the abnormal use,” he said.

26 Department of Defense | Commanding General of Task Force Leatherneck and First Marine Division Forward Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Joseph Osterman via Teleconference from Afghanistan remarks on detainee abuse in Iraq and WikiLeaks saying, "WikiLeaks, that really has had no impact at all on us."  and " And getting to the prisoner situation, that -- we closely monitor the taking of detainees.  We don't maintain any long-term detainees here within the field forces.  They're allowed to keep them for 96 hours, and then we move -- if they need to be detained beyond that point, we'll move them up to a regulated detention facility that has longer-term capability, that are run by coalition forces."

Full Transcript

Excerpts:

COL. DAVID LAPAN (deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations):  Good morning here at the Pentagon, and good evening in Afghanistan.  I'd like to welcome to the Pentagon Briefing Room Brigadier General Joseph Osterman, the commanding general of Task Force Leatherneck and the First Marine Division Forward.   

                As part of Regional Command Southwest, Task Force Leatherneck is comprised of approximately 10,700 personnel, and is responsible for all U.S. Marine ground forces and the Georgian 32nd Infantry Battalion in Helmand province.   

                General Osterman assumed his duties in Afghanistan in March. This is his first time joining us in this format.  He joins us today from his headquarters at Camp Leatherneck in the central Helmand province to provide an update on current operations.  General Osterman will make some opening comments, and then he will take your questions. 

...

COL. LAPAN:  One last question. 

                Q     General, it's Al Pessin from VOA again. 

                I wanted to ask you about two things that have been in the news in the last week or so.  One is the court rulings on "don't ask, don't tell" that invalidated and then reinstated the policy.  Was that noticed out at the FOBs and COPs in your region?  And if so, did it create any disruption or any confusion? 

                And then, the other is the WikiLeaks documents that talked about U.S. forces in Iraq perhaps not doing enough to stop prisoner abuse by Iraqi forces.  I want to know if you have any concerns about how Afghan forces treat their prisoners.  And what are your orders to your Marines if they become aware of any abuses? 

                GEN. OSTERMAN:  Okay.  Well, I'll start with the "don't ask, don't tell."  The -- really, here down on the ground level here in Afghanistan, there is no impact at all.  I think it's safe to say that most of the Marines and sailors of all -- Marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen that I have underneath my charge really are not that aware of a lot of the dialogue that's going on.  You've got to remember that most of my Marines are living in 15-man patrol bases where they're lucky to have some running -- some fresh water, you know, in terms of a pump, or some kind of shelter over their head beyond a tent.  So as a result, they are not that -- I would say there's not that much information that's coming down to them. 

                And I also don't know that they necessarily would take it as problematic in terms of the dialogue.  They understand that, as Marines, we'll follow the -- whatever laws are in place, and also whatever policies are promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.  So really, basically, we'll follow, you know, whatever policy is promulgated there and move on. 

                As far as the WikiLeaks, that really has had no impact at all on us.  Frankly, I personally just read about it in the news, but have not, you know, even visited the website or anything like that.  So I'd say it's no impact from that. 

                And getting to the prisoner situation, that -- we closely monitor the taking of detainees.  We don't maintain any long-term detainees here within the field forces.  They're allowed to keep them for 96 hours, and then we move -- if they need to be detained beyond that point, we'll move them up to a regulated detention facility that has longer-term capability, that are run by coalition forces. 

                We do -- because we're closely aligned with our Afghan partners, we do have visibility of the detainees that they take as well.  There have been very minor instances where we didn't feel as though they were treating the prisoners correctly.  And the Marines have orders to intervene, frankly, and stop that immediately.  And once they stop that, they then try to educate the -- whether it be a police officer or an Afghan soldier, educate them on the proper way to conduct detainee operations.  And that seems to have worked very well.  Most of them, frankly, don't understand all of the rules and regulations associated with that, so the Marines end up providing the mentorship to them, just like they do for combat operations or for patrolling or anything else.  We just view that as part of our responsibility to create them as a respected and viable force within the community. 

26

Department of State | At a press briefing, State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley, responds to a reporters questions about the U.N. High Commissioner's statement that WikiLeaks releases showed that U.S. troops were turning over people to the Iraqi Security Forces with full knowledge that the Iraqi forces were abusing and torturing people, violating international law, and calling for a full inquiry, saying the U.S. has an obligation to investigate.

Crowley responds that, "I would go back to statements I think that were also made by General George Casey yesterday disputing the idea that we, in any way, turned our back on what we saw. This is an issue that we talked regularly with the Iraqi Government, but at the same time, we have and are continuing to fulfill not only our international obligations, but our obligations to Iraq as a sovereign government. We have an agreement with Iraq where we have turned over responsibilities to Iraq as a sovereign government and these are more appropriate questions to direct to the sovereign Government of Iraq, not to the United States."

Crowley also says that, "I will take a question as to the suggestion that our activities in recent years posed a potential violation. I think our lawyers would suggest it does not."

Full Transcript

Full Video

QUESTION: Okay. And then my last one is the UN High Commissioner for Refugees today came out with a statement saying that the latest WikiLeaks disclosures show that the U.S. had knowledge of serious abuses and continue to turn people – by the Iraqis and continue to turn prisoners over to them and says that this may be a gross violation of international human rights law. I know that you talked yesterday about the investigation having to start with the Iraqis, but the High Commissioner is saying the U.S. also has an obligation to investigate. Is the U.S. ready to do this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I would go back to statements I think that were also made by General George Casey yesterday disputing the idea that we, in any way, turned our back on what we saw. This is an issue that we talked regularly with the Iraqi Government, but at the same time, we have and are continuing to fulfill not only our international obligations, but our obligations to Iraq as a sovereign government. We have an agreement with Iraq where we have turned over responsibilities to Iraq as a sovereign government and these are more appropriate questions to direct to the sovereign Government of Iraq, not to the United States.

QUESTION: Well, but is the U.S. willing to consider opening an investigation into whether the transfer of prisoners to the Iraqis – not current transfers, but past transfers – with knowledge that they – of these abuses could be a violation of international law?

MR. CROWLEY: I will take a question as to the suggestion that our activities in recent years posed a potential violation. I think our lawyers would suggest it does not. But I’ll take that question. Okay.

(Source: Department of State)

25

Department of State | At a press briefing, State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley, answers a reporters' questions on United Nations Special Representative for Torture, Manfred Nowak, saying the White House has an obligation to carry out a full, independent inquiry into "the abuse and torture of Iraqi citizens by Iraqi security forces, and allegations that the U.S. turned a blind eye to that."

Crowley remarks, "We have not turned a blind eye. Our troops will report – were obligated to report abuses to appropriate authorities and to follow up, and they did so in Iraq. Without commenting on any specific documents, obviously these documents have a range of dates attached to them. One of the things that we’ve done in Iraq during our time there has been to partner with Iraqi forces, conduct human rights training. We have done that, and that’s one of the reasons why we continue to have military forces in Iraq to help with ongoing training of Iraqi security forces. And we believe that we’ve seen their performance improve over time."

Full Transcript

Full Video

QUESTION: P.J., I’m sorry, my question is a bit of a war and a peace question today, if you’d graciously just bear with me for 20 seconds. As you know, my stations Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera Arabic, have been disseminating the WikiLeaks information, the 400,000 classified documents, over the weekend. The three key headlines, as far as I can see, are Iran’s influence in the region, the abuse and torture of Iraqi citizens by Iraqi security forces, and allegations that the U.S. turned a blind eye to that, though the Pentagon denies that.

Now, the United Nations Special Representative for Torture, Manfred Nowak, has said that the White House has an obligation to carry out a full, independent inquiry. So that’s already the administration he was talking about generally. Do you – does State have a reaction to all of this?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, let’s see. Let’s take them one at a time. The first one is concern – documentation of concern about Iran’s influence in Iraq. Just move the same context from Afghanistan to Iraq. We have been concerned about the role that Iran has been playing in Iraq for some time, which is not to say that an Iraqi government or the Iraqi people are not going to stand up for their own sovereign rights. They are. But certainly, we have had and have been vocal in our concerns about Iran trying to undercut Iraq’s sovereignty.

The second point?

QUESTION: The allegation of torture of Iraqi citizens by Iraqi security forces and that the U.S. turn a blind eye to that, by and large.

MR. CROWLEY: We have not turned a blind eye. Our troops will report – were obligated to report abuses to appropriate authorities and to follow up, and they did so in Iraq. Without commenting on any specific documents, obviously these documents have a range of dates attached to them. One of the things that we’ve done in Iraq during our time there has been to partner with Iraqi forces, conduct human rights training. We have done that, and that’s one of the reasons why we continue to have military forces in Iraq to help with ongoing training of Iraqi security forces. And we believe that we’ve seen their performance improve over time.

QUESTION: And just quickly, pressure mounting from the Australian Government, the Denmark Government, the UN, there for a full investigation. Do you think there will be one?

MR. CROWLEY: I think if there needs to be an accounting, first and foremost, there needs to be an accounting by the Iraqi Government itself and how it has treated its own citizens. And that, too, is a conversation that we have had and will continue to have with the Government of Iraq.

QUESTION: P.J., on this specifically --

QUESTION: Stay on Iraq?

QUESTION: -- you said that they – troops hadn’t turned a blind eye and that they were obligated to report and to follow up. What was – what’s your understanding of how they were supposed to follow up after they reported the --

MR. CROWLEY: Well, in detail, I would probably defer to the Department of Defense on these issues. But – and I’m constrained because I don’t want to get into a discussion of any classified document. We, of course, abhor the release of classified documents. We think they put our troops and our interests at risk.

Our troops are well trained on human rights issues. And where they have seen issues of concern or outright abuse by any country where we have a partnership, they are required to report that, and they did.

QUESTION: P.J., on Iraq. Last Friday, former ambassador to Iraq, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Ryan Crocker, spoke at SAIS and he said he believed that whatever government comes into being – whatever Iraqi Government, a new Iraqi Government – they will request that SOFA be renegotiated to extend U.S. presence in Iraq. Is that your thinking? Are you working towards that? Are you working towards sort of revamping the SOFA agreement?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we have a Status of Forces Agreement and a strategic framework. The Status of Forces Agreement expires at the end of next year, and we are working towards complete fulfillment of that Status of Forces Agreement, which would include the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of next year. The nature of our partnership beyond next year will have to be negotiated. On the civilian side, we are committed to Iraq over the long term. We will have civilians there continuing to work with the government on a range of areas – economic development, rule of law, civil society, and so forth. But to the extent that Iraq desires to have an ongoing military-to-military relationship with the United States in the future, that would have to be negotiated. And that would be something that I would expect a new government to consider.

QUESTION: But you do have a contingency sort of to deal with this issue provided that comes up?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, first and foremost, we are going to fulfill the terms of the existing agreement, which means that the roughly 50,000 troops in Iraq today will go to zero by the end of next year. Should Iraq wish to continue the kind of military partnership that we currently have with Iraq, we’re open to have that discussion.

(Source: Department of State)

25 Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) | Department of Defense press release announces that "A joint task force led by the Defense Intelligence Agency is comparing the original with redacted documents, he said, to assess the damage that WikiLeaks’ publication of the classified Iraq significant-activities reports, called the SIGACTS data base, could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and current operations." The press release also quotes Clinton October 22 comments that WikiLeaks release of Iraq War Logs threaten US national security.

[Tags: Information Review Task Force, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)]

Press Release

By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25, 2010 – Despite WikiLeaks’ attempt to redact the names of Iraqi informants from its recent leak of classified military reports, some of those people are still in danger, a Pentagon spokesman said today.

On Oct. 22, WikiLeaks released more than 400,000 sensitive documents chronicling military operations during the Iraq war from 2004 to 2009.

“We had identified 300 or so people whose names were [mentioned in the documents] that possibly would be put at risk if their names were published,” Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said.

Of that group, he added, the names were removed but “in a few dozen cases there’s still information that could identify those people.”

Such remaining information includes job titles, he said.

The U.S. Central Command has the names of those potentially at risk and “is deciding whether they’re going to make notifications or not,” Lapan said.

A joint task force led by the Defense Intelligence Agency is comparing the original with redacted documents, he said, to assess the damage that WikiLeaks’ publication of the classified Iraq significant-activities reports, called the SIGACTS data base, could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and current operations.

During an Oct. 22 State Department press briefing with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mahmood Qureshi, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton denounced the WikiLeaks release of sensitive military documents.

“We should condemn in the most-clear terms the disclosure of any classified information by individuals and organizations which puts the lives of United States’ and partner servicemembers and civilians at risk,” she said, “threatening our national security and the national security of those with whom we are working.

The count of civilian war deaths in Iraq –- 15,000 more than reported by the Pentagon, according to some news reports and the nongovernmental organization Iraq Body Count -– is one topic arising from the WikiLeaks’ release.

“We have rejected the premise that … the U.S. has not been tracking civilian casualties. We have. We report that on a regular basis to Congress,” Lapan said.

Also in the reports to Congress, he added, “We note carefully that these are not a complete picture. … We don’t profess to have knowledge about every civilian that’s killed across Iraq. We can only report on the ones that we’re aware of.”

All reports of civilian casualties –- even those that put the number of casualties at 15,000 more than the U.S. has reported -- all come from the same SIGACTS data base, Lapan said.

“The matter of trying to estimate Iraqi civilian casualties in the war has been an ongoing issue,” he said, including a June report by the Congressional Research Service.

“To suggest that there is some kind of precise number that some organization has, I find hard to believe,” he added, “because over the years it has been impossible for any of the various organizations that have tried to come to agreement on a specific figure.”

23 WikiLeaks Press Conference in London on Iraq War Logs.

22 Department of Defense press release, Pentagon Press Secretary calls WikiLeaks Iraq War log shameful: " “That danger is now exponentially multiplied as a result of this leak because it gives our enemies the wherewithal to look for vulnerabilities in how we operate and to exploit those opportunities and potentially kill our forces. That is just shameful...A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that the WikiLeaks publication of the activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and on-going operations...Potentially what one could mine from a huge data base like this are vulnerabilities in terms of how we operate, our tactics, our techniques, our procedures, the capabilities of our equipment, how we respond in combat situations, response times -- indeed how we cultivate sources,” Morrell said. “All of that, [given the] thinking and adaptive enemy we’ve been facing in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be used against us...U.S. intelligence reports and Taliban public statements indicate that enemy forces have been mining the released Afghan data base for operational vulnerabilities, Morrell said. [Tags: Information Review Task Force]

Press Release

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22, 2010 – WikiLeaks full public release on its website of 400,000 classified military documents from Iraq war operations is shameful, the Pentagon press secretary said tonight.

“This is an extraordinary disservice to America’s men and women in uniform,” Geoff Morrell said.

More than 150,000 forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are already in considerable danger, he said. “That danger is now exponentially multiplied as a result of this leak because it gives our enemies the wherewithal to look for vulnerabilities in how we operate and to exploit those opportunities and potentially kill our forces. That is just shameful.”

The department does not yet know in detail what Wikileaks has published, but officials say they expect the same sort of documents the organization put on the Internet in July about the conflict in Afghan. WikiLeaks posted 77,000 documents from the Afghan database online in that breach of national security.

“This document leak is four times as large as the Afghan document leak,” Morrell said. “It gives our enemies that much more to mine, and it puts our forces that much more in danger, so we condemn it, we deplore it.”

Based on information contained in the newly released Iraq documents, some news outlets are already reporting on alleged abuse and civilian deaths.

“It has been a driving force for us, a guiding principle for us over the last seven years of this conflict to do everything in our power -- perhaps more than any other military in the history of the world has ever done -- to minimize civilian casualties,” Morrell said.

“We have not always been perfect but we have been far better than anyone else has in the history of warfare,” he added, “and we continue to do everything in our power to prevent innocent civilians from being killed in the war zones.”

A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that the WikiLeaks publication of the activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and on-going operations.

“Potentially what one could mine from a huge data base like this are vulnerabilities in terms of how we operate, our tactics, our techniques, our procedures, the capabilities of our equipment, how we respond in combat situations, response times -- indeed how we cultivate sources,” Morrell said. “All of that, [given the] thinking and adaptive enemy we’ve been facing in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be used against us.”

U.S. intelligence reports and Taliban public statements indicate that enemy forces have been mining the released Afghan data base for operational vulnerabilities, Morrell said.

“We fear that this indeed can further endanger and get our troops killed,” he said.

“We are extraordinarily disappointed that [WikiLeaks is] making the same mistake twice,” Morrell said, “that they are leaking classified information -- in fact that they induce people to break the law to leak classified information and then share that information with the world, including our enemies.”

22 WikiLeaks publishes the Iraq War Logs.

War Diary: Iraq War Logs

"The 391,832 reports (’The Iraq War Logs’), document the war and occupation in Iraq, from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2009 (except for the months of May 2004 and March 2009) as told by soldiers in the United States Army. Each is a ’SIGACT’ or Significant Action in the war. They detail events as seen and heard by the US military troops on the ground in Iraq and are the first real glimpse into the secret history of the war that the United States government has been privy to throughout." (Source: wikileaks.org)

22 Department of Defense admits "neither the Iraq, nor Afghanistan data bases contain intelligence sources and methods" in a press release.

Also, "A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that a proposed WikiLeaks publication of 400,000 significant activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies, and on-going operations." And, "department does not know for sure what Wikileaks will publish, but officials expect the same type of documents the organization put on the Internet in July about the Afghan conflict. "

Press Release.

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22, 2010 – The Defense Department is preparing for an additional publication by WikiLeaks of classified military documents from Iraq operations, DOD officials said here today.

A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that a proposed WikiLeaks publication of 400,000 significant activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies, and on-going operations.

“We strongly condemn the unauthorized disclosure of classified information and will not comment on these leaked documents other than to note that ‘significant activities’ reports are initial, raw observations by tactical units,” Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell told reporters. “They are essentially snapshots of events, both tragic and mundane, and do not tell the whole story.

“That said, the period covered by these reports has been well-chronicled in news stories, books and films and the release of these field reports does not bring new understanding to Iraq’s past,” Morrell added.

In a note to news organizations, Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said the department does not know for sure what Wikileaks will publish, but officials expect the same type of documents the organization put on the Internet in July about the Afghan conflict. WikiLeaks put 77,000 documents from the Afghan data base on line in that breach of national security.

“If the release of documents is four times what it was for the Afghan logs, this is larger in that sense,” Lapan said. “But in view of the types of information, the two are very similar.”

Task force officials, he said, concluded that WikiLeaks might release the names of Iraqis who cooperated with the coalition and information that could aid enemies in operations.

The potential breach is dangerous, but not fatal, Lapan said, noting neither the Iraq, nor Afghanistan data bases contain intelligence sources and methods.

“That’s a different level, and that’s not what is in these documents,” he said.

The data bases contain reports of every company level significant activity, Lapan said.

“These are raw observations from the tactical level of combat operations,” he said. “They could be casualty incidents; they could be IED incidents, information on working with Iraqis –- any number of things that units use this database to report.”

WikiLeaks should not publish anything, the colonel said.

“The problem with WikiLeaks is it goes beyond just taking out names of people,” Lapan said. “There is lots of other information that could be damaging, and they don’t have the expertise to know what they are.”

Lapan said if WikiLeaks does publish the documents on the Web, servicemembers and DOD civilians should steer clear of the site.

“The information remains classified even if it is released publicly,” Lapan said. DOD personnel should not access that website from their government computers, he said, lest they create a security breach.

“We deplore WikiLeaks for inducing individuals to break the law, leak classified documents and then cavalierly share that secret information with the world, including our enemies,” Lapan continued. “We know terrorist organizations have been mining the leaked Afghan documents for information to use against us, and this Iraq leak is more than four times as large.”

WikiLeaks’ actions are putting the lives of troops and civilians at risk, Lapan said.

“The only responsible course of action for Wikileaks at this point is to return the stolen material and expunge it from their websites as soon as possible,” he said.

22 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xviii) 28 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 15 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 8 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.' Another entry on this date notes that 'SND was evaluated by the the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 22 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 15 October and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

22 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?].

"xvii) 22 October 2010 Entry: '"SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] this past week and found fit from (sic) removal of prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.' The entry also notes, “SND was respectful and courteous and well spoken. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

15 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist evaluates Manning and recommends that he be removed from POI.

"xviii) 28 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 15 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 8 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.' Another entry on this date notes that 'SND was evaluated by the the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 22 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 15 October and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xvi) 14 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on (no date given) and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review ...' The entry also notes 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xvii) 22 October 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] this past week and found fit from (sic) removal of prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.' The entry also notes, “SND was respectful and courteous and well spoken. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

14 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xvi) 14 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on (no date given) and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review ...' The entry also notes 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

12 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning.

"xv) 12 October 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

8 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xviii) 28 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 15 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 8 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.' Another entry on this date notes that 'SND was evaluated by the the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 22 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 15 October and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

7 President Barrack Obama signed into law the Reducing Over-Classification Act.

(Source: White House, PDF)

See also The President Signs H.R. 553, The Reducing Over-Classification Act

From Defense Article 32 Witness List "XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will also testify about the problem of over-classification within the government. Specifically, that he supported and signed into law the Reducing Over-Classification Act on 7 October 2010. Additionally, he will testify, that on his first full day in office , 2l January 2009, he issued two memoranda for the head of Executive Departments and Agencies that were related to transparency in government. The first memorandum focused on the administration of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the second focused on transparency and open government. XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify that the transparency memorandum he wrote committed the administration to "an unprecedented level of openness" and to the establishment of "a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration" XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify that on 8 December 2009 his administration released a third memorandum - an Open Government Directive (OGD). The OGD included detailed instructions for departments and agencies on how they are to "implement the principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration." Finally, on 29 December 2009, XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify, that he issued Executive Order 13526 in an attempt to improve the system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including the establishment of the National Declassification Center."

(Source: Defense Article 32 Witness List)

6 Quantico Brig Observation Reports of Manning.

"xiv) 6 October 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry notes, 'SND appears to be content with his situation and goes through the motions of the Brig‟s plan of the day without incident. SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 1 October and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' The entry also notes, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was respectful, neat in appearance and maintained eye contact. SND‟s mood and appearance were consistent with normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

4 Department of Justice sues American Express, Mastercard and Visa to Eliminate Rules Restricting Price Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and Mastercard Department to Litigate Against American Express.

(Source: CSPAN)

Press Release

Justice Department Sues American Express, Mastercard and Visa to Eliminate Rules Restricting Price Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and Mastercard Department to Litigate Against American Express.

WASHINGTON — The Department of Justice announced today that it filed a civil antitrust lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging rules that American Express, MasterCard and Visa have in place that prevent merchants from offering consumers discounts, rewards and information about card costs, ultimately resulting in consumers paying more for their purchases. The department also said that the rules increase merchants’ costs of doing business. Joining the department in its lawsuit are the states of Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio and Texas.

At the same time, the department announced that it has reached a proposed settlement with Visa and MasterCard, that, if approved by the court, would require the two companies to allow merchants to offer discounts, incentives, and information to consumers to encourage the use of payment methods that are less costly.

According to the complaint, American Express, MasterCard and Visa maintain rules that prohibit merchants from encouraging consumers to use lower-cost payment methods when making purchases. For example, the rules prohibit merchants from offering discounts or other incentives to consumers in order to encourage them to pay with credit cards that cost the merchant less to accept.

“With today’s lawsuit we are sending a clear message: We will not tolerate anticompetitive practices,” said Attorney General Eric Holder. “We want to put more money in consumers’ pockets, and by eliminating credit card companies’ anticompetitive rules, we will accomplish that.”

“These restrictive rules restrain competition among credit card networks for merchant acceptance and distort the competitive process,” said Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “The proposed settlement with MasterCard and Visa is an important step in bringing more credit card competition to the point of sale. The department’s lawsuit against American Express will continue that effort and, if successful, allow merchants more freedom to benefit their customers.”

Credit card acceptance costs U.S. merchants approximately $35 billion each year. Those costs are collected from merchants in the form of a “swipe fee” they pay every time a credit card is used. American Express has the highest merchant fees of any credit card network. Merchants pass on these billions of dollars in fees to all their consumers in the form of higher retail prices. By preventing merchants from rewarding consumers when they use less expensive credit cards to make a purchase, American Express, MasterCard and Visa have inhibited merchants’ ability to reduce card acceptance costs, and therefore their retail prices to consumers.

The proposed settlement requires MasterCard and Visa to allow their merchants to:

  • Offer consumers an immediate discount or rebate or a free or discounted product or service for using a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment;
  • Express a preference for the use of a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment;
  • Promote a particular credit card network, low-cost card within that network or other form of payment through posted information or other communications to consumers; and
  • Communicate to consumers the cost incurred by the merchant when a consumer uses a particular credit card network, type of card within that network, or other form of payment.

The proposed settlement allows any merchant that only accepts Visa and MasterCard to take advantage of the relief immediately.

The ongoing litigation against American Express seeks to allow merchants that accept American Express to engage in the same kind of discounting and encouragement that the proposed settlement with MasterCard and Visa allows. Until American Express’s restraints on merchants are lifted, the many merchants that accept American Express, as well as Visa and MasterCard, will not be able to take full advantage of their new options under the proposed settlement, the department said.

American Express Company, the parent of American Express Travel Related Services Company Inc., is a New York corporation, with its principal place of business in New York City. Cardholders used American Express credit and charge cards for $419.8 billion in purchases in 2009. MasterCard is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Purchase, New York. Cardholders used MasterCard credit and charge cards for $476.9 billion in purchases in 2009. Visa is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco. Cardholders used Visa credit and charge cards for $764.2 billion in purchases in 2009.

The proposed settlement, along with the department’s competitive impact statement, will be published in The Federal Register, as required by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement within 60 days of its publication to John R. Read, Chief, Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street N.W., Suite 4000, Washington D.C. 20530. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the court may enter the final judgment as to MasterCard and Visa only upon a finding that it serves the public interest.

The court will determine a pretrial schedule for the case against American Express once American Express files its response to the government’s lawsuit.

4 Quantico Brig Observation Report of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"xiii) 4 October 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 Sep 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

1 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist, [WHO IS THIS?] evaluates Manning and recommends his removal from POI.

"xiv) 6 October 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry notes, 'SND appears to be content with his situation and goes through the motions of the Brig‟s plan of the day without incident. SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 1 October and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' The entry also notes, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was respectful, neat in appearance and maintained eye contact. SND‟s mood and appearance were consistent with normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

Oct Agents return to Bradley Manning's aunt's home in Potomac, Maryland in the suburbs of Washington D.C., to collect an unopened package sent from Kuwait containing Bradley Manning's personals. Bradley Manning's aunt's home is searched agains and more items are collected, according to the testimony of Special Agent Mark Mander, Computer Crimes Investigation Unit (CCIU) at Bradley Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Two, 12/17/11. Bradley manning's aunt Debbie is a "financial-industry power attorney and adjunct law professor"

Prosecution: What sorts of leads did you pursue?

Mander: About June 18, 2010 I was involved in contacting and interviewing Manning's aunt. She was identified through his personnel file. Myself and four other agents, as well as Dept of State interviewed her about what she may know. We discussed a wide range of topics: family, where his mother was from, how he was brought up, and the circumstances of enlistment prior to apprehension. Manning had contacted his aunt two times while in Iraq: to ask her about the 2007 Apache video, and secondly to ask her to make a posting referencing the 2007 Apache video.

Prosecution: Did you search that residence, since it was the place of residence in his personnel file?

Mander: Yes. His belongings were obtained in a basement room. We looked through that room, and specifically for digital media, as well as anything he sent her while in Iraq. Upstairs in her room was a computer powered on while he was in Iraq. She could not use that computer.

Prosecution: Did you collect that?

Mander: Yes.

Prosecution: Visit again?

Mander: Yes.

Mander: In October a package came from the confinement center in Kuwait. After Manning's apprehension and confinement they collect his personals. The facility said that we needed a warrant to search those belongings. There was a hold up with the administration. The authorizing authority for the warrant said we shouldn't need one. By that time we got that figured out, Manning was transferred, and his effects were sent to his aunt's home, and signed by his dad.

Prosecution: What did the aunt tell you?

Mander: She had the unopened box. She saved the box and allowed us to go into basement to find other items.

Prosecution: Find anything else?

Mander: Yes. In June when we searched the room, it had no organization. She had organized his items into plastic containers. We identified numerous items that were digital media. All those items were selected. Most important, on an SD card we found various classified data. We split the room into two parts, photographed were item were found, and placed those items on the bed. When we were done we asked his aunt if she could look at items, and verify that they were his.

Mander: She verified them.

(Source: Transcript)

See also Denver Nick's Private.

... Assange continues to makes himself available for an interview with Swedish prosecutor Marianne Ny, offering to return to Sweden for that purpose or to be interviewed in England, in person or via video link or other telecommunication. All proposals are rejected by Marianne Ny.

"October 2010 Assange continues to make himself available for an interview by prosecutor Ny, offering to return to Sweden for that purpose or to be interviewed in England, in person or via video link or other telecommunications. All such proposals are rejected by Ms. Ny. Threats from leading figures in the United States against Assange's life and freedom escalate in response to the continuing disclosures of WikiLeaks." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

... Manning under MAX Custody and POI watch at Quantico against recommendations by two separate forensic psychiatrists, Captain Hocter and Col. Ricky Malone.

"Over the course of the following three months, two separate forensic psychiatrists  consistently stated that there was no medical reason for PFC Manning to be under POI watch." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Due to my improvement and adjustment to confinement, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended on 27 August 2010 that I be taken off of POI watch and that my confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)...Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

? US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Sep 2010

30 The lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of an Encase forensic image of each computer from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC),2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq.

"An Encase forensic image of each computer from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC),2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. The lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of these items on 30 September 2010. See Appendix C. Given the government's own preservation request, it should easily be able to determine the location of these items. The government responded to the defense request by stating that "it is still actively working to preserve related computer hard drives based on defense's preservation request dated 2l September 2011'" (Source: Defense Compel the Production of Evidence for Manning Article 32)

28 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning

"xii) 28 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Later, the entry notes, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

Aug 21-
Sept 27
Assange voluntarily remains in Sweden and through his attorney [NAME OF ATTORNEY makes repeated attempts to be interviewed by prosecutor Marianne Ny, and her agents. Marianne Ny rejects all proposals. After five weeks, and having secured Marianne Ny's consent, Assange departs for England. Marianne Ny issues a secret warrant for Assange's arrest.

"21 August – 27 September 2010 Since first learning of the accusations against him from news media, Assange has voluntarily remained in Sweden and made himself available to the police and prosecutor. Through his attorney, he has made repeated attempts to be interviewed by prosecutor Ny or her agents, but she has rejected all proposals. Finally, after five weeks and having secured Ms. Ny's consent, Assange departs for England. On the same day, Ms. Ny issues a secret warrant for Assange's arrest." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

24 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] recommends that Manning be removed from POI status.

"xii) 28 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Later, the entry notes, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.' [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]" (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xiii) 4 October 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 Sep 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

23 General Keith Alexander testifies before the House Armed Services Subcommittee, Cyberspace Operations Testimony

Hearing Web Site

Opening Statement Witnesses

 

General Keith Alexander's testimony

REP. REYES: In the context of the threat that you just mentioned, we're focused mostly on attacks from other countries on our -- through the -- via the Internet. I'm concerned, given the case of private manning and the Wikileaks case as well, about attacks within, you know, in other words, people that have access to our systems that deliberately either steal information from our secure systems or, in some cases, may be enemy agents that have access to them. What -- are you concerned about that? What are we doing about that, and how can we -- what can we do to minimize those kinds of concerns?

GEN. ALEXANDER: Congressman, I am -- I am concerned about it; it is an issue. I do think we have some ideas on how to address that, some of which we have already implemented, some that will need to be implemented as we transition to a new architecture. I think both of those will help address that problem. There is always going to be concern about an inside actor, and I would just add to it, supply chain issues. Both of those are going to be key things that we're going to have to look at. Knowing that those are issues will help us in the development and planning of our future systems. And I think we've got to address those with our eyes wide open. It is always going to be a problem. There are things that we can do to mitigate it. We will never solve that a hundred percent.

23 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, dodges question about how publishing classified transcripts from the Situation Room in Bob Woodward's new book is different from WikiLeaks in a press briefing at the Department of Defense.

Full Video
Full Transcript

Q     Why did you decide to speak with Bob Woodward? 

                 SEC. GATES:  Well, I think I was probably the last person he spoke to.  I think I was the last person he spoke to with the previous book, at the end of the Bush administration, and I think I timed it to the point where the book was already in galleys at that point.   

                 I think that he had some specific questions about overall issues and about the strategy.  We didn't get into any specifics about issues or anything like that.  And I had his questions in advance, and they were sort of at the 40,000-foot level, about tone and atmosphere and the role of the president in this process.  These were issues I'd spoken to publicly, and so I felt comfortable responding. 

                 Q     How do feel about the fact that classified transcripts from Situation Room briefings were shared with him?  How is it really different from a WikiLeaks publication? 

                 SEC. GATES:  Well, I can't say, because I haven't read the book. And so I don't know about that.  I guess I would -- I would just -- since I figured I'd -- we'd get a question on this book, there are -- there are actually three points I'd like to make. 

                  The first is, conflict sells.  The second, the relationship among senior officials in this administration is as harmonious as any I've experienced in my time in government.   

                 And the third is -- and I believe this very strongly -- presidents are always well served when there is a vigorous and spirited debate over important issues.  And I felt that the debate with respect to Afghanistan was instructive.  I learned things in the course of that debate.   

                 My positions changed, or were adjusted, or I adjusted them at various points.  So I thought it was a constructive process. 

                 Q     Mr. Secretary, but, you know, American public support for the war in Afghanistan is already waning.  And for them to see the kind of what appears to be divisiveness and backbiting and backstabbing in a way this policy was eventually arrived at, how can you expect the American people to have confidence, not only in the strategy but in American leadership to carry it out? 

                 SEC. GATES:  Well, I said that there was a spirited debate. People were often passionate about their views.  But I will tell you that once the president made his decision, this team came together and has been working together to execute this strategy.  And that was last December. 

                 Q     Do you expect another spirited debate at the review in December? I mean, it seems like many of these issues, the fundamental issues of the strategy, aren't settled.  People may be behind it now, but when the next review happens, will we have a fundamental debate on the principles of how to go forward?  What's December going to look like in that regard? 

                 SEC. GATES:  Well, I think just based on the things that I've heard people say, I think the evaluation that we will have in December will be, how are we doing, are we on the right path, do we need to make any adjustments to the basic strategy?  I have not gotten the sense from my conversations with people that any basic decisions or basic -- basic changes are likely to occur.   

                 I suspect that we will find some areas where we can make some adjustments and tweaks to try and enhance what's going on now.  The fact is we've now got triple the number of civilians as when the president made his decision.   

                 We've got another 30-plus-thousand -- 30,000 American troops, pretty much all in now.  All of the -- as the chairman said earlier, all the inputs are there now.  And now it's just a matter of executing, both on the civilian and the -- and the military side.  I don't know if you want to add anything. 

                 ADM. MULLEN:  No, sir, I think -- I think you have it exactly right.  I think there certainly could be some adjustments, but we think the strategy's sound.  Things that we've -- a lot of things we talked about last year have changed fairly dramatically.  And one of the keys has been the development of the security forces, for instance.   

                 So it, I think, looks to how it has been implemented, you know, how we're doing against that strategy and what adjustments we will need to make, if any. 

                 Q     If I could follow up with one specific, the Woodward book makes the allegation that the two of you were upset with Lieutenant General Lute that his position that he took during the review last year was not helpful.  Was that accurate?  Is that book accurate in that regard?  Did you make that -- did you say that to Lute? 

                 ADM. MULLEN:  (Inaudible) -- well, the secretary's already said it:  He hasn't read the book; I haven't read the book either. 

                 Q     But in terms of that accusation, which seems -- (it's been blowing up ?) -- 

                 SEC. GATES:  Not going there. 

                 ADM. MULLEN:  Yeah. 

                 Q     Mr. Secretary, in general terms, are books like this helpful in that they expose, you know, what we like to think of as smart people wrestling with hard questions?  Or would you prefer to be operating in the dark -- (off mike)?  (Laughter.) 

                 SEC. GATES:  I think the safest answer to that is no comment. (Chuckles.) 


20 [11:20 PM - 12:17 PM] Donald Bostrom, a Swedish journalist, is interviewed by Stockholm police officer Mats Gehlin, in the presence of Ewa Olofsson, also a police officer regarding the Swedish investigation into sexual relations between Julian Assange and both Sophia Wilen and Anna Ardin.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

Date: 20 September 2010
Interviewing officer: Mats Gehlin (police officer)
Also present: Ewa Olofsson (police officer, as witness)
Type of interview: In person; audio-recorded
Type of protocol: Verbatim transcript (slightly edited in this translation)

Abbreviations: DB, Donald Boström; MG, Mats Gehlin; EO, Ewa Olofsson

Matt Gehlin (police officer): So, this has a bit to do with your contacts with Julian Assange.

Donald Bostrom: Yep.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): To begin with, I would like you to tell us about how you got to know Julian and when you met him for the first time.

Donald Bostrom: I met Julian for the first time this spring — the spring of 2010, that is. I don't recall exactly which month, but it was in connection with his being interviewed for Aftonbladet by a journalist named Johannes Wahlström. I then learnt via Johannes and Aftonbladet that Julian would be coming to Sweden and I was asked if I wanted to participate in a meeting….

So, Julian had a rather important presentation in Sweden through an important assignment — an interview in Aftonbladet. That was possibly what made him decide to travel to Sweden at that time. He was also thinking about Sweden in any event, due to the freedom of expression and the press, the laws that exist…. I was asked if I wanted to participate in a meeting in connection with his visit here… with Julian and some journalists. Of course I said yes. I and many others were curious and interested in what this was all about.

So we had a meeting with him, a number of journalists who had received the same invitation. What is happening now is that there is a journalistic co-operation around WikiLeaks. The most recent media that have become known are Der Spiegel, The Guardian in London and the New York Times…. Other newspapers and TV stations are also involved. And in Sweden this was some sort of embryo which could develop into something similar. There were a number of journalists from various workplaces, including media organizations like Swedish Public Television and Aftonbladet, who were also involved in those discussions. So, of course it was extremely interesting.

Then Julian went abroad again, and then returned. And then we had another meeting, continued the discussion. If we are going to do this, we said, what shall we do, how shall we do it, and what do we want to do. As I recall, no decisions were made and no organization was established….

So, there was nothing formal; it was just sort of at the discussion stage. But I remember that all the Swedish journalists felt pretty much the same — that one sees material which is worth its weight in gold for a journalist, then of course we want to see the sources. And here was the opportunity to get the sources, literally — for a lot of issues, not only those that are already known. In that case we would then, as journalists, assess the general interest and, based on that, perhaps publish something. That is to say, not publish everything — as WikiLeaks usually does — but select a more normal Swedish journalistic angle on the material. And on that point we were pretty much all agreed.

Then nothing more became of it. Then Julian travelled abroad again, and there was that collaboration with Der Spiegel, the New York Times and The Guardian.…

Much the same media reviewed some material, and we began to discuss the possibility of doing a similar project in Sweden with some other material.

Aftonbladet, Swedish Public TV and other journalists were involved in those discussions. It never got started — no documents to dig into, no research has got started, not yet. But it is still in the air. After this storm [i.e. the sex allegations] has settled down, perhaps it will be resumed, perhaps not. I have met Julian on three occasions when he has been in Sweden and we have discussed these matters, many others and myself.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): So the first time was in the spring?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, in the spring.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes, all right.

Donald Bostrom: And the second time was also before summer.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And the third time, that was when he was to give the presentation?

Donald Bostrom: Just so. He had been invited by Broderskapet and, in connection with that, Anna Ardin had called me. I had not met her before, but we soon got on quite well. It was because there was enormous interest from the media, and she wondered if she could pass all the media inquiries on to me in the event that there were a great many….

So when they called her, which is part of being the organization that invites, she often passed them along to me.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): O.K.

Donald Bostrom: And I mentioned that I have more media experience than she — I know many of the journalists who were calling her. So I said I could do it, without realizing what a tremendous amount of time it would consume. And so I believe that many people thought that I was some sort of media co-ordinator for WikiLeaks, but that was not the case.…

I merely helped out — helped Anna and Broderskapet to get organized for the conference [laughs].…

I have known, or have been familiar with Peter Weiderud for years. We ran into each other in international contexts. I am mainly a foreign correspondent.…

Peter Weiderud is chair of Broderskapet and is also very engaged in international issues; so we have sometimes met in the Swedish parliament and so on.

But when this event was to take place, Anna was assigned to act as press secretary. It was then that she rang me and asked is she might pass the media inquiries on to me [laughs]. I told her that she could. And then a rather big circus started to build around this seminar, there was a lot of interest. And then another circus began a week later when Anna and the other woman went to you lot. At that point my telephone number was already known to the world media, so it was time for the next storm.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): If we put it like this: When all this began, these allegations…. what reactions did you get from Julian? You were in contact with him then, I understand.

Donald Bostrom: Yes I was. But there is a story that goes with it…. I had daily contact with Anna and Julian in connection with the seminar; and Anna and I were usually in contact several times a day. Since there was a lot of media interest, we had a lot of contact. And before all this started [i.e. the allegations] Anna rang me and said: "What I said before is not true. In fact, we did have sex, Julian and I." Previously, she had said that they had not done so. Without anyone asking, she had joked about Julian living in her flat and sleeping in her bed, but that "we haven't had sex. Of course he tried," she said, "but I turned him down".…

But then the phone rang one day, I think it was Thursday, and I could hear from her voice that it was something serious. So she said, "It's not true what I said, we did indeed have sex."

Aha, I said, and was a little surprised [inaudible] rings me up and tells me this. And then she tells me that the other woman, Sofia, has called her and said that Julian had been there and had sex with her. It was consensual on both occasions.

And now I am telling you what Anna told me; hers is the only version I have, actually.

We had many conversations, and I am telling you all this in answer to your question… because there is some background to relate.

So then she told me that Julian and Sofia had travelled to Enköping and had consensual sex, or however one may wish to put it, until the morning. And then Anna said: "Sofia told me that Julian continued to have sex with her in the morning without protection, without a condom. And she did not want that and she protested, but Julian continued and consummated the sex without protection, despite Sofia's protests," said Anna.

All right, I said; I was of course speechless at suddenly hearing this. "And I have to tell you that we also had sex at an early stage at my place, and right in the midst of the act or [inaudible] he destroyed the condom," she said. She did not say "removed".

My mind fastened on that word — "destroyed". It is such a strange… Either you are wearing a condom or you are not, or you take — yeah….

So that's why I remember exactly that description — and she said to me that suddenly he destroyed the condom and continued against my will. Again, I was extremely bewildered and could not say anything; I was just somewhat shocked, of course, that this had happened.

So that is the background; and I believe, I think Anna is very, very credible —or I have thought that, all the while. So I did not just brush it off, but instead contacted Julian immediately and confronted him with this. Something like, "What the hell is going on?" And his reaction was one of shock; he did not understand anything.

His story was just the opposite, of course. He said Sofia had not protested, that it was just [inaudible], that they had fun. I really tried to press him: "Did you remove the condom, did you destroy the condom?" He did not even understand the question, that's a fact.

So it was two completely different — and I have not drawn any personal conclusions of any kind from this….

But that is the background, and that is why I knew what was going to happen —because then Anna said: "Sofia has asked me to go to the police with her, and I have decided to follow along and support her in this. But we are not planning to file charges against Julian; we just want to go there and tell our stories." And then I wondered: Is it possible to tell one's story without it becoming a formal compl….

Yes, technicalities like that; but I did not pursue them in detail. In any event, that is what she said. So she went there together with Sofia; and we rang a few times back and forth.

We sent some SMS messages to each other about this. And I also called Julian a few times. They wanted Julian to test himself for HIV, otherwise they were going to file a complaint against him. That's how they put it. They did not want to speak with Julian, themselves. But Julian had spoken with Sofia, he said, and he believed that things had been blown out of proportion. But I told Julian, "The young women want you to take an HIV test; and if you do, they will not file a complaint. But if you do not, they will file a complaint." So I just passed that on; I was the messenger.…

Then Anna rang again and said, "Now we have been to the police and Sofia told her story; and as I was sitting there, I filled in with one sentence."

This is exactly word for-word, as I recall what she said. Aha, I said, and what was that sentence? Well, the sentence was: "I think Sofia is telling the truth because I experienced something similar", said Anna.

And then she told me that part about the condom, so that's why I thought that it was true.

I don't know anything about police technicalities, but then Anna said: "Because all of a sudden we were two women with a statement about the same man, it became [a matter for investigation] and thus became a formal complaint, even though we had not filed a complaint." And so it became a complaint.

Therefore, I already knew Julian's reaction, and now we come to your question.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): I see.

Donald Bostrom: He was shocked and did not understand anything. It was his first… And then there were two versions: First, there was no sex. Then there was sex, but something had happened that Anna didn't want to happen. And now, third, it is a matter of rape, even. So from my viewpoint, I have seen three different versions of the same event.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): If we say — …. You have then — .… Julian has been here earlier — …. Have you, have you any insight into or knowledge of his activities with women in general?

Donald Bostrom: Well, insight.… We have never spoken in private and we have never associated privately.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No.

Donald Bostrom: So what exactly he has done and with whom, I don't know. But there is a general impression, of course, and that is that he attracts a great many women. I mean, it is really quite remarkable. It is something of a rock-star phenomenon…. The most famous man in the world… I mean, in some people's eyes, he was the world's most famous man. Extremely intelligent — that is attractive, of course — and he challenges the Pentagon and so forth…. That impresses a lot of people, and I have seen many women — I can say that the overwhelming majority of women who have gotten near him have fallen completely.….

They come completely under his spell — really — and I have drawn the conclusion that he has sometimes had use of that; that much one can say. But exactly with whom, how many and what — that I don't know.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No. He… you get… so he… his reaction, if one says…. How does he feel about that attention from women?

Donald Bostrom: I think he experiences it as positive, actually.… I believe that he experiences it as positive. And Anna's comment when she called me and said, "Donald, that isn't true, what I said before. We have had sex"…. And then she adds, exactly in line with what I have been saying here: "I was proud as a peacock — the world's most awesome man in my bed and living in my flat."

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Hmm.

Donald Bostrom: So it is the same theme and that was why I said, in answer to your question, that I believe that Julian experiences the attention as positive, very positive.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Hmm. The events surrounding Julian's residing with Anna….

Donald Bostrom: Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Do you know anything about that?

Donald Bostrom: Yes. I was about to say that I am the one who knows about that, because it was just before Julian's arrival that Anna called me for the first time. And then it was not media related — we had never spoken before— but: "Hi, my name is Anna Ardin and I am involved in planning this seminar. I am going to be on an election campaign tour, so my flat will be vacant. So Julian is welcome to live there," she said. "Can you tell him that?" In addition, Broderskapet would save on hotel costs, and Julian would rather stay in a flat than in a hotel. So I forwarded the message and he gladly accepted the offer; so I brought the two together, quite simply.

The idea was that Julian would stay until Friday, I think it was. The seminar was to be on Saturday and Anna was to come home on Saturday; I think that was the original plan. But then she came back on Friday. Then there was a little discussion about where Julian was going to spend the night and so on. But my understanding is that they went out to dinner, then they went home, and so they decided that Julian would stay in her bed. So it was that simple: Anna realized that her flat was going to be vacant, it can be used; and she offered it to Julian, then he lived there for one more week.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes. Did you then have any contact with Anna during that week?

Donald Bostrom: Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): After the seminar in other words.

Donald Bostrom: Yes. After the seminar we went — that was on Saturday. They met on a Friday and the seminar was on Saturday. Then we went to lunch; that is something which I also believe has been mentioned in the media. There was a little group that lingered after, when all the journalists had gradually departed and just a few people were left. There was also a woman that I had seen during the seminar, that I did not recognize and did not know who she was. So being polite, I said hello and asked her if she was also a member of Broderskapet and so on. "No, not at all," she said. "I just asked if I could help out."

Then I understood that she was one of those — you can call them groupies, or stalkers, or those who are attracted to his star aura.… But there was nothing more with that, and she followed along to lunch with us.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Who saw to it that she joined you for lunch?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, that's a good question. But it was like this: Broderskapet says thanks for the seminar and now we invite you to lunch, and she is just sitting there.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): So you don't even know if she was invited?

Donald Bostrom: No, but she said that she phoned Anna and asked if she could help out. So there was some sort of acceptance from Anna that she was included in the group. I don't know what she helped out with, but there was an acceptance that she was with us.…

So she didn't just push her way in; she…. Then I was the first to finish lunch and move on. But before that Peter Weiderud said — because this has been in the media —that now it is crayfish season and Julian is here from abroad, it's crayfish season, so he ought to have a chance to try some Swedish crayfish.

And then Anna started calling around — this is Saturday, after the seminar —Anna called some friends and said, by all means let's organize a crayfish party for Julian. And so she called around and delegated tasks — can you buy this, can you buy that. That was about the last I heard before I said thanks and left the restaurant.…

And then came the crayfish party in the evening, around 7:00 p.m.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): How were you invited, were you already invited at lunch?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, just so. I was invited then. It was not a large gathering, it was a smaller party…. Among others, there were two people from the Pirate Party who came, who Anna contacted; for, the idea was that Julian was to start living with them, instead. That's why they came — so they could meet and be introduced. And there were also a few friends of Anna.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): If we back up a bit to the lunch and the part about Sofia tagging along.… What was your impression of Sofia during the luncheon?

Donald Bostrom: I thought she was spec— … Yes, the best term I can think of is "special". Basically, she did not say anything, as I recall. She just said that she rang Anna and asked if she could help out; and she said at one point that she worked at the Swedish Museum of Natural History. That was pretty much what I heard her say, and…. So I did not think much about her; but since you ask, then yes: a special person.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Did she converse at all with Julian during lunch?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, they sat next to each other and said something to each other and did something with each other; but cannot recall any details.… The only picture I have is that there sits a person who is delighted in Julian.… And as I said, Julian experiences that as positive. That is pretty much the picture I have, as I do not dig into people's private lives and so on…. But apropos that, there is another detail that I have also thought about. It was — I spoke with Anna on a regular basis — and she joked about Julian, said he was a special bloke. Suddenly he is simply gone in the middle of the night, and it turns out that he is sitting in the bathroom with his computer…. She jokes quite heartily, in an amused sort of way. And sometimes we related similar things to each other.

But at the crayfish party, she was sitting beside Julian and then she said, she took that up: "Where did you disappear to last night?" she said. At that time I did not think that they had any sort of relationship. I really believed Anna — she is a strong woman [inaudible] — so that…. But that grabbed his attention, and he looked at her — I was sitting right next to them. "And I woke up and you were gone from the bed, and I felt like I had been dumped," she said. And just that word startled me a little: Why would she feel like she had been 'dumped' if she did not…. And I noticed afterward that the word came back, that she….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): But was that the night before the seminar, then?

Donald Bostrom: No, it was after the seminar. Yes, that's right; the Friday night before Saturday.…That was when Julian was supposed to move [out of Anna's flat]. But instead they went out to dinner, went home again, and decided that he would stay. And so they shared the bed. And then she had told me with a laugh how he — strange fellow who disappears and sits in the bathroom with his computer. But towards him there was another feeling — that she felt dumped. And I reacted to that; because you do not feel that way if you do not have a relationship or something like, do you? And as far as I knew, they had no relationship.

So that, well she felt dumped; yes… That was during the crayfish party, and they sat and talked quietly about that for a while, because it….

Oh, right! And then she also joked that Julian had disappeared with a "random girl", [inaudible] the media. Because those who had called her had asked if Julian and so on. But no, "He disappeared with a 'random girl'," and I did not then understand what she meant. But she meant that, after the lunch that we have just talked about, Julian and Sofia had gone off to the museum and the cinema and so on. But he returned for the crayfish party.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Was there anything else that you picked up during the crayfish party?

Donald Bostrom: Well, the only possibly relevant…. Actually, I did not participate very much. Mainly, I sat and ate; I love crayfish [laughs]. So I concentrated very much on eating.

But I know that there was a discussion about where Julian was going to sleep. Should he go home with this couple, as planned. There was another friend of Anna, and there was Anna. But I did not understand that it was already decided then, at the table, that Julian was to remain at Anna's that night. I was not involved in that discussion, but I understood that so it would be, so that…. Once again, I was among the first to leave; and the others remained and…. Then he and Anna went up and slept there, from what I have been told.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Did you get the impression that Julian was flirting with any woman in particular at the crayfish party?

Donald Bostrom: Not that I could see. Maybe he did on the sly, or however one might put it. But I did not see that he did so.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No.

Donald Bostrom: The classic— that man chases woman, or something like that….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No.

Donald Bostrom: No. My recollection is that he rather intended to continue meeting Anna, because what he said was, "I think it will be best if I sleep here afterwards. It's the simplest." He devised a formal explanation, so to speak — i.e. instead of moving luggage and so on…. That was my impression. But, in fact, I was not overly observant in that gathering. I know that I ate more than the others did [laughs]. [Inaudible] Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And then if we put it like this: Sofia, have you had any contact with Sofia, have you met Sofia other than at the lunch?

Donald Bostrom: No. That occasion was the last time I…. I have not spoken with her. I have not seen her.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Before that, had you any contact with Sofia?

Donald Bostrom: No. It was at the seminar. I saw someone at the seminar who just looked special —that is, whom I noticed but.… Everyone seemed to have a role to play. There were journalists, there were technicians, and there were, like, organizers. And it was very obvious that she did not have any role. So I sat and considered: But think.… Who can that be; can it be a member of the Pirate Party, can it be…? Yeah you know — like that. And suddenly she was just standing there next to Julian…. That's why I introduced myself; and then I understood, "All right, she is one of his female admirers," so to speak.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Then let's go back to, to this, a little, to this about her living, that Julian was to stay with Anna.

Donald Bostrom: Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And then, was it then decided how long he would stay with Anna?

Donald Bostrom: No, not as far as I know. It was my understanding that he was actually supposed to have moved out on Friday, as mentioned; that was the plan. And then he remained, and then I never heard about any other time limit. Not that I have heard. If they said something to each other.… But I don't think so. Perhaps what you are getting at is that, eventually during that week — towards Wednesday and afterward, I believe —Anna told me that she wanted him to move. O.K., but tell him, I said. And then she said. "I have told him, but he doesn't want to move." And then I confronted him with that.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): Julian?

Donald Bostrom: Confronted Julian — that it was time to move, that Anna wants you to move, that she says she told you. And again he was surprised and said she had not said a word about it.… And again I can… So I have… two — it is like stereo speakers, where one channel says one thing and the other channel says something else. But not once has anyone mentioned any time limit, other than on a certain day [inaudible]. "No, now I want you to move"…. She said to me. And I conveyed that message to Julian —now it is time. And it is not until Friday, I believe, that he moves.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Where does he move to then?

Donald Bostrom: Good question. I don't know. I think you should ask Johannes; maybe you already have. I have not been involved in arranging his lodging, not at any point.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No. Do you know, did you get any, did you hear Anna mention Sofia or that, in other words, did she mention Sofia before this business about the HIV tests and so on? Did she mention Sofia at all?

Donald Bostrom: No, the only thing I heard was what I just mentioned, that she called her a "random girl".… With a shrug of her shoulder, or she tried to sort of joke that Julian disappeared with a "random girl". More than that I have not heard.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): O.K.

Donald Bostrom: One could perhaps ask her girlfriends how she…. Those closest to her. No, so it was fairly clear then, the impression she gave me — Anna, that is — that her manner toward me was pleasant, trustworthy, straightforward, refreshing in some way. But then I understood later that a lot of other things had happened — that the impression I had got was not correct….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No.

Donald Bostrom: Did not correspond with reality.

DL: No.

Donald Bostrom: So, hmm.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): So, how and when did this come…. That is, when she called and told you this…. that things had happened with this Sofia.… And that you, even then, she told you what, was true and that.… What was your impression of her when she related what she said she had experienced?

Donald Bostrom: My impression was that — partly, I was of course bewildered that suddenly it is a completely different picture…. But then I believe that my impression was that she was credible, and there was a little of this — one is inclined to believe a woman who has been mistreated. It is like that, in some way; it is sort of…. So that was my immediate impression.…

But at the same time, I began to think: How can it be possible? For, if they are having sex, consensual according to her, and something happens that she experiences as an assault, how can she nevertheless gladly arrange a crayfish party, let him remain in her flat, share a bed and so forth? I felt that there is something here that does not add up. So I had the feeling that she was a credible person, yet there was something about her story that did not add up.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No.

Donald Bostrom: But I also decided not to dig into this. That is something for you to do, so to say [laughs].

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes [laughs].

Donald Bostrom: So those are pretty much the two impressions I have, parallel with each other: a credible young woman, a strong young woman who knows what she wants, but something that does not add up. And it is somewhat strengthened by the fact that I now had three versions of what happened.… And Julian still says the same thing: "I don't understand anything".…

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): May I toss in a question here?

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Of course.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): When you spoke with Anna, and she said that she had been the victim of a sexual assault. Did you get any sense of what she had actually been subjected to — or Sofia?

Donald Bostrom: Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Based on Anna's story.

Donald Bostrom: Yes, I understand; based on Anna's story. When she called me and said "we had sex" and this happened, she did not in any way imply that she had been the victim of sexual assault. In fact, she did not even want to go to the police. But the way she put it was like, "I want to go with, I promised Sofia I would go with her for support" — not that she had any reason to go, herself. And so my impression is that she did not experience anything very serious, but that she had become angry. Roughly: Don't destroy the condom, but not that it was an assault. That was my impression, because she did not want to go to the police for her own sake.

Then she called back and said, as I mentioned, that because she strengthened Sofia's story with that one sentence, the case became stronger, as she expressed it. That was exactly what she said.… But it was not her case. If she then went to you lot and made a strong case for herself, I don't know. But [I am explaining what she said] to me, because that was your question.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): Yes, yes; of course.

Donald Bostrom: So she toned it down a lot as something unpleasant, or something she got angry about — and no intention to file a complaint or pursue the matter further.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): But this is then before you, this is before it…. It seems like….

Donald Bostrom: This is on Thursday, then….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And when does she go to the police — do you know that?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, I believe it is on Friday that she goes to the police. And I believe that it is on Saturday that Julian is arrested in absentia. So that, yes, on Friday afternoon Anna phoned me fairly often, or we phoned each other a great many times that Friday. Then she said, "Now Sofia is with the police. Now I have been with the police", and there is talk of HIV tests again…. So on Friday, in particular, there was a fairly intensive telephone traffic…. But she gave me the impression that she went there to say what I have just told you; and she is a supportive friend to Sofia. Just so….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): What she told you — what did you feel?

Donald Bostrom: I guess I felt precisely so — or believe her, quite simply.… For when this came out, I got a call from Aftonbladet; and I decided that I did not want to say anything in the media. I did not want to get dragged into this. It is not my story, so to speak.… I was not present on these occas…. and so, so that…. But I know that I said to Aftonbladet straight off that my impression of Anna was what I have told you — that she seemed to be a credible young woman. I remember that I did say that to Aftonbladet.… But nevertheless, there are things about the story that do not add up. …

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Have you ever talked with Julian about, well, women? Have you ever talked with him, that is….

Donald Bostrom: Yes, I understand the question. Yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): That bit about how they, how he is pursued all the time.… Have you had, shall we say, ethical discussions with him

Donald Bostrom: Yes, yes.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And have you had, well, shall we say ethical conversations with him?…

Donald Bostrom: Yes, I have.… Precisely because there is an astounding surge of women. It takes only a few seconds; it is very noticeable. And when it is like that, I believe that one has to keep things under control, for a variety of reasons. There are then ethical, moral ways to, so to say — . But I cannot really offer an opinion, because I do not know what he has done and not done, so to say, you understand.…

It is just like, handle…. On the one hand it was: If it is going to be like this, it must be handled very, very well. Deal with it so that no young woman, you know…. On the other hand, our discussions were more about the security aspects — that he has portrayed himself, which I think is at least partly accurate, as a hunted man. He is not so popular in the United States. According to reliable sources that I have read in several places, there over one hundred who [inaudible] Pentagon trying to crack his codes….

There is a hunt — and most important, he is sitting on material that the USA believes can damage the USA.… But not only the USA. It was the same in Iceland, and there are other countries.…

So it is a source of intelligence that is without parallel. That is why it is interesting from a journalistic standpoint to [inaudible] the actual sources. So it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that this is something that many people want to stop. I do not believe that anyone will try to attack him physically; but there are other things that can be done.

And although it may seem conspiratorial, there have been many episodes throughout history where a girl with a short skirt has been sent in. There was a case not so long ago in Russia…. And we talked about just that case. We also talked about Vanunu, the Israeli scientist who revealed Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. That was the same thing: They sent a girl to his hotel room, and that was that. Then they could transport him to Israel and so on.

So we talked about all that, and there were two aspects. One was to deal with the young women in a proper way. The other was that now he was becoming someone who could expect to be subjected to various…. That's what we talked about, in those terms.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes, and what did he say to that?

Donald Bostrom: I only remember him saying that he understood.… So that was probably how it was. But I also got the impression — don't recall the exact words — that he thought he had it under control, that because he understood the problem, he thought….

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Do you feel there is any reason to think about this case in those terms?

Donald Bostrom: I don't think so. Not really, if one can think in different ways. So if one thinks about the Pentagon and the CIA and such…. No, I don't think so. I don't believe that at all —any such conflict.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Has Julian discussed that possibility?

Donald Bostrom: No, in fact he has not. He has talked about it being a smear campaign. But he does not know where it is coming from — or he merely refers to what is in the entire world press. "Assange" plus "rape" gets several million hits on the web. So it is a gigantic smear campaign, he says but... No, I don't believe he thinks that the CIA is behind it.…

Not in this case. But he has also said — he has got tips from intelligence agencies that he should be careful, because there are indications that such plans exist.…

But that does not necessarily apply to this business.… Then, there are always things one does not know, but…. If you are just asking me, then no, I do not believe that this is something bigger. I believe it is more private, personal.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes. You said that you had also confronted Julian in connection with hearing about this from Anna.

Donald Bostrom: That is correct.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Did he say anything about what had happened? That is, did he way, "No, no I don't understand anything"… but did he add anything about what had happened?

Donald Bostrom: Yes partly. It was not a lot. It was just, "I don't understand what you are talking about, because we had sex exactly as normal".…And I also said that Anna had said that Sofia protested loud and clear: "No, do not continue".… And then he became outraged several times. I have taken it up with him several times and he becomes, like, outraged. He absolutely did not, he states emphatically – or that she did not. And he also says that it is a pure, pure, pure, pure lie.…

And then he says that they only had normal sexual intercourse, and that which has also been mentioned in the press, that "We joked about what name the baby would have" and so on.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Did he say whether he was wearing a condom or not?

Donald Bostrom: On that occasion with Sofia, no condom.… And on the other occasion, why does one destroy a condom. Regarding that he said that, no, he had not. He said that they simply continued as usual.… So, it was protected sex on that occasion.… Consensual, protected sex, and he had not damaged the condom in any way. That is his version, to me.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): How — what do you know about Julian's private life? Do you have any knowledge of his life, in general? Is he married, does he have children?

Donald Bostrom: I know very, very little. Most of it comes from newspaper articles.… Some people have tried to explore his background. I know very, very, very little. But I know that he is not married, and he has at least four children, I believe. He talks very little about his private life. That suits me; I have no need to discuss private matters. That is not our role; rather…. And to my knowledge, he has no permanent residence; he has no permanent base, but instead circulates.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Hmm. Have you, has he ever expressed a desire for more children?

Donald Bostrom: Not to me… He is not a man who talks about his private life.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): No. [Silence.] Yes, Ewa?

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): I see a few things here. Yes, had Julian any, did he talk about his future life, like did he want to establish himself here in Sweden, or…?

Donald Bostrom: Yes, that.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): What were his thoughts?

Donald Bostrom: His idea — as he expressed it to me, or to others at any rate — was to establish himself in Sweden. Apply for a work and residence permit, as he has done.… So he ahas [sic] sent in the application, that much I know. Then he was planning to establish a publication in Sweden and, in order to do that, to obtain a publishing license [sic] and be the publisher responsible under Swedish law. And with that, Sweden would become a sort of base for his life and work. But no more details on how he would live — well, a few. But this was purely professional future planning. Work and residence permit, publishing license [sic], start a publication, and Sweden would become some sort of home base for those activities. And that shows a future orientation, which is how he thinks.

His links to Sweden would be strengthened, and become more long-term and more….

And that is the clear impression that I have.… Yes, and that was the direction, and he presumably is continuing with that plan.…

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): Yes, precisely. It occurred to me: Are you still in contact with Anna [inaudible]?

Donald Bostrom: No. We had a little, I'll see when was the last — so, in the midst of the rush, and we were in touch for a while afterwards. Then it was more and more seldom. I phoned a few times, but she did not answer. That was after Claes Borgström came into the picture. And I think I concluded — because we had a good relationship…. In one of her last SMS messages she wrote that, "We trust each other, don't we?"…. So my conclusion is that she was worried that I was going to talk to the press — and especially to Aftonbladet because I have a lot of contact with Aftonbladet — and that she therefore winds down our communication to prevent leaks. I can well imagine that the lawyer says, "Don't talk with any journalists, even if they are friends." That's what I would say. So the last time, she did not answer. Instead, there have been some SMS messages, and then…. Yes, since a over a week ago or longer, she has not even sent an SMS.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): And your contact with Julian these days?

Donald Bostrom: I have not seen him in ten days or thereabouts, nor have I met him. But we have spoken, perhaps four, three, four days ago…. It is now and then, sort of.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): And because he knows, because you have been following it, do you talk about his case much, this ongoing preliminary investigation? Does he bring it up, does he ask you things? Do you have a dialog….

Donald Bostrom: Yes we do. But it is not so much of a dialog; rather, it is more that he expresses his thoughts, for example that nothing will happen before the [Swedish national] election.… I believe he thinks about it very much. We don't talk so often; but the times we have spoken, he mentions this case. Of course, he feels — he expresses [inaudible] dissatisfaction, he feels unjustly treated. To take a concrete example that usually comes up: There was a murder case that was in the newspapers, about a young woman in Malmö named Nancy who got hacked to death with a bottle, I think it was. The killer was caught and sentenced to eight years in prison. After the sentence, the photo of the murderer was distorted, pixeled out. But the photo of Julian, who is only a suspect. is not pixeled out. So he feels that there is something going on that is systematically not right, and he comments on that often.… Yes, and so on in that manner, so to speak.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Who in Sweden is his most trusted confidant, Julian that is? Who would you say is the person here in Sweden whom he trusts the most?

Donald Bostrom: It probably varies a little. But if I were to name one person, it would probably be Johannes Wahlström. I think they got on very well in the United States when Johannes interviewed Julian.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Have you had any contact, how has your contact with Johannes been from….

Donald Bostrom: The beginning of time?

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes, or to put it more properly — no, but if we say since after this bomb was dropped.

Donald Bostrom: Basically, Johannes has been out of the country the entire time. Now I cannot say if we have spoken on the phone once or twice, and some SMS messages. In other words, it has been very little — low frequency contact.… This is not anything that has unravelled, and people have been going to meetings, sat and planned. Rather, this is something that has just been allowed to unfold as it has. My last SMS message from Johannes was yesterday. But I did not reply; I kind of did not have the energy…. He can come home and see for himself [laughs]. So it's at that level, in other words.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And before — that is, did you know him for a long time before this, or…?

Donald Bostrom: No. I met him once in Jerusalem, with a lot of journalists together. So that's why I knew who he was. Then he interviewed me once about the Middle East for some journal. That was the first time I met him and spoke with him. The third time I met him was the first time I met Julian Assange, essentially.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): And where was this?

Donald Bostrom: I believe…. [Inaudible] think. I might be missing something here. Yes, I met him, I wrote also [inaudible]. If you write about the Middle East, there are often fireworks.…

Even I have experienced that. Lots of fireworks, and I spoke with him in connection with that. So, he is someone I have known and associated with and so forth. But I have met Johannes a number of times in connection with Julian and WikiLeaks.… Much more. So all of a sudden I can say that, yes, I know him.… But that is only recently.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Anything you think of that we should have asked, that you want to convey?

Donald Bostrom: I think I have covered everything. But there is this: It feels as though there are so many versions of the same event.… I have been thinking about that.… And certain —that thing about Anna sitting there next to Julian and feeling dumped. That has also fastened in my…. Why did you feel that way?

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): Just one thing: When that phone call comes, on Thursday, when Anna….

Donald Bostrom: Yes.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): And then you confronted Julian.… Was it then made known that he had had sex with both Sofia and Anna, or were you entirely focused on Sofia?

Donald Bostrom: When Anna called, I think it was Thursday…. Up until then she had joked that, "He has not succeeded in bedding me", and so on…. But on Thursday, that is why she said, "I have also had sex with Julian… What I said before wasn't true." So it did come out that they had sex.… And the reason she said that was that Sofia called and told her about their night…. So that within the space of a minute or so, I understood that both of them had had sex with Julian — but also that the sex was consensual….

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): But then you confronted Julian with this.… Did you also speak with him about the young women?

Donald Bostrom: I told him explicitly, precisely what Anna said to me. I said it straight out.… About the broken condom, and why did you continue when Sofia said no, protested.…

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Yes. That leads to this question: Do you know if Julian has had any contact with the young women… after…?

Donald Bostrom: Not after the complaint was filed. But that Friday when the women went to the police [inaudible]; I think it was a Friday. Before that, Anna phoned me often and said that all we want is for him to take an HIV test; then we won't file a complaint, she said.

All right, I said. I will call Julian and tell him that; and so I did. And so I called Anna, and Anna called me. Then I called Julian again and he said, "But now I have had a long conversation with Sofia," he said on Friday. "And she (inaudible) no problem". In other words, she was not going to the police, and they were in complete agreement. Is that really true, I asked; because I have just spoken with Anna and I got a completely different impression. They are on their way to the police [inaudible]. "No," he said, "we were in complete agreement, it was very friendly, very pleasant." And he has come back to that several times: "I spoke with her about this on Friday and she said such and such." I don't know if they have had any contact after that, but I don't think so.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): Good.

Ewa Olofsson (police officer, witness): No questions.

Matt Gehlin (police officer): In that case, we will end the interview at 12:17 p.m.

14 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning.

"xi) 14 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 10 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Finally, the entry notes, 'SND has been cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. When observed in his cell, SND is always sitting quietly on his rack and appears to be content with doing nothing else. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

10 Quantico Brig Observation Records of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?].

"x) 10 September 2010 Entry: 'SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 3 SEPT 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]" (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

10 Quantico Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] recommends that Manning be removed from POI status.

"xi) 14 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 10 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Finally, the entry notes,'“SND has been cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. When observed in his cell, SND is always sitting quietly on his rack and appears to be content with doing nothing else. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

8 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning.

"ix) 8 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 3 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Additionally it states, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND‟s mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

3 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?]

"viii) 3 September 2010 Entry: 'SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 27 August 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

3 Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] recommends Manning removed from POI.

"ix) 8 September 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 3 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.' Additionally it states, 'SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND‟s mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

1 The case is reopened is Sweden by a third prosecutor, Marianne Ny. Julian Assange is now once again suspected of rape and other sex crimes, the details of which will not be made known until November.

"1 September 2010 At the urging of Claes Borgström (see 24 August), the original case is reopened by prosecutor #3, Marianne Ny. Assange is now once again suspected of rape and other sex crimes, the precise details of which are not made known to him until mid-November. In the months to follow, Ms. Ny will violate her own guidelines on the proper investigation of such case" (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

... Manning under MAX Custody and POI watch at Quantico against recommendations by two separate forensic psychiatrists, Captain Hocter and Col Malone.

"Over the course of the following three months, two separate forensic psychiatrists  consistently stated that there was no medical reason for PFC Manning to be under POI watch." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Due to my improvement and adjustment to confinement, Capt. Hocter[FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended on 27 August 2010 that I be taken off of POI watch and that my confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)...Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

... Beginning in September 2010, David House is detained for questioning at the border on each of seven occasions he has reentered the United States after foreign travel and is routinely questioned on those occasions about his work with the Support Network or his political beliefs and activities.

"Following the formation of the Support Network [June 2010], Plaintiff has been visited and questioned, both at his home and place of work in Cambridge, by investigators for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Plaintiff has been placed on a watch list which has resulted in his being stopped for questioning and searched each time that he enters the United States following foreign travel. Beginning in September 2010, Plaintiff has been detained for questioning at the border on each of seven occasions he has reentered the United States after foreign travel and is routinely questioned on those occasions about his work with the Support Network or his political beliefs and activities". (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

... David House makes first visit to Bradley Manning with unidentified friend.

"After that first visit...the friend who had introduced me to the visitors list...for legal reasons I kinda need to halt my visits for now...will you keep on visiting him." (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Aug 2010

30 Around 5pm, Julian Assange is interviewed by police officer Mats Gehlin. Also present are police officer, Ewa Olofsson; as witness; Leif Silbersky as legal counsel for Julian Assange, and Gun von Krusenstjerna, an interpreter. The interview is audio recorded and in person.

" 30 August 2010 Julian Assange is finally interviewed for the first time, after a delay of ten days that violates police guidelines which call for rapid investigation. As specified by prosecutor #2 [NAME OF PROSECUTOR No. 2], the interview is supposed to concern the one remaining suspected crime of nonsexual molestation. But the police interviewer chooses instead to focus on Assange's sexual relations with Anna Ardin, especially her story about the broken condom (see 21 August)" (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

Date: 30 August 2010
Interviewing officer: Mats Gehlin
Also present: Police officer Ewa Olofsson as witness; Leif Silbersky, legal counsel for Julian Assange; Gun von Krusenstjerna, interpreter
Type of interview: In person; audio-recorded
Type of protocol: Verbatim transcript with all utterances in English translated into Swedish (slightly edited in this translation to English) Abbreviations: JA, Julian Assange; MG, Mats Gehlin; LS, Leif Silbersky; GK, Gun von Krusenstjerna

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Now the tape recorder is running. The interview will be transcribed.… The entire interview, every word, will be written out.

Julian Assange: I have a question.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Wait. And as noted, you are suspected and will be formally notified of that suspicion, and it is for the crime of molestation. The formal notification reads as follows: "During the period from 13 to 14 August 2010, in Anna Ardin's residence at Tjurbergsgatan in Stockholm, Assange molested Anna Ardin during an act of copulation — which was begun and conducted under the express condition that a condom would be used — by purposely damaging the condom and continuing the copulation until he ejaculated in her vagina."

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Is that everything?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes.

Julian Assange: Is this one or two incidents?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): One incident.

Julian Assange: The 13th, the 14th [inaudible].

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): In the evening or…?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): It is during this period between the 13th...

Julian Assange: Between.… O.K.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so this is the question: What is your response to this accusation?

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Is it correct or incorrect?

Julian Assange: I am trying to understand exactly what he said.

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): Can you repeat it one more time?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): I can try…. The molestation would be in that you destroyed the condom.

JA. O.K.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that you would have done so intentionally.

Julian Assange: Yes. So in other words there are several condoms?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes, in this context — no, in this context it has to do with one condom on one occasion.

Julian Assange: O.K., so it's one incident...

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): One condom.

Julian Assange: Between the 13thand the 14th when you say that I have intentionally destroyed a condom during copulation.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Correct. What is your response to that?

Julian Assange: It is not true.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. So that you can relate your experience of that evening, is it true that you and Anna dined out together?

Julian Assange: What date?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The 13th.

Julian Assange: What day of the week was that?

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): I can check…. The 13th of August was a Friday.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And then the question is: Do you know of — if one can put it like this — do you know of an occasion on which you had sex together?

Julian Assange: Before I answer that, shall I assume that this is going to go to Expressen?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): From us? I am not going to release anything. And the only ones who are here, that's we three at this interview, plus a stenographer who will write it out afterwards. And I am the only who has access to the case file. So if it comes out in Expressen, you can quarrel with me.

Julian Assange: And as the case continues?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes, after this interview the prosecutor will decide whether to continue or shut down the case.

Julian Assange: (Inaudible) previous statements (inaudible) all the previous statements.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): From?

Julian Assange: From this office.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): It has gone out via a reviewer who acts as a censor for everything relating to the investigation.

Julian Assange: So it will be the same with what I say here?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes, but according to the Secrecy Act nothing about what happened will be made public. No names will be released. It works like this: On every document, everything that may not be made public is blacked out. But according to the law it must be reviewed for confidentiality, and we are required to make public everything which according to the law does not have to be reviewed for confidentiality [sic].

Julian Assange: So this part of the conversation, for example, will be released?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): If it is not to your detriment.

Julian Assange: And who decides that?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Our legal department.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): I think you should answer, because if they accuse you of something and you do not respond, they will have to accept what the young woman says. You have to defend yourself by giving your version. Otherwise it will be made known you did not respond, in which case the prosecutor will be required to take it to court.

Julian Assange: O.K.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): But if you answer, the prosecutor will have both your version and the young woman's version, and she will have to ask herself: Can I prove that he has done this?

Julian Assange: And how much of my version do I have to provide?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): One more thing: You have the right to take a break during the interview, and then we turn off the tape recorder. That applies to the discussion we are now having, because the interview is actually only supposed to be about the alleged crime.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): It is even easier than that…. Either you destroyed the condom intentionally, as the young woman says, or it was an accident, or no condom was used whatsoever. Those are the possible alternatives. So state your alternative to the police as your answer.

Julian Assange: All I am saying.…

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you want to take a break so that we can thoroughly discuss this, so that you feel fairly comfortable with the proceedings?

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Do you want to discuss….

Julian Assange: Perhaps we should have a discussion.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): O.K., we take a break.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): We pause to clarify the interview procedure; the time is 5:55 p.m.

(Pause)

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The interview is resumed at 6:02 p.m.… If I put it like this: You denied committing the crime and so my question is, are you aware of an event during which a condom has broken in connection with sex with Anna?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Have you had….

Julian Assange: I have heard that accusation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): You have heard that accusation. From whom?

JA. Friday, the 20th, the same day that the police were contacted, I spoke with Anna and she accused me of several things. And there were a number of false statements, as well. During that conversation she made a similar accusation; she said that I had removed a condom during sex. That was the first time I heard that accusation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Is it true that you have had a sexual relationship, you and Anna?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had a sexual relationship from that Friday, the 13th, for a couple of days. We slept in the same bed until the following Friday.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What sort of sexual relationship was it; were there several occasions?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Was a condom used on any of those occasions?

Julian Assange: On the first occasion; and we had sex several times on the 13th and the 14th. And afterwards, on the other days as well, we also had a sexual relationship.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The subsequent sexual relations, did they also involve copulation?

Julian Assange: No, it was more… we touched each other.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So we're talking about one time when copulation was involved?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had intercourse on the 13th and the 14th.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that was once, or was it several times?

Julian Assange: Several times.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so the first time was with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And who was it that wanted to use a condom?

Julian Assange: I'm not sure.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And why was a condom not used with the subsequent acts of copulation?

Julian Assange: It was used with the subsequent acts of copulation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. I misunderstood. So you had intercourse, and then only with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The accusation appears to be that a condom was damaged after the copulation; and it is Anna's contention that, on one occasion when you withdrew your penis, it sounded at first as though you removed the condom. But when you entered her again,she felt with her hand and she could feel you were still wearing the condom. Then you ejaculated and, among other things, she felt that she had semen inside her. And she also looked at the condom, and there was no semen in the condom. And so the question to you is: Is this a situation that you recognize in any way?

Julian Assange: No. On one occasion Anna pointed to the bed, which had a wet spot, and said, 'Look at that. Is that you?' I said, 'No, it must be you'. And there was no more discussion about that, not a word — until the accusation last Friday, a week afterward.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Are we talking about the first occasion again….

Julian Assange: And during that time, except for one night, Anna and I slept in the same bed. Every night except Tuesday night and Thursday night. On Thursday evening Anna said she was going out for a few hours to visit a journalist who wrote something about me and who lived in the same area, or the same housing complex or nearby. But she did not return that evening.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember what you did with the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you have no recollection of a damaged condom, either?

Julian Assange: No. Nor have I searched for a damaged condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you use a condom otherwise?

Julian Assange: Yes, usually; not always, but usually.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you say that you did not check, or you say that you do not recall what you did with the condom. Is that correct?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you normally do?

Julian Assange: I have no special routine for what I do with condoms.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): No.… How did you become acquainted with Anna?

Julian Assange: When I now think back on that situation, it was no unusual occasion for me and I had no reason to suspect that I would be accused of anything afterwards. No, there was no question of any accusations of any sort, in any way. So I do not really remember when I heard the first accusation before Friday. I did not think back on that evening and night in any great detail.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): No.

Julian Assange: You asked how I knew Anna. To come to Sweden, it was necessary for me to get diplomatic support in order to leave England — due to the security situation between my organization and the Pentagon. Political contacts in Sweden therefore suggested that I be invited by the Christian Democrats to give a presentation. A formal invitation would be sent to (inaudible) and England, so that I would have a secure journey from England to Sweden. And I understood that Anna Ardin was press secretary for Broderskapet within the Christian Democrats.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): A correction: It is not the Christian Democrats, but rather the Social Democratic

(inaudible).

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): Sorry, sorry, I apologize for giving the wrong party.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes.

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): Excuse me, sorry. The Social Democrats.

Julian Assange: She was contacted by Peter — I don't remember his last name. I believe he is the chair of Broderskapet, and a good man. Anna offered me her flat, and was also involved in organizing the press conference last Friday.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And on what date did you come to Sweden?…

Julian Assange: I'm not sure. Perhaps the 12th— between the 10th and the 12th.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): This accusation — I might sound like I'm nagging, but I still have to ask. It is a fairly clear picture that Anna has of what happened, especially about hearing a sound from the condom [?].

Julian Assange: Anna Ardin has never spoken to me about this incident in any way — nor anyone else of whom I am aware. I got a very brief and completely different reference — something other than what you are now saying [HEARING A SOUND FROM THE CONDOM?]— on Friday, the 20th.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you think Anna meant by pointing to that wet spot?

Julian Assange: At the time, I had no idea. Maybe she was trying to point out how amorous the sex had been.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): But she said something about it coming from you.

Julian Assange: Yes. She said, "Is that from you?"

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So why did she say that if you had a condom?

Julian Assange: That I don't know.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did you check the condom beforehand?

Julian Assange: Before what?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Before you put the condom on, so to speak.

Julian Assange: No, I am not in the habit of inspecting them in detail before I put them on. There was nothing unusual in any way. My behavior was nothing other than normal. So I did not inspect the condom in any special way, nor did I ignore it completely.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Who applied the condom?

Julian Assange: I don't remember.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): You don't remember who took it off, either?

Julian Assange: Probably, it was me. It is unusual for a woman to remove the condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Then, you said, that you had sex. Did you have any more sex that evening?

Julian Assange: We took several pauses and then began again, with the same condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So it was a protracted episode of sexual intercourse?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How long, at an estimate?

Julian Assange: A few hours; I am not certain how many.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did you bring the condom to Anna's, yourself, or where did you get it?

Julian Assange: I think it was Anna's.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember where she kept the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How did you get hold of the condom?

Julian Assange: I am not certain who put the condom on, so I cannot say.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): But you cannot remember exactly how you got the condom?

Julian Assange: No, I do not recall. But as I just said, it was just an ordinary night. I had no reason to suspect that I would need to recall all the details from that night.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How was your sexual relation after that night?

Julian Assange: It was still quite warm. On one occasion after that, Anna had two orgasms. We slept in the same bed.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And if have understood you correctly, you did not have sexual intercourse then?

Julian Assange: That is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And nothing happened during the time you resided with her after the first night?

Julian Assange: No there was no sexual intercourse; that's correct. But other sexual activities, yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Were you ever rejected by Anna?

Julian Assange: In what way?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): That she rejected a sexual advance from you?

Julian Assange: Yes, sometimes but in no way that was significant. No, nothing that would in any way be unusual.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): If we go back to the first night: Did you ejaculate?

Julian Assange: Yes.…

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Leif, anything you want to…?

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): I have a couple of questions.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): At what time of the day did you have sexual intercourse, what time was it approximately?

Julian Assange: Late at night and early in the morning.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): What would you say, though; approximately what time — three, four, five…?

Julian Assange: Between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): O.K. Was there any alcohol?

Julian Assange: No.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Neither you nor her?

Julian Assange: I do not recall that I had drunk any large quantity. We might have had white wine with dinner. But it was not an evening where we drank a lot.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Was either of you intoxicated?

Julian Assange: Not so intoxicated that I noticed. I would have noticed if either of us was inebriated.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): When did you first hear from Anna about the problem we are discussing today?

Julian Assange: I have never heard about precisely this problem directly from Anna. Today is the first time I have got an exact description of it.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): So during that entire week when you resided with Anna, from Friday to Friday and you had various sexual relations, she said nothing about a broken condom?

Julian Assange: No, nothing at all.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): O.K. I have no further questions.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): One more question occurs to me: Who was it who, shall we say, took the initiative to your advances toward each other?

Julian Assange: Anna.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How did that happen?

Julian Assange: She said I should sleep in her bed.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And it was in bed that things began?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did either of you make any advances before you went to the bed?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did Anna say anything?

Julian Assange: No, she said something, but nothing unusual.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And what do you mean by "unusual"?

Julian Assange: They were just things one would expect of a lover.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And what were your plans when it was time for you both to go to bed, then?

Julian Assange: After Anna had…?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): No, before that.

Julian Assange: Before.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So, you are saying that she invited you to her bed.

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Where were you planning to sleep before she invited you to the bed?

Julian Assange: Either on the floor, or.… I don't know. It is Anna's flat, after all.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How long had you resided in Anna's flat before her return that evening?

Julian Assange: I stayed in the flat for one day when Anna was away. I got the keys three or four days before that. I had access to the flat, but I didn't sleep there. Anna, she said that…No, I don't want to discuss that, because I don't believe it has anything to do with this case. I don't want to discuss anything private if it has nothing to do with the case.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Any follow-up questions? O.K. then, is there anything you want to say before we terminate the interview?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Go ahead.

Julian Assange: I was contacted by a mutual friend of Anna and me [SONJA WHO?] on Friday, the 20th [WHAT TIME?]. It was a woman named Sonja [SONJA WHO?] who was at the hospital [WHICH HOSPITAL?]. She said something about DNA and the police — and I was very upset to hear that. No one alleged anything. It would be a long story if I were to go into that. It does not seem relevant.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): OK so we hereby conclude the interview.

Julian Assange: We can always continue if it is needed. But the main thing is that I and other people [WHO?], we heard a bunch of unbelievable lies [WHAT WERE THE LIES?], and heard that I was to meet Sonja [WHO IS THIS?] on Saturday afternoon to discuss the matter. Anna [ARDIN] had no accusations, and no one had any intention of going to the police and so on. That is how I expected things to remain until I heard the news in Expressen.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. then. The interview is concluded. The time is 6:37 p.m.

 

27 Quantico Brig Observation Report [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?].

"vi) 27 August 2010 Entry: 'SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 20 August 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

27 The Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board [WHO IS ON THIS?] reviewed SND Manning and recommended that he remain on POI against recommendation of Brig Psychiatrist, Capt. Hocter.

"vii) 31 August 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry also notes 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 27 August and was recommended to be removed from POI status. The C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS?] reviewed SND on the same date and recommended that he still remain POI. SND remains courteous and respectful to staff and has presented no problems toward staff or inmates thus far. During the interview SND was well spoken, groomed and neat in appearance.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

27 Quantico brig psychiatrist, Captain Hocter, recommends Manning be removed from POI watch and confinement changed from Max to Medium.

"Due to his improvement and adjustment to confinement, on August 27, 2010, the Brig's forensic psychiatrist [CAPT. HOCTER] recommended that PFC Manning be taken off of POI watch and that his confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

"Due to my improvement and adjustment to confinement, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended on 27 August 2010 that I be taken off of POI watch and that my confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)...Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also, Quantico Brig Observation Report:

"vii) 31 August 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.' The entry also notes 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[CAPT. HOCTER] on 27 August and was recommended to be removed from POI status. The C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS?] reviewed SND on the same date and recommended that he still remain POI. SND remains courteous and respectful to staff and has presented no problems toward staff or inmates thus far. During the interview SND was well spoken, groomed and neat in appearance.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

"xxvii) 14 December 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 10 December 2010 and recommended to remain on POI. (The Brig noted that this was the first time since 27 August 2010 that Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended PFC Manning remain on POI. His main criteria was that it seemed PFC Manning was not doing well). SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

25 WikiLeaks publishes CIA Red Cell Memorandum on United States "exporting terrorism" originally published on 2 February 2010.

"This CIA "Red Cell" report from February 2, 2010, looks at what will happen if it is internationally understood that the United States is an exporter of terrorism; 'Contrary to common belief, the American export of terrorism or terrorists is not a recent phenomenon, nor has it been associated only with Islamic radicals or people of Middle Eastern, African or South Asian ethnic origin. This dynamic belies the American belief that our free, open and integrated multicultural society lessens the allure of radicalism and terrorism for US citizens.' The report looks at a number cases of US exported terrorism, including attacks by US based or financed Jewish, Muslim and Irish-nationalism terrorists. It concludes that foreign perceptions of the US as an "Exporter of Terrorism" together with US double standards in international law, may lead to noncooperation in renditions (including the arrest of CIA officers) and the decision to not share terrorism related intelligence with the United States." (Source: wikileaks.org)

24 DOD News Briefing with Gen. Conway from the Pentagon answers a question about WikiLeaks impact in Afghanistan saying, "Okay.  WikiLeaks was not helpful, to the degree that I think our partners are concerned that we could have such a serious breach.  At the same time...except, perhaps, for compromising some of our sources, I don’t think that it’s being felt tactically on the battlefield.  My troops chose not to raise it with me in a single question-and-answer session, so I don’t think that the impact is severe, except as it relates to our capacity to maintain secrets. "

Full Transcript

General Conway is the 34th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General James T. Conway. General Conway has served as Commandant since November 13th of 2006, and is one of only two Commandants to serve his entire tenure during wartime... General Conway just returned from a trip to the Central Command region.  Specifically, he and his group visited Romania, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Landstuhl, Germany.  General Conway spent the majority of his trip visiting Marines and sailors in Helmand province in Afghanistan.  And General Conway will retire this fall after more than 40 years of service.  And he’ll, again, give you a briefing on his recent travels, and then take your questions. 

 ...

Q     Thank you, General.  Three questions into one.  One, how does this WikiLeaks impact on your mission in Afghanistan?  And two, as far as floods in Pakistan is concerned, is it impacting the mission in Afghanistan?  And finally, as far as withdrawal and the mission change in Iraq, how does your soldiers or your Marines or your -- I mean people in Afghanistan are thinking that you can learn some method, some -- can you learn some lessons from Iraq into your mission in Afghanistan? 

                GEN. CONWAY:  Sir, I missed the first question.  Would you restate it? 

                Q     WikiLeaks. 

                GEN. CONWAY:  Okay. 

                Q     Yes, sir. 

                GEN. CONWAY:  Okay.  WikiLeaks was not helpful, to the degree that I think our partners are concerned that we could have such a serious breach.  At the same time -- and I haven’t -- I haven’t examined all the documents.  I haven’t tasked anybody to do that.  At the same time, except, perhaps, for compromising some of our sources, I don’t think that it’s being felt tactically on the battlefield.  My troops chose not to raise it with me in a single question-and-answer session, so I don’t think that the impact is severe, except as it relates to our capacity to maintain secrets. 

                The MEUs that are supporting Pakistan are the theater reserve for the theater commander.  That he has chosen and elected to commit both the MEU that’s there now and the future MEU, at least for a time, to Pakistan crisis requirements I think strips him of some of that capability to respond elsewhere in theater.  But for purposes of Marines in Helmand, there is no impact.  We aren’t relying upon any of the MEU capacity in Helmand province to be able to continue our functions there. 

                In terms of Iraq, you know, we’re out of Iraq, for all intents and purposes, have been now for the better part of a year, started the process really about a year before that.  But we asked ourselves, to the essence of your question, what lessons are transferable -- that we learned over four or five years in Iraq -- to Afghanistan as we built up our presence there. 

                And we found there was about 70 percent application, probably, I mean, but you’ve got a different culture, different environment, different language, different tribal construct, different leadership, of course, that we’ve got to deal with.  And so we focused on the delta. 

                We focused on that 30 percent and tried to, you know, inject that into our training to make our leadership more prepared and that manner of thing.  And that’s working for us. 

                None of it gets far from our old Small Wars Manual.  You know, Marines back in the ‘20s in Central and South America learned many of these lessons in terms of this transition process that we talked about earlier.  So a manual that’s soon to be 100 years old has really been our beacon for the way ahead in terms of how we approach. 

                Q     And so finally, troops are watching all the news, ups and downs, what is -- 

                GEN. CONWAY:  They’re incredible informed, they really are. 

                Q     -- what is happening around the globe. 

                GEN. CONWAY:  Yeah. 

                Q     How do you keep their morale?  Because things change in their minds also, whatever they watch, whatever they hear, whatever they see. 

                GEN. CONWAY:  Yeah.  Well, again, I emphasize to them, the number-one concern on the part of American troops anywhere they go is the country behind us.  That was the case in 2003.  That’s the case today in 2010.   

                And I’ll tell you, I am so proud of our American public, that regardless how they see what happened in Iraq or what’s happening in Afghanistan, they support the troops.  And that’s the message that they get from me; that’s the message that they see when they come home on dwell.  And in that regard, I’m just incredibly proud of our country. 

                Over here.  Yes, sir. 

24 Quantico Brig Observation Report on Manning.

"v.) 24 August 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive an average work and training report.' The entry also notes '[t]o this point in confinement, SND has presented no problems and has been courteous and respectful to staff. SND‟s conduct has been excellent, so much so that is it apparent that he is extremely cautious about what he says or how he acts. During the interview SND was well spoken, groomed and neat in appearance'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

24 Politician and lawyer, Claes Bogstrom, who is in the midst of an election campaign, becomes the publicly financed representative of Anna Ardin and Sophia Wilen.

"24 August 2010 A politician-lawyer named Claes Borgström, who is in the midst of an election campaign and who is struggling to restore a tarnished legal reputation, becomes the publicly financed representative of Anna Ardin and Sofia Wilén. He immediately accuses Assange of sex crimes, cowardice, etc., in a "trial by media" that has continued for 17 months. " (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

23 Pentagon publishes press release titled, "Spokesman Denies Pentagon Role in WikiLeaks Founder Charge" The press release also quotes Pentagon spokesman Brain Whitman saying, "“I think we’ve made our position very clear, that this stolen property should be returned immediately,” Whitman said. “The information on the Web should be taken down. There should be no further posting of any information, and the department is not interested in any sort of minimization or sanitation exercise.”"

Press Release

By Army Sgt.. 1st Class Michael J. Carden
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 23, 2010 – A Defense Department spokesman today termed as “ridiculous” the notion that Pentagon officials were involved in recent rape allegations against WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.

Swedish authorities issued an arrest warrant Aug. 20, but revoked it soon after.

CNN reported today that Assange said the allegations were part of a “smear campaign” after his website posted tens of thousands of classified U.S. military war records. Assange says WikiLeaks has an additional 15,000 documents it plans to post.

Assange said he has ideas about who may be behind the accusations, but would not share his suspicion “without direct evidence.”

Any thought that the Defense Department may be part of such a conspiracy is “absurd,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said today when reporters questioned him about the matter.

“No. That’s ridiculous,” Whitman said.

Whitman said the Pentagon remains firm in its demand for WikiLeaks to remove the posted documents, many of which contain the names of U.S. troops and Afghan nationals who support them.

“I think we’ve made our position very clear, that this stolen property should be returned immediately,” Whitman said. “The information on the Web should be taken down. There should be no further posting of any information, and the department is not interested in any sort of minimization or sanitation exercise.”

The Pentagon is working to ensure the safety of the individuals – American and Afghan – named in the documents, Whitman added.

“The mere existence of some of these documents and the names that are in the documents certainly do pose a threat,” he said. “We have a moral and ethical obligation to take measures.”

23 Irmeli Krans, the police officer who interviewed Sofia Wilen on August 20 is denied access to that interview that he conducted that day. After an exchange of emails, he is ordered by Mats Gehli, his superior, to alter protocol (written summary) by instead creating and signing a new interview , which was done on 26 August, and which still has not been approved by Sophia Wilen.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"23 August 2010 The police officer who interviewed Sofia Wilén on August 20 the [NAME OF OFFICER] is ordered by a superior to alter the protocol (written summary), which has still not been approved by Ms. Wilén." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

"In the course of the interview, Sofia and I were informed that Julian Assange had been arrested in absentia. After that, Sofia had difficulty concentrating, as a result of which I made the judgement that it was best to terminate the interview. But Sofia did mention that Assange was angry at her. There was not enough time to obtain any further information about why he was angry at her or how this was expressed. Nor did we have time to discuss what had happened afterwards. The interview was neither read back to Sofia nor read by her for approval; but Sofia was informed that she could do so at a later date." (Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network)

"On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system." (Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network)

22 WikiLeaks posts ABC Foreign Correspondent video report on Thailand, 13 April 2010 not available outside Australia.

"This April 2010 video report was prepared by the Australian Broadcasting Commission or ABC. It covers Thailand's most taboo topic, the King of Thailand and his successor Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. The video was met with outrage from the Royal Thai Embassy in Australia, who cited national security concerns Bangkokpost article after it aired on the state-funded TV station. This video is not available on the ABC NEWS website for viewing outside of Australia (i.e. in Thailand)." (Source: wikileaks.org)

22 Pentagon Twitter Rape Campaign: "(Blackfive) Julian Assange, collateral rapist: Turns out that Julian Assange is now a collateral rapist, in addition..."

Aug 21-
Sept 27
Julian Assange remains in Sweden voluntarily and makes himself available to the police and the prosecutor.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"21 August – 27 September 2010 Since first learning of the accusations against him from news media, Assange has voluntarily remained in Sweden and made himself available to the police and prosecutor. Through his attorney, he has made repeated attempts to be interviewed by prosecutor Ny or her agents, but she has rejected all proposals. Finally, after five weeks and having secured Ms. Ny's consent, Assange departs for England. On the same day, Ms. Ny issues a secret warrant for Assange's arrest." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

21 [WHAT TIME?] Swedish prosecutor withdraw arrest warrant. "I don't think there is reason to suspect that he has committed rape," says Stockholm's chief prosecutors, Eva Finne. Anna Ardin is interviewed by telephone.

"20 August 2010 Accompanied by Anna Ardin, Sofia Wilén visits a Stockholm police station — by their own account, for the limited purpose of obtaining assistance in compelling Assange to take an HIV test. Anna Ardin is present during the interview with Ms. Wilén, which is conducted by a friend and political ally of Ms. Ardin [Irmelin Krans].

On the basis of very little information, prosecutor #1 [NAME OF PROSECUTOR No. 1] decides to arrest Assange in absentia on suspicion of rape and other sex crimes. When Ms. Wilén is informed of that decision, she is unable to continue the interview and leaves without approving the written account of it. News of the warrant is leaked to a Swedish tabloid [Expressen] and, within hours, global media are full of articles and headlines linking Assange's name to the word 'rape'." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

" 21 August 2010 Less than one full day after the arrest warrant is issued, it is revoked by prosecutor #2 [NAME OF PROSECUTOR No. 2] who finds that there are no grounds for suspicion of rape or any other sex crime. Anna Ardin is interviewed by the police via telephone, and gives an account of her sexual encounter with Assange on 13 August which differs from what she has previously told friends. Now, she says that she was the victim of a sexual assault, during which Assange is said to have destroyed a condom and duped her into having unprotected sex. But the "used" condom she subsequently provides as evidence turns out to be " (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

Need primary sources.

21 [11:31 AM - 12:31 PM] Anna Ardin is interviewed by police officer Sara Wennerblom, by telephone (not recorded). The protocol for the interview is a summary report by police officer, Sara Wennerblom.

According to her August 21 police interview (eight days late)r, "She [Anna Ardin] believes that she still has the condom at home and will check to see. She also states that the bed sheets used on this occasion are still lying unwashed in her hamper."

The interview was read back to Anna Ardin and according to police officer's summary, approved by Anna Ardin.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

Date: 21 August 2010
Interviewing officer: Sara Wennerblom
Type of interview: Per telephone; not recorded
Type of protocol: Summary by interviewing officer

Anna states that she is employed as press and political secretary for Sweden's Christian Social Democrats, Broderskapet. Anna says that she worked on preparing a seminar that was to take place on 14 August, at which Julian Assange had been invited to speak.

Since Anna would be out of town during 11–14 August, she lent her flat to Assange. But Anna returned early to Stockholm on Friday, 13 August, because she had a lot to do for the seminar. Anna and Assange had never previously met in person, only professionally via e-mail and telephone.

On Friday, Assange and Anna went out to dine together. They had agreed that Assange would continue residing in Anna's flat, despite her return a day ahead of time. After dining in town, they returned to Anna's flat and drank tea.

In answer to my question, Anna replies that neither she nor Assange had taken any alcohol during the evening. While they sat and drank tea, Assange began caressing her leg. To my question Anna replies that Assange had not made any physical approach toward her earlier that evening, except now which Anna initially welcomed. However, it felt "unpleasant right from the start", because Assange was rough and impatient.

According to Anna, "everything went so fast". He tore off her clothes and in the process pulled at and broke her necklace. Anna tried to put some clothes back on, because it all went so fast and she felt uncomfortable; but Assange immediately took them off again. Anna states that in fact she felt that she no longer wanted to go any further, but that it was too late to tell Assange to stop, as she had "gone along this far". She thought she "had only herself to blame". She therefore allowed Assange to remove all of her clothes.

Then they lay down on the bed, Anna on her back and Assange on top of her. Anna sensed that Assange wanted to insert his penis in her vagina right away, which she did not want because he was not wearing a condom. She therefore tried to twist her hips to the side and squeeze her legs together in order to prevent penetration. Anna tried several times to reach for a condom, but Assange stopped her from doing so by holding her arms and prying open her legs while trying to penetrate her with his penis without a condom. Anna says that eventually she was on the verge of tears because she was held fast and could not get a condom, and felt that 'this can end badly'. To my question Anna replies that Assange must have known that Anna was trying to reach for a condom, and that he therefore held her arms to prevent her from doing so.

After a moment, Assange asked Anna what she was doing and why she was squeezing her legs together. Anna then told him that she wanted him to wear a condom before he came in her. At that, Assange released Anna's arms and put on a condom that Anna fetched for him. Anna sensed a strong unspoken reluctance by Assange to use a condom, as a result of which she had a feeling that he had not put on the condom that he had been given. She therefore reached down her hand to Assange's penis in order to ensure that he had really put on the condom. She felt that the rim of the condom was where it should be, at the base of Assange's penis. Anna and Assange resumed having sex and Anna says that she thought that she "just wanted to get it over with".

After a short while, Anna notes that Assange withdraws from her and begins to adjust the condom. Judging from the sound, according to Anna, it seemed that Assange removed the condom. He entered her again and continued the copulation. Anna once again handled his penis and, as before, felt the rim of the condom at the base of the penis; she therefore let him continue.

Shortly thereafter, Assange ejaculated inside her and then withdrew. When Assange removed the condom from his penis, Anna saw that it did not contain any semen. When Anna began to move her body she noticed that something "ran" out of her vagina. Anna understood rather quickly that it must be Assange's semen. She pointed this out to Assange, but he denied it and replied that it was only her own wetness. Anna is convinced that when he withdrew from her the first time, Assange deliberately broke the condom at its tip and then continued copulating to ejaculation. To my question Anna replies she did not look closely at the condom in order to see if it was broken in the way that she suspected; but she believes that she still has the condom at home and will check to see. She also states that the bed sheets used on this occasion are still lying unwashed in her hamper.

Anna states that she and Assange did not have sex again after the above-mentioned event. However, Assange continued residing with her until yesterday (Friday, 20 August). According to Anna, Assange made sexual advances to her every day after the evening when they had sex, for example by touching her breasts. Anna had rejected Assange on every such occasion, which Assange had accepted. On one occasion (on Wednesday, 18 August) he had suddenly removed all the clothes from his lower body, and then rubbed his lower body and erect penis against Anna. Anna states that she felt this was strange and unpleasant behavior, and had therefore moved down to a mattress on the floor and slept there instead of on the bed with Assange. The following night, Anna stayed with a friend because she did not want to be with or near Assange due to his strange behavior. She had also said after Wednesday 18 August that she no longer wanted Assange to reside at her flat, which he did not act upon until Friday [yesterday], when he took his things and returned her key.

To my question Anna replies that Assange resided with her, but that they rarely slept together because Assange was up all night, working with his computer. When he lay down to sleep, around 7:00 a.m., Anna was usually up.

To my question Anna replies that she knew about Sofia, because she had been in contact with Anna before the above-mentioned seminar and was in the audience at the presentation. According to Anna, Sofia had purchased electrical cables for Assange, and had joined Anna and Assange for lunch after the seminar. Anna noticed that Assange had flirted with Sofia during lunch and understood that they subsequently had begun some sort of relationship, because Assange had rung to Sofia later in the evening during the crayfish party at Anna's place.

Yesterday, Anna received an e-mail message from Sofia [WHAT TIME?] who wondered how she could contact Assange, as she had something important to tell him. Anna understood immediately what it was about; she contacted Sofia [WHAT TIME?] who then related what had happened to her — that she and Assange had had sex, that he did not want to use a condom, etc. Sofia wanted to take this further to the police and Anna decided [WHEN DID THEY DECIDE?] to follow along, primarily as support. [AROUND 4:20 PM BASED ON IRMELIN KRANS POLICE INTERVIEWER, AND FRIEND OF ANNA ARDIN'S STATEMENT ON AUG 20, REVISED Aug 26 POLICE INTERVIEW]

Anna states she had previously heard from various sources that Assange "chases every woman who crosses his path". Given Assange's reputation, Anna felt that it was very important to use a condom the time they had sex, i.e. the day before the seminar.

Anna states that she has felt very badly after the occasion when she and Assange had sex, primarily due to worry that she might have been infected with HIV or some other sexual disease. Anna states that she had consented to have sex with Assange, but that she would not have done so if she had known that he was not wearing a condom. Anna has contacted the health centre and been given a time for testing next week. Anna consents to the police acquiring medical background.

For the present, Anna does not desire any contact with a crime victims service, but will get back to us if she feels the need.

Interview read back to Anna and approved by her.

21 According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, he learns the arrest warrant from Expressen.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Any follow-up questions? O.K. then, is there anything you want to say before we terminate the interview?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Go ahead.

Julian Assange: I was contacted by a mutual friend of Anna and me [SONJA WHO?] on Friday, the 20th [WHAT TIME?]. It was a woman named Sonja [SONJA WHO?] who was at the hospital [WHICH HOSPITAL?]. She said something about DNA and the police — and I was very upset to hear that. No one alleged anything. It would be a long story if I were to go into that. It does not seem relevant.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): OK so we hereby conclude the interview.

Julian Assange: We can always continue if it is needed. But the main thing is that I and other people [WHO?], we heard a bunch of unbelievable lies [WHAT WERE THE LIES?], and heard that I was to meet Sonja [WHO IS THIS?] on Saturday afternoon to discuss the matter. Anna [ARDIN] had no accusations, and no one had any intention of going to the police and so on. That is how I expected things to remain until I heard the news in Expressen. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

21 Pentagon launches Twitter campaign calls Assange a rapist

20 [11:18 P.M.] Expressen, a Swedish Tabloid publishes a story titled, "WikiLeaks' Julian Assange hunted down, suspected of rape" by Av Diamant Salihu and Av Niklas Svensson. (The story is later updated and headline altered August 21 at 4:06 p.m., after senior prosecutor Eva Finné reversed the arrest order and found there were no grounds for the 'rape' allegations that day [August 21].

(Source: Justice For Assange, Expressen, svt.se)

"Expressen 20 August 2010 ran the breaking news "WikiLeaks' Julian Assange hunted down, suspected of rape" - the 'hunted down' part of the headline is not found on the online version of Expressen's article anymore (the article was updated online on 21 August 2010 after senior prosecutor Eva Finné reversed the arrest order and found there were no grounds for the 'rape' allegations), but a picture of the full headline is available here." (Source: Justice For Assange)

 

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20

[4:21 p.m. - 6:40 p.m.] Anna Ardin is present during the interview with Sophia Wilen (which is irregular in standard police protocol). The interview is not recorded (audio or video, also irregular), and conducted by a friend and political ally, Irmeli Krans. [NEED SOURCE]

According to Irmeli Krans, the police interviewer: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system."

Also, according to Irmeli Krans, the police interviewer: "In the course of the interview, Sofia and I were informed that Julian Assange had been arrested in absentia [SOME TIME AROUND 6:40 PM]. After that, Sofia had difficulty concentrating, as a result of which I made the judgement that it was best to terminate the interview...The interview was neither read back to Sofia nor read by her for approval; but Sofia was informed that she could do so at a later date."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

Also, according to Irmeli Krans, the police interviewer: "In the course of the interview, Sofia and I were informed that Julian Assange had been arrested in absentia. After that, Sofia had difficulty concentrating, as a result of which I made the judgement that it was best to terminate the interview...The interview was neither read back to Sofia nor read by her for approval; but Sofia was informed that she could do so at a later date.")

Date: 20 August 2010 [See Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted and revised on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"]
Interviewing officer: Irmeli Krans
Type of interview: In person; not recorded
Type of protocol: Summary by interviewing officer; revised 26 August 2010

Background

Sofia says she saw an interview on TV a few weeks ago with Julian Assange, who is known to be responsible for WikiLeaks' release of U.S. military documents from Afghanistan. Sofia thought that he was interesting, courageous, and admirable. During the next two weeks she carefully followed news reports, read numerous articles and watched interviews. One evening at home when she googled the name Julian Assange, she discovered he had been invited to Sweden to give a presentation arranged by the Social Democratic Brotherhood ["Broderskapet"]. She e-mailed Broderskapet's press secretary Anna Ardin, whose contact details she found on its website, and asked if he was coming to Sweden and, in that case, if she could attend his presentation. She offered to help out with practical details in exchange for being allowed to attend. Anna Ardin replied that she would forward her message to those in charge.

However, Sofia got no further response, and suddenly one day she saw an advert with the time and place. The presentation was to take place in the headquarters of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation at Norra Bantorget on Saturday, 14 August. On Friday she telephoned those in charge and asked if it was O.K. to attend. She was told that she was one of the first to apply, so that it would probably be all right. She took the day off from work and went to the meeting place on Saturday. Seeing a woman standing outside whom she presumed to be Anna Ardin, Sofia went up to her and introduced herself. Anna told Sofia that she was on the list and that she was welcome. At the same time the speaker himself, Julian Assange, arrived in the company of a man in his 30s. She got the impression that the man was Julian's press secretary or the like. Julian looked at Sofia with an amused expression. She had the feeling that he thought she did not fit in there, with her shocking-pink cashmere jumper amongst the others — grey-clad journalists.

The presentation

She sat at the far right in the front row of the meeting room. The speaker would stand at the left front. Everyone else in the room seemed to be a journalist. A half-hour before the presentation was to begin, Anna asked Sofia if she could help by purchasing a cable for Julian's computer. A cable was lacking, and Sofia had offered to help out. Sofia went up to Julian to find out what type of cable he needed. He explained what kind it was and also wrote it on a slip of paper. She took the paper and placed it in her pocket. Julian said contemptuously, "You didn't even look at the note'". She replied that she didn't need to, as he had already explained what type of cable it was.

The luncheon

After the presentation, many journalists interviewed Julian. Sofia remained, because she wanted very much to speak with him. She asked Anna if that were possible, and Anna said that Julian would be standing outside the entrance to the building in order to be accessible to the public in case anyone wanted to ask him questions. Sofia went out and sat in the shade, waiting for the interviews to be over. Outside, there were more interviews. Sofia again approached the entrance and overheard that the Broderskapet people were going to invite Julian to lunch. Sofia asked if she could come along; after all, she had helped them with the cable. She was invited to join them and walked with Anna, Julian, his entourage, and two members of Broderskapet to a restaurant on Drottninggatan Street opposite the Central Bathhouse. She ended up next to Julian and started talking with him. He glanced at her now and then during the lunch. On one occasion when he had cheese on his flatbread, she asked him if he thought it tasted good; he then extended it toward her and, still holding it, let her take a bite. Later during lunch, he remarked that he needed a charger for his laptop. She said she could get one for him; she had, after all, got the cable for him earlier. He put his arm around her back and said, "Yes, you gave me a cable'". Sofia thought this was flattering; for, it was obvious he was now flirting with her.

The others left after lunch, leaving only Sofia, Julian, and Julian's companion. They all went off together to buy an electric cable for Julian's computer. Kjell & Co. didn't have the item; so they proceeded to Webhallen on Sveavägen Street, but it was closed again. They walked back on Sveavägen St. toward Hötorget Square and discussed what they would do next. Julian's companion asked him if he wanted to come along and help move furniture for his [companion's] parents; and Sofia offered Julian a visit to the Swedish Museum of Natural History, where she worked. It was decided that Julian would accompany Sofia to the museum, and his companion left them. Julian and Sofia entered the Hötorget tube station where she bought a day-ticket for him, as he had neither a monthly commuter card nor, he said, any money. They took the train toward Mörby Centrum and got off at the Stockholm University station. A man at the station recognized Julian and told him how much he admired him.

The Natural History Museum

On the way from the university tube station, Julian stopped to pet a few dogs, which Sofia thought was charming. Once in the museum they went to the staff room where Julian sat down and began surfing the Internet; he was looking for tweets about himself. They sat there, waiting for a film that was to be shown at the Cosmonova theatre at 18:00.

They were let into the theatre by Sofia's colleague, and Julian held Sofia's hand. In the darkness of the theatre, he began kissing her. Some latecomers arrived and sat behind them, so they moved to seats at the rear. There, Julian continued kissing her; he caressed her breasts under the jumper, undid her bra, unbuttoned her pants, caressed her buttocks, and sucked her nipples. He muttered about the armrest being in the way. When the lights went on, she was sitting in his lap and he attempted to put her bra back on. She thought it was embarrassing to sit there in full view of her colleagues, who she knew could have seen everything.

They went out via the inner courtyard, and she went to the toilet. When she came out, he was lying on his back and resting on a permanent picnic table; he said he was exhausted. He was due at a crayfish party at 8:00 p.m. and wanted to sleep for 20 minutes before departing. They lay down beside each other on the grass, he with his arm around her. He dozed off and she woke him after twenty minutes. They walked off across the grass, passing cows and Canada geese. He held her hand; it was pleasant in every way, and he said, "You are very attractive… to me…." During the Cosmonova performance, he has also said she had lovely breasts. She asked him if they would meet again. He said that of course they would, after the crayfish party.

She accompanied him to the Zinkensdamm tube station, from which he took a cab to Anna Ardin's home where the party was to take place. He hugged her and said he didn't want to part from her; he encouraged her to recharge her mobile phone. She returned to her home town of Enköping, arriving at her flat at 11:00 p.m. When she recharged her telephone, there was a voice message from Julian; he had called her at 10:55 p.m. with a message to call him when her phone was working again. She rang back at 11:15 p.m. and realized that he was still at the crayfish party. She had developed stomach cramps from a sandwich she had eaten on the way home, and told him that she wanted to go to bed. He insinuated it was not due to the food, but rather to guilt feelings.

Monday

She rang Julian twice on Sunday, but his phone was turned off. On Monday she told her work mates about her experiences on the weekend. Their opinion was that Julian had surely felt rejected by her and that was why he had not called back, that it was now her move. She rang him and he answered. She asked if they could do something together. He said that he would be at a meeting that could drag on until 8:30 p.m., but that he could ring her back later. He also asked about her stomach. He insinuated that she had lied about her stomach cramps, and when he said that he referred to her in the third person. She promised to wait for him, and after she finished work at 7:00 p.m. she went to Kungshallarna to eat sushi. Afterwards she strolled around town and ended up in the Old Town around 9:00 p.m. As he still had not contacted her, she called him and asked what was happening. He said that he was in a meeting on Hornsgatan Street, and that he wanted her to come there. She got the address and went there. But she could not find the address, so she rang Julian whose phone was answered by a man who spoke Swedish and explained that she was to enter via a side entrance. She stood there and was waiting for him when he came out together with another man; they said goodbye to each other and looked very happy.

Julian and Sofia walked along Hornsgatan Street to Slussen, and from there to the Old Town. They sat near the water by Munkbroleden and he commented on girls who sat there, "lonely and abandoned'" who "needed to be saved". They lay down and began a session of very heavy petting. Among other things, he put his hands under her jumper and when they left the area she noticed people were looking at them. They decided to go to her place. They entered the Underground where his card was no longer valid; she passed him through by using her own card twice. They took the train to Enköping from the Central Station; she paid for the tickets, SEK 107 each (ca. USD 8). He said he did not want to use his credit card, to avoid being traced. They sat at the rear of the train, facing the direction of travel. Julian connected his computer to the Internet and started reading about himself on Twitter, using both his computer and mobile phone. He paid more attention to the computer than to her. She had suggested that they check in at a hotel, but he said that he wanted to see "girls in their natural habitat"

Enköping

It was dark when they got off the train and they passed old industry buildings where he went off to urinate. She also urinated. When they arrived at her flat she went into the bedroom before him to clean up a bit before he came in. They took off their shoes and the relationship between them did not feel warm anymore. The passion and excitement had disappeared. They snogged in the bedroom, but she wanted to brush her teeth. It was midnight, pitch black outside, and they brushed their teeth together, which felt commonplace and boring.

When they want [sic] back in the bedroom Julian stood in front of Sofia, grabbed her hips and pushed her demonstratively down onto the bed, as if he to show that he was a real man. He took off his clothes and they had foreplay on the bed. They were naked and he rubbed his penis against her genital region without penetrating her, but coming closer and closer to her vagina. She squeezed her legs together because she did not want to have intercourse with him without protection. They carried on for hours and Julian could not get a full erection. Julian had no interest in using a condom

"Suddenly, Julian said that he was going to get some sleep. She felt rejected and shocked. It was so abrupt: They had engaged in a very lengthy foreplay, and then — nothing. She asked what was wrong; she did not understand anything. He drew the blanket over himself, turned away from her and went to sleep. She left him and got her fleece blanket because she was cold. She lay awake, wondering what had happened, and sent SMS messages to her friends. He lay beside her, snoring. She must have dozed off; for, later she woke up and they had sex. Earlier, she had fetched some condoms and laid them on the floor by the bed. He reluctantly agreed to use a condom, although he muttered that he preferred her to latex. He no longer had an erection problem. At one point when he took her from behind, she turned to look at him and smiled and he asked her why she was smiling, what had she to smile about. She did not like the undertone of his voice.

They fell asleep, and when they woke up they may have had sex again; she does not really remember. He ordered her to fetch him some water and orange juice. She did not like being ordered about in her own home, but thought "what the hell" and fetched the liquids anyway. He wanted her to go out and buy more breakfast. She did not want to leave him alone in the flat — she really did not know him very well — but she did it anyway. When she left the flat he lay naked in her bed and was fiddling with one of his telephones. Before she left she said, "Be good'". He replied: "Don't worry, I'm always bad". When she returned she served him oatmeal porridge, milk, and juice. She had already eaten before he awoke, and had spoken with a friend on the phone.

The Assault

They sat on the bed and talked, and he took off her clothes again. They had sex again and she suddenly discovered that he had placed the condom only over the head of his penis; but she let it be. They dozed off and she awoke and felt him penetrating her. She immediately asked, "Are you wearing anything?", to which he replied, "You". She said to him: "You better don't have HIV", and he replied, "Of course not". "She felt that it was too late. He was already inside her and she let him continue. She didn't have the energy to tell him one more time. She had gone on and on about condoms all night long. She has never had unprotected sex before. He said he wanted to come inside her; he did not say when he did, but he did it. A lot ran out of her afterward.

She said to him: What if I get pregnant? In reply he merely said that Sweden is a good country to have children in. She said jokingly that, if she is pregnant, he would have to pay off her student loan. On the train to Enköping, he had told her that he had slept in Anna Ardin's bed after the crayfish party. She asked if he had sex with Anna. But he said that Anna liked girls, that she was lesbian. But now she knows that he did the same thing with Anna. She asked him how many he had had sex with, but he replied that he had not counted. He also said that he had taken a HIV test three months earlier and that he had had sex with one girl afterwards, but that girl had also taken a HIV test and was not infected. She made sarcastic comments to him in a jocular tone. She believes that she was trying to minimize, in her own mind, the significance of what had happened. He, on the other hand, didn't seem to care. When he learned the size of her student loan he said that, if he were to pay so such money, she would have to give birth. They joked about naming the child Afghanistan. He also said that he should always carry abortion pills that were actually sugar pills.

His phone rang and he had a meeting with Aftonbladet on Tuesday at noon. She explained to him that he could not get to the meeting on time and he moved his entire schedule for the day forward one hour. Then they bicycled to the train station with her on the luggage rack. She paid for his ticket to Stockholm. Before they parted he told her to keep her phone on. She asked if he would call her, and he said that he would.

Afterwards

She cycled home, showered, and washed the bed sheets. Because she had not gone to work on time, she called in sick and stayed home all day. She wanted to clean up and wash everything. There was semen on the bed sheets; she thought it was disgusting. She also went to the chemist's and bought a morning-after pill.

When she talked with her friends [WHO? WHEN?] afterwards, she understood that she was the victim of a crime. She went to Danderyd Hospital [WHEN?], and from there to Söder Hospital [WHEN?] where she was examined and where samples with a so-called rape kit were also taken.

Forensic medical report

Sofia gives her consent to the acquisition of a forensic medical report.

Legal counsel

Sofia wishes to be represented by an attorney whom she will name at a later time.

Interviewer's comment

In the course of the interview, Sofia and I were informed that Julian Assange had been arrested in absentia. After that, Sofia had difficulty concentrating, as a result of which I made the judgement that it was best to terminate the interview. But Sofia did mention that Assange was angry at her. There was not enough time to obtain any further information about why he was angry at her or how this was expressed. Nor did we have time to discuss what had happened afterwards. The interview was neither read back to Sofia nor read by her for approval; but Sofia was informed that she could do so at a later date.

Note on date and time of document

On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.

20 [TIME?] Swedish Prosecutor's Office [WHO?] issues an arrest warrant for Julian Assange, sometime before Sophia Wilen has completed her August 20 (revised August 26, see note) police interview. The arrest warrant is withdrawn the next day.

20 [2:43 PM - 6:40 PM IS THIS CORRECT? AS THE TECHNICAL ISSUE AND IRREGULARITY AS IT WAS REVISED 8/26/10 - SEE SWEDISH ORIGINAL ] Anna Ardin accompanies Sophia Wilen to the police station, according to her own August 21 police interview, "primarily as support."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Yesterday, Anna received an e-mail message from Sofia who wondered how she could contact Assange, as she had something important to tell him. Anna understood immediately what it was about; she contacted Sofia who then related what had happened to her — that she and Assange had had sex, that he did not want to use a condom, etc. Sofia wanted to take this further to the police and Anna decided to follow along, primarily as support." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20

[WHAT TIME?] According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, he was contacted by a mutual friend of his and Anna Ardin [SONJA WHO?]. This mutual friend [SONJA WHO?] was at a hospital [WHICH HOSPITAL?]. She said something about "DNA and the police. Julian Assange says he was "to meet Sonja [WHO IS THIS?] on Saturday [AUGUST 21] afternoon to discuss the matter. Anna [ARDIN] had no accusations, and no one had any intention of going to the police."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Any follow-up questions? O.K. then, is there anything you want to say before we terminate the interview?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Go ahead.

Julian Assange: I was contacted by a mutual friend of Anna and me [SONJA WHO?] on Friday, the 20th [WHAT TIME?]. It was a woman named Sonja [SONJA WHO?] who was at the hospital [WHICH HOSPITAL?]. She said something about DNA and the police — and I was very upset to hear that. No one alleged anything. It would be a long story if I were to go into that. It does not seem relevant.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): OK so we hereby conclude the interview.

Julian Assange: We can always continue if it is needed. But the main thing is that I and other people [WHO?], we heard a bunch of unbelievable lies [WHAT WERE THE LIES?], and heard that I was to meet Sonja [WHO IS THIS?] on Saturday afternoon to discuss the matter. Anna [ARDIN] had no accusations, and no one had any intention of going to the police and so on. That is how I expected things to remain until I heard the news in Expressen. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20 [WHAT TIME?] According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, Julian Assange moves out of her flat on August 20, but it is not clear from her police interview if or on what day she had asked Julian Assange to leave.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Anna states that she and Assange did not have sex again after the above-mentioned event. However, Assange continued residing with her until yesterday (Friday, 20 August)." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Anna states that she and Assange did not have sex again after the above-mentioned event. However, Assange continued residing with her until yesterday (Friday, 20 August). According to Anna, Assange made sexual advances to her every day after the evening when they had sex, for example by touching her breasts. Anna had rejected Assange on every such occasion, which Assange had accepted. On one occasion (on Wednesday, 18 August) he had suddenly removed all the clothes from his lower body, and then rubbed his lower body and erect penis against Anna. Anna states that she felt this was strange and unpleasant behavior, and had therefore moved down to a mattress on the floor and slept there instead of on the bed with Assange. The following night, Anna stayed with a friend because she did not want to be with or near Assange due to his strange behaviour. She had also said after Wednesday 18 August that she no longer wanted Assange to reside at her flat [DID SHE ASK HIM TO LEAVE? WHEN DID SHE ASK HIM TO LEAVE? THIS IS UNCLEAR], which he did not act upon until Friday [yesterday], when he took his things and returned her key." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20

[WHAT TIME?] According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, Anna Ardin confronts Julian Assange and accuses him of several things which Julian Assange calls, "false statements." One of the false accusations is that "he removed a condom during sex" [THE ONLY TIME THEY HAD SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS NIGHT OF AUGUST 13, ONE WEEK PRIOR].

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, he will not hear an exact description of the allegation against him that he intentionally broke the condom during sexual intercourse with Anna Ardin on August 13, until August 30, during his police interview.

According to Anna Ardin's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The interview is resumed at 6:02 p.m.… If I put it like this: You denied committing the crime and so my question is, are you aware of an event during which a condom has broken in connection with sex with Anna?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Have you had….

Julian Assange: I have heard that accusation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): You have heard that accusation. From whom?

Julian Assange: Friday, the 20th, the same day that the police were contacted, I spoke with Anna and she accused me of several things. And there were a number of false statements, as well. During that conversation she made a similar accusation; she said that I had removed a condom during sex. That was the first time I heard that accusation. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Julian Assange: When I now think back on that situation, it was no unusual occasion for me and I had no reason to suspect that I would be accused of anything afterwards. No, there was no question of any accusations of any sort, in any way. So I do not really remember when I heard the first accusation before Friday. I did not think back on that evening and night in any great detail. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): This accusation — I might sound like I'm nagging, but I still have to ask. It is a fairly clear picture that Anna has of what happened, especially about hearing a sound from the condom [?].

Julian Assange: Anna Ardin has never spoken to me about this incident in any way — nor anyone else of whom I am aware. I got a very brief and completely different reference — something other than what you are now saying [HEARING A SOUND FROM THE CONDOM?]— on Friday, the 20th. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): When did you first hear from Anna about the problem we are discussing today?

Julian Assange: I have never heard about precisely this problem directly from Anna. Today [AUGUST 30] is the first time I have got an exact description of it. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): So during that entire week when you resided with Anna, from Friday to Friday and you had various sexual relations, she said nothing about a broken condom?

Julian Assange: No, nothing at all. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20 [WHAT TIME?] According to her August 21 police interview, Anna Ardin calls Sophia Wilen back, after receiving an email from her: "She [Anna Ardin] contacted Sofia [WHAT TIME?] who then related what had happened to her — that she and Assange had had sex, that he did not want to use a condom, etc."

Anna Ardin's police interview continues, "Sofia wanted to take this further to the police [WHAT TIME DO THEY DECIDE TO GO TO THE POLICE TOGETHER?] and Anna decided to follow along, primarily as support."[AROUND 4:20 PM BASED ON IRMELIN KRANS POLICE INTERVIEWER, AND FRIEND OF ANNA ARDIN'S STATEMENT ON AUG 20, REVISED Aug 26 POLICE INTERVIEW]

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Yesterday, Anna received an e-mail message from Sofia who wondered how she could contact Assange, as she had something important to tell him. Anna understood immediately what it was about; she contacted Sofia who then related what had happened to her — that she and Assange had had sex, that he did not want to use a condom, etc. Sofia wanted to take this further to the police and Anna decided to follow along, primarily as support." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20

[WHAT TIME?] According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, she receives an email from Sophia, "who wondered how she could contact Assange, as she had something important to tell him. Anna understood immediately what it was about."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Yesterday, Anna received an e-mail message from Sofia who wondered how she could contact Assange, as she had something important to tell him. Anna understood immediately what it was about; she contacted Sofia who then related what had happened to her — that she and Assange had had sex, that he did not want to use a condom, etc. Sofia wanted to take this further to the police and Anna decided to follow along, primarily as support." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

20 Quantico Brig Observation Report notes Manning was reviewed on 20 AUG 2010 [Pretrial Confinement Facility Classification and Assignment Board?].

"vi) 27 August 2010 Entry: 'SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 20 August 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

20 WikiLeaks publishes the planning Duisburg planning documents 2007-2010 for Loveparade 2010, which led to a stampede leaving 21 dead and 511 injured.

(Source: wikileaks.org)

19 Department of State | At a daily press briefing, State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley dos not respond to a reporter's questions about the "ongoing saga with the Pentagon," only saying, "There’s nothing new that I’m aware of."

QUESTION: Would you like to add anything to the WikiLeaks ongoing saga with the Pentagon?

MR. CROWLEY: There’s nothing new that I’m aware of.

(Source: Department of State)

19 According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, she stays with a friend the night of August 19.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"19 August 2010 Sofia Wilén phones Anna Ardin to seek assistance in contacting Assange. It is not clear what they discussed with each other or with Assange. Ms. Ardin asks Assange to move out of her flat, which he does the following morning." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: The following night, Anna stayed with a friend because she did not want to be with or near Assange due to his strange behaviour. She had also said after Wednesday 18 August that she no longer wanted Assange to reside at her flat [DID SHE ASK HIM TO LEAVE? WHEN? THIS IS UNCLEAR], which he did not act upon until Friday [yesterday], when he took his things and returned her key." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

19 According to Donald Bostrom's September 20 police interview,

Content.

18 Department of Defense publishes, Jeh Johnson, general counsel's, Aug 16, 2010 letter, whose name, the DoD claims "came and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak".

(Source: Department of Defense Press Release)

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 – Defense Department officials today released a letter the Pentagon’s top lawyer sent to a man purported to be an attorney for the WikiLeaks website, which published tens of thousands of classified documents last month and is threatening to release 15,000 more.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters this afternoon that Timothy J. Matusheski was a “no show” for a telephone call that was arranged last week when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak.

The following day, Whitman said, the Pentagon’s general counsel codified the Defense Department’s position in a letter and sent it to Matusheski.

Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:

Dear Mr. Matusheski

I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss “harm minimization” with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.

The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:

WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.

The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks’ illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.

The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.

Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some “minimized” or “sanitized” version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.

(Signed)

Jeh Charles Johnson

18 Department of Defense posts a press release that says that WikiLeaks has not contacted them, titled WikiLeaks Has Yet to Contact 'Competent Authorities'. [NEED TO LINK TO SOURCE WHEN WIKILEAKS REACHED OUT TO AMERICAN EMBASSY] The press release goes on to say: “Those documents should be returned,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said. “There should be no further posting of these classified documents, and those that have been posted should be removed.” The press release says that Army CID and the FBi are conducting the investigation.

[The Department of Defense links to this press release again on December 21, 2010 in a press release titled, " Defense.gov Names Top Stories of 2010"]

Contents of the Press Release Below:

"By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 – The operators of a website that published tens of thousands of classified documents have contacted no “competent authorities” in the Defense Department, a Pentagon spokesman said here today.

WikiLeaks already has released 90,000 classified documents, and the site’s publisher said he plans to release about 15,000 more.

“Those documents should be returned,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said. “There should be no further posting of these classified documents, and those that have been posted should be removed.”

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division and the FBI are conducting an investigation into the leak of the documents.

WikiLeaks officials have attempted to use the media as an intermediary, “but the Defense Department has had no direct contact with WikiLeaks,” Whitman said.

In any event, the Defense Department is not interested in negotiating with the organization, Whitman said, noting that it’s simply against the law to release classified documents. If Defense Department officials participated in trying to sanitize or redact these documents, he said, they still would be guilty of releasing classified documents.

“These documents are property of the United States government,” Whitman said. “The unauthorized release of them threatens the lives of coalition forces, as well as Afghan nationals. All should be returned immediately, they should be removed from the Web, there should be no further posting of them to the Web, and all data bases containing them should be destroyed.”

Defense Department officials are analyzing the leaked documents to try to minimize the risk to coalition forces and to Afghans who worked with the coalition, Whitman said, though he would not get into specifics.

Another danger of the leaks is the possibility that commands may safeguard information and intelligence so much that those who need it won’t get it, Whitman noted.

“There is a balance to make sure that all the available intelligence is accessible where it needs to be accessible,” Whitman said. “But there should be safeguards, too, to preclude or mitigate instances where people may be acting in an improper, unauthorized or even illegal way.”

Intelligence is a tool that young servicemembers must have to carry out their missions, he added.

“Anything that we do as we assess the situation here and learn lessons from this will always be balanced with the imperative that our forces on the ground need to have access to the best information that we can provide them,” he said.

Related Articles:
Pentagon Demands WikiLeaks Return Stolen Documents 
WikiLeaks Guilty on Moral Grounds, Gates Says 
Official Rejects Claim WikiLeaks Offered Document Review 
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation 
Document Leaks Could Endanger Afghan Civilians 
Obama: Issues in Leaked Documents Led to Review 
Pentagon Launches Probe into Document Leaks 
Chairman Appalled by WikiLeaks Release 
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents 
Pentagon Releases Letter Sent to Purported WikiLeaks Attorney"

17 Quantico Brig Observation of Manning.

"iv.) 17 August 2010 Entry: "The Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] found SND to be a reduced threat to himself on 6 August 2010." (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

17 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform | Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight, Representative Darrell Issa sends a letter to General James [Jim] Jones, U.S.M.C, National Security Advisor to President Obama about WikiLeaks. According to a December 22, 2010 press release, the administration did not respond.

WASHINGTON, DC – Oversight and Government Reform Committee Ranking Member Darrell Issa, today in a letter to National Security Advisor Jim Jones, asked the Administration to respond to questions and provide information about efforts to prevent the Internet publication of leaked national security documents. Issa’s query comes in advance of the anticipated publication of classified Department of Defense documents obtained by the organization WikiLeaks.

“Concerns of Pentagon officials that the anticipated publication of classified documents by WikiLeaks will cause significant harm to national security interests and place lives at risk underscores the importance of having relevant Federal agencies working under a unified strategy,” said Rep. Issa on sending the letter. “Because information can move rapidly over the Internet, and into the hands of our enemies, it is imperative that diplomatic, law enforcement, and other government efforts are being effectively coordinated to protect sensitive information and ultimately innocent lives.”

Rep. Issa’s letter requests that the Administration provide information including specific diplomatic and legal steps it is taking in regard to WikiLeaks by August 23, 2010.

(Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform)

(Source: Rep. Darrell Issa letter General James [Jim] Jones, U.S.M.C.)

See also Representative Darrell Issa's public comments that the Obama administration never responded to the August 17, 2010 letter

17 Sometime time in the morning, according to Sophia Wilen's August 20 (revised August 26) police interview by police officer, Irmeli Krans (see note on irregular protocol) Sophia has sexual relations with Julian Assange, which are the subject of a later arrest warrant.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

See also: Sex, lies, no videotape and more lies. False accusations in the Assange case by Goran Rudling, translated into English by Goran Rudling and Peter Kemp for a discussion of subtlety between English and Swedish language.

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: " They fell asleep, and when they woke up they may have had sex again; she does not really remember. He ordered her to fetch him some water and orange juice. She did not like being ordered about in her own home, but thought "what the hell" and fetched the liquids anyway. He wanted her to go out and buy more breakfast. She did not want to leave him alone in the flat — she really did not know him very well — but she did it anyway. When she left the flat he lay naked in her bed and was fiddling with one of his telephones. Before she left she said, "Be good'". He replied: "Don't worry, I'm always bad". When she returned she served him oatmeal porridge, milk, and juice. She had already eaten before he awoke, and had spoken with a friend on the phone" (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "They sat on the bed and talked, and he took off her clothes again. They had sex again and she suddenly discovered that he had placed the condom only over the head of his penis; but she let it be. They dozed off and she awoke and felt him penetrating her. She immediately asked, "Are you wearing anything?", to which he replied, "You". She said to him: "You better don't have HIV", and he replied, "Of course not". "She felt that it was too late. He was already inside her and she let him continue. She didn't have the energy to tell him one more time. She had gone on and on about condoms all night long. She has never had unprotected sex before. He said he wanted to come inside her; he did not say when he did, but he did it. A lot ran out of her afterward. " (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "She said to him: What if I get pregnant? In reply he merely said that Sweden is a good country to have children in. She said jokingly that, if she is pregnant, he would have to pay off her student loan. On the train to Enköping, he had told her that he had slept in Anna Ardin's bed after the crayfish party. She asked if he had sex with Anna. But he said that Anna liked girls, that she was lesbian. But now she knows that he did the same thing with Anna. She asked him how many he had had sex with, but he replied that he had not counted. He also said that he had taken a HIV test three months earlier and that he had had sex with one girl afterwards, but that girl had also taken a HIV test and was not infected. She made sarcastic comments to him in a jocular tone. She believes that she was trying to minimize, in her own mind, the significance of what had happened. He, on the other hand, didn't seem to care. When he learned the size of her student loan he said that, if he were to pay so such money, she would have to give birth. They joked about naming the child Afghanistan. He also said that he should always carry abortion pills that were actually sugar pills." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "His phone rang and he had a meeting with Aftonbladet on Tuesday at noon. She explained to him that he could not get to the meeting on time and he moved his entire schedule for the day forward one hour. Then they bicycled to the train station with her on the luggage rack. She paid for his ticket to Stockholm. Before they parted he told her to keep her phone on. She asked if he would call her, and he said that he would." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "She cycled home, showered, and washed the bed sheets. Because she had not gone to work on time, she called in sick and stayed home all day. She wanted to clean up and wash everything. There was semen on the bed sheets; she thought it was disgusting. She also went to the chemist's and bought a morning-after pill." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

16 Robert Gates, Former Secretary of Defense, send a letter to Senator Karl Levin, Chairman of the Arms Services Committee in response to his July 28, 2010 letter. The Information Review Task Force to date has , "not revealed any sensitive intelligence source and methods comprised by this disclosure." [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, Information Review Task Force]

(Robert Gate's letter to Karl Levin dated 201108016, fas.org)

"After consulting with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I have directed a thorough investigation to determine the scope of any unauthorized release of classified information and identify the person or persons responsible. I have also established an interagency Information Review Task Force, led by the Defense Intelligence Agency, to assess the content of any compromised information and the impact of such a compromise. Our initial review indicates most of the information contained in these documents relates to tactical military operations. The initial assessment in no way discounts the risk to national security; however, the review to date has not revealed any sensitive intelligence source and methods comprised by this disclosure.

The documents do contain the names of cooperative Afghan national and the Department takes very seriously the Taliban threats recently discussed in the press. We access the risk as likely to cause significant harm or damage to the national security interest of the Unites States and are examining mitigation options. We are working closely with our allies to determine what risks out mission partners may face as a result of the disclosure. There is a possibility that additional military documents may be published by WikiLeaks and the Department is developing courses of action to address this possibility.

The scope of the assessment and nature of the investigative process requires a great deal of time and effort. I am committed to investigating this matter and determining appropriate action to reduce the risk of any such compromises in the future. We will keep you informed as additional information becomes available."

16 Quantico Brig Observation Record on Manning.

"iii.) 16 August 2010 Entry: 'SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychologist [WHO IS THIS? NOTE PSYCHOLOGIST, AS OPPOSED TO PSYCHIATRIST] and found not to be a threat to himself. It is recommended that SND be removed from SR, and be placed on POI (sic) remain MAX custody.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

16 Julian Assange accompanies Sofia Wilen to her flat in the town of Enkoping.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

"Assange accompanies Sofia Wilén to her flat in the town of Enköping. He wears a condom during several consensual acts of sexual intercourse. Then he penetrates her once without a condom. She warns that he'd "better not have HIV" but lets him continue without objection. They part on apparently friendly terms and agree to meet again." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "On Monday she told her work mates about her experiences on the weekend. Their opinion was that Julian had surely felt rejected by her and that was why he had not called back, that it was now her move. She rang him and he answered. She asked if they could do something together. He said that he would be at a meeting that could drag on until 8:30 p.m., but that he could ring her back later. He also asked about her stomach. He insinuated that she had lied about her stomach cramps, and when he said that he referred to her in the third person. She promised to wait for him, and after she finished work at 7:00 p.m. she went to Kungshallarna to eat sushi. Afterwards she strolled around town and ended up in the Old Town around 9:00 p.m. As he still had not contacted her, she called him and asked what was happening. He said that he was in a meeting on Hornsgatan Street, and that he wanted her to come there. She got the address and went there. But she could not find the address, so she rang Julian whose phone was answered by a man who spoke Swedish and explained that she was to enter via a side entrance. She stood there and was waiting for him when he came out together with another man; they said goodbye to each other and looked very happy." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "Julian and Sofia walked along Hornsgatan Street to Slussen, and from there to the Old Town. They sat near the water by Munkbroleden and he commented on girls who sat there, "lonely and abandoned'" who "needed to be saved". They lay down and began a session of very heavy petting. Among other things, he put his hands under her jumper and when they left the area she noticed people were looking at them. They decided to go to her place. They entered the Underground where his card was no longer valid; she passed him through by using her own card twice. They took the train to Enköping from the Central Station; she paid for the tickets, SEK 107 each (ca. USD 8). He said he did not want to use his credit card, to avoid being traced. They sat at the rear of the train, facing the direction of travel. Julian connected his computer to the Internet and started reading about himself on Twitter, using both his computer and mobile phone. He paid more attention to the computer than to her. She had suggested that they check in at a hotel, but he said that he wanted to see "girls in their natural habitat." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "It was dark when they got off the train and they passed old industry buildings where he went off to urinate. She also urinated. When they arrived at her flat she went into the bedroom before him to clean up a bit before he came in. They took off their shoes and the relationship between them did not feel warm anymore. The passion and excitement had disappeared. They snogged in the bedroom, but she wanted to brush her teeth. It was midnight, pitch black outside, and they brushed their teeth together, which felt commonplace and boring." (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "When they want back in the bedroom Julian stood in front of Sofia, grabbed her hips and pushed her demonstratively down onto the bed, as if he to show that he was a real man. He took off his clothes and they had foreplay on the bed. They were naked and he rubbed his penis against her genital region without penetrating her, but coming closer and closer to her vagina. She squeezed her legs together because she did not want to have intercourse with him without protection. They carried on for hours and Julian could not get a full erection. Julian had no interest in using a condom."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: " "Suddenly, Julian said that he was going to get some sleep. She felt rejected and shocked. It was so abrupt: They had engaged in a very lengthy foreplay, and then — nothing. She asked what was wrong; she did not understand anything. He drew the blanket over himself, turned away from her and went to sleep. She left him and got her fleece blanket because she was cold. She lay awake, wondering what had happened, and sent SMS messages to her friends. He lay beside her, snoring. She must have dozed off; for, later she woke up and they had sex. Earlier, she had fetched some condoms and laid them on the floor by the bed. He reluctantly agreed to use a condom, although he muttered that he preferred her to latex. He no longer had an erection problem. At one point when he took her from behind, she turned to look at him and smiled and he asked her why she was smiling, what had she to smile about. She did not like the undertone of his voice"(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

 

16 Pentagon’s general counsel codified the Defense Department’s position in a letter and sent it to Timothy J. Matusheski, whose "name and purported status" the Department of Defense says, "as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak." In the letter the Department of Defense claims that "we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks’ illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims."

(Source: Department of Defense Press Release)

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 – Defense Department officials today released a letter the Pentagon’s top lawyer sent to a man purported to be an attorney for the WikiLeaks website, which published tens of thousands of classified documents last month and is threatening to release 15,000 more.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters this afternoon that Timothy J. Matusheski was a “no show” for a telephone call that was arranged last week when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak.

The following day, Whitman said, the Pentagon’s general counsel codified the Defense Department’s position in a letter and sent it to Matusheski.

Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:

Dear Mr. Matusheski

I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss “harm minimization” with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.

The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:

WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.

The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks’ illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.

The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.

Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some “minimized” or “sanitized” version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.

(Signed)

Jeh Charles Johnson

15 Department of Defense's press release claims, "Timothy J. Matusheski was a “no show” for a telephone call that was arranged when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak"

(Source: Department of Defense Press Release)

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 – Defense Department officials today released a letter the Pentagon’s top lawyer sent to a man purported to be an attorney for the WikiLeaks website, which published tens of thousands of classified documents last month and is threatening to release 15,000 more.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters this afternoon that Timothy J. Matusheski was a “no show” for a telephone call that was arranged last week when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak.

The following day, Whitman said, the Pentagon’s general counsel codified the Defense Department’s position in a letter and sent it to Matusheski.

Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:

Dear Mr. Matusheski

I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss “harm minimization” with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.

The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:

WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.

The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks’ illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.

The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.

Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some “minimized” or “sanitized” version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.

(Signed)

Jeh Charles Johnson

15

Anna Ardin serves as Assange's press secretary at a meeting on future WikiLeaks activities in Sweden.

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20 (Revised August 26, see note): "She [Sophia Wilen] rang Julian twice on Sunday, but his phone was turned off."

"At a meeting on the future activities of WikiLeaks in Sweden, Anna Ardin serves as Assange's press secretary" (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

14 According to Sophia Wilen's August 20 (revised August 26, see note) In the evening, Anna Ardin arranges a crayfish party in Assange's honor and invites Julian Assange to continue residing at her flat.

According to Sophia Wilen's August 20 (revised August 26) police interview, Sophia Wilen and Julian exchange phone calls at the crayfish party. According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, "Anna noticed that [Julian] Assange had flirted with Sofia [Wilen] during lunch and understood that they subsequently had begun some sort of relationship, because Assange had rung to Sofia later in the evening during the crayfish party at Anna's place."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"Assange is the principal speaker at the seminar; Anna Ardin plays a key supporting role. Assange spends the afternoon with Sofia Wilén, during which they engage in heavy petting and agree to meet again. That evening, Anna Ardin arranges a crayfish party in Assange's honor and expresses great delight at the company she is keeping. Alternative lodgings are offered to Assange, but Ms. Ardin invites him to continue residing at her flat." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "They went out via the inner courtyard, and she went to the toilet. When she came out, he was lying on his back and resting on a permanent picnic table; he said he was exhausted. He was due at a crayfish party at 8:00 p.m. and wanted to sleep for 20 minutes before departing. They lay down beside each other on the grass, he with his arm around her. He dozed off and she woke him after twenty minutes. They walked off across the grass, passing cows and Canada geese. He held her hand; it was pleasant in every way, and he said, "You are very attractive… to me…." During the Cosmonova performance, he has also said she had lovely breasts. She asked him if they would meet again. He said that of course they would, after the crayfish party."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "To my question Anna replies that she knew about Sofia, because she had been in contact with Anna before the above-mentioned seminar and was in the audience at the presentation. According to Anna, Sofia had purchased electrical cables for Assange, and had joined Anna and Assange for lunch after the seminar. Anna noticed that Assange had flirted with Sofia during lunch and understood that they subsequently had begun some sort of relationship, because Assange had rung to Sofia later in the evening during the crayfish party at Anna's place." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

14 According to Sophia Wilen's August 20 (revised August 26, see note) police interview, Sofia Wilen spends the afternoon with Julian Assange.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"Assange is the principal speaker at the seminar; Anna Ardin plays a key supporting role. Assange spends the afternoon with Sofia Wilén, during which they engage in heavy petting and agree to meet again. That evening, Anna Ardin arranges a crayfish party in Assange's honor and expresses great delight at the company she is keeping. Alternative lodgings are offered to Assange, but Ms. Ardin invites him to continue residing at her flat." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "The others left after lunch, leaving only Sofia, Julian, and Julian's companion. They all went off together to buy an electric cable for Julian's computer. Kjell & Co. didn't have the item; so they proceeded to Webhallen on Sveavägen Street, but it was closed again. They walked back on Sveavägen St. toward Hötorget Square and discussed what they would do next. Julian's companion asked him if he wanted to come along and help move furniture for his [companion's] parents; and Sofia offered Julian a visit to the Swedish Museum of Natural History, where she worked. It was decided that Julian would accompany Sofia to the museum, and his companion left them. Julian and Sofia entered the Hötorget tube station where she bought a day-ticket for him, as he had neither a monthly commuter card nor, he said, any money. They took the train toward Mörby Centrum and got off at the Stockholm University station. A man at the station recognized Julian and told him how much he admired him."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "On the way from the university tube station, Julian stopped to pet a few dogs, which Sofia thought was charming. Once in the museum they went to the staff room where Julian sat down and began surfing the Internet; he was looking for tweets about himself. They sat there, waiting for a film that was to be shown at the Cosmonova theatre at 18:00."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "They were let into the theatre by Sofia's colleague, and Julian held Sofia's hand. In the darkness of the theatre, he began kissing her. Some latecomers arrived and sat behind them, so they moved to seats at the rear. There, Julian continued kissing her; he caressed her breasts under the jumper, undid her bra, unbuttoned her pants, caressed her buttocks, and sucked her nipples. He muttered about the armrest being in the way. When the lights went on, she was sitting in his lap and he attempted to put her bra back on. She thought it was embarrassing to sit there in full view of her colleagues, who she knew could have seen everything."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "They went out via the inner courtyard, and she went to the toilet. When she came out, he was lying on his back and resting on a permanent picnic table; he said he was exhausted. He was due at a crayfish party at 8:00 p.m. and wanted to sleep for 20 minutes before departing. They lay down beside each other on the grass, he with his arm around her. He dozed off and she woke him after twenty minutes. They walked off across the grass, passing cows and Canada geese. He held her hand; it was pleasant in every way, and he said, "You are very attractive… to me…." During the Cosmonova performance, he has also said she had lovely breasts. She asked him if they would meet again. He said that of course they would, after the crayfish party."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "She accompanied him to the Zinkensdamm tube station, from which he took a cab to Anna Ardin's home where the party was to take place. He hugged her and said he didn't want to part from her; he encouraged her to recharge her mobile phone. She returned to her home town of Enköping, arriving at her flat at 11:00 p.m. When she recharged her telephone, there was a voice message from Julian; he had called her at 10:55 p.m. with a message to call him when her phone was working again. She rang back at 11:15 p.m. and realized that he was still at the crayfish party. She had developed stomach cramps from a sandwich she had eaten on the way home, and told him that she wanted to go to bed. He insinuated it was not due to the food, but rather to guilt feelings"(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

14 Based on her August 20 2010 (revised August 26) see note police interview, Sophia Wilen says that she had asked if she might also attend lunch, she overhears the Broderskapet people have invite Julian Assange to, and subsequently attends. "She was invited to join them and walked with Anna, Julian, his entourage, and two members of Broderskapet to a restaurant on Drottinggatan Street opposite the Central Batthouse."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "After the presentation, many journalists interviewed Julian. Sofia remained, because she wanted very much to speak with him. She asked Anna if that were possible, and Anna said that Julian would be standing outside the entrance to the building in order to be accessible to the public in case anyone wanted to ask him questions. Sofia went out and sat in the shade, waiting for the interviews to be over. Outside, there were more interviews. Sofia again approached the entrance and overheard that the Broderskapet people were going to invite Julian to lunch. Sofia asked if she could come along; after all, she had helped them with the cable. She was invited to join them and walked with Anna, Julian, his entourage, and two members of Broderskapet to a restaurant on Drottninggatan Street opposite the Central Bathhouse. She ended up next to Julian and started talking with him. He glanced at her now and then during the lunch. On one occasion when he had cheese on his flatbread, she asked him if he thought it tasted good; he then extended it toward her and, still holding it, let her take a bite. Later during lunch, he remarked that he needed a charger for his laptop. She said she could get one for him; she had, after all, got the cable for him earlier. He put his arm around her back and said, "Yes, you gave me a cable'". Sofia thought this was flattering; for, it was obvious he was now flirting with her"(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "To my question Anna replies that she knew about Sofia, because she had been in contact with Anna before the above-mentioned seminar and was in the audience at the presentation. According to Anna, Sofia had purchased electrical cables for Assange, and had joined Anna and Assange for lunch after the seminar. Anna noticed that Assange had flirted with Sofia during lunch and understood that they subsequently had begun some sort of relationship, because Assange had rung to Sofia later in the evening during the crayfish party at Anna's place." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

14 Julian Assange presents at seminar, Social Democratic Brotherhood ["Broderskapet"] in the headquarters of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation at Norra Bantorget, to which Anna Ardin plays a key supporting role, and for which Sophia Wilen had offered to help.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

"Assange is the principal speaker at the seminar; Anna Ardin plays a key supporting role. Assange spends the afternoon with Sofia Wilén, during which they engage in heavy petting and agree to meet again. That evening, Anna Ardin arranges a crayfish party in Assange's honor and expresses great delight at the company she is keeping. Alternative lodgings are offered to Assange, but Ms. Ardin invites him to continue residing at her flat." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "However, Sofia got no further response, and suddenly one day she saw an advert with the time and place. The presentation was to take place in the headquarters of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation at Norra Bantorget on Saturday, 14 August."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "She [Sophia Wilen] sat at the far right in the front row of the meeting room. The speaker would stand at the left front. Everyone else in the room seemed to be a journalist. A half-hour before the presentation was to begin, Anna asked Sofia if she could help by purchasing a cable for Julian's computer. A cable was lacking, and Sofia had [emphasis in the English Translation] offered to help out. Sofia went up to Julian to find out what type of cable he needed. He explained what kind it was and also wrote it on a slip of paper. She took the paper and placed it in her pocket. Julian said contemptuously, "You didn't even look at the note'". She replied that she didn't need to, as he had already explained what type of cable it was."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview of August 20, Revised August 26: "She took a cab to the Webhallen shop on Sveavägen Street, but it was closed. It was 10:30 a.m. and the store would not open until 11:00. But that was when the presentation was scheduled to begin, so Sofia became a bit stressed. The cabbie drove her instead to Hötorget Square, where she bought two variants of the cable for safety's sake. She got back in time and had the right cable, but received no thanks from Julian for helping out. The presentation went well."(Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "To my question Anna replies that she knew about Sofia, because she had been in contact with Anna before the above-mentioned seminar and was in the audience at the presentation. According to Anna, Sofia had purchased electrical cables for Assange, and had joined Anna and Assange for lunch after the seminar. Anna noticed that Assange had flirted with Sofia during lunch and understood that they subsequently had begun some sort of relationship, because Assange had rung to Sofia later in the evening during the crayfish party at Anna's place." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

13

White House | At a Press Briefing by Press Secretary Gibbs and Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano, Gibbs says:

We discussed the nature of what's in these documents, why there are laws in place to ensure that documents that are classified as secret and top secret aren't posted on the Internet. It's the safety and the security of our soldiers.  And I think if you go back to the beginning of -- or go back to the initial release of documents and find what the spokesman for the Taliban said specifically about names that they found in those documents, that they knew how to deal with those individuals.  I think we're clear on what that means.  And I think we're clear on the danger that those that are helping an effort to provide safety and security and peace to the Afghans, how that is threatened by those who wish to do us harm and those who wish to continue to garner attention for themselves by posting these documents on the Internet.

Full Transcript
Full Video [INSERT LINK TO VIDEO]

Excerpts:

Q    On another matter, WikiLeaks says it’s going to release about half of the 15,000 documents it withheld because of its admitted concern about their sensitivity initially.  Does this trouble you more than the initial release?

MR. GIBBS:  Look, I would -- I don’t know that it would be easy to quantify the troubling nature of the initial releases with this release as well.  I think all of the releases have been troubling.

We discussed the nature of what’s in these documents, why there are laws in place to ensure that documents that are classified as secret and top secret aren’t posted on the Internet. It’s the safety and the security of our soldiers.  And I think if you go back to the beginning of -- or go back to the initial release of documents and find what the spokesman for the Taliban said specifically about names that they found in those documents, that they knew how to deal with those individuals.  I think we’re clear on what that means.  And I think we’re clear on the danger that those that are helping an effort to provide safety and security and peace to the Afghans, how that is threatened by those who wish to do us harm and those who wish to continue to garner attention for themselves by posting these documents on the Internet.

13-18

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview and Julian Assange's August 30 police statement, the only time had, had sexual intercourse is the night of August 13, multiple times.

Anna Ardin also says that they share the same bed, although it is unclear from her police interview what on what nights they are actually in the same bed at the same time, since she said, "Assange resided with her [from when she arrived home August 13, until August 20 when he left], but that they rarely slept together because Assange was up all night, working with his computer. When he lay down to sleep, around 7:00 a.m., Anna was usually up."

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, Assange made sexual advances to her everyday after the evening when they had had physical intercourse [August 13], but "Anna had rejected Assange on every such occasion, which Assange had accepted."[WHEN EXACTLY? SINCE, THEY WERE NOT IN THE SAME BED AND ON DIFFERENT SLEEP SCHEDULES.]

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview: He slept in the same bed as Anna Ardin except Tuesday night [DOES HE MEAN MONDAY NIGHT WHE HE SLEPT AT SOPHIA WILEN'S?] and Thursday night [ANNA ARDIN STAYED WITH A FRIEND]

Also according to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, he and Anna Ardin did not have sexual intercourse again [AFTER FRIDAY, AUGUST 13] but had other sexual relations that were not intercourse (and he only made initmate advances towards her) when they were both situated in the same bed: [PROCESS OF DEDUCTION BASED ON STATEMENTS: COULD HAVE BEEN ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 14; SUNDAY, AUGUST 15; TUESDAY, AUGUST 17; OR WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18]

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview, Julian Assange and Anna Ardin slept in the same bed on the night of August 18, and Assange made sexual advances towards. She then "moved down to a mattress on the floor and slept there instead of on the bed with Assange."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Anna states that she and Assange did not have sex again after the above-mentioned event. However, Assange continued residing with her until yesterday (Friday, 20 August). According to Anna, Assange made sexual advances to her every day after the evening when they had sex, for example by touching her breasts. Anna had rejected Assange on every such occasion, which Assange had accepted. On one occasion (on Wednesday, 18 August) he had suddenly removed all the clothes from his lower body, and then rubbed his lower body and erect penis against Anna. Anna states that she felt this was strange and unpleasant behaviour, and had therefore moved down to a mattress on the floor and slept there instead of on the bed with Assange. The following night, Anna stayed with a friend because she did not want to be with or near Assange due to his strange behaviour. She had also said after Wednesday 18 August that she no longer wanted Assange to reside at her flat, which he did not act upon until Friday [yesterday], when he took his things and returned her key" (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "To my question Anna replies that Assange resided with her, but that they rarely slept together because Assange was up all night, working with his computer. When he lay down to sleep, around 7:00 a.m., Anna was usually up." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Is it true that you have had a sexual relationship, you and Anna?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had a sexual relationship from that Friday, the 13th, for a couple of days. We slept in the same bed until the following Friday [AUGUST 20, THE DAY JULIAN ASSANGE MOVED OUT OF ANNA ARDIN'S FLAT].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What sort of sexual relationship was it; were there several occasions?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Was a condom used on any of those occasions?

Julian Assange: On the first occasion; and we had sex several times on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th]. And afterwards, on the other days as well, we also had a sexual relationship.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The subsequent sexual relations, did they also involve copulation?

Julian Assange: No, it was more… we touched each other.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So we're talking about one time when copulation was involved?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had intercourse on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that was once, or was it several times?

Julian Assange: Several times.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so the first time was with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And who was it that wanted to use a condom?

Julian Assange: I'm not sure.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And why was a condom not used with the subsequent acts of copulation?

Julian Assange: It was used with the subsequent acts of copulation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. I misunderstood. So you had intercourse, and then only with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The accusation appears to be that a condom was damaged after the copulation; and it is Anna's contention that, on one occasion when you withdrew your penis, it sounded at first as though you removed the condom. But when you entered her again,she felt with her hand and she could feel you were still wearing the condom. Then you ejaculated and, among other things, she felt that she had semen inside her. And she also looked at the condom, and there was no semen in the condom. And so the question to you is: Is this a situation that you recognize in any way?

Julian Assange: No. On one occasion Anna pointed to the bed, which had a wet spot, and said, 'Look at that. Is that you?' I said, 'No, it must be you'. And there was no more discussion about that, not a word — until the accusation last Friday, a week afterward.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Are we talking about the first occasion again….

Julian Assange: And during that time, except for one night, Anna and I slept in the same bed. Every night except Tuesday night [DOES HE MEAN MONDAY NIGHT, WHEN HE SLEPT AT SOPHIA WILEN'S?] and Thursday night [ACCORDING TO ANNA'S AUG 21 POLICE INTERVIEW SHE STAYED WITH A FRIEND]. On Thursday evening Anna said she was going out for a few hours to visit a journalist who wrote something about me and who lived in the same area, or the same housing complex or nearby. But she did not return that evening.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember what you did with the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you have no recollection of a damaged condom, either?

Julian Assange: No. Nor have I searched for a damaged condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you use a condom otherwise?

Julian Assange: Yes, usually; not always, but usually.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you say that you did not check, or you say that you do not recall what you did with the condom. Is that correct?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you normally do?

Julian Assange: I have no special routine for what I do with condoms. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How was your sexual relation after that night?

Julian Assange: It was still quite warm. On one occasion after that, Anna had two orgasms. We slept in the same bed.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And if have understood you correctly, you did not have sexual intercourse then?

Julian Assange: That is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And nothing happened during the time you resided with her after the first night?

Julian Assange: No there was no sexual intercourse; that's correct. But other sexual activities, yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Were you ever rejected by Anna?

Julian Assange: In what way?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): That she rejected a sexual advance from you?

Julian Assange: Yes, sometimes but in no way that was significant. No, nothing that would in any way be unusual.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): If we go back to the first night: Did you ejaculate?

Julian Assange: Yes.… (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Leif, anything you want to…?

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): I have a couple of questions.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): At what time of the day did you have sexual intercourse, what time was it approximately?

Julian Assange: Late at night and early in the morning.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): What would you say, though; approximately what time — three, four, five…?

Julian Assange: Between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): O.K. Was there any alcohol?

Julian Assange: No.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Neither you nor her?

Julian Assange: I do not recall that I had drunk any large quantity. We might have had white wine with dinner. But it was not an evening where we drank a lot.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): Was either of you intoxicated?

Julian Assange: Not so intoxicated that I noticed. I would have noticed if either of us was inebriated.

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): When did you first hear from Anna about the problem we are discussing today?

Julian Assange: I have never heard about precisely this problem directly from Anna. Today [AUGUST 30] is the first time I have got an exact description of it. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): So during that entire week when you resided with Anna, from Friday to Friday and you had various sexual relations, she said nothing about a broken condom?

Julian Assange: No, nothing at all. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Leif Silbersky (legal counsel for Julian Assange): O.K. I have no further questions.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): One more question occurs to me: Who was it who, shall we say, took the initiative to your advances toward each other?

Julian Assange: Anna.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How did that happen?

Julian Assange: She said I should sleep in her bed.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And it was in bed that things began?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did either of you make any advances before you went to the bed?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did Anna say anything?

Julian Assange: No, she said something, but nothing unusual.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And what do you mean by "unusual"?

Julian Assange: They were just things one would expect of a lover.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And what were your plans when it was time for you both to go to bed, then?

Julian Assange: After Anna had…?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): No, before that.

Julian Assange: Before.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So, you are saying that she invited you to her bed.

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Where were you planning to sleep before she invited you to the bed?

Julian Assange: Either on the floor, or.… I don't know. It is Anna's flat, after all.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How long had you resided in Anna's flat before her return that evening?

Julian Assange: I stayed in the flat for one day when Anna was away. I got the keys three or four days before that. I had access to the flat, but I didn't sleep there. Anna, she said that…No, I don't want to discuss that, because I don't believe it has anything to do with this case. I don't want to discuss anything private if it has nothing to do with the case. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

13 Based on her police interview, Sophia Wilen telephones "those in charge" [WHO?] of the presentation that was to take place the following day and asks if it was okay if she were to attend. She is told that she is one of the first to apply, so it would probably be alright.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

(Source: Revised August 26 Interview of Sophia Wilen English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish. See also Irmeli Krans note on the date and time of the document, the interview was conducted on August 26: "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system"

According to Sophia Wilen's police interview: "On Friday she telephoned those in charge and asked if it was O.K. to attend. She was told that she was one of the first to apply, so that it would probably be all right". (Source: English Translation of Original Police Interview by Nordic News Network NB "On Friday, 20 August 2010. I [Irmeli Krans] conducted an interview with complainant Sofia Wilén in connection with case #0201-K246314-10 at Klara Police Station. The interview commenced at 4:21 p.m. and was terminated at 6:40 p.m. The interview [protocol] was thereafter written with the word-processing program in the DurTvå computer system. The interview was to be copyedited on my next workday, Monday the 23 rd of August 2010. That was not possible because I was denied access to the interview I had conducted. After an exchange of e-mails, I was directed by supervisor Mats Gehlin to instead create and sign a new interview in DurTvå, which was done on 26 August with the necessary changes. Unfortunately, the date and time of that document conforms with the time that the changes were made, as that is done automatically by the DurTvå system.)

13

Anna Ardin returns a day early to her flat in Stockholm, which she has lent to Julian Assange in connection with a seminar she has organized for Sweden's Christian Social Democrats, Broderskapet, for whom she is employed as a press and political secretary.

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview and Julian Assange's August 30 police interview, Ardin and Assange go to dinner together, and later that evening have sexual relations. The subject of police suspicion according to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview concerns one act of copulation that night between Anna Ardin and Julian Assange.

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "On Friday, Assange and Anna went out to dine together. They had agreed that Assange would continue residing in Anna's flat, despite her return a day ahead of time. After dining in town, they returned to Anna's flat and drank tea." (Source: Police Interviews English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "In answer to my question, Anna replies that neither she nor Assange had taken any alcohol during the evening. While they sat and drank tea, Assange began caressing her leg. To my question Anna replies that Assange had not made any physical approach toward her earlier that evening, except now which Anna initially welcomed. However, it felt "unpleasant right from the start", because Assange was rough and impatient." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "Then they lay down on the bed, Anna on her back and Assange on top of her. Anna sensed that Assange wanted to insert his penis in her vagina right away, which she did not want because he was not wearing a condom. She therefore tried to twist her hips to the side and squeeze her legs together in order to prevent penetration. Anna tried several times to reach for a condom, but Assange stopped her from doing so by holding her arms and prying open her legs while trying to penetrate her with his penis without a condom. Anna says that eventually she was on the verge of tears because she was held fast and could not get a condom, and felt that 'this can end badly'. To my question Anna replies that Assange must have known that Anna was trying to reach for a condom, and that he therefore held her arms to prevent her from doing so." (Source:Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "After a moment, Assange asked Anna what she was doing and why she was squeezing her legs together. Anna then told him that she wanted him to wear a condom before he came in her. At that, Assange released Anna's arms and put on a condom that Anna fetched for him. Anna sensed a strong unspoken reluctance by Assange to use a condom, as a result of which she had a feeling that he had not put on the condom that he had been given. She therefore reached down her hand to Assange's penis in order to ensure that he had really put on the condom. She felt that the rim of the condom was where it should be, at the base of Assange's penis. Anna and Assange resumed having sex and Anna says that she thought that she 'just wanted to get it over with'." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: "After a short while, Anna notes that Assange withdraws from her and begins to adjust the condom. Judging from the sound, according to Anna, it seemed that Assange removed the condom. He entered her again and continued the copulation. Anna once again handled his penis and, as before, felt the rim of the condom at the base of the penis; she therefore let him continue." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: Shortly thereafter, Assange ejaculated inside her and then withdrew. When Assange removed the condom from his penis, Anna saw that it did not contain any semen. When Anna began to move her body she noticed that something "ran" out of her vagina. Anna understood rather quickly that it must be Assange's semen. She pointed this out to Assange, but he denied it and replied that it was only her own wetness. Anna is convinced that when he withdrew from her the first time, Assange deliberately broke the condom at its tip and then continued copulating to ejaculation." (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Wait. And as noted, you are suspected and will be formally notified of that suspicion, and it is for the crime of molestation. The formal notification reads as follows: "During the period from 13 to 14 August 2010, in Anna Ardin's residence at Tjurbergsgatan in Stockholm, Assange molested Anna Ardin during an act of copulation — which was begun and conducted under the express condition that a condom would be used — by purposely damaging the condom and continuing the copulation until he ejaculated in her vagina."

Leif Silbersky (JA legal counsel): Is that everything?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes.

Julian Assange: Is this one or two incidents?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): One incident.

Julian Assange: The 13th, the 14th [inaudible].

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): In the evening or…?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): It is during this period between the 13th...

Julian Assange: Between.… O.K.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so this is the question: What is your response to this accusation?

Leif Silbersky (JA legal counsel): Is it correct or incorrect?

Julian Assange: I am trying to understand exactly what he said.

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): Can you repeat it one more time?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): I can try…. The molestation would be in that you destroyed the condom.

Julian Assange: O.K.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that you would have done so intentionally.

Julian Assange: Yes. So in other words there are several condoms?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Yes, in this context — no, in this context it has to do with one condom on one occasion.

Julian Assange: O.K., so it's one incident...

Gun von Krusenstjerna (interpreter): One condom.

Julian Assange: Between the 13th and the 14th when you say that I have intentionally destroyed a condom during copulation.

Leif Silbersky (JAlegal counsel): Correct. What is your response to that?

Julian Assange: It is not true. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The interview is resumed at 6:02 p.m.… If I put it like this: You denied committing the crime and so my question is, are you aware of an event during which a condom has broken in connection with sex with Anna?

Julian Assange: No. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The interview is resumed at 6:02 p.m.… If I put it like this: You denied committing the crime and so my question is, are you aware of an event during which a condom has broken in connection with sex with Anna?

Julian Assange: No. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Is it true that you have had a sexual relationship, you and Anna?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had a sexual relationship from that Friday, the 13th, for a couple of days. We slept in the same bed until the following Friday [AUGUST 20, THE DAY JULIAN ASSANGE MOVED OUT OF ANNA ARDIN'S FLAT].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What sort of sexual relationship was it; were there several occasions?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Was a condom used on any of those occasions?

Julian Assange: On the first occasion; and we had sex several times on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th]. And afterwards, on the other days as well, we also had a sexual relationship.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The subsequent sexual relations, did they also involve copulation?

Julian Assange: No, it was more… we touched each other.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So we're talking about one time when copulation was involved?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had intercourse on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that was once, or was it several times?

Julian Assange: Several times.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so the first time was with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And who was it that wanted to use a condom?

Julian Assange: I'm not sure.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And why was a condom not used with the subsequent acts of copulation?

Julian Assange: It was used with the subsequent acts of copulation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. I misunderstood. So you had intercourse, and then only with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The accusation appears to be that a condom was damaged after the copulation; and it is Anna's contention that, on one occasion when you withdrew your penis, it sounded at first as though you removed the condom. But when you entered her again,she felt with her hand and she could feel you were still wearing the condom. Then you ejaculated and, among other things, she felt that she had semen inside her. And she also looked at the condom, and there was no semen in the condom. And so the question to you is: Is this a situation that you recognize in any way?

Julian Assange: No. On one occasion Anna pointed to the bed, which had a wet spot, and said, 'Look at that. Is that you?' I said, 'No, it must be you'. And there was no more discussion about that, not a word — until the accusation last Friday, a week afterward.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Are we talking about the first occasion again….

Julian Assange: And during that time, except for one night, Anna and I slept in the same bed. Every night except Tuesday night [DOES HE MEAN MONDAY NIGHT, WHEN HE SLEPT AT SOPHIA WILEN'S?] and Thursday night [ACCORDING TO ANNA'S AUG 21 POLICE INTERVIEW SHE STAYED WITH A FRIEND]. On Thursday evening Anna said she was going out for a few hours to visit a journalist who wrote something about me and who lived in the same area, or the same housing complex or nearby. But she did not return that evening.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember what you did with the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you have no recollection of a damaged condom, either?

Julian Assange: No. Nor have I searched for a damaged condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you use a condom otherwise?

Julian Assange: Yes, usually; not always, but usually.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you say that you did not check, or you say that you do not recall what you did with the condom. Is that correct?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you normally do?

Julian Assange: I have no special routine for what I do with condoms. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Julian Assange: When I now think back on that situation, it was no unusual occasion for me and I had no reason to suspect that I would be accused of anything afterwards. No, there was no question of any accusations of any sort, in any way. So I do not really remember when I heard the first accusation before Friday. I did not think back on that evening and night in any great detail. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Is it true that you have had a sexual relationship, you and Anna?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had a sexual relationship from that Friday, the 13th, for a couple of days. We slept in the same bed until the following Friday [AUGUST 20, THE DAY JULIAN ASSANGE MOVED OUT OF ANNA ARDIN'S FLAT].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What sort of sexual relationship was it; were there several occasions?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Was a condom used on any of those occasions?

Julian Assange: On the first occasion; and we had sex several times on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th]. And afterwards, on the other days as well, we also had a sexual relationship.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The subsequent sexual relations, did they also involve copulation?

Julian Assange: No, it was more… we touched each other.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So we're talking about one time when copulation was involved?

Julian Assange: Yes, we had intercourse on the 13th and the 14th [NIGHT OF THE 13TH/MORNING OF 14th].

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And that was once, or was it several times?

Julian Assange: Several times.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And so the first time was with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And who was it that wanted to use a condom?

Julian Assange: I'm not sure.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And why was a condom not used with the subsequent acts of copulation?

Julian Assange: It was used with the subsequent acts of copulation.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): O.K. I misunderstood. So you had intercourse, and then only with a condom?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): The accusation appears to be that a condom was damaged after the copulation; and it is Anna's contention that, on one occasion when you withdrew your penis, it sounded at first as though you removed the condom. But when you entered her again,she felt with her hand and she could feel you were still wearing the condom. Then you ejaculated and, among other things, she felt that she had semen inside her. And she also looked at the condom, and there was no semen in the condom. And so the question to you is: Is this a situation that you recognize in any way?

Julian Assange: No. On one occasion Anna pointed to the bed, which had a wet spot, and said, 'Look at that. Is that you?' I said, 'No, it must be you'. And there was no more discussion about that, not a word — until the accusation last Friday, a week afterward.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Are we talking about the first occasion again….

Julian Assange: And during that time, except for one night, Anna and I slept in the same bed. Every night except Tuesday night [DOES HE MEAN MONDAY NIGHT, WHEN HE SLEPT AT SOPHIA WILEN'S?] and Thursday night [ACCORDING TO ANNA'S AUG 21 POLICE INTERVIEW SHE STAYED WITH A FRIEND]. On Thursday evening Anna said she was going out for a few hours to visit a journalist who wrote something about me and who lived in the same area, or the same housing complex or nearby. But she did not return that evening.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember what you did with the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you have no recollection of a damaged condom, either?

Julian Assange: No. Nor have I searched for a damaged condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you use a condom otherwise?

Julian Assange: Yes, usually; not always, but usually.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): And you say that you did not check, or you say that you do not recall what you did with the condom. Is that correct?

Julian Assange: Yes, that is correct.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you normally do?

Julian Assange: I have no special routine for what I do with condoms. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): This accusation — I might sound like I'm nagging, but I still have to ask. It is a fairly clear picture that Anna has of what happened, especially about hearing a sound from the condom [?].

Julian Assange: Anna Ardin has never spoken to me about this incident in any way — nor anyone else of whom I am aware. I got a very brief and completely different reference — something other than what you are now saying [HEARING A SOUND FROM THE CONDOM?]— on Friday, the 20th. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Julian Assange's August 30 police interview:

Mats Gehlin (police officer): What do you think Anna meant by pointing to that wet spot?

Julian Assange: At the time, I had no idea. Maybe she was trying to point out how amorous the sex had been.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): But she said something about it coming from you.

Julian Assange: Yes. She said, "Is that from you?"

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So why did she say that if you had a condom?

Julian Assange: That I don't know.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did you check the condom beforehand?

Julian Assange: Before what?

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Before you put the condom on, so to speak.

Julian Assange: No, I am not in the habit of inspecting them in detail before I put them on. There was nothing unusual in any way. My behaviour was nothing other than normal. So I did not inspect the condom in any special way, nor did I ignore it completely.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Who applied the condom?

Julian Assange: I don't remember.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): You don't remember who took it off, either?

Julian Assange: Probably, it was me. It is unusual for a woman to remove the condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Then, you said, that you had sex. Did you have any more sex that evening?

Julian Assange: We took several pauses and then began again, with the same condom.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): So it was a protracted episode of sexual intercourse?

Julian Assange: Yes.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How long, at an estimate?

Julian Assange: A few hours; I am not certain how many.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Did you bring the condom to Anna's, yourself, or where did you get it?

Julian Assange: I think it was Anna's.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): Do you remember where she kept the condom?

Julian Assange: No.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): How did you get hold of the condom?

Julian Assange: I am not certain who put the condom on, so I cannot say.

Mats Gehlin (police officer): But you cannot remember exactly how you got the condom?

Julian Assange: No, I do not recall. But as I just said, it was just an ordinary night. I had no reason to suspect that I would need to recall all the details from that night. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

11-13

According to her August 21, 2010 police interview, Anna Ardin is away between August 11-14. Julian Assange is presenting at a seminar that she has organized for Sweden's Christian Social Democrats, Broderskapet, for whom she is employed as a press and political secretary, and Anna Ardin offers her Stockholm flat to Julian Assange.

According to her August 21, 2010 police interview, Anna Ardin had planned to leave town between August 11-14, but comes back August 13, one day early: "because she had a lot to do for the seminar."

(Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: Anna states that she is employed as press and political secretary for Sweden's Christian Social Democrats, Broderskapet. Anna says that she worked on preparing a seminar that was to take place on 14 August, at which Julian Assange had been invited to speak. (Source: Police Interviews, English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

According to Anna Ardin's August 21 police interview: Since Anna would be out of town during 11–14 August, she lent her flat to Assange. But Anna returned early to Stockholm on Friday, 13 August, because she had a lot to do for the seminar. Anna and Assange had never previously met in person, only professionally via e-mail and telephone. (Source: Police Interviews English Translation by Nordic News Network, and Original Document in Swedish)

12  Defense Department press release about Secretary Robert M. Gates today photo opportunity on the USS Higgins mentions WikiLeaks, "The sailors also wanted the straight talk on the WikiLeaks situation. Gates said the illegal release and posting of classified documents on the website poses 'very serious consequences.' The documents contain the names of many Afghans who have helped the coalition and they contain a huge amount of information showing the tactics, techniques and procedures used by coalition forces."

Full Press Release

Excerpt:

"The sailors also wanted the straight talk on the WikiLeaks situation. Gates said the illegal release and posting of classified documents on the website poses “very serious consequences.” The documents contain the names of many Afghans who have helped the coalition and they contain a huge amount of information showing the tactics, techniques and procedures used by coalition forces.

“We know from intelligence that both the Taliban and al-Qaida have given direction to comb those documents for information, so I think the consequences are potentially very severe,” he said."

12 Quantico Brig Observation Record of Manning.

"ii) 12 August 2010 Entry: 'SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.' The entry also notes 'SND stated that he would like a job in the facility library if it became possible. To this point in confinement SND's conduct has been average and has presented no problems to staff or inmates. During the interview SND was quiet, but courteous and respectful. SND answers questions but speaks very little unless responding to a question. Currently SND appears to be trying to adjust to the daily routine and observing what is going on around him. During the interview SND was well spoken, neat in appearance and maintained eye contact. SND stated that he have any suicidal feelings at this time.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

12 Department of Defense | Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, commissions two internal DoD Studies: One by Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) directed a review of information security policy. Second lead by Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas.

On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.

Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:

• Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.
• Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
• Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement.
• Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.

Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented. (Source: Teresa Takai, Chief Information Officer Department of Defense and Thomas Ferguson, Principal Deputy Undersecretary Department of Defense)

See also White House Fact Sheet: "U.S. Government Mitigation Efforts in Light of the Recent Unlawful Disclosure of Classified Information":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) INITIATIVES
 
On August 12, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates commissioned two reviews to determine what policy, procedural and/or technological shortfalls contributed to the unauthorized disclosure to the Wikileaks website. He specifically directed an assessment to determine if the DoD had appropriately balanced restrictions associated with information security and the need to provide our front-line personnel with the information needed to accomplish their assigned missions.
 
As a result of these two reviews, a number of findings and recommendations are in the process of being assessed and implemented, including the following:

  • Disabling and controlling use of removable storage media on DoD classified networks to prevent download from classified networks.
  • Developing procedures to monitor and detect suspicious, unusual or anomalous user behavior (similar to procedures now being implemented by credit card companies to detect and monitor fraud).
  • Conducting security oversight inspections in all Combatant Commands.
  • Undertaking vulnerability assessments of DoD networks.
  • Improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures. Specific examples being undertaken at the Combatant Command level include:
  • Increased “insider threat” training focusing on awareness of associated activity.
  • Multi-discipline training between traditional security, law enforcement and information assurance at all echelons.
  • The establishment of “Insider Threat Working Groups” to address the Wikileaks incident and prevent reoccurrence.
  • Component-determined restricted access to the Wikileaks site to prevent further dissemination or downloading of classified information to unclassified DoD networks.
  • Restating of policy to all personnel regarding restrictions on downloading to government systems and cautionary advice regarding personal IT systems.

Individual DoD components are taking additional action as relevant and appropriate, ranging from random physical inspections to enabling new security features on networks. Leadership reinforcement of workforce responsibilities and new initiatives to safeguard information are key components of DoD’s mitigation efforts. Department-wide, the Pentagon is accelerating its publication of policy issuances related to the information security program as well as focusing increased attention on detecting potential insider threats. (Source: White House)

10 Department of State | At the daily press briefing, State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley responds to a journalist's questions about reports that the U.S. is pressuring Britain and other allies to launch their own criminal investigations about WikiLeak and to block the site."

Full Transcript

Full Video

QUESTION: On WikiLeaks, can you talk about reports that you’re pressuring Britain and other allies to launch their own criminal investigations about WikiLeak and to block the site? We had talked about this a little bit over a week ago, but there are more reports surfacing that you’re putting pressure on allies to do something about that.

MR. CROWLEY: Yeah. Let me take that question. I’m not aware of any specific conversations that we’ve had with some of the countries mentioned. Obviously, there’s something that’s cropped up in different conversations that we’ve had; citing one, in the Secretary’s call last week with President Karzai, they did talk about WikiLeaks and she asked the president what his perspective on it was. So I’ll take the question as to whether we’ve had conversations along those lines and are encouraging others to consider their own potential prosecutions.

(Source: Department of State)

10 Rep Rush D. Holt of New Jersey, member of the House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee, remarks in the Congressional Record about WikiLeaks.

(Source: Congressional Record)

Rep Rush D. Holt bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Education and Labor Committee and sub House Education and Labor Committee and sub Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education Subcommittee and , House Natural Resources Committee and sub Energy and Mineral Resources Subcommittee and sub National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands Subcommittee, House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee  and subs Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee and sub Intelligence Community Management Subcommittee

"Madam Speaker, I have taken some time to review some of the previously classified documents on the war in Afghanistan that were published by the WikiLeaks.org website. Before rushing to judgment about this very large, unauthorized disclosure of information, I wanted to review some of the documents myself to determine if indeed potential human sources of information had been compromised. After reviewing some of these documents, I have concluded that their release could indeed cause real harm to real people.

I have frequently taken the executive branch to task for over-classifying documents. There have been many episodes in our nation’s history where the classification system has been used to hide improper acts or to shield policy-makers and bureaucrats from scrutiny or embarrassment. The Pentagon Papers episode is perhaps the most well publicized example of the executive branch seeking to keep information classified because it is embarrassing.

That is not the case with the so-called ‘‘Afghan War Diary’’ of WikiLeaks.org. Some of the documents I reviewed contained the names of real Afghan insurgents who turned themselves in to U.S. or Afghan government forces. Those same reports say these defectors were interrogated, and we may presume that after they are released from custody they and their families could be in danger of assassination by other insurgents.

The government has a legitimate need to keep secret any sources and methods that are truly important for our nation’s security. The individual or individuals responsible for the release of these un-redacted documents should be prosecuted. A criminal investigation into this matter is underway."

9 Gen. Michael Hayden, former head of the CIA 2006-2009, and former head of the NSA 1999-2005, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence April 2005 - April 2006, comments on WikiLeaks and Bradley Manning.

Retired four star Air Force General. As Principal Director of National Intelligence, he was "the highest-ranking military intelligence officer in the armed forces." He is currently a principal at the Chertoff Group, a security consultancy cofounded by former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. Hayden was elected to the Board of Directors of Motorola Solutions (NYSE:MSI) effective January 4, 2011. (Source: Wikipedia)

Full Video

Excerpts:

Need transcription.

6 Department of Defense press release demands WikiLeaks return stolen documents, claiming WikiLeaks has made no contact with "competent authorities" in the Defense Department. “The unauthorized release of them threatens the lives of coalition forces, as well as Afghan nationals. All should be returned immediately, they should be removed from the Web, there should be no further posting of them to the Web, and all data bases containing them should be destroyed.”

Press Release

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 – The operators of a website that published tens of thousands of classified documents have contacted no “competent authorities” in the Defense Department, a Pentagon spokesman said here today.

WikiLeaks already has released 90,000 classified documents, and the site’s publisher said he plans to release about 15,000 more.

“Those documents should be returned,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said. “There should be no further posting of these classified documents, and those that have been posted should be removed.”

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division and the FBI are conducting an investigation into the leak of the documents.

WikiLeaks officials have attempted to use the media as an intermediary, “but the Defense Department has had no direct contact with WikiLeaks,” Whitman said.

In any event, the Defense Department is not interested in negotiating with the organization, Whitman said, noting that it’s simply against the law to release classified documents. If Defense Department officials participated in trying to sanitize or redact these documents, he said, they still would be guilty of releasing classified documents.

“These documents are property of the United States government,” Whitman said. “The unauthorized release of them threatens the lives of coalition forces, as well as Afghan nationals. All should be returned immediately, they should be removed from the Web, there should be no further posting of them to the Web, and all data bases containing them should be destroyed.”

Defense Department officials are analyzing the leaked documents to try to minimize the risk to coalition forces and to Afghans who worked with the coalition, Whitman said, though he would not get into specifics.

Another danger of the leaks is the possibility that commands may safeguard information and intelligence so much that those who need it won’t get it, Whitman noted.

“There is a balance to make sure that all the available intelligence is accessible where it needs to be accessible,” Whitman said. “But there should be safeguards, too, to preclude or mitigate instances where people may be acting in an improper, unauthorized or even illegal way.”

Intelligence is a tool that young servicemembers must have to carry out their missions, he added.

“Anything that we do as we assess the situation here and learn lessons from this will always be balanced with the imperative that our forces on the ground need to have access to the best information that we can provide them,” he said.

6 Manning placed on POI watch. Capt. William Hocter, forensic psychiatrist for Quantico Brig recommended that move from suicide watch to POI watch. CWO4 Averhart follows recommendation.

"In August 6, 2010, the forensic psychiatrist for the Brig [CAPT. WILLIAM HOCTER] recommended that he be moved from suicide risk to POI watch. That recommendation was followed and PFC Manning was moved to POI watch."  (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint).

"On 6 August 2010, Capt. William Hocter, the forensic psychiatrist for the Brig, recommended that I be removed from suicide risk to Preventions of Injury (POI) watch. CWO4 Averhart [FORMER COMMANDER OF THE QUANTICO BRIG] followed that recommendation and I was moved to POI watch. " (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

See also: "5.) Life was not much better for me under the previous confinement assignment of POI watch. Like suicide risk, I was held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sat in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes by asking me if I was okay. I was required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guard could not see me clearly, because I had a blanket over my head or i was curled up towards the wall, they would wake me in order to ensure that I was okay. I received each of my meals in my cell. I was not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I was not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I was only allowed to have one book or magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine was taken away from me at the end of the day before I went to sleep. I was prevented from exercising in me [sic] cell daily. The guards would take me to an empty room and allow me to walk. I usually walked in figure eights around the room. When I went to sleep, I was required to strip down to my underwear and surrender my clothing to the guards. my clothing was returned to me the next morning." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)

5 DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon demanding Wikileaks return "stolen documents". Pentagon regards WikiLeaks in illegal possession of the documents, while the New York Times only "reviewed" the documents. Morrell also details the composition and tactics of the Information Review task force. [Tags: Patrick Kennedy, Information Review Task Force]

Full Transcript.
Press Release, dated Aug 6, 2010

MR. MORRELL:  Hi, guys, good afternoon.  I have a brief opening statement, and then we’ll get to questions.   

                On Monday -- pardon me -- Tuesday, it was reported that WikiLeaks has asked the Department of Defense for help in reviewing approximately 15,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks obtained in an unauthorized and inappropriate manner, before WikiLeaks releases those classified documents to the public.   

                WikiLeaks has made no such request directly to the Department of Defense.  These documents are the property of the U.S. government and contain classified and sensitive information.   

                The Defense Department demands that WikiLeaks return immediately to the U.S. government all versions of documents obtained directly or indirectly from the Department of Defense databases or records.   

                WikiLeaks’s public disclosure last week of a large number of our documents has already threatened the safety of our troops, our allies and Afghan citizens who are working with us to help bring about peace and stability in that part of the world.   

                Public disclosure of additional Defense Department classified information can only make the damage worse.  The only acceptable course is for WikiLeaks to take steps immediately to return all versions of all of these documents to the U.S. government and permanently delete them from its website, computers and records.   

                A final note.  WikiLeaks’s web page constitutes a brazen solicitation to U.S. government officials, including our military, to break the law.  WikiLeaks’s public assertion that submitting confidential material to WikiLeaks is safe, easy and protected by law is materially false and misleading.   

                The Department of Defense therefore also demands that WikiLeaks discontinue any solicitation of this type.   

                Anne. 

                Q     Two things on that.  Do you have any mechanism or authority to compel WikiLeaks to do as you say -- as you are demanding?  And do you now consider Private Manning the prime suspect in your -- in the WikiLeaks leak? 

                MR. MORRELL:  To the second part first, I think we have described Private Manning -- who is charged with leaking other classified information to this same organization -- as a person of interest.  I know of no update to his status since our initial description of him as such. 

                With regards to the first part of your question, which gets to, beyond our demand, how do we intend to compel, what I would say there, Anne, is that at this point we are making a demand of them.  We are asking them to do the right thing.  This is the appropriate course of action, given the damage that has already been done, and we hope they will honor our demands and comply with our demands. 

                We will cross the next bridge when we come to it.  If it requires them compelling to do anything -- if doing the right thing is not good enough for them, then we will figure out what other alternatives we have to compel them to do the right thing.  Let me leave it at that. 

                Daphne. 

                Q     Well, as far as -- could it be -- could it involve legal action, as the next step? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, I don’t want to speculate as to what it could involve.  Obviously, this is a matter that has gotten the attention not just of this department, but of the entire United States government.  As we’ve talked about before, the secretary of Defense brought the FBI into this investigation very early on.  The Department of Justice is also involved in this matter. 

                So those are two entities which have the authority, the wherewithal, should they choose to approach this through the legal system.  

                That is not what we -- what I am announcing here.  What I am announcing here is a request, a demand of WikiLeaks, the organization, to do the right thing and to not further exacerbate the damage that has been done by them to date and return to us all the information that was illegally passed to them and to expunge it from their website and all their records. 

                Yeah, Craig. 

                Q     Has DOD analyzed these 15,000 outstanding records and come to any conclusion on -- of how harmful it might be for them to be released? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, obviously these 15,000 documents, which they claim to be withholding as part of a harm-minimization exercise, are not in our possession.  We don’t know for sure which 1,500 [sic; 15,000] documents they are referring to.  We have some ideas and are doing some proactive work, some prophylactic work in the event that the documents we suspect they could be are indeed the documents that they are threatening to post.  But that’s where I’ll leave it now. 

                Yeah, Tom. 

                Q     Has there been any further discussion or even decisions on changing or tightening security rules in the field?  The secretary has acknowledged it’s important to have access to this information at the unit level, but clearly there are challenges and risks as well. 

                MR. MORRELL:  Yeah, I mean, I think he addressed this last week, Tom, when he was asked about it when this first broke.  I think fundamentally, as he said to you a few weeks ago, even before this most recent disclosure, he fundamentally still believes that one of the things that makes our military the envy of the world is that we instill an incredible degree of trust and responsibility in our most junior officers and our most junior enlisted, so that this organization is not top-heavy, it’s effective from top to bottom.   

                And I think as troubling as this episode is, and again we don’t know who is responsible for leaking this information -- as troubling as it is, I think he does not want to do anything to jeopardize the fundamental goodness of this trusting relationship that has existed for decades in the United States military.   

                That said, this is a problem.  The fact that information like this gets out into the public domain is a serious breach.  And we are taking measures internally to reinforce existing rules and guidelines and to make sure that people are aware of those rules and guidelines and are being even more vigilant about enforcing the existing rules and guidelines.   

                Yeah, Jeff.   

                Q     You have called on WikiLeaks to do the right thing.  By your standards, they haven’t done the right thing so far.  What makes you think they’ll suddenly have a change of heart?   

                MR. MORRELL:  I don’t know that we’re very confident they’ll have a change of heart.  They’ve shown no indication thus far that they appreciate the gravity, the seriousness of the situation they have caused -- the lives they have endangered, the operations they have potentially undermined, the innocent people who have potentially been put in harm’s way as a result.   

                So I don’t know that we have a high degree of confidence that this -- that this request, this demand unto itself will prevail upon them.   

                We certainly are hopeful of that being the case.  But you know, I don’t know what to expect of this organization.  We’ve heard so many different things from so many different people purporting to represent them, I don’t know what’s the truth. 

                You know, they claimed initially to have, you know, reviewed these documents.  Then we learn afterwards, they’ve only looked at 2,000 of them, so they don’t really know what’s in all of them.  They claim to have reached out to -- you know, to the United States government to assist in -- you know, for assistance in harm minimization.  Then we find out, no, it was through their partner, The New York Times.  I don’t know The New York Times would describe themselves as their partner. 

                There is -- there have been a lot of contradictory and conflicting statements along the way, which certainly cause us to question their motivation, their intent, their credibility. 

                This is an opportunity, it seems to me, for them to turn a new page; to recognize the situation that they have created, and to try to rectify it.  If, indeed, these claims that they have made through these third parties -- these spokesmen -- communicated to us through the news media, are serious, if they are serious about engaging with us, they should reach out to us directly.  And, you know -- and we will consider how to proceed once something like that happens. 

                The easiest way, however, to solve this -- I mean, we’re not looking to have a conversation about harm minimization.  We’re looking to have a conversation about how to get these perilous documents off the website as soon as possible, return them to their rightful owners, and expunge them from their records.  That will help minimize harm that has already been created. 

                Barbara. 

                Q     Can I just make sure about something you just said?  And it’s a technical, cyber question, I guess.  You said:  return to their rightful owners. 

                So this --  

                MR. MORRELL:  This is -- these documents belong to the United States government.  They don’t belong to WikiLeaks.  They don’t belong to anyone else.   

                Q     Okay, my question --  

                MR. MORRELL:  Please.   

                Q     Right, I’m sorry, I just want to make sure I understood.   

                MR. MORRELL:  Please.   

                Q     I -- did they -- are they copies on the Internet?  Or are these documents missing from U.S. military possession?   

                MR. MORRELL:  Nothing is missing as far as we can tell.  But they do not belong to anyone but us.  We want whatever they have returned to us.  And we want whatever copies they have expunged, erased, gone.   

Excerpt:

Q     Some people --  

                MR. MORRELL:  What?  You’re -- Tony, you’re shaking your head.   

                Q     Well, what about --  

                MR. MORRELL:  I’ve caused some consternation to you.   

                Q     What about asking The New York Times and the other papers to return them also?   

                MR. MORRELL:  I don’t know that The New York Times or the other publications are in possession of the documents.  I think --  

                Q     They had them for a month, Geoff.   

                MR. MORRELL:  I think they were allowed to review the documents, is my understanding, Tony.  I do not believe that they are currently in possession of those documents.   

                David.   

                Q     You said they should reach out to us directly.  Your original statement sounded like an unqualified no.   

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, we’re not looking to have a conversation, David, as I said before about, can we help you redact them?  That’s not the conversation we are prepared to have.  But if they want to have a conversation about how they return the documents to us, we’re happy to have that conversation.   

                Q     If you have no confidence that they’re going to as you say do the right thing --  

                MR. MORRELL:  I said I don’t know that I have a whole lot of confidence.   

                Q     Why don’t you just go ahead with whatever legal remedies you have to compel, rather than make this appeal?   

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, I think that this is the appropriate first step.  We’ll see if it requires further steps.   

                Q     Is it a first step or a bluff?  Do you really have legal remedies?   

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, this is the Department of Defense.  I mean, we’re not one who makes judgments about legal remedies and the appropriate recourse and all that kind of stuff.   

                But as I mentioned before, we’re not alone in this endeavor.  The FBI, the DOJ are also investigating this, are also involved in this matter.  And they will obviously have to make judgments about how to proceed.   

                But this is our first step to try to compel them, to prevail upon them to do the right thing and return the documents and erase them from their website so that no more additional harm is done, so that this potential database for all of our enemies that now hangs on the Internet and provides an opportunity for them to mine, looking for -- looking for weaknesses in force protection; tactics, techniques and procedures; who we do business with; how we -- how we cultivate sources -- all this stuff is potentially out there for people who wish to do us harm to take advantage of.  And so we’re trying to prevail upon them to do the right thing here. 

                Barbara, yes. 

                Q     Number one, a couple of questions.  It’s been out there for some period of days if not weeks.  Is it too late?  Why didn’t -- no disrespect -- why didn’t the department do this before?  What is this -- that’s number one. 

                Number two, what is the status of you knowing exactly what’s out there?  Because we’ve heard that you’re still going through all of it and you don’t know. 

                And number three, are you now, for the first time, basically negotiating with cybercriminals? 

                MR. MORRELL:  I don’t think we’re negotiating with anybody.  I think we’ve made very clear an explicit demand.  There wasn’t any offer of anything in exchange.  We are asking them to do the right thing.  We are asking them to return stolen property and to no longer publish stolen property.  That’s what we’re asking. 

                The first question was "Why not sooner?" 

                Q     What about, is it too late?  I mean --  

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, I don’t know if it’s too late.  I mean, it’s never too late.  I mean, the -- you know, there is always -- if we can get this off the Internet, if we can compel them to return it, that is a good thing. 

                The longer it hangs out there, the more potential damage it does, so that’s why we’re taking the step we’re taking. 

                Q     Why didn’t you take this step days ago? 

                MR. MORRELL:  I think there has been consideration being given internal to this building about how to proceed.  They’re now come to some resolution about taking this next step.  This is the decided-upon course of action.  

                Q     And my third question, very quickly, is you -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  Is she entitled to a third, Anne?  (Laughter.)

                Q:    It’s your call.

                MR. MORRELL:  Go ahead. 

                Q     What is the status -- what do you now know about what they have?  Do you know what they have?  Because until now, you’ve said -- the department has said that the task force is looking at it and reviewing at it.  As we sit here today, do you know what WikiLeaks has in totality? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, I think I’ve addressed this question. 

                We know what is on the website, and we have this -- the task force that we have set up to review the -- review this material has been working -- as I’ve described before, they have a 24-hour operation.  They have roughly -- they’re up to about 80 personnel. And they are -- they are reviewing it. 

                They’ve gone through, I think, the 70-odd thousand documents that are online.  They’ve done about 400 keyword searches through the -- through the 70-odd thousand documents that are online, looking for areas that are of particular concern to us.  They then take whatever they find, and whatever hits they find, they then create batches of those documents for further, more extensive review. 

                And eventually, once we have done that sort of first triage kind of operation, there will be a painstaking, deliberate, page-by-page, word-by-word evaluation of every single document.  But right now this team of 80, working around the clock, is going through them. 

                And as we find things that are of concern, we are notifying appropriate entities -- be they foreign governments, when they come up; be they -- if there are Afghan citizens who are named or Afghan -- and in this case, if there are -- if there are Afghan citizens who are named, we are informing the command in Kabul, who is then sharing the information with the appropriate subordinate commands and units so that they can take appropriate action to safeguard those people. 

                Q     But you haven’t opened the 15,000 yet? 

                MR. MORRELL:  What I’ve said is, the 15,000 -- the way I’ve described it is we have -- we believe we have some idea of what those 15,000 could be, and are reviewing what we believe to be, potentially, those 15,000.  We do not know for sure if the 15,000 we believe they have and are waiting to post are indeed the same documents that they do indeed have and are waiting to post. 

                Q     Can I -- can I -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  You seem -- Tony, I’m really concerned about you today. 

                Q     I’m listening -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  You are laughing.  You’re scowling.  You seem to be confused. 

                Q     Well, yeah, but your last comment was hard to follow because it had so many different -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, follow up.  I’m happy -- I’m happy to -- I’m happy to hold your hand through this process. 

                Q     I don’t have -- (off mike) -- but her question is a good one.  Why didn’t you move sooner?  And what -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  I think I’ve -- I think I’ve answered it.  We’ve been evaluating appropriate courses of action.  This is the one that was deemed appropriate at this time.  We’re moving out on it. 

                Q     If Pandora’s Box has been open for a week.  Realistically, what purpose would be served by you getting back documents that the world have had -- has had access to for a week? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, as I said before, Tony, the longer they hang out there, the more opportunity there is for those to wish us harm -- do us harm, to use those documents to their advantage.  So we’re trying to, as best we can, mitigate the damage caused by this and compel them to take those documents off the Internet and return them to their rightful owner, the United States government. 

                Al Pessin.   

                Q     Can you say from these keyword searches how many Afghan citizens have been identified and what actions generally speaking have been taken to protect them?   

                MR. MORRELL:  Yeah, I’m not going to get into how many and what kinds of people.  I mean, there clearly have been Afghan names, which have been found doing searches of these -- of these documents.  And as such, they have -- that information has been shared with the command. And they will make judgments about how to proceed with it.   

                We have housed within this task force of 80-odd people, and it’s still growing by the way -- I think, you know, it could grow as -- there are -- we have personnel on hand, they’re flowing in, that could take it to about 120-125.   

                But they are going through this.  The personnel they have are people steeped in -- largely they’re intelligence analysts who we’ve gotten from DIA and from the PAC and CENTCOM and USD(I).  The FBI and Army CID are also represented.   

                And then also there are counterintelligence experts, you know, as part of this organization as well, who are there to make determinations about whether or not any TTPs have been exposed and whether or not any adjustments need to be made, in light of that exposure.   

                Yeah.   

                Q     Thank you, Geoff.  Two-part question.   

                One, today, State Department issued a terrorism report, global terrorism report.  In this report, what they are saying is that as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned, Pakistan is a major concern as far as protecting the U.S. security in Afghanistan is concerned and safe haven.   

                And second, President Zardari, as you may have seen his report, that he said that war in Afghanistan is not winnable -- is not winnable.   

                And finally, the public opinion of -- (inaudible) -- not very good -- Pakistan as far as the U.S. is concerned. 

                MR. MORRELL:  Okay.  There’s a question in there? 

                Q     Do you have any comments? 

                MR. MORRELL:  You made three provocative statements.  Let me to go in reverse. 

                Public opinion is not high for the U.S. in Pakistan.  That is -- there is clearly, as we’ve talked about many, many times before, a trust deficit that really emanated from the fact that we turned our backs on the Pakistanis and walked away after the collapse of the Soviet Union and their pullout from Afghanistan.  It is something we’ve been working hard to overcome for quite some time.  It is something that we believe we have made considerable strides on, at least in terms of government-to-government trust, over the past two years, 18 months, particularly, the last 12 to six months. 

                The population is a concern.  There clearly is work to be done there.  I think you saw in President -- sorry, Secretary of State Clinton’s trip to Pakistan a few months ago a real effort to engage with the Pakistani people and try to dispel some of the myths and some of the misinformation that contributes to this lack of trust.   

                I think part of this, frankly, is due to some elements within Pakistan, within the Pakistani media that sort of feeds on this; this is good copy.  And it incites a degree of anger that may be good for their sales, but is clearly not helpful to their security or our overall relationship. 

                So that’s to your first point.  Your -- the State Department report you cite, I’m not aware of.  President Zardari questioning the “winnability” of the war in Afghanistan, I haven’t seen his statements on it.  

                I would tell you we obviously disagree.  If the -- if the -- if he really did say that we -- that the war is not winnable -- we clearly would not be fighting a war we did not believe to be unwinnable -- or we would not be fighting a war that we believe to be unwinnable.  

                No wonder I confuse you, Tony.  I confuse myself.  (Laughter.) 

                Go ahead. 

                Q     I want to try Tony’s question a slightly different way. Are you --  

                MR. MORRELL:  Which was Barbara’s question.   

                Q     Right. 

                MR. MORRELL:  So he stole it from Barbara, you’re going to steal it from him.  Okay.  Let’s try it.  

                Q     (Off mike) -- on the third try we can -- we can get somewhere.   

                Are you -- are you demanding of WikiLeaks something that is -- that is functionally impossible?  Can they -- they cannot pull back everything that’s on the Internet, right?  I mean, how could they do that?  Every news organization, all kinds of other websites beyond theirs have taken the material, made their own databases and so forth out of it.  It’s generated a bazillion news stories.  There’s -- how, as a functional matter, is what you’re asking them, demanding them to do even remotely possible? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, the demands we are making of them are entirely possible.  They have the ability to erase it from their website and to return whatever is in their possession.  So this is a very simple demand which can very easily be complied with. 

                The second question, or the other part of your question, which is, it has hung out there for a while, it has been accessed by many other people, some of whom who have downloaded said material and are exploiting it for journalistic or perhaps criminal purposes, sir? -- obviously that’s another problem that we have to deal with.  What we are addressing is what we believe to be the culprit here in terms of soliciting people to share classified information illegally.  And  so our focus with this measure that I’ve announced here today is on them.   

                It is not the exclusive focus of all of our efforts, but that is what I am prepared to address here today. 

                Q     Would it then extend to other -- 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, again, this is a -- this is the step we are taking at this moment.  We do not preclude taking other measures as well.  But this is the step we are taking, in light particularly of this request that all of you have asked us so much about, that they want our help in trying to conduct harm minimization on the 15,000 documents they have yet to post. 

                Q     So do you consider the news organizations that have taken these documents to be -- also to be in possession of stolen property? 

                MR. MORRELL:  Well, the only rightful owner of this material is the United States government.  No one else has any right, any legal reason -- any reason, period -- to have that material.  So that is problematic, that others have it. 

                Our focus at this point, as you see here from this statement, is on WikiLeaks and what they have done and what they are doing to try to solicit people to break the law and share classified information.  We are trying to put an end to the solicitation, and we are trying to get them to return other illegally obtained classified materials from the U.S. government. 

                Let’s go to somebody that -- Mike Emanuel. 

                Q     Geoff, President Karzai’s visiting Iran.  Does the United States believe that’s a productive use of time and something positive could come from such a visit? 

                MR. MORRELL:  I’m not aware of President Karzai’s travel schedule.  I mean, he is the leader of a sovereign state.  He obviously lives in a neighborhood that includes Iran as a neighbor to the west, a country that they have had long historical, cultural and economic ties with. 

                I don’t think any of us have any issue with -- frankly -- I’m playing my counterpart at Foggy Bottom -- but I don’t think anybody in this building has an issue with him engagi