Top
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
2012
DOJ WL Contract Ops
Sonic 2703d
Twitter Unseal 2703d
Dynadot 2703d
Google 2703d
2011
Twitter 2703d
Appelbaum Search & Seizure
End Charge Dates
2010
House Search & Seizure
2009
Begin Charge Dates
2008
2007
2006

alexaobrien.com | blog | interviews | audio | video | features | about | in the press | contact | archives

Other resources...

Dec 2011

31 Quantico brig, where Manning was confined after Kuwait and prior to Fort Leavenworth, scheduled to be closed.

"All confinement at Quantico would cease Dec. 31" "...brig was the home for nine months of Army Pfc. Bradley Manning..." (Source: Reported October 25, 2011 by AP, Marines plan Quantico brig closure)

22 Department of Defense publishes press release at the end of Bradley Manning's Pretrial Hearing refers to WikiLeaks as a "whistle-blowing website"

Press Release

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

FORT MEADE, Md., Dec. 22, 2011 – The prosecution and defense rested today after delivering their closing statements in the Article 32 hearing of a soldier charged with leaking hundreds of thousands of classified documents.

Today’s session, which adjourned at about 10:30 a.m., wrapped up eight days of pre-trial proceedings in the case against Army Pfc. Bradley E. Manning that began Dec. 16.

An Article 32 hearing, often compared to a civilian grand jury, is a pretrial hearing to determine if grounds exist for a general court martial, the most serious of courts martial.

The investigating officer, Army Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, now has until Jan. 16 to issue his recommendations to the Special Court Martial Convening Authority, a Military District of Washington spokesperson told American Forces Press Service.

Almanza may ask for an extension, if needed, the official said.
His report will recommend that the case be referred to a court martial, or that some or all of the charges against Manning be dismissed.

The Special Court Martial Convening Authority, Army Col. Carl Coffman, will then provide Almanza’s recommendation to the General Court Martial Convening Authority, and indicate whether he concurs with it, the MDW official said.

Manning, an intelligence analyst, is suspected of leaking military and diplomatic documents to the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks in what officials believe is the biggest intelligence leak in U.S. history.

WikiLeaks, in turn, released thousands of these documents, including classified records about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on its website last year.

At the time, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and other senior defense officials condemned the organization’s actions, claiming the act put deployed service members at an increased risk.

The Article 32 hearing marked 24-year-old Manning’s first appearance in a military court since his arrest in Iraq in May 2010.

He faces more than 20 charges alleging he introduced unauthorized software onto government computers to extract classified information, unlawfully downloaded it, improperly stored it, and transmitted the data for public release and use by the enemy.

The charge of aiding the enemy under Article 104 of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice is a capital offense; however, the prosecution team has said it won’t recommend the death penalty, a legal official said.

If convicted of all charges, Manning would face a maximum punishment of life in prison. He also could be reduced to E-1, the lowest enlisted grade, face a total forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonorable discharge, officials said.

22

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Seven.

[NEED TO INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

21 Department of Justice Press Briefing. Eric Holder says, "Given the dependencies of where we are on the military side, it would be inappropriate for me to comment."

Excerpt:

Full Video

21

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Six. Witnesses: Sergeant [former Specialist] Daniel Padgett; Captain Barclay Kaey

[NEED TO CREATE OR UPDATE WITNESS PROFILES AND INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

[NEED TO CREATE OR UPDATE WITNESS PROFILES AND INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

  • Sergeant [former Specialist] Daniel Padgett
  • Captain Barclay Kaey

21 Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice gives an update on the WikiLeaks Grand Jury stating, "given the dependency of what is going on on the military side it would be inappropriate to comment on that at this time"

20

Rely in Support of Motion of Real Parties in Interest For Stay. and Injunction Pending Appeal.

REPLY TO RESPONSE to by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 89 MOTION to Stay re 84 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Hearing

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of December, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314

20

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Five. Witnesses: Specialist Jihrleah Showman; Staff Sergeant Peter Bigalow; Special Agent Alfred Williamson, CCIU; Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU; Special Agent Antonio Patrick Edwards, CCIU; Adrian Lamo; Special Agent Troy Bettencourt, CID

[NEED TO CREATE OR UPDATE WITNESS PROFILES AND INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

[NEED TO CREATE OR UPDATE WITNESS PROFILES AND INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

  • Specialist Jihrleah Showman
  • Staff Sergeant Peter Bigalow
  • Special Agent Alfred Williamson, CCIU
  • Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU
  • Special Agent Antonio Patrick Edwards, CCIU
  • Adrian Lamo

19

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Four. Witnesses: Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU; Specialist Eric Baker; Mark Johnson, ManTech International, U.S. Army CCIU

[NEED TO COMPLETE WITNESS PROFILE, INPUT DATES FROM TESTIMONY INTO TIMELINE.]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

[NEED TO CREATE WITNESS PROFILES AND INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

  • Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU
  • Specialist Eric Baker
  • Mr. Mark Johnson, ManTech International Contractor, U.S. Army CCIU

18

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Three. Witnesses: Captain Casey Fulton; Former Master Sergeant, now Sergeant 1st Class Paul Adkins; Chief Warrant Officer 1st Class [now retired]; Kyle Balonek; Sergeant Chad Madaras; Jason Allen Milliman; Captain Thomas Cherepko; Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU

[NEED TO COMPLETE WITNESS PROFILE, INPUT TIMELINE.]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

[NEED TO COMPLETE WITNESS PROFILES, INPUT DATES INTO TIMELINE]

  • Captain Casey Fulton
  • [Former Master Sergeant, now Sergeant 1st Class, demoted by administrative action concerning the alleged leaks] Paul Adkins
  • Chief Warrant Officer 1st Class [now retired] Kyle Balonek
  • Sergeant Chad Madaras
  • Jason Allen Milliman
  • Captain Thomas Cherepko
  • Special Agent David Shaver, CCIU

17

US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day Two. Witnesses: Special Agent Toni Graham, Army CID; Special Agent Calder Robertson, CCIU (Head of the European Branch of CCIU for Army CID); Special Agent Mark Mander, CCIU; Special Agent Troy Bettencourt; Sergeant First Class Brian Madrid; Captain Steven Lim

[NEED TO INPUT DATES FROM MIDDLE OF LIM TESTIMONY ONWARD INTO TIMELINE]

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Almanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

[NEED TO INPUT DATES FROM MIDDLE OF LIM TESTIMONY ONWARD INTO TIMELINE]

16 UK Supreme Court announces it will grant permission to Julian Assange to appeal his extradition to Sweden, given the great public importance of the issue raised, which is whether a prosecutor is a judicial authority.

"The Supreme Court has today considered an application by Julian Assange for permission to appeal to the Court, following the Divisional Court's certification of a point of law of general public importance.

A panel of three Supreme Court Justices - Lord Hope, Lord Mance and Lord Dyson - has considered the written submissions of the parties; this is the Court's usual practice for considering applications for permission to appeal.

The Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal and a hearing has been scheduled for two days, beginning on 1 February 2012.

The Court has decided that seven Justices will hear the appeal given the great public importance of the issue raised, which is whether a prosecutor is a judicial authority.

Details of the Justices who will hear the case and the timings of the hearing will be published in the new year." (Source: US Supreme Court)

"16 December 2011 The U.K. Supreme Court grants an appeal on one point of law concerning the European Arrest Warrant. The hearing is scheduled for 1-2 February 2012" (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

16 Department of Defense Press Release on Manning Pretrial hearing.

By Elaine Sanchez
American Forces Press Service

FORT MEADE, Md., Dec. 16, 2011 – The Article 32 hearing for the soldier allegedly involved in what’s considered one of the largest leaks of classified material in U.S. history got under way in a crowded military courthouse here today.

Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, an Army intelligence analyst, is suspected of leaking military and diplomatic documents, including classified records about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks, which released thousands of classified military documents on its website last year.

At the time, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and other senior defense officials condemned the organization’s actions, claiming the act put deployed service members at an increased risk.

The hearing today marked Manning’s first appearance in a military court since his arrest in Iraq in May 2010. An Article 32 hearing, often likened to a civilian grand jury, is a pretrial hearing to determine if there are grounds for a general court martial, the most serious of courts martial.

The soldier, dressed in an Army combat uniform, his hair cut short and with black-rimmed glasses, sat between his civilian lawyer David E. Coombs, and his two military lawyers. The soldier was attentive throughout, eyes forward and his hands clasped or fiddling with a pen, taking notes occasionally. When asked if he understood the charges and if he was satisfied with his representation, he answered “Yes sir” each time in a soft-spoken tone.

The soldier, who turns 24 tomorrow, faces more than 20 charges and a maximum sentence of life in prison if proven guilty. The charges allege Manning introduced unauthorized software onto government computers to extract classified information, unlawfully downloaded it, improperly stored it, and transmitted the data for public release and use by the enemy.

The charge of aiding the enemy under Article 104 of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice is a capital offense; however, the prosecution team has said it won’t recommend the death penalty, a legal official said today.

First up today was Coombs for defense, who came out swinging. He almost immediately called for Army Reserve Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, the hearing’s investigating officer, to disqualify himself from the hearing for bias or perception of bias, along with some rulings against the defense. It’s the investigating officer’s role to consider witnesses’ testimony and evidence presented to counsel and to recommend if the case should be referred for trial to general court martial or other courts martial, or be dismissed.

Almanza serves as a reserve military judge as well as the deputy chief of the Justice Department’s child exploitation and obscenity section. Coombs argued there’s a conflict of interest since the Justice Department has an ongoing criminal investigation regarding this case.

The officer, Coombs continued, also allowed all of the government’s 20 witnesses and only two of the defense’s 38 witnesses, who were not in common with the government. He also argued the fact that the hearing is open, not closed, which can allow prejudicial information to impact the trial. Finally, Almanza is allowing unsworn statements from the prosecution to be considered, he added.

After lengthy recesses and with input from the defense, the government and his legal advisor, Almanza denied the defense’s request for a recusal and for a stay, or delay, of proceedings.

Almanza said he doesn’t believe that “a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances” of the case would question his impartiality, and stressed that no aspect of his civilian work is involved with or relates to Manning’s case.

Almanza then called for another recess to give Manning’s defense team time to file a writ, or legal document, to stay the hearing to the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, located at Fort Belvoir, Va.

Turning proceedings back to the case at hand, Almanza reviewed Manning’s rights with him, ensuring the soldier had a copy of the charge sheet and understood the charges preferred against him.

Almanza also discussed the possibility that classified information may be introduced into the hearing. If classified information needs to be discussed, he explained, a determination will be made to close portions of the hearing as required.

After one final recess, Almanza noted the hearing will reconvene tomorrow at 10 a.m. Manning remains in pretrial confinement.

Manning’s Article 32 hearing is expected to continue for several days, possibly up to a week. When the hearing is over, Almanza will file a report recommending either a trial, or that some or all of the charges against Manning be dismissed.

16 US v PFC Bradley Manning | Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, Day One. No Witnesses.

Defense: 

Prosecution: 

  • Captain Ashden Fein
  • Captain Joe Morrow
  • Captain Angel Overgaard

Investigative Officer: 

  • Lieutenant Colonel Paul Amanza
    • Paul Almanza is the Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. He is the former Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section at the Department of Justice. (Source: The Federal Bar Association)
    • Almanza received his law license in 2002. Work Address. Office Of Legal Policy US Dept. Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., Nw Washington, DC 20530 O: 202-616-2250 (Source: avvo.com)
    • DOJ Bulletin by Paul Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity,DOJ (PDF) (Sept 2011)
    • Justia US Law Search for "Paul R. Almanza"
    • Lt. Col. Mark Holzer, author of 'Unfunding Terror' was Almanza legal advisor. (PDF) (Source: Alexa O'Brien)
    • Col Stephen Henley notably appointed Pres of a GTMO  military commission, informed Almanza of his appointment as  IO. (Source: Alexa O'Brien)

Resources:

No Witnesses.

16 Center for Constitutional Rights, representing Julian Assange, as publisher of the WikiLeaks media organization, files a petition seeking guaranteed access by Assange and WikiLeaks’ counsel to the proceedings against Private Bradley Manning at Ft. Meade.

(Source: Center for Constitutional Rights)
Copy of the Petition via Center for Constitutional Rights (PDF)

16 Rep James Langevin remarks on WikiLeaks and an "insider threat detection program" during discussion on the floor of Congress about the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012.

This bill was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President.

Rep James Langevin bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and Chair of sub Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology and sub Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee and sub Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee and sub Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence and sub Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee

"Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act. In particular, this bill includes funding to accelerate implementation of an insider threat detection program and requires best practices implemented in the Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the Intelligence Community. In addition, the bill supports critical resources for cybersecurity, a threat which demands the attention of national security specialists.

As the successful operation against Usama bin Ladin demonstrated earlier this year, the Intelligence Community has made significant strides towards working together to counter the most complex threats facing our nation. Productive cooperation and intelligence integration embodies the intent of congressional reforms made after the tragic events of 9/11. I am encouraged to see this progress, especially in the area of information sharing.

While the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep our country safe, technological advances have also increased the risks of this cooperation. As we saw last year with the damage of Wikileaks the threat from a malicious insider, with the `keys to the kingdom,' is real.

This bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to review improvements made to the Army's insider threat regulation and consider implementation across the Intelligence Community. The bill also accelerates other technical initiatives within the insider threat program. It is imperative that we ensure our security officers and network administrators have this capability in place to protect our most sensitive information.

Further, this bill helps secure our information and networks both from the insider and from outside actors by addressing the risks posed to our cyber networks. We must all work together to raise awareness of this threat and work with both public and private sector partners. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill." (Source: Congressional Record)

15

Department of State | The State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland starts by saying, "With regard to the impact of WikiLeaks, we were quite clear at the time, and we remain clear, that it was very – a very bad thing."

Nuland refers to the WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group saying, "that you know that we stood up a cell in this building to work with individuals who were concerned about their security and we’ve made good progress in trying to help some of these individuals, I think I won’t go into a broad, aggregate effort to, sort of, quantify this. But we were concerned and we have taken measures to try to help those who have been concerned about government -- ," which Nuland says, "In a number of cases, we’ve been able to be quite effective." Nuland would not comment on if there are instances when it was not "effective" or if persons were still at risk.

Nuland says that "the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world, " but she adds, "we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months." (So since May or June 2011)

[Tags: WikiLeaks 24/7 task Force; WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group; WikiLeaks Mitigation Team]

Full Video

Full Transcript

QUESTION: Bradley Manning’s trial begins tomorrow. I’m wondering if you have any thought – this building has any thoughts on that? Or, more broadly, just on the impact – the negative impact, how bad the impact was from the WikiLeaks disclosures.

MS. NULAND: Well, with regard to the trial, it’s now a law enforcement matter, so I’m obviously not going to comment on it when the issue’s in the courts. With regard to the impact of WikiLeaks, we were quite clear at the time, and we remain clear, that it was very – a very bad thing.

QUESTION: Can I ask, following that – at the time you – this building voiced some serious concerns about the effect it might have on sources and methods and, in particular, a number of human rights activists around the world who’ve spoken to embassy officials. Can you speak to the overall impact now, several months later, that you’ve seen from the disclosure of these documents?

MS. NULAND: Well, beyond saying, Kirit, that you know that we stood up a cell in this building to work with individuals who were concerned about their security and we’ve made good progress in trying to help some of these individuals, I think I won’t go into a broad, aggregate effort to, sort of, quantify this. But we were concerned and we have taken measures to try to help those who have been concerned about government --

QUESTION: And do you think those measures have been effective?

MS. NULAND: In a number of cases, we’ve been able to be quite effective.

QUESTION: And have there been any cases in which you feel that somebody’s still at risk?

MS. NULAND: Again, I think it won’t help the people involved for me to go any deeper on this issue.

QUESTION: Okay. And my last question will be just the diplomatic impact, just following on Matt’s question, if you could speak to that at all. I mean, that was a subject at the Secretary’s meetings for months after the initial release --

MS. NULAND: Absolutely.

QUESTION: -- I mean, have – are you guys still reeling from that, or is that kind of patched up for the most part?

MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world.

QUESTION: And you do feel that you’ve reached that point? In other words, where things have patched up?

MS. NULAND: Well, look, I’m not in a position to qualify/quantify, but I would say that we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months. So --

[*****]

QUESTION: But there have been some kind of tactical changes, I mean, right – of some diplomats not being able to take notes in certain meetings, or like meetings being restricted? I mean there have been practical effects since then, wouldn’t you say?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve obviously taken steps both on the strategic level and --

QUESTION: Well, and host governments also have on you, haven’t they?

MS. NULAND: I don’t think that you can necessarily make a direct link. I mean, in diplomatic conversations, sometimes it’s appropriate to have small meetings, and sometimes it’s appropriate to have bigger delegation meetings. Obviously, individual governments have made their own policy decisions, but more importantly, this building and this government, broadly, has taken steps to address some of the issues that allowed the WikiLeaks thing to happen in the first place.

QUESTION: Can you be a little bit more specific about when you say “It was a very bad thing”? Because it sounds as though from one of your answers to Kirit is that this has pretty much blown over now. And in the light of that, I wonder how difficult it’s going to be for the Administration to make the case that this was, in fact, as damaging as you claim it was – or as you claimed it was at the time.

MS. NULAND: Again, this is now a legal case. The case will be made by the lawyers, and I’m not going to get in the middle of it.

QUESTION: No, I understand. But can you be a little bit – I mean, “It was a very bad thing,” is not particularly enlightening.

MS. NULAND: Matt, we spoke extensively at the time about the damage to America’s reputation, about the damage to individual – individuals who had been open and honest with us, about the risks with regard to trust that are essential for diplomacy. And as I said, the Secretary, the President had to spend many months reassuring governments afterwards. I can’t quantify the residual impact standing here today. But what’s most important is that this case is now in the U.S. courts --

QUESTION: No. It’s in the military courts.

MS. NULAND: -- and that he will face justice. Yeah.

(Source: Department of State)

15

Department of State | AP reporter Matt Lee asks Secretary of State Hillary Clinton about Bradley Manning's trial and the impact that WikiLeaks had or is still having on foreign policy.

Clinton responds that she cannot comment on an ongoing legal proceeding but that "it was a very unfortunate and damaging actions – action – that were taken that put at risk individuals and relationships to an extent that we took it very seriously and launched a vigorous diplomatic effort to try to counter."

MS. NULAND: Next question, Matt Lee, AP.

QUESTION: Hello. Hi, Madam Secretary.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Hello.

QUESTION: I hope I don’t shock you too much, but I actually only have one question.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I can’t believe it.

QUESTION: It’s got two parts, but it’s only – (laughter.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: No. Then I’m not at all shocked. I’m actually reassured.

QUESTION: As you are no doubt aware, Bradley Manning’s trial begins tomorrow. I’m wondering if you have any thoughts about that, but more broadly what your thoughts are about the impact the WikiLeaks incident, if we can call it that, had and is having, if it is still having any effect or deleterious effect on U.S. diplomacy in a way that foreign policy is conducted.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Matt, I cannot comment on an ongoing legal proceeding, and as you rightly point out, the trial is beginning, and we will, obviously, save any comment while that proceeding is ongoing.

I’ve said numerous times from this podium and in other locations that it was a very unfortunate and damaging actions – action – that were taken that put at risk individuals and relationships to an extent that we took it very seriously and launched a vigorous diplomatic effort to try to counter.

I think that in an age when so much information is flying through cyberspace, we all have to be aware of the fact that some information – which is sensitive, which does affect the security of individuals and relationships – deserves to be protected. And we will continue to take necessary steps to do so.

(Source: Department of State)

14 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | RESPONSE in Opposition by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 89 MOTION to Stay re 84 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Hearing, (Peterson, Andrew)

RESPONSE in Opposition by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 89 MOTION to Stay re 84 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Hearing, (Peterson, Andrew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18USC 2703(d)
No. 1:11EC3
Hon. Liam O'Grady
Hearing Date: January 13, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

NEIL H. MACBRIDE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: _________/s/___________________

Andrew Peterson

Assistant United States Attorney
Office of the United States Attorney
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 2231

 

14 Rep Langevin remarks on provisions within the NDAA FY 2012 'and also the inclusion of important cyberprotections to prevent future incidents similar to WikiLeaks,' during a speech on the floor of Congress regarding the Conference Report on HR 1540.

Rep James Langevin bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and Chair of sub Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology and sub Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee and sub Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee and sub Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence and sub Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee

"Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1540, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.

I would like to begin by thanking Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and my subcommittee chairman, Mr. Thornberry, for their leadership and commitment to keeping our Nation safe and protecting our servicemembers. As a conferee, I was proud to join them in signing the conference report Monday night, and I am even more proud of our excellent staff that completed a full conference in a record 1 week's time.

As ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I am especially pleased with the inclusion of significant funding for special operations forces, the full reauthorization of the SBIR program to support our job-creating small businesses, and also the inclusion of important cyberprotections to prevent future incidents similar to WikiLeaks.

This bill will also ensure the long-term strength of programs critical to our naval dominance and strategic posture, such as the purchase of two new Virginia class submarines, fully funding the development of the Ohio replacement submarine, and continuing work on the first Zumwalt DDG-1000 destroyer.

Further, the conference committee successfully removed damaging language that would have ended efforts by DOD to procure clean alternative fuel technology in order to break our dependence on foreign oil and reduce our carbon footprint, which DOD officials have stated are both high risks to our national security.

Finally, while I'm concerned that we were unable to remove some harmful measures requiring that terrorist detainees be held in military custody, provisions included in this bill help address concerns about potential detention of U.S. citizens in military custody and the flexibility of counterterrorism efforts by the FBI.

In closing, this legislation supports the incredible sacrifices that our brave men and women in uniform make for our country every day and provides critical resources to carry out vital national security projects.

With that, I am proud to serve on the House Armed Services Committee and to serve with Chairman McKeon and Ranking Member Smith. I commend them for the great work they have done in producing a good bill, and I appreciate the staff for their great work as well." (Source: Congressional Record)

13 Rep Carolyn B. Maloney cites WikiLeaks released State Department Cables on the floor of Congress in a remarks on the Iran Threat Reduction Act.

"Given Iran’s success in developing a nuclear program, a number of its neighbors have suggested that they may follow suit, creating further instability in the region. Earlier this month, Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United States, suggested that Saudi Arabia may seek nuclear weapons. Wikileaks revealed that Egypt’s leaders told U.S. officials that Egypt would acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did. This lends greater urgency to the need to persuade Iran to end its nuclear ambitions." (Source: Congressional Record)

13

Department of State | Daniel Baer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in an interview entitled, "Internet Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy" says in response to a question concerning the State Department's supposed stance about Internet Freedom in light of its rhetoric and actions towards WikiLeaks, saying "theft is not the same as freedom of expression."

The WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group is run out of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

[Tags: WikiLeaks Persons at Risk Group]

Full Transcript

Full Video

MS. JENSEN: Our next question comes from Merette Ibrahim from Egypt: I would love to know far do – you support the freedom of expression on the Internet, as you have been against WikiLeaks since the beginning. Don’t you consider it a part of the freedom of information?

DR. BAER: Obviously, this has been a long conversation. I think there’s a distinction to be drawn between freedom of expression and the criticism that was lodged against WikiLeaks, which was – the criticism was that it was based on an act of theft, and theft is not the same as freedom of expression. And also, we expressed our well founded concerns, as did many others, about the implications for this act of theft on the safety of people around the world. I think that what WikiLeaks – the alleged cables and WikiLeaks exposed was – one of the things that’s been lost is that one of the things it exposed was the fact that really, by and large, around the world, what it exposed was thousands and thousands of acts of right-doing on behalf of American diplomats who were working not only to protect the best interests of American citizens but many, many citizens around the world, many, many people around the world, to solve global challenges, to solve problems, et cetera.

And so, no, I don’t see any conflict in our commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association online, and our expression of well founded concerns about the theft on which WikiLeaks was based.

(Source: Department of State)

13 Rep Kucinich enters a comment by Seymour Hersh that cites a WikiLeaks released US State Department Cable in his speech on the floor of Congress about the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011 H.R. 1905.

This bills passage history.

"Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   I would like to place in the Record an article by Seymour Hersh which cites the IAE's report suggesting, according to the Arms Control Association, that Iran is working to shorten a time frame to build a bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.

[The New Yorker Online Only Daily Comment, November 18, 2011]

   Iran and The I.A.E.A.

(Posted by Seymour M. Hersh)

The first question in last Saturday night's Republican debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report, which raised renewed concern about the ``possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran,'' struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the I.A.E.A. report had provided ``additional credible evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon'' and asked what various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he would coordinate with the Israeli government and maximize covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's ``greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint'' and added, ``Look, one thing you can know ..... and that is if we reelect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon.'' The Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.

I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk American covert operations was to find something physical--a ``smoking calutron,'' as a knowledgeable official once told me--to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to attack and destroy the site.

The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators ``have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a `credible' case'' that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as declaring that ``the level of detail is unbelievable. ..... The report describes virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of those steps. It reads like a menu.'' The Times set the tone for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that ``it is true that the basic allegations in the report are not substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for years.'')

But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years ``to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program'' and, as a result, it has been able ``to refine its analysis.'' The net effect has been to create ``more concern.'' But Robert Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who previously spent more than thirty years with the Department of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established. Those materials, and others, ``were old news,'' Kelley said, and known to many journalists. ``I wonder why this same stuff is now considered `new information' by the same reporters.''

A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose mission is to encourage public support for effective arms control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did ``reinforce what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued others.'' (The American intelligence community reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report ``suggests,'' the A.C.A. paper said, that Iran ``is working to shorten the time frame to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.'' Greg Thielmann, a former State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me, ``There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran is really building a bomb.'' He added, ``Those who want to drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of aggressively misrepresented the report.''

Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's International Security Advisory Board, said, ``I was briefed on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report. Most of this information is well known to experts who follow the issue.'' Cirincione noted that ``post-2003, the report only cites computer modeling and a few other experiments.'' (A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, ``I was under whelmed by the information.'')

The report did note that its on-site camera inspection process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities--mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory--``continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material.'' In other words, all of the low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for the manufacture of a bomb, it would have to have another, unknown source.

The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed internationally, although not always in Washington, as an honest broker--a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described Amano as being ``ready for prime time.'' According to the cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent representative to the I.A.E.A., said, ``Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.'' The cable added that Amano's ``willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy ..... bodes well for our future relationship.''

It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility. Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good: its leadership began construction of its initial uranium facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to I.A.E.A. inspectors.

The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since 2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the Axis of Evil--with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons program." (Source: Congressional Record)

12-16 Between December 12 and December 16, Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, Chief of Staff Legal Policy at the Department of Justice, which has an ongoing investigation into Bradley Manning, says he reviews all "the documentary evidence provided by government and defense, for the purpose of determining which witnesses and what evidence needed to be produced for the investigation." Other than that, he has only had several written communications (sometimes from his DOJ email, as came out on Day One of the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing).

Between December 12 and December 16, the day of the pretrial hearing he says he: "As I previously mentioned, I have reviewed the documentary evidence provided by the government to both me and your defense team, but solely for the purpose of determining which witnesses and what evidence needed to be produced during this investigation. Other than those actions, i have no substantive knowledge of the actions alleged, and I do not know any of the witnesses or persons involved in this hearing. I have had several written communications with counsel and regarding administrative and scheduling matters related to this hearing. i have not acted in any way that would disqualify me from conducting this investigation. Does either side wish to question or challenge me?" (Source: Article 32 Pretrial Hearing Almanza Script)

"Coombs: Are you aware the DOJ has a case against my client?

IO: Yes.

Coombs: Have you been exposed to this info [regarding the DOJ case against Manning and Assange]?

IO: No.

Coombs: Discussed this information with anyone [referring to pretrial hearing]?

IO: …supervisor

Coombs: Did you inform him you would be the IO for Manning's pretrial?

IO: Yes. I did.

[Coombs asks when the IO was mobilized, put on orders.]

IO: December 12, 2011.

Coombs: So up until Dec 12, 2011 you were working at the DOJ?

Coombs: Have you responded to any email from the DOJ since the time you were put on leave? Have you
perform any work for the DOJ during that time?

Coombs: What prior knowledge do you have of the matter?

IO: Aware of some articles, some TV coverage Since Dec. [did not specify year]…made a point of not reading
anything.

Coombs: Any impressions prior?

IO: Recall that I thought if allegations were true, serious matter.

Coombs: Any discussions?

IO: Not that I recall.

Coombs: Any opinions?

IO: No...generally, no. Just because something reported in paper, doesn't mean its true.

Coombs: Under RCN902A the defense asks that you recuse yourself.
RCN902A…just the mere existence of bias' as follows: Number one...your position as a prosecutor for the DOJ, a 'career prosecutor' since 2002 coupled with an ongoing criminal grand jury...they would get a plea to go after Julian Assange. DOJ has not ruled out fact they would not rule out taking this case… you deny…but listening to the facts, you are not impartial.

Number two…every one of the government’s witnesses was granted. In their request they listed just the names, and no basis, yet you granted all the witnesses they requested. Defense had 19 pages of relevance for each of the 38 names it requested, 10 were government witnesses and they were granted. Of the 38, only two witnesses for the defense were granted. Then this morning two more were approved to the detriment of the defense to prepare in a case that involves death penalty.

A 'reasonable individual ‘would consider that biased.

Number three...ruling on 'closure' [of trial] unchanged. Defense has argued harm would come to client if certain details were made public….affect fair trial for PFC Manning. Three times defense has asked; and three times you have refused.

Anyone who has practiced for more than a day...if individual hears something... if an individual hears something in the press, with ‘again the exception of a career prosecutor’…

Number three…[Coombs repeats number three]…ruling with regard to sworn statements. Government has asked for a delay after delay because the government needed to figure out classification. So the government has finally figured out what is classified...inexplicably so it doesn't want to produce witnesses.

Unsworn statements from witnesses RLN45 [case number needs verification] cannot consider unsworn statements over defense. And, the IO has gone out independently to find two cases that support the government. Three cases... went out to find 3 cases. Defense is now arguing against government and prosecutor.

You made up a test all on your own...eliminating OCA. All this has been leaked. Where is the damage or harm? And, yet government again ruled, no. The fact that you are a career prosecutor independently supports your recusing yourself.

Defense is filing a motion that you recuse yourself…defense requests that you consider recusing yourself.

[IO paused before responding then seemed to bumble procedure.]" (Source: Alexa O'Brien, Article 32, Pretrial Transcript, Day One)

12 Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice, informs his supervisor [WHO IS THIS?] at the Department of Justice that he will act as Bradley Manning's, Investigating Officer at the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing using his DOJ email.

"Coombs: Are you aware the DOJ has a case against my client?

IO: Yes.

Coombs: Have you been exposed to this info [regarding the DOJ case against Manning and Assange]?

IO: No.

Coombs: Discussed this information with anyone [referring to pretrial hearing]?

IO: …supervisor

Coombs: Did you inform him you would be the IO for Manning's pretrial?

IO: Yes. I did.

[Coombs asks when the IO was mobilized, put on orders.]

IO: December 12, 2011.

Coombs: So up until Dec 12, 2011 you were working at the DOJ?

Coombs: Have you responded to any email from the DOJ since the time you were put on leave? Have you
perform any work for the DOJ during that time?

Coombs: What prior knowledge do you have of the matter?

IO: Aware of some articles, some TV coverage Since Dec. [did not specify year]…made a point of not reading
anything.

Coombs: Any impressions prior?

IO: Recall that I thought if allegations were true, serious matter.

Coombs: Any discussions?

IO: Not that I recall.

Coombs: Any opinions?

IO: No...generally, no. Just because something reported in paper, doesn't mean its true.

Coombs: Under RCN902A the defense asks that you recuse yourself.
RCN902A…just the mere existence of bias' as follows: Number one...your position as a prosecutor for the DOJ, a 'career prosecutor' since 2002 coupled with an ongoing criminal grand jury...they would get a plea to go after Julian Assange. DOJ has not ruled out fact they would not rule out taking this case… you deny…but listening to the facts, you are not impartial.

Number two…every one of the government’s witnesses was granted. In their request they listed just the names, and no basis, yet you granted all the witnesses they requested. Defense had 19 pages of relevance for each of the 38 names it requested, 10 were government witnesses and they were granted. Of the 38, only two witnesses for the defense were granted. Then this morning two more were approved to the detriment of the defense to prepare in a case that involves death penalty.

A 'reasonable individual ‘would consider that biased.

Number three...ruling on 'closure' [of trial] unchanged. Defense has argued harm would come to client if certain details were made public….affect fair trial for PFC Manning. Three times defense has asked; and three times you have refused.

Anyone who has practiced for more than a day...if individual hears something... if an individual hears something in the press, with ‘again the exception of a career prosecutor’…

Number three…[Coombs repeats number three]…ruling with regard to sworn statements. Government has asked for a delay after delay because the government needed to figure out classification. So the government has finally figured out what is classified...inexplicably so it doesn't want to produce witnesses.

Unsworn statements from witnesses RLN45 [case number needs verification] cannot consider unsworn statements over defense. And, the IO has gone out independently to find two cases that support the government. Three cases... went out to find 3 cases. Defense is now arguing against government and prosecutor.

You made up a test all on your own...eliminating OCA. All this has been leaked. Where is the damage or harm? And, yet government again ruled, no. The fact that you are a career prosecutor independently supports your recusing yourself.

Defense is filing a motion that you recuse yourself…defense requests that you consider recusing yourself.

[IO paused before responding then seemed to bumble procedure.]" (Source: Alexa O'Brien, Article 32, Pretrial Transcript, Day One)

"The government prosecutor, Capt. Ashden Fein, asked Almanza if he had ever dealt with any issues related to WikiLeaks or Manning in his prior role as a Justice Department attorney, a job he left on Dec. 12. (Source: foxnews.com)

"I am currently assigned to the 150th Judge Advocate General Detachment (LSO), United States Army Reserve. At the time I was appointed to this investigation, I had no detailed knowledge of this case, having only seen limited coverage in the media concerning the allegations against you. As I previously mentioned, I have reviewed the documentary evidence provided by the government to both me and your defense team, but solely for the purpose of determining which witnesses and what evidence needed to be produced during this investigation. Other than those actions, i have no substantive knowledge of the actions alleged, and I do not know any of the witnesses or persons involved in this hearing. I have had several written communications with counsel and regarding administrative and scheduling matters related to this hearing. i have not acted in any way that would disqualify me from conducting this investigation. Does either side wish to question or challenge me?" (Source: Lt. Col. Paul Almanza's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing Script)

8 USCA Case Number 11-5151 4th Circuit. Case Manager M. Radday for 87 Notice of Appeal filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum. 

USCA Case Number 11-5151 4th Circuit. Case Manager M. Radday for 87 Notice of Appeal filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum. No file available. (Source: web archive)

8 Defense files a request to compel the production of witnesses.

(Source: David Coombs, PDF)

"On December 2, 2011, the defense filed a request for the production of 48 witnesses for the Article 32 hearing. The government responded to the defense's request on December 7, 2011. In the government's response, it opposed the presence of all defense requested witness (with the exception of ten witnesses who were also on the government's witness list)...The defense filed a request to compel the production of the witnesses on December 8, 2011. The Investigating Officer [LT COL PAUL ALMANZA] will consider the government and defense requests, and make a ruling sometime later this week." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Response to Government Denial of Witnesses)

  • Regarding Defense requested witness, an agent involved with Department of State and FBI investigation on original 7 July 2010 prosecution witness list, but denied:

One agent that the defense requested as a witness on Dec. 2, 2011 for Bradley Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing was on the prosecution's original government witness list dated Jul 7, 2010. "The defense has requested the attendance of XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] [See Defense's Dec. 2, 2011 Request for Witnesses (PDF)] in order to provide the Investigating Officer with testimony concerning the joint investigations being conducted by both the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Notable XXXXXXXXXX was on the original government's witness list filed on 7 July 2010. According to the government's memo dated 7 December 2011, the other agents 'XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX can provide the needed testimony.' Their testimony, however, will in large part be hearsay evidence about what other agents have done on the case and what witnesses have told these other case agents..." (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Key Leaders of 2nd Brigade Combat Team

    • All the requested witnesses from the "Key Leaders of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team" "provided sworn statements as part of the Secretary of the Army's 15-6 Investigation. This includes XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?]." Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)
    • a.) XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] statement about the perception of the leadership qualities of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] is relevant to their responses of lack of responses in this case. Additionally, the fact that XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] ultimately decided to remove XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] and XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] from their respective positions and considered XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] "Marginal, but not bad enough to either relieve or replace" s also relevant and provides mitigation evidence that the Investigating Officer should consider.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    b.) XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] will testify not only to XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] weak performance and the fact that he was not a strong leader, but he will also testify that XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] did not take appropriate action to correct mistakes made by junior members in his unit and did not have control over the S-2 shop. XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] will also testify that XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] was handicapped by weak NCO leadership and that XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] was not an effective leader. XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] also provides key testimony regarding the S-2 section's failure to initiate a suspension of PFC Manning's security clearance when it became obvious such action was required.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    c.) XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] will testify to the fact he was not kept aware of the problems being suffered by PFC Manning. He will testify the XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] and XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] failed to inform him of PFC Manning's mental health issues. (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    d.) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] will testify about the command's lack of relevant information from XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] and XXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] concerning PFC Manning. The failure to provide this information impacted not only the decision regarding whether to deploy PFC Manning, but also the timeliness of the suspension of PFC Manning's security clearance... (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    Defense then makes a Article 46 statement regarding government's denial:

    2.) ...in its response to the defense witness request, the government states that the defense's proffered testimony regarding the total breakdown in command and control within the S-2 Section and the multiple failures by the unit to take basic steps in response to clear mental health issues being suffered by PFC Manning is somehow "not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues" The government cites to RCM 405(a) Inexplicably, the government ignores R.C.M. 405(f) and controlling case law which clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available *witnesses, requested..."); United States v. Garcia,59 M.J. 447,451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation). Each of the above requested witnesses will have relevant and independent information of the events that transpired, and all of these witnesses should be produced in order to accomplish the purposes of the investigation. Simply reading the sworn statements of some of these witnesses and hearing from a few others will not allow either party or the Investigating Officer to explore the relevant information. The listed witnesses need to be questioned personally and individually about what they saw, heard, and experienced if there is to be a thorough and impartial investigation. (Footnote: It is troubling that in the government's response dated 7 December 2011, it objects to every listed witness by the defense that is not also on the government's list. The government does not seem to be interested at all in providing a thorough and impartial investigation. The government indicates that it is going to go to the expense and trouble of bringing two civilian witnesses and other military witnesses from multiple duty locations in the United States and overseas, and yet the government claims that it is too costly and troublesome to bring any of the defense requested witnesses. Such a position defies logic and common sense.) (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Key Members of 2nd Brigade Combat Team's S-2 Section

    • All of the requested witnesses provided sworn statement as part of the Secretary of the Army's 15-6 Investigation[WHO WAS PART OF THIS?] . This includes XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] ...Each of these witnesses can provide unique information regarding not only the dysfunctional leadership scheme by XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] and XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] , but also the numerous recommendations to get PFC Manning help both prior to the deployment and during the deployment. Each witness will provide relevant mitigation and extenuation evidence regarding how the S-2 section failed to notify the company commander [WHO IS THIS?] of the issues PFC Manning was struggling with of the multiple acts of behavior that should have resulted in an immediate suspension of PFC Manning's clearance. (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    Defense makes an Article 46 statement regarding government's denial:

    In its response to the defense witness request for relevant S-2 section witnesses, the government states that the testimony of these witnesses is somehow "not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The government also opines that the breakdown in command and control, the decision to deploy PFC Manning, and the decision to not suspend his security clearance earlier "is not relevant to the Article 32 Investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The government cites to R.C.M. 405(a). Again, the government ignores R.C.M. 405(0 and controlling case law which clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(0 (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested..."); United States v. Garcia,59 M.J. 447,451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation) (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Mental Heath Providers

    • The government states the testimony of these mental health providers "is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." Additionally, the government points to the fact that a R.C.M.706 board concluded that "PFC Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct" as a basis to ignore any mental health testimony. Such a position is indefensible. The fact PFC Manning did not have a "severe mental disease or defect" only indicates that he does not have a basis to claim an insanity defense. Such a conclusion does not speak to any diminished capacity or mitigating and extenuating circumstances... (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Original Classification Authorities (OCA)

  • 2.) The government objected to the defense request for any of these witnesses. The government, without any justification, requested that you find the requested witness were not reasonably available given the importance of their respective position. The government seems to argue that in matters of justice, if you have too important of a position, you should not be bothered. Military justice should not be controlled by the importance of your duty position. Each individual took the time to provide an unsworn affidavit. The defense should be provided with the opportunity to examine these witnesses at the Article 32 hearing...

    Defense Objects to use of Unsworn Statement because they cannot be considered by IO:

    3.) In the event these witnesses are not produced, the defense objects to the Investigating Officer [LT. COL. PAUL ALMANZA] considering their unsworn statements. R.C.M.405 (g)(4)(B). Unsworn statements under 28 U.S.C. 1746 cannot be considered by the Investigating Officer [LT COL PAUL ALMANZA]. The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that testimony given at an Article 32be under oath. R.C.M. 405(h)(1)(A). If a witness is deemed not reasonably available, the Investigating Officer [LT COL PAUL ALMANZA] can consider sworn statements. R.C.M. 405(g)(5)(B)(i). A unsworn statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 is not a sworn statement. In order for an unsworn statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 to be admissible, it must be subscribed and signed "in a judicial proceeding or course of justice" in order to subject the declarant to the penalty of perjury at the Article 32 hearing. See Article 131 c(3) (noting that "section 1746 does not change the requirement that a deposition be given under oath or alter the situation where an oath is required to be taken before a specific person"); See also 28 U.S.C. 1746 (noting that the unsworn declaration is not effective in "depositions or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official.") (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Current and Former Members of the US Government and Article 37
  • 1.) ...Each of these witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] has provided statements that contradict those govern by the OCA witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] regarding the alleged damage caused by the unauthorized disclosures. Additionally each of these witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] is relevant in order to inquire into the issues of unlawful command influence and unlawful pretrial punishment in violation of Articles 13 and Article 37 of the UCMJ... (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    3.) The defense objects to the witnesses not being produced at the Article 32 based solely on the determination by the government that they are too important to be made available. Assuming the witnesses are not produced, the defense will request a deposition of these witnesses if charges are referred, pursuant to RCM 702 and the holding in United States v. Chuculate, 5 MJ 143 (CMA 1978). (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Mental Health Providers at the Quantico Confinement Facility
  • 1.) ...Each of these witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] has provided statements that would support the fact PFC Manning was subjected to unlawful pretrial punishment under Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

    2.) The government objects to the defense request, stating that the alleged unlawful pretrial punishment is not relevant at the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. Whether PFC Manning was unlawfully punished prior to trial is a relevant matter for you to consider. The facts of his unlawful pretrial punishment is appropriate information for you to consider in forming your recommendations to the convening authority. The issue is also important for the integrity of the military justice system and the appearance of fairness in the process.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • h.)XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] : In the defense's witness request, it requested XXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] be made available. The relevancy of this witness should be obvious. Any agent testifying to the matters allegedly heard by XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] would only be testifying to hearsay. Given the potential impact of his testimony, XXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] must be produced in order to provide for a thorough and impartial investigation. (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses) [IS THIS ADRIAN LAMO?]
  • 2. PFC Manning is charged with offenses that carry the maximum punishment of life without the possibility of parole. His charges are among the most serious charges that a soldier can face. The government must be prepared to accept the costs incurred by the seriousness of the charges that they have preferred against PFC Manning. Anything but the personal appearances of all witnesses requested by the defense and government would deny PFC Manning his right to a thorough and impartial investigation and turn this into a hollow exercise.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

3. The government's claim that the cost and burden is too great to require the production and personal appearance of relevant and necessary witnesses is not justified. It was the government's decision to conduct this Article 32 investigation at Fort Meade. The defense's position has been consistent; it does not object to this location provided it has the personal appearance of all relevant and necessary witnesses. The government should not be allowed to use its own decision to conduct the investigation at Fort Meade as a way to avoid making relevant witnesses available. (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

7

White House | A report for the President assessing the executive branch's successes and shortcomings in sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks and discussing potential future vulnerabilities due today, 90 days after Obama White House Executive Order 13587 - Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information from the "unlawful disclosures by WikiLeaks"

See also Fact Sheet: Safeguarding the U.S. Government's Classified Information and Networks

Executive Order 13587

EXECUTIVE ORDER

STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING AND SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to ensure the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information (classified information) on computer networks, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Policy. Our Nation's security requires classified information to be shared immediately with authorized users around the world but also requires sophisticated and vigilant means to ensure it is shared securely. Computer networks have individual and common vulnerabilities that require coordinated decisions on risk management.

This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.

Sec. 2. General Responsibilities of Agencies.

Sec. 2.1. The heads of agencies that operate or access classified computer networks shall have responsibility for appropriately sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks. As part of this responsibility, they shall:

(a) designate a senior official to be charged with overseeing classified information sharing and safeguarding efforts for the agency;

(b) implement an insider threat detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and standards developed by the Insider Threat Task Force established in section 6 of this order;

(c) perform self-assessments of compliance with policies and standards issued pursuant to sections 3.3, 5.2, and 6.3 of this order, as well as other applicable policies and standards, the results of which shall be reported annually to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee established in section 3 of this order;

(d) provide information and access, as warranted and consistent with law and section 7(d) of this order, to enable independent assessments by the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force of compliance with relevant established policies and standards; and

(e) detail or assign staff as appropriate and necessary to the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office and the Insider Threat Task Force on an ongoing basis.

Sec. 3. Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee.

Sec. 3.1. There is established a Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee (Steering Committee) to exercise overall responsibility and ensure senior-level accountability for the coordinated interagency development and implementation of policies and standards regarding the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks.

Sec. 3.2. The Steering Committee shall be co-chaired by senior representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Staff. Members of the committee shall be officers of the United States as designated by the heads of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Information Security Oversight Office within the National Archives and Records Administration (ISOO), as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Steering Committee may designate.

Sec. 3.3. The responsibilities of the Steering Committee shall include:

(a) establishing Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals and annually reviewing executive branch successes and shortcomings in achieving those goals;

(b) preparing within 90 days of the date of this order and at least annually thereafter, a report for the President assessing the executive branch's successes and shortcomings in sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks and discussing potential future vulnerabilities;

(c) developing program and budget recommendations to achieve Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals;

(d) coordinating the interagency development and implementation of priorities, policies, and standards for sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks;

(e) recommending overarching policies, when appropriate, for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO;

(f) coordinating efforts by agencies, the Executive Agent, and the Task Force to assess compliance with established policies and standards and recommending corrective actions needed to ensure compliance;

(g) providing overall mission guidance for the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) with respect to the functions to be performed by the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office established in section 4 of this order; and

(h) referring policy and compliance issues that cannot be resolved by the Steering Committee to the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-1 of February 13, 2009 (Organization of the National Security Council System).

Sec. 4. Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office.

Sec. 4.1. There shall be established a Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office (CISSO) within and subordinate to the office of the PM-ISE to provide expert, full time, sustained focus on responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. Staff of the CISSO shall include details, as needed and appropriate, from agencies represented on the Steering Committee.

Sec. 4.2. The responsibilities of CISSO shall include:

(a) providing staff support for the Steering Committee;

(b) advising the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force on the development of an effective program to monitor compliance with established policies and standards needed to achieve classified information sharing and safeguarding goals; and

(c) consulting with the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the ISOO, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and others, as appropriate, to ensure consistency with policies and standards under Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, Executive Order 12829 of January 6, 1993, as amended, Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, and Executive Order 13556 of November 4, 2010.

Sec. 5. Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks.

Sec. 5.1. The Secretary of Defense and the Director, National Security Agency, shall jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks (the "Executive Agent"), exercising the existing authorities of the Executive Agent and National Manager for national security systems, respectively, under National Security Directive/NSD-42 of July 5, 1990, as supplemented by and subject to this order.

Sec. 5.2. The Executive Agent's responsibilities, in addition to those specified by NSD-42, shall include the following:

(a) developing effective technical safeguarding policies and standards in coordination with the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), as re-designated by Executive Orders 13286 of February 28, 2003, and 13231 of October 16, 2001, that address the safeguarding of classified information within national security systems, as well as the safeguarding of national security systems themselves;

(b) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the Executive Agent's timely development and issuance of technical policies and standards;

(c) reporting at least annually to the Steering Committee on the work of CNSS, including recommendations for any changes needed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of that work; and

(d) conducting independent assessments of agency compliance with established safeguarding policies and standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee.

Sec. 6. Insider Threat Task Force.

Sec. 6.1. There is established an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that shall develop a Government-wide program (insider threat program) for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure, taking into account risk levels, as well as the distinct needs, missions, and systems of individual agencies. This program shall include development of policies, objectives, and priorities for establishing and integrating security, counterintelligence, user audits and monitoring, and other safeguarding capabilities and practices within agencies.

Sec. 6.2. The Task Force shall be co-chaired by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees. Membership on the Task Force shall be composed of officers of the United States from, and designated by the heads of, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the ISOO, as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Task Force may designate. It shall be staffed by personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), and other agencies, as determined by the co-chairs for their respective agencies and to the extent permitted by law. Such personnel must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States. To the extent permitted by law, ONCIX shall provide an appropriate work site and administrative support for the Task Force.

Sec. 6.3. The Task Force's responsibilities shall include the following:

(a) developing, in coordination with the Executive Agent, a Government-wide policy for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider threats, which shall be submitted to the Steering Committee for appropriate review;

(b) in coordination with appropriate agencies, developing minimum standards and guidance for implementation of the insider threat program's Government-wide policy and, within 1 year of the date of this order, issuing those minimum standards and guidance, which shall be binding on the executive branch;

(c) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are obtained, continuing in coordination with appropriate agencies after 1 year from the date of this order to add to or modify those minimum standards and guidance, as appropriate;

(d) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are not obtained, recommending for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO any additional or modified minimum standards and guidance developed more than 1 year after the date of this order;

(e) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the timely development and issuance of minimum standards;

(f) conducting, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Task Force, independent assessments of the adequacy of agency programs to implement established policies and minimum standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee;

(g) providing assistance to agencies, as requested, including through the dissemination of best practices; and

(h) providing analysis of new and continuing insider threat challenges facing the United States Government. 

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) For the purposes of this order, the word "agencies" shall have the meaning set forth in section 6.1(b) of Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009.

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to change the requirements of Executive Orders 12333 of December 4, 1981, 12829 of January 6, 1993, 12968 of August 2, 1995, 13388 of October 25, 2005, 13467 of June 30, 2008, 13526 of December 29, 2009, 13549 of August 18, 2010, and their successor orders and directives.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede or change the authorities of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Secretary of Defense under Executive Order 12829, as amended; the Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order 13549; the Secretary of State under title 22, United States Code, and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986; the Director of ISOO under Executive Orders 13526 and 12829, as amended; the PM-ISE under Executive Order 13388 or the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency under NSD-42 and Executive Order 13286, as amended; the National Counterintelligence Executive, under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; or the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, NSD-42, and Executive Orders 12333, as amended, 12968, as amended, 13286, as amended, 13467, and 13526.

(d) Nothing in this order shall authorize the Steering Committee, CISSO, CNSS, or the Task Force to examine the facilities or systems of other agencies, without advance consultation with the head of such agency, nor to collect information for any purpose not provided herein.

(e) The entities created and the activities directed by this order shall not seek to deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of information by Government employees or contractors that are lawful under and protected by the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of 1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or policies.

(f) With respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies, may issue such policy directives and guidance as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order.

(g) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(1) the authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or

(2) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals

(h) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties, and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(i) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

 BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 7, 2011.

7 Government responds to Manning defense's December 2, 2011 Requested Witness List.

"On December 2, 2011, the defense filed a request for the production of 48 witnesses for the Article 32 hearing. The government responded to the defense's request on December 7, 2011. In the government's response, it opposed the presence of all defense requested witness (with the exception of ten witnesses who were also on the government's witness list)...The defense filed a request to compel the production of the witnesses on December 8, 2011. The Investigating Officer will consider the government and defense requests, and make a ruling sometime later this week." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Response to Government Denial of Witnesses)

  • Regarding Defense requested witness, an agent involved with Department of State and FBI investigation on original 7 July 2010 prosecution witness list, but denied:

One agent that the defense requested as a witness on Dec. 2, 2011 for Bradley Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing was on the prosecution's original government witness list dated Jul 7, 2010. "The defense has requested the attendance of [WHO IS THIS?] XXXXXXXXXX [See Defense's Dec. 2, 2011 Request for Witnesses (PDF)] in order to provide the Investigating Officer with testimony concerning the joint investigations being conducted by both the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Notable XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] was on the original government's witness list filed on 7 July 2010. According to the government's memo dated 7 December 2011, the other agents 'XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?]can provide the needed testimony.' Their testimony, however, will in large part be hearsay evidence about what other agents have done on the case and what witnesses have told these other case agents..."(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Regarding defense request for Key Leaders of 2nd Brigade Combat Team:

2.) in its response to the defense witness request, the government states that the defense's proffered testimony regarding the total breakdown in command and control within the S-2 Section and the multiple failures by the unit to take basic steps in response to clear mental health issues being suffered by PFC Manning is somehow "not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues" The government cites to RCM 405(a) Inexplicably, the government ignores R.C.M. 405(f) and controlling case law which clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available *witnesses, requested..."); United States v. Garcia,59 M.J. 447,451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation). Each of the above requested witnesses will have relevant and independent information of the events that transpired, and all of these witnesses should be produced in order to accomplish the purposes of the investigation. Simply reading the sworn statements of some of these witnesses and hearing from a few others will not allow either party or the Investigating Officer to explore the relevant information. The listed witnesses need to be questioned personally and individually about what they saw, heard, and experienced if there is to be a thorough and impartial investigation. (Footnote: It is troubling that in the government's response dated 7 December 2011, it objects to every listed witness by the defense that is not also on the government's list. The government does not seem to be interested at all in providing a thorough and impartial investigation. The government indicates that it is going to go to the expense and trouble of bringing two civilian witnesses and other military witnesses from multiple duty locations in the United States and overseas, and yet the government claims that it is too costly and troublesome to bring any of the defense requested witnesses. Such a position defies logic and common sense.) (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Regarding defense request for Key Members of 2nd Brigade Combat Team's S-2 Section:

In its response to the defense witness request for relevant S-2 section witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?], the government states that the testimony of these witnesses is somehow "not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The government also opines that the breakdown in command and control, the decision to deploy PFC Manning, and the decision to not suspend his security clearance earlier "is not relevant to the Article 32 Investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The government cites to R.C.M. 405(a). Again, the government ignores R.C.M. 405(0 and controlling case law which clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(0 (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested..."); United States v. Garcia,59 M.J. 447,451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation) (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Regarding defenses request for Mental Health Providers:

The government states the testimony of these mental health providers [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] "is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." Additionally, the government points to the fact that a R.C.M.706 board concluded that "PFC Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conductt" as a basis to ignore any mental health testimony. Such a position is indefensible. The fact PFC Manning did not have a "severe mental disease or defect" only indicates that he does not have a basis to claim an insanity defense. Such a conclusion does not speak to any diminished capacity or mitigating and extenuating circumstances...(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Original Classification Authorities (OSA)

2.) The government objected to the defense request for any of these witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?]. The government, without any justification, requested that you find the requested witness were not reasonably available given the importance of their respective position. The government seems to argue that in matters of justice, if you have too important of a position, you should not be bothered. Military justice should not be controlled by the importance of your duty position. Each individual took the time to provide an unsworn affidavit. The defense should be provided with the opportunity to examine these witnesses at the Article 32 hearing (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Current and Former Members of the US Government and Article 37

1.) ...Each of these witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?]has provided statements that contradict those govern by the OCA witnesses [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] regarding the alleged damage caused by the unauthorized disclosures. Additionally each of these witnesses is relevant in order to inquire into the issues of unlawful command influence and unlawful pretrial punishment in violation of Articles 13 and Article 37 of the UCMJ... (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

3.) The defense objects to the witnesses not being produced at the Article 32 based solely on the determination by the government that they are too important to be made available. Assuming the witnesses are not produced, the defense will request a deposition of these witnesses if charges are referred, pursuant to RCM 702 and the holding in United States v. Chuculate, 5 MJ 143 (CMA 1978). (Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

  • Mental Health Providers at the Quantico Confinement Facility:

1.) ...Each of these witnesses has provided statements that would support the fact PFC Manning was subjected to unlawful pretrial punishment under Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

2.) The government objects to the defense request, stating that the alleged unlawful pretrial punishment is not relevant at the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. Whether PFC Manning was unlawfully punished prior to trial is a relevant matter for you to consider. The facts of his unlawful pretrial punishment is appropriate information for you to consider in forming your recommendations to the convening authority. The issue is also important for the integrity of the military justice system and the appearance of fairness in the process.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

2. PFC Manning is charged with offenses that carry the maximum punishment of life without the possibility of parole. His charges are among the most serious charges that a soldier can face. The government must be prepared to accept the costs incurred by the seriousness of the charges that they have preferred against PFC Manning. Anything but the personal appearances of all witnesses requested by the defense and government would deny PFC Manning his right to a thorough and impartial investigation and turn this into a hollow exercise.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

3. The government's claim that the cost and burden is too great to require the production and personal appearance of relevant and necessary witnesses is not justified. It was the government's decision to conduct this Article 32 investigation at Fort Meade. The defense's position has been consistent; it does not object to this location provided it has the personal appearance of all relevant and necessary witnesses. The government should not be allowed to use its own decision to conduct the investigation at Fort Meade as a way to avoid making relevant witnesses available.(Source: Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

7 DOJ FY 2012 Forecast of Contracting Opportunities for FBI "WikiLeaks Software & Hardware Maintenance" ManTech (Incumbent Contractor) $1M-$2M, Fairfax, VA, [email protected]

(Source: DOJ, PDF, XLS, TEXT)

Will update as develops, more info here:

NB On cursory glance, neither WikiLeaks nor Mantech listed in 2011 procurement.

6 WikiLeaks and an unnamed Army soldier is mentioned in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Strategic Plan for 2012-2017

Defense Intelligence Agency's Strategic Plan 2012-2017

Change Imperatives

"The Guiding Principles define broad, enduring, aims that guide DS as it fulfills its mission. The Change Imperatives are derived from the Guiding Principles and drive DS' strategic goals. Recent events as outlined below illustrate even further the necessity for change.

• In 2010, an Army soldier allegedly leaked classified information to the organization Wikileaks, which then used IT tools to release thousands of classified military and diplomatic documents through the web. The information compromise and the global disclosure of sensitive information potentially endangers U.S. troops and damages U.S. diplomatic relationship"

2 Defense submits witness list to the Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, Investigating Officer for Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing. [Tags: Information Review Task Force; Captain Steven Lim; Adrian Lamo; Barrack Obama; Robert Gates; Hillary Clinton; James Culky; Kevin Donegan; Mr. Betts; Robert Schmidle; Robert Harward; Patrick Kennedy; David Woods; Robert Oltman, James Averhart, Robert Roland]

2 Motion to Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal.

Notice of Hearing Date set for 01-13-2012 re 89 MOTION to Stay re 84 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Hearing, by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir

Motion for Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal

"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of December, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314" (Source: Motion for Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal)

Notice of Hearing Date set for 01-13-2012 re 89 MOTION to Stay re 84 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Hearing, by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. No file available. (Source:web archive)

2 Rep Bartlett cites WikiLeaks release of US State Dept Cables in his speech on Energy Policy on the floor of Congress.

"The next chart kind of puts this in a global perspective. This is a chart which shows what the size of the countries of the world would look like if their size were relevant to the amount of oil reserves that they have. And you notice here that Saudi Arabia dominates the world. That's because Saudi Arabia may--we aren't really sure because they won't open their books. Saudi Arabia may have 22 percent of all the reserves in the world.

You may remember, oh, 6 weeks or a couple months ago, there was a WikiLeaks expose that said that maybe the Saudis had overestimated their oil reserves by as much as 40 percent. So the map might not look quite like this, but relatively like this.

Now, why would they overestimate their reserves?

When OPEC couldn't produce more oil than they were producing and they were all anxious for more revenues, OPEC decided that they would limit their production so as to keep the price of oil up. And so they permitted each of the countries to pump a percentage of their reserves.

And so if you look back at the history of this, you will see that, without finding any new fields, their reserves could go up 50 percent, sometimes their reserves doubled. It was kind of a contest amongst liars, because the more you said you had, the more you could pump because you could pump a percentage of what your reserves were. So we really aren't sure what these reserves are because they will not open their books, but it's roughly like this. Certainly, the largest reserves of all the oil are in Saudi Arabia."

(Source: Congressional Record)

1 US v PFC Bradley Manning | Defense responds to Prosecution's November 30, 2011 response to their original November 22, 2011 Defense Request for the Production of Evidence.

Excerpts:

"The government responded to the defense request for production of evidence on 30 November 2011." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

"Instead of responding to the defense request as envisioned under R.C.M. 405(g)(l)(B), the government simply treated the request as another request for discovery. Consistent with its previous responses to discovery requests, the government provided one of the following responses: (a) a general denial; (b) a statement that it had already provided all information in its possession; or (c) a statement that it was either unaware of any information or did not presently have the authority to disclose the requested information." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

a.) "...The video is clearly within the possession of the government and should have already been produced. The government has responded that it 'will provide all matters requested that are it is possession no later than 2 December 2011.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

b.) "...Thus far, the defense believes it has only received information on one of the fifteen individuals recommended for adverse administrative action. The government has responded that it 'has provided all matters requested that are in its possession. '" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

c.) "...The lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of these items on 30 September 2010. See Appendix C. Given the government's own preservation request, it should easily be able to determine the location of these items. 'The government responded to the defense request by stating that "it is still actively working to preserve related computer hard drives based on defense's preservation request dated 2l September 2011'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

d.) "...Under military law, the trial counsel has an affirmative obligation to seek out requested evidence by the defense that is in the possession of the government even if that evidence is not already in the immediate possession of the trial counsel. United States v. Williams, 50 M.J . 436,441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan 868 F.2d 1032,1036 (9th Cir. 1989), United States v. Brooks, 966F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992) (the government is considered to have possession of information that is in the control of agencies that are "closely aligned with the prosecution"). The defense specifically requested the below listed information from the government that is in control of agencies that are closely aligned with this prosecution. As is apparent from the government's responses, it has either purposefully chosen to not search for the specifically requested information, or is shirking its responsibility to do so by saying it has 'no knowledge'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

XXXXXXXXXX [RUSSELL TRAVERS] National Security Staff's Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this case. See Appendix D. The government responded to the defense request by stating that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material .. [and] will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes aware of such records.'" (See White House December 1, 2010 Fact Sheet and David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

ii) "A copy of any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS? OBAMA?] to the Department of Defense concerning this case in order to determine the presence of unlawful command influence. See R.C.M. 405(e). Additionally, defense requests any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by to the Department of State or Department of Justice concerning this case. The government responded to the defense request by stating that it "has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material...[and] will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes aware of such records.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

iii) "The damage assessment conducted by the Information Review Task Force and by XXXXXXXXXX [WHAT IS THIS?]. See Appendix E and F. The government responded that it ' has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... [andJ does not presently have the authority to disclose damage assessments, if any, cited by the defense and will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes available.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

iv.) The collateral investigations by the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and XXXXXXXXXX [CIA See Defense Reply to Government Response to Defense Motion to Compel Discovery No. 2, May 10, 2012] The defense is entitled to receive any forensic results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation. United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 19th Cir. 1989); (United States v. Brooks,966F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992);Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The government responded that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... [and] has provided all forensic results and investigative reports requested that are in its possession and that the United States has authority to disclose.'"

v.) The Department of Justice investigation into the alleged leaks by WikiLeaks as referenced by XXXXXXXXXX [WHAT IS THIS?] to include any grand jury testimony and any information relating to any 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) order or any search warrant by the government of Twitter, Facebook, Google or any other social media site. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);Jencks v. United States,353 U.S. 657 (1957). The government responded that it 'presently has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... and will furnish said records to the defense should it become aware of such records.'"

vi.) "The Department of State damage assessment review conducted by its task force of over 120 individuals. This task force reviewed each released diplomatic cable. See Appendix G. The government responded that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material .. [and] does not presently have the authorize to disclose damage assessments, if any, cited by the defense and will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes available'"

e. "The Damage Assessment of Compromised Information that is required to be submitted to the Special Security Officer (SSO) under DoD 5105.21-M-1 once an SCI Security Official determines that a security violation has occurred. The defense also requested a copy of the final security violation investigation report submitted to the SSO DoD Defense Intelligence Agency under DoD 5105.21-M-1. The government had not previously responded to the defense discovery requests for this information. The government's response confirms that the alleged disclosures in this case did not involve any sensitive compartmented information. While this fact alone is not dispositive of whether the alleged disclosures caused harm, it is an additional factor supporting the defense request for production of the above damage assessments. In response to the defense request for production of evidence, the government responded that it 'there is currently no evidence supporting a compromise of sensitive compartmented information (SCI).'"

1 White House | Fact Sheet on the United States' Relationship with the European Union: An Enduring Partnership talks about US-EU Working Group Cybersecurity and Cybercrime

Cybersecurity and Cybercrime. The U.S.-EU Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime made significant progress in 2011 in each of its four priority areas of cooperation: incident management; public-private partnerships; awareness raising; and cybercrime.

--The U.S. and EU held a joint, “Cyber Atlantic” cyber incident management exercise on November 3 and a joint capabilities workshop in June. Designed to work towards synchronized, coordinated responses to cyber incidents of mutual concern, the program will culminate in a full joint U.S.-EU cyber exercise in 2013, involving the private sector.v

--The Working Group developed an in-depth strategy for public-private sector engagement, building on existing initiatives, and focused on two key areas of mutual concern: botnets and industrial control system security/smart grid security. In 2012, the Working Group will also work on confronting unfair market access barriers that U.S. and European technology companies face abroad.

--This year the U.S. and EU launched a program for immediate joint awareness raising initiatives, which led to an exchange of information during U.S. National Cyber Security Awareness Month, and development of a roadmap towards synchronized annual awareness efforts—culminating in a fully-fledged EU and U.S. Cyber Security month by 2014.

--Cybercrime activities focused on: combating child pornography through more rapid identification, notice and takedown procedures; enhancing security of domain names and IP addresses to combat illicit use; and encouraging ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime. We committed to expand the global number of states party to the Budapest Convention, including all European states’ accession by the end of 2012.

(Source: White House)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Nov 2011

30 US Government responds to Manning defense's request for the production of evidence for Manning's Article 32 Pretrial Hearing. Government does not provide Quantico video. Only provides info on one of 15 individuals who had adverse administrative actions related to alleged leaks; and states it still actively working to preserve related computer hard drives from the SCIF and TOC at FOB Hammer and more, see below.

Excerpts:

"The government responded to the defense request for production of evidence on 30 November 2011." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

"Instead of responding to the defense request as envisioned under R.C.M. 405(g)(l)(B), the government simply treated the request as another request for discovery. Consistent with its previous responses to discovery requests, the government provided one of the following responses: (a) a general denial; (b) a statement that it had already provided all information in its possession; or (c) a statement that it was either unaware of any information or did not presently have the authority to disclose the requested information." (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

a.) "...The video is clearly within the possession of the government and should have already been produced. The government has responded that it 'will provide all matters requested that are it is possession no later than 2 December 2011.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

b.) "...Thus far, the defense believes it has only received information on one of the fifteen individuals recommended for adverse administrative action. The government has responded that it 'has provided all matters requested that are in its possession. '" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

c.) "...The lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of these items on 30 September 2010. See Appendix C. Given the government's own preservation request, it should easily be able to determine the location of these items. 'The government responded to the defense request by stating that "it is still actively working to preserve related computer hard drives based on defense's preservation request dated 2l September 2011'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

d.) "...Under military law, the trial counsel has an affirmative obligation to seek out requested evidence by the defense that is in the possession of the government even if that evidence is not already in the immediate possession of the trial counsel. United States v. Williams, 50 M.J . 436,441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan 868 F.2d 1032,1036 (9th Cir. 1989), United States v. Brooks, 966F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992) (the government is considered to have possession of information that is in the control of agencies that are "closely aligned with the prosecution"). The defense specifically requested the below listed information from the government that is in control of agencies that are closely aligned with this prosecution. As is apparent from the government's responses, it has either purposefully chosen to not search for the specifically requested information, or is shirking its responsibility to do so by saying it has 'no knowledge'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

XXXXXXXXXX [RUSSELL TRAVERS] National Security Staff's Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this case. See Appendix D. The government responded to the defense request by stating that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material .. [and] will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes aware of such records.'" (See White House December 1, 2010 Fact Sheet and David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

ii) "A copy of any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS? OBAMA?] to the Department of Defense concerning this case in order to determine the presence of unlawful command influence. See R.C.M. 405(e). Additionally, defense requests any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by to the Department of State or Department of Justice concerning this case. The government responded to the defense request by stating that it "has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material...[and] will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes aware of such records.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

iii) "The damage assessment conducted by the Information Review Task Force and by XXXXXXXXXX [WHAT IS THIS?]. See Appendix E and F. The government responded that it ' has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... [andJ does not presently have the authority to disclose damage assessments, if any, cited by the defense and will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes available.'" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Compel the Production of Article 32 Evidence)

iv.) The collateral investigations by the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and XXXXXXXXXX [CIA See Defense Reply to Government Response to Defense Motion to Compel Discovery No. 2, May 10, 2012] The defense is entitled to receive any forensic results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation. United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 19th Cir. 1989); (United States v. Brooks,966F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992);Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The government responded that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... [and] has provided all forensic results and investigative reports requested that are in its possession and that the United States has authority to disclose.'"

v.) The Department of Justice investigation into the alleged leaks by WikiLeaks as referenced by XXXXXXXXXX [WHAT IS THIS?] to include any grand jury testimony and any information relating to any 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) order or any search warrant by the government of Twitter, Facebook, Google or any other social media site. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);Jencks v. United States,353 U.S. 657 (1957). The government responded that it 'presently has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material ... and will furnish said records to the defense should it become aware of such records.'"

vi.) "The Department of State damage assessment review conducted by its task force of over 120 individuals. This task force reviewed each released diplomatic cable. See Appendix G. The government responded that it 'has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material .. [and] does not presently have the authorize to disclose damage assessments, if any, cited by the defense and will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes available'"

e. "The Damage Assessment of Compromised Information that is required to be submitted to the Special Security Officer (SSO) under DoD 5105.21-M-1 once an SCI Security Official determines that a security violation has occurred. The defense also requested a copy of the final security violation investigation report submitted to the SSO DoD Defense Intelligence Agency under DoD 5105.21-M-1. The government had not previously responded to the defense discovery requests for this information. The government's response confirms that the alleged disclosures in this case did not involve any sensitive compartmented information. While this fact alone is not dispositive of whether the alleged disclosures caused harm, it is an additional factor supporting the defense request for production of the above damage assessments. In response to the defense request for production of evidence, the government responded that it 'there is currently no evidence supporting a compromise of sensitive compartmented information (SCI).'"

29

Department of State | State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner, when asked about David Coombs, Pfc. Manning's lead defense counsel's remarks that State Department task force of 120 individuals that reviewed the cables and found that they were either low-level opinions or materials already known in – from previous public disclosures.

Toner says, this "release of classified information, and that is that the unauthorized release of any classified information puts individuals at risk and does damage to our national security."

[Tags: WikiLeaks Mitigation Team, WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group, WikiLeaks 24/7 Task Force]

Full Transcript

Full Video

QUESTION: On WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning’s lawyer has recently said that the impact of the leaked documents has been exaggerated. And he points to a State Department task force of 120 individuals that reviewed the cables and found that they were either low-level opinions or materials already known in – from previous public disclosures. Can you speak generally --

MR. TONER: I can speak generally to say – because this is an ongoing legal case, I can speak generally, just to reiterate what we said at the time of this release of classified information, and that is that the unauthorized release of any classified information puts individuals at risk and does damage to our national security.

QUESTION: And more specifically, can you react to the claim that this task force of (inaudible) --

MR. TONER: I really can’t, given some of the legal constraints here. I apologize. I mean, we’re talking about an ongoing legal case, and so I’m limited to what I can say.

(Source: Department of State)

28

EU-US Summit, Washington | EU and US leaders met in Washington for their yearly summit. The EU was represented by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, assisted by High Representative Catherine Ashton. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht also attended.

The US was represented by President Barack Obama assisted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

(Source: eeas.europa.eu)

"22. We share a commitment to a single, global Internet, and will resist unilateral efforts to weaken the security, reliability, or independence of its operations— recognizing that respect for fundamental freedoms online, and joint efforts to strengthen security, are mutually reinforcing. We welcome the progress made by the U.S.-EU Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime, notably the successful Cyber Atlantic 2011 [November 3, 2011] exercise. We endorse its ambitious goals for 2012, including combating online sexual abuse of children; enhancing the security of domain names and Internet Protocol addresses; promotion of international ratification, including by all EU Member States, of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime ideally by year’s end; establishing appropriate information exchange mechanisms to jointly engage with the private sector; and confronting the unfair market access barriers that U.S. and European technology companies face abroad." (Source:

White House Press Release: Joint Statement: US-EU Summit)

28 Manning notified by defense of the date of the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing.

"IO: When did the accused receive notification of pretrial date?

[There is the matter of the Lt. Col transmitting the document to Manning's defense and then defense to their client.]

IO: What is the receipt?

Coombs:  November 28, 2011 (Source: Alexa O'Brien, Pretrial Transcript Day 1)

25 Transmission of Notice of Appeal to 4CCA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Birgitta Jonsdottir ,Rop Gonggrijp, Twitter, Inc.

Transmission of Notice of Appeal to 4CCA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. to US Court of Appeals re 87 Notice of Appeal. No file available. (Source: web archive)

23 Lt. Col. Paul Almanza, while still working as Chief of Staff for the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice, notified Manning's defense counsel of the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing.

On 23 November 2011, I advised you of this investigation and your rights to counsel in this investigation. As you were in pretrial confinement, I provided that notification to your counsel. Counsel, when was your client provided with that notification? (Source: Lt. Col. Paul Almanza Article 32 Script)

23 Wikileaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Notice of Appeal by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir as to 84 Order to Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order for Motion of Hearing.

22 US v PFC Bradley Manning | Defense files Defense Request for the Production of Article 32 Evidence

1. On behalf of PFC Bradley E. Manning, his civilian counsel, David E. Coombs, requests the production of the below listed evidence. The defense also requests that the Investigating Officer, XXXXXXXXXX [LT. COL. PAUL ALMANZA] following reasons:

a. In order to inquire into the truth of the matter alleged in the charges, consider the form of the charges, and assist the Investigating Officer in making recommendations as to disposition of the charges. See Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(e);

b. In order to serve as a means of discovery for the defense. The defense has repeatedly requested the below discovery in this case, but the government has consistently responded with a blanket denial of the defense request. See R.C.M. 405(a) Discussion (stating the "investigation also serves as a means of discovery" for the defense); R.C.M. 405(g)(l)(B)(stating "evidence, including documents or physical evidence, which is under the control of the Government and which is relevant to the investigation and not cumulative, shall be produced...");

c. In order to present matters in mitigation of the charged offenses. R.C.M. 405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested. .."); United States v. Garcia,59 M.J. 447,451(C.A.A.F. 2004) (ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation);

2. On 18 January 2011,the defense was notified that PFC Manning, at the direction of XXXXXXXXXX [CWO4 Averhart, Pretrial Confinement Commander Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint], was placed in suicide risk. This decision was made over the recommendations of XXXXXXXXXX [ Capt. Hocterm Forensic Psychiatrist for the Brig See Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint] and the defense appointed expert XXXXXXXXXX [Captain Moore, Defense Forensic Psychiatrist See Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint]. When PFC Manning was being ordered to surrender his clothes as part of he unnecessary suicide risk, the Brig made the decision to videotape this event along with an interrogation of PFC Manning by XXXXXXXXXX [Who is this? Four guards? See Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint ] and others. On 19 January 2011, the defense filed a preservation of evidence request with the government and a request for the production of the video. The defense believes the video will support PFC Manning's claim of unlawful pretrial punishment. The government has yet to respond to the defense request. See R.C.M. 905(e) Discussion (stating that inquiry into other issues such as legality of searches or the admissibility of evidence is proper by an Article 32 Investigating Officer).

3. The defense has previously requested a copy of all adverse administrative or UCMJ action, all supporting documentation, and any rebuttal materials to such action based upon the 15-6 investigation conducted by XXXXXXXXXX [Who is this?] or any any other governmental investigation, with regards to any individual that was the subject of such an adverse action in relation to the alleged leak of classified information in this case. The previous requests included, but was not limited to, the following individuals: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX[Who is this?]. The government has so far only provided information in relation to XXXXXXXXXX[Who is this?].

4. The defense specifically requested an Encase forensic image of each computer from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC),2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1Oth Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. The defense has previously requested these items in discovery and filed a preservation of evidence request with the government. An inspection of all seized governmental computers from the T-SCIF and TOC would allow the defense to provide evidence that it was common for soldiers to add unauthorized computer programs to include, but not limited to: mIRC (a full featured Internet Relay Chat client for Windows that can be used to communicate, share , play or work with others on IRC networks); Wget (a web crawler program designed for robustness over slow or unstable network connections); GEOTRANS (an application program which allows a user to easily convert geographic coordinates among a wide variety of coordinate systems, map projections and datums); and Grid Extractor (a binary executable capable of extracting MGRS grids from multiple free text documents and importing them into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) to their computers. The government has used this alleged conduct to charge PFC Manning with two Specifications of a violation of Article 92.

5. The defense has previously requested any Brady or Jencks material in the government's possession. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process requires the Government to turn over exculpatory evidence in its possession); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (holding that, in a criminal prosecution, the government may not withhold documents relied upon by government witnesses, even where disclosure of those documents might damage national security matters). Under military law, the trial counsel has an affirmative obligation to seek out requested evidence by the defense that is in the possession of the government even if that evidence is not already in the immediate possession of the trial counsel. United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436,44I (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032,103619thCir. 1989); UnitedStates v. Brooks, 966F.2d,1500, 1503 (1992)(the government is considered to have possession of information that is in the control of agencies that are "closely aligned with the prosecution"). The defense specifically requests the below listed information from the government that is in control of agencies that are closely aligned with this prosecution. The trial counsel has responded with a blanket denial of the requested information despite the fact that this information clearly impacts not only on the form and proper disposition of the charges, but also represents clear Brady and Jencks material:

a. White House: XXXXXXXXXXRUSSELL TRAVERS, NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF SENIOR ADVISOR FOR INFORMATION ACCESS AND SECURITY] was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this case. He has completed a report detailing the rather benign nature of the leaks and the lack of any real damage to national security. The defense requests a copy of this review and any assessment given, or discussions concerning, the WikiLeaks disclosures by any member of the government to XXXXXXXXXX [RUSSELL TRAVERS, NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF SENIOR ADVISOR FOR INFORMATION ACCESS AND SECURITY]. The defense requests any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by XXXXXXXXXX [RUSSELL TRAVERS, NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF SENIOR ADVISOR FOR INFORMATION ACCESS AND SECURITY]to the Department of Defense concerning this case in order to determine the presence of unlawful command influence. See R.C.M. 405(e). Additionally, defense requests any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by XXXXXXXXXX [RUSSELL TRAVERS, NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF SENIOR ADVISOR FOR INFORMATION ACCESS AND SECURITY] to the Department of State or Department of Justice concerning this case; [Name sourced from White House, December 1, 2010]

b. XXXXXXXXXX[WHO IS THIS?] The Original Classification Authority's (OCA) classification review was completed by XXXXXXXXXX[WHO IS THIS?] His classification review indicated XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX[WHAT IS THIS?] This determination is at odds with the damage assessment completed by the Wikileaks Task Force and by the Information Review Task Force. Additionally, this determination is at odds with the XXXXXXXXXXXX[WHAT IS THIS?] review at the direction of XXXXXXXXXXXXXX[WHO IS THIS?] As such, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?] should not be permitted to espouse an opinion which is inconsistent with the damage assessments conducted by the Government. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Jencla v. United States,353 U.S. 657 (1957);

c. Department of Defense: Early on in the investigation, the Department of Defense reached out for assistance from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and XXXXXXXXXX [CIA See Defense Reply to Government Response to Defense Motion to Compel Discovery No. 2, May 10, 2012]. The defense is entitled to receive any forensic results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation. United States v. Williams,5O M.J. 436, 441(C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan,868 F.2d 1032,1036 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brooks, 966F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992); Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Finally,

XXXXXXXXXX [ROBERT GATES] on 29 July 2010 directed the Defense Intelligence Agency to lead a comprehensive review of the documents allegedly given to Wikileaks and to coordinate under the Information Review Task Force (IRTF, formerly TF 725) to conduct a complete damage review. The results of this damage review undercut the testimony of each of the representatives from the OCA for the charged documents in this case. Specifically, the damage assessment concluded that all of the information allegedly leaked was either dated, represented low-level opinions, or was already commonly understood and known due to previous public disclosures.

d. Department of Justice: The defense requests any and all documentation related to the Department of Justice investigation into the alleged leaks by Wikileaks as referenced by XXXXXXXXXX [WHAT/WHO IS THIS?] to include any grand jury testimony and any information relating to any 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) order or any search warrant by the government of Twitter, Facebook, Google or any other social media site. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957);

e. Department of State: The Department of State formed a task force of over 120 individuals to review each released diplomatic cable. The task force conducted a damage assessment of the leaked cables and concluded that the information leaked either represented low-level opinions or was already commonly known due to previous public disclosures. According to published reports in multiple new agencies, including the Associated Press, The Huffington Post, and Reuters, internal U.S. Government reviews by the Department of Defense and the Department of State have determined that the leak of diplomatic cables caused only limited damage to U.S. interests abroad, despite the Obama administration's public statements to the contrary. "A congressional official briefed on the reviews stated that the administration felt compelled to say publicly that the revelations had seriously damaged American interests in order to bolster legal efforts to shut down the Wikileaks website and bring charges against the leakers. According to the published account 'We were told (the impact of Wikileaks revelations) was embarrassing but not damaging,' said the official, who attended a briefing given in late 2010 by State Department officials. National security officials familiar with the damage assessments being conducted by defense and intelligence agencies told Reuters the reviews so far have shown "pockets" of short-term damage, some of it potentially harmful." See generally, htp://www/huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/19/us-official-wikileaks-rev_n_810778.html. This determination is at odds with the classification review conducted bv the OCA. XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS? ]

should not be permitted to espouse an opinion which is inconsistent with the damage assessments conducted by the government. Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83 (1963); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (res7);

6. The defense has requested a copy of the Damage Assessment of Compromised Information that is required to be submitted to the Special Security Officer (SSO) under DoD 5105.21-M-1 once an SCI Security Official determines that a security violation has occurred. The damage assessment is supposed to contain the date of the assessment; the name and office symbol conducting the assessment; subject/title, date, number, originator and original classification of document; whether the document can be declassified or downgraded, either in whole or in part; justification for classification (the specific statements in the document which are classified, the basis for classification, and a complete bibliography of all classified source materials used in preparation of the document); whether the classified information identified is accurate; whether the classified information identified was the subject of any official release; and whether the information identified as classified can be edited for the purpose of prosecution. The government has not yet provided this information to the defense. This information should be ordered produced for the consideration of the Investigating Officer at the Article 32.

7. The defense requested a copy of the final security violation investigation report submitted to the SSO DoD/ Defense Intelligence Agency under DoD 5105.21-M-1. The report is used to assess intent, location of the incident, risk of compromise, sensitivity of information, and mitigating factors in arriving at a final analysis of the incident. The government has not yet provided this information to the defense. This information should be ordered produced for the consideration of the Investigating Officer at the Article 32.

8. The defense has previously requested any known evidence tending to diminish credibility of any Government witness including, but not limited to, prior convictions under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 609, evidence of other character, conduct, or bias bearing on witness credibility under M.R.E. 608. Specifically, the defense requests the name and contact information for any law enforcement agent working with XXXXXXXXXX [WHO IS THIS?]. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

9. The defense has previously requested a copy of all audio and video surveillance of the visitation booths at Quantico, Virginia when individuals, including defense team members, met with PFC Manning. The defense also requests a copy of all audio and video surveillance of the visitation rooms at the Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas when individuals, including defense team members, met with PFC Manning. The government has only provided a partial account of the audio and video surveillance in its possession.

Source: David Coombs, Defense Request for the Production of Article 32 Evidence, November 22, 2011)

16 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

15 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

15 Department of State | Secretary of State says, "when an organization – and you mentioned WikiLeaks – when an organization steals information, which is what happened, that is – just because they put it on an internet doesn’t make it any more right than if they had passed it out on a street corner."

Full Transcript

MR. SEVERINO: Let us talk about something that you probably want to comment on. You’ve called this the Age of Participation.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes.

MR. SEVERINO: And you and the State Department have championed the internet and social media as tools for democratization, especially in oppressed nations. Yet your government, the U.S. Government, has not been very happy with an organization like WikiLeaks that has professed that it promotes transparency and accountability. Where would you suggest drawing the line using the internet in challenging governments, including your own?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it’s a great question. We’ve had over 235 years in our democracy of trying to struggle with the issues about free expression, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly. And the internet is a vehicle. And 200 years ago, you would go to the town square or you would work on a newspaper, and then obviously communications became more sophisticated. So I think that the rules are not so different; it’s just that the mechanism of communication in the internet is so revolutionary because you could in the past say something to two people and then those two people might spread it around, but here you can press a button and billions of people can see something.

So I think you have to be both protective of the openness of the internet but recognize that just as in free speech in any setting, there does have to be a certain set of expectations. So we do champion freedom of speech. We champion tools that can help people living in oppressive regimes continue to communicate and get around all of the obstacles that governments put up.

But when an organization – and you mentioned WikiLeaks – when an organization steals information, which is what happened, that is – just because they put it on an internet doesn’t make it any more right than if they had passed it out on a street corner. So there still has to be a fundamental respect for and a real benefit of the doubt given to freedom, but there also has to be certain standards, expectations, rules that have to continue to be recognized.

(Source: Department of State)

10 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

MEMORANDUM OPINION as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 11/10/2011

Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief File not available. (Source: web archive)

Memorandum opinion

IN TH UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18USC 2703(d)

MISC No. 1:11-DM-3
No. 10-GJ-3793
No. 1:11-EC-3


III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner' objections to Magistrate Judge Buchanan's orders will be DENIED. the Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record.

November 10, 2011
Alexandria, Virginia

/s/
Liam O'Grady
United States District Judge

3 EU-US Working Group on Cyber-security and Cyber-crime | The first joint cyber security exercise between the EU and US is being held in Brussels, with the support of the EU’s cyber security Agency ENISA and the US Department of Homeland Security. The day-long table-top exercise, "Cyber Atlantic 2011", is using simulated cyber-crisis scenarios to explore how the EU and US would engage each other and cooperate in the event of cyber-attacks on their critical information infrastructures.

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Oct 2011

24 Assistant Deputy Commandant Raymond Geoffroy sent the memo to the Defense Department for approval to close Quantico brig that housed Bradley Manning for 9 months.

 Assistant Deputy Commandant (Security), Plans, Policies, and Operations Department, Raymond Geoffroy, Jr., pictured to the left. See also Raymond Geoffroy, Jr.'s bio.

(Source: Reported October 25, 2011 by AP, Marines plan Quantico brig closure)

13 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request. We know that within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8] of this discovery request, concerned he results of any investigation or review concerning the alleged leaks in this case by Mr. Russell Travers, National Security Staff s Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy. Also, concerned any report or recommendation regarding the alleged leaks in this case by Chairman Chuck Hagel or any other member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Appellate Exhibit VIII [8] also requested the results of any inquiry and testimony taken by House of Representative Oversight Committee led by Representative Darrell Issa.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October 2010, 15 November 2010, 8 December 2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January 2011, 16 February 2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October 2011, 15 November 2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

See also Def. Motion to Compel Discovery, dated 10 May 2012:

Interagency Committee Review. The results of any investigation or review concerning the alleged leaks in this case by Mr. Russell Travers, National Security Staff Senior Advisor for Information Access and Security Policy. Mr. Travers was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this case. See Defense Discovery Request Dated 8 December 2010 and 13 October 2011 within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8]; (Source: Defense Discovery Request No. 2 of May 10 2012)

President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Any report or recommendation concerning the alleged leaks in this case by Chairman Chuck Hagel or any other member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. See Defense Discovery Request Dated 13 October 2011 within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8];

House of Representatives Oversight Committee. The results of any inquiry and testimony taken by House of Representative Oversight Committee led by Representative Darrell Issa. The committee considered the alleged leaks in this case. the actions of Attorney General Eric Holder, and the investigation of PFC Bradley Manning. See Defense Discovery Request Dated 10 January 2011 and 13 October 2011 within Appellate Exhibit VIII [8]. (Source: Defense Discovery Request No. 2 of May 10 2012)

13 Department of State | State Department Spokesperson, Victoria, Nuland refuses to comment on a U.S. State Department cable concerning the allegation that the Iranians targeted Mr. Jubair, Saudi ambassador to the U.S., because he played a very strong role in convincing the United States to allow Saudi troops to go to Bahrain

QUESTION: Victoria, it has been alleged that the Iranians targeted Mr. Jubair because he played a very strong role in convincing the United States to allow Saudi troops to go to Bahrain. Do you have any comment on that?

MS. NULAND: Well, I think you’re into the realm of WikiLeaks here and other things, and you know where I’m going to go on that, Said, which is to say that we’re not going to comment. It was a good effort, though.

(Source: Department of State)

11 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Wall Street Journal reports Sonic loses fight against US government secret order to hand over IP address from which Mr. Appelbaum logged into his account and the email and IP addresses of the users with whom he communicated dating from November 1, 2009 to April 15, 201. Google was also served a secret order, and fought to unseal it, but did not comment further.

"Sonic said it fought the government's order and lost, and was forced to turn over information. Challenging the order was "rather expensive, but we felt it was the right thing to do," said Sonic's chief executive, Dane Jasper. The government's request included the email addresses of people Mr. Appelbaum corresponded with the past two years, but not the full emails." (The Wall Street Journal)

"The court orders reviewed by the Journal seek the same type of information that Twitter was asked to turn over. The secret Google order is dated Jan. 4 and directs the search giant to hand over the IP address from which Mr. Appelbaum logged into his gmail.com account and the email and IP addresses of the users with whom he communicated dating back to Nov. 1, 2009. It isn't clear whether Google fought the order or turned over documents.

The secret Sonic order is dated April 15 and directs Sonic to turn over the same type of information from Mr. Appelbaum's email account dating back to Nov. 1, 2009.

On Aug. 31, the court agreed to lift the seal on the Sonic order to provide Mr. Appelbaum a copy of it. Sonic Chief Executive Mr. Jasper said the company also sought to unseal the rest of its legal filings but that request "came back virtually entirely denied.'" (The Wall Street Journal)

11 MOTION Non-Confidential Memorandum Accompanying (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. 

Sealed Document (jlan) (Entered: 10/11/2011)

Sealed Motion by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir.

MOTION Non-Confidential Memorandum Accompanying (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. 

Sealed Document (jlan) (Entered: 10/11/2011) File not available. (Source:web archive)

Sealed Motion by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. (Source:web archive)

20 Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice, proposes to the Judicial Conference on Criminal Rules of Procedure that Rule 6(e) regarding the Grand Jury be amended regarding historically significant grand jury material.

(Source: uscourts.gov, PDF)

7

White House | The White House releases "Fact Sheet: Safeguarding the U.S. Government's Classified Information and Networks" calls releases in the Summer of 2010 "unlawful disclosure by WikiLeaks" and outlines the interagency committee formed by the National Security Staff formed to review the policies and practices surrounding the handling of classified information, and to recommend government-wide actions to reduce the risk of a future breach.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13587 - The interagency committee that was established in the wake of WikiLeaks proposed a new oversight structure to orchestrate the development and implementation of policies and standards for the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. These structural reforms are reflected in the Executive Order 13587 -- Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information (also signed today) by President Obama.

See Executive Order 13587

Following the unlawful disclosure of classified information by WikiLeaks in the summer of 2010, the National Security Staff formed an interagency committee to review the policies and practices surrounding the handling of classified information, and to recommend government-wide actions to reduce the risk of a future breach. Since then, this effort has been a top priority of the Administration and senior agency officials have been actively engaged in developing policies and oversight mechanisms to enhance our national security through responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information.

The strategic imperative of our efforts has been to ensure that we provide adequate protections to our classified information while at the same time sharing the information with all who reasonably need it to do their jobs. The guiding principles during the Administration’s review were to:

  • Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing and not undo all of the significant and important progress we’ve made in interagency information sharing since 9/11;
  • Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures evolve to match our information sharing and safeguarding requirements;
  • Emphasize that effective and consistent guidance and implementation must be coordinated across the entire Federal government. We are only as strong as our weakest link and this is a shared risk with shared responsibility; and;
  • Continue to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the American people.

The committee that was established in the wake of WikiLeaks proposed a new oversight structure to orchestrate the development and implementation of policies and standards for the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. These structural reforms are reflected in the Executive Order signed today by President Obama.

In accordance with today’s Executive Order:

  • Agencies bear the primary responsibility for sharing and safeguarding classified information, consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Federal agencies that use classified networks will:
    • designate a senior official to oversee classified information sharing and safeguarding for the agency;
    • implement an insider threat detection and prevention program; and
    • perform self assessments of compliance with policy and standards.
  • A Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee will have overall responsibility for fully coordinating interagency efforts and ensuring that Departments and Agencies are held accountable for implementation of information sharing and safeguarding policy and standards. 
  • A Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office will be created within the office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment to provide sustained, full-time focus on sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information. The office will also consult partners to ensure the consistency of policies and standards and seek to identify the next potential problem. 
  • Senior representatives of the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency will jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks to develop technical safeguarding policies and standards and conduct assessments of compliance. 
  • An Insider Threat Task Force will develop a government-wide program for insider threat detection and prevention to improve protection and reduce potential vulnerabilities of classified information from exploitation, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure. 

We did not, however, wait for today’s Executive Order to begin taking steps. The Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee formally established today began meeting informally in June to track steps taken across the Federal Government. In addition to those measures identified in today’s Executive Order, significant progress has been made by U.S. Departments and Agencies in five priority areas:

1. Removable media
Departments and Agencies have made significant progress in clarifying and standardizing removable media policies, processes, and technical controls.  We have limited the numbers of users with removable media permissions and strengthened accountability for violations.

2. Online Identity Management
The owners and operators of classified systems are accelerating efforts to strengthen the online verification of individuals logging on to classified systems, and to be able to track what information is being accessed by these individuals.

3. Insider Threat Program   
As directed in the Executive Order, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence are actively establishing an interagency Insider Threat Task Force. This Task Force will integrate specialized abilities, tools, and techniques to more effectively deter, detect, and disrupt the insider threat. 

4. Access control
Departments and Agencies are implementing more robust access control systems to enforce role-based access privileges that serve to ensure that an individual user’s information access is commensurate with his/her assigned role.

5. Enterprise audit
Enhancing auditing capabilities across U.S. Government classified networks is a priority effort, and planning has been initiated to define the policy and develop standards for the collection and sharing of audit and insider threat data.

(Source: White House)

7 White House | Obama White House Executive Order 13587 - Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information

Executive Order 13587

EXECUTIVE ORDER

STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING AND SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to ensure the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information (classified information) on computer networks, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Policy. Our Nation's security requires classified information to be shared immediately with authorized users around the world but also requires sophisticated and vigilant means to ensure it is shared securely. Computer networks have individual and common vulnerabilities that require coordinated decisions on risk management.

This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will address all agencies that operate or access classified computer networks, all users of classified computer networks (including contractors and others who operate or access classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government), and all classified information on those networks.

Sec. 2. General Responsibilities of Agencies.

Sec. 2.1. The heads of agencies that operate or access classified computer networks shall have responsibility for appropriately sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks. As part of this responsibility, they shall:

(a) designate a senior official to be charged with overseeing classified information sharing and safeguarding efforts for the agency;

(b) implement an insider threat detection and prevention program consistent with guidance and standards developed by the Insider Threat Task Force established in section 6 of this order;

(c) perform self-assessments of compliance with policies and standards issued pursuant to sections 3.3, 5.2, and 6.3 of this order, as well as other applicable policies and standards, the results of which shall be reported annually to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee established in section 3 of this order;

(d) provide information and access, as warranted and consistent with law and section 7(d) of this order, to enable independent assessments by the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force of compliance with relevant established policies and standards; and

(e) detail or assign staff as appropriate and necessary to the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office and the Insider Threat Task Force on an ongoing basis.

Sec. 3. Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee.

Sec. 3.1. There is established a Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee (Steering Committee) to exercise overall responsibility and ensure senior-level accountability for the coordinated interagency development and implementation of policies and standards regarding the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks.

Sec. 3.2. The Steering Committee shall be co-chaired by senior representatives of the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Staff. Members of the committee shall be officers of the United States as designated by the heads of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Information Security Oversight Office within the National Archives and Records Administration (ISOO), as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Steering Committee may designate.

Sec. 3.3. The responsibilities of the Steering Committee shall include:

(a) establishing Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals and annually reviewing executive branch successes and shortcomings in achieving those goals;

(b) preparing within 90 days of the date of this order and at least annually thereafter, a report for the President assessing the executive branch's successes and shortcomings in sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks and discussing potential future vulnerabilities;

(c) developing program and budget recommendations to achieve Government-wide classified information sharing and safeguarding goals;

(d) coordinating the interagency development and implementation of priorities, policies, and standards for sharing and safeguarding classified information on computer networks;

(e) recommending overarching policies, when appropriate, for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO;

(f) coordinating efforts by agencies, the Executive Agent, and the Task Force to assess compliance with established policies and standards and recommending corrective actions needed to ensure compliance;

(g) providing overall mission guidance for the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) with respect to the functions to be performed by the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office established in section 4 of this order; and

(h) referring policy and compliance issues that cannot be resolved by the Steering Committee to the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-1 of February 13, 2009 (Organization of the National Security Council System).

Sec. 4. Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office.

Sec. 4.1. There shall be established a Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office (CISSO) within and subordinate to the office of the PM-ISE to provide expert, full time, sustained focus on responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. Staff of the CISSO shall include details, as needed and appropriate, from agencies represented on the Steering Committee.

Sec. 4.2. The responsibilities of CISSO shall include:

(a) providing staff support for the Steering Committee;

(b) advising the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks and the Insider Threat Task Force on the development of an effective program to monitor compliance with established policies and standards needed to achieve classified information sharing and safeguarding goals; and

(c) consulting with the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the ISOO, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and others, as appropriate, to ensure consistency with policies and standards under Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009, Executive Order 12829 of January 6, 1993, as amended, Executive Order 13549 of August 18, 2010, and Executive Order 13556 of November 4, 2010.

Sec. 5. Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks.

Sec. 5.1. The Secretary of Defense and the Director, National Security Agency, shall jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks (the "Executive Agent"), exercising the existing authorities of the Executive Agent and National Manager for national security systems, respectively, under National Security Directive/NSD-42 of July 5, 1990, as supplemented by and subject to this order.

Sec. 5.2. The Executive Agent's responsibilities, in addition to those specified by NSD-42, shall include the following:

(a) developing effective technical safeguarding policies and standards in coordination with the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), as re-designated by Executive Orders 13286 of February 28, 2003, and 13231 of October 16, 2001, that address the safeguarding of classified information within national security systems, as well as the safeguarding of national security systems themselves;

(b) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the Executive Agent's timely development and issuance of technical policies and standards;

(c) reporting at least annually to the Steering Committee on the work of CNSS, including recommendations for any changes needed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of that work; and

(d) conducting independent assessments of agency compliance with established safeguarding policies and standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee.

Sec. 6. Insider Threat Task Force.

Sec. 6.1. There is established an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that shall develop a Government-wide program (insider threat program) for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure, taking into account risk levels, as well as the distinct needs, missions, and systems of individual agencies. This program shall include development of policies, objectives, and priorities for establishing and integrating security, counterintelligence, user audits and monitoring, and other safeguarding capabilities and practices within agencies.

Sec. 6.2. The Task Force shall be co-chaired by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees. Membership on the Task Force shall be composed of officers of the United States from, and designated by the heads of, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the ISOO, as well as such additional agencies as the co-chairs of the Task Force may designate. It shall be staffed by personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), and other agencies, as determined by the co-chairs for their respective agencies and to the extent permitted by law. Such personnel must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States. To the extent permitted by law, ONCIX shall provide an appropriate work site and administrative support for the Task Force.

Sec. 6.3. The Task Force's responsibilities shall include the following:

(a) developing, in coordination with the Executive Agent, a Government-wide policy for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider threats, which shall be submitted to the Steering Committee for appropriate review;

(b) in coordination with appropriate agencies, developing minimum standards and guidance for implementation of the insider threat program's Government-wide policy and, within 1 year of the date of this order, issuing those minimum standards and guidance, which shall be binding on the executive branch;

(c) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are obtained, continuing in coordination with appropriate agencies after 1 year from the date of this order to add to or modify those minimum standards and guidance, as appropriate;

(d) if sufficient appropriations or authorizations are not obtained, recommending for promulgation by the Office of Management and Budget or the ISOO any additional or modified minimum standards and guidance developed more than 1 year after the date of this order;

(e) referring to the Steering Committee for resolution any unresolved issues delaying the timely development and issuance of minimum standards;

(f) conducting, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Task Force, independent assessments of the adequacy of agency programs to implement established policies and minimum standards, and reporting the results of such assessments to the Steering Committee;

(g) providing assistance to agencies, as requested, including through the dissemination of best practices; and

(h) providing analysis of new and continuing insider threat challenges facing the United States Government. 

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) For the purposes of this order, the word "agencies" shall have the meaning set forth in section 6.1(b) of Executive Order 13526 of December 29, 2009.

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to change the requirements of Executive Orders 12333 of December 4, 1981, 12829 of January 6, 1993, 12968 of August 2, 1995, 13388 of October 25, 2005, 13467 of June 30, 2008, 13526 of December 29, 2009, 13549 of August 18, 2010, and their successor orders and directives.

(c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to supersede or change the authorities of the Secretary of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Secretary of Defense under Executive Order 12829, as amended; the Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order 13549; the Secretary of State under title 22, United States Code, and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986; the Director of ISOO under Executive Orders 13526 and 12829, as amended; the PM-ISE under Executive Order 13388 or the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency under NSD-42 and Executive Order 13286, as amended; the National Counterintelligence Executive, under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; or the Director of National Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, NSD-42, and Executive Orders 12333, as amended, 12968, as amended, 13286, as amended, 13467, and 13526.

(d) Nothing in this order shall authorize the Steering Committee, CISSO, CNSS, or the Task Force to examine the facilities or systems of other agencies, without advance consultation with the head of such agency, nor to collect information for any purpose not provided herein.

(e) The entities created and the activities directed by this order shall not seek to deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of information by Government employees or contractors that are lawful under and protected by the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of 1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or policies.

(f) With respect to the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence, after consultation with the heads of affected agencies, may issue such policy directives and guidance as the Director of National Intelligence deems necessary to implement this order.

(g) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(1) the authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or

(2) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals

(h) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties, and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(i) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

 BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 7, 2011.

7 Department of Defense | Department of Defense press release on Executive Order 13587 -- Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information

Press Release

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7, 2011 – President Barack Obama issued an executive order today that strengthens the government’s information and computer security policies and practices to prevent breaches such as the 2010 WikiLeaks episode.

The order follows an interagency committee review of existing policies and practices following WikiLeaks’ unlawful disclosure of classified information last summer, White House officials said.

The WikiLeaks.org group posted more than 90,000 documents, many of which detailed classified and sensitive field reports regarding military operations.

Obama’s executive order cites efforts already taken to reduce the risk of future security breaches while providing a framework for enhancing national security through responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information.

“The strategic imperative of our efforts has been to ensure that we provide adequate protections to our classified information while at the same time sharing the information with all who reasonably need it to do their jobs,” officials said.

The emphasis, they explained, is on balancing the requirements of responsible information sharing with safeguarding imperatives, while ensuring consistency across government and respecting the American people’s privacy, civil rights and civil liberties.

The executive order assigns agencies the primary responsibility for sharing and safeguarding classified information, consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties.

Federal agencies that use classified networks are required to:

-- Designate a senior official to oversee the agency’s classified information sharing and safeguarding;

-- Implement a program to detect and prevent insider threats; and

-- Conduct self-assessments of policy and standard compliance.

The executive order establishes several new bodies to develop, oversee and enforce these new security reforms.

A senior information sharing and safeguarding steering committee formally established today will coordinate interagency efforts and ensure that the federal departments and agencies are held accountable. In addition, a new classified information sharing and safeguarding office will provide a sustained, full-time focus on sharing and safeguarding classified national security information. The office also will help to ensure consistent policies and standards and strive to identify the next potential problem.

Meanwhile, senior representatives both at the Defense Department and National Security Agency will act together as the executive agent for safeguarding classified information on computer networks. As part of this joint mission, they will develop technical safeguarding polices and standards and assess compliance.

Also, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. and Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. are forming a task force to develop a program to detect and prevent insider threats and reduce potential vulnerabilities throughout the government that will integrate specialized abilities, tools and techniques to deter, detect and disrupt the insider threat, officials said.

White House officials noted measures already taken within the Defense Department and other federal agencies to safeguard classified information and networks.

All have made significant progress in clarifying and standardizing polices, processes and technical controls regarding removable media, officials said, limiting the numbers of users with removable media permissions and strengthening accountability for violations.

In addition, owners and operators of classified systems continue to strengthen verification procedures to log on to classified systems and the tracking of what information users access, officials added, noting that more robust access control systems are being implemented to ensure individual users’ information access is commensurate with their assigned roles.

Meanwhile, high priority is being placed on enhancing the auditing capabilities across U.S. government classified networks. Planning is now under way to define policy and develop standards for collecting and sharing of audit and insider threat data, officials said.

Douglas B. Wilson, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, noted this spring that the WikiLeaks episode underscores the need for laws and policies that address the unintended consequences of “technology at the intersection of national security.”

“Classified information is classified information, and releasing that information is illegal,” Wilson said during an April 17 interview with Vago Muradian on “This Week in Defense News.”

“But I think that we have a lot to do in government to understand that we need to be focusing much more on policy and much more on the laws that we need to think about to address what have been very unintended consequences of technological advance,” he said.

Even as social media revolutionizes information-sharing, the Defense Department’s communication strategy boils down to the responsibility of being transparent and timely without jeopardizing the safety and privacy of service members and their families, Wilson said.

“How do you deal with the press and public openly, credibly, in a timely manner and honestly?” Wilson asked. “How do you provide facts and the truth, by the same token understanding that we’re responsible for our men and women in uniform who are in harm’s way in many places? How do you make sure that there [are] not unintended consequences of information which can put them further in harm’s way and affect their safety and the privacy of their families?

“Those are the issues that frame everything that we do,” Wilson said.

... The Government provides documentation related to PFC Manning’s confinement at Quantico in October of 2011.

The Government provided extensive documentation related to PFC Manning’s confinement at Quantico in October of 2011. (Source: David Coombs, Defense Motion for Continuance, July 27, 2012)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Sep 2011

21 Lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of Encase forensic image of each computer from the T-SCIF and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, FOB Hammer Iraq "still working to preserve related computer hard drives on defense's preservation request dated September 21, 2011.

"An Encase forensic image of each computer from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC),2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. The lead investigative unit for the government requested preservation of these items on 30 September 2010. See Appendix C. Given the government's own preservation request, it should easily be able to determine the location of these items. The government responded to the defense request by stating that 'it is still actively working to preserve related computer hard drives based on defense's preservation request dated 2l September 2011.'"

(Source: Defense Compel the Production of Evidence for Manning Article 32)

20

MOTION Non-Confidential Memorandum Accompanying (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir.

NOTICE of (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir 

Sealed Document (jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011)

Sealed Motion by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011)

Sealed Document in re 78 Sealed Motion filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum (jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011)

MOTION Non-Confidential Memorandum Accompanying (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST JACOB APPELBAUM, ROP GONGGRIJP, AND BIRGITTA JONSDOTTIR'S NON-CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING (1) MOTION FOR SEALING AND (2) MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE UNSEALING

MISC NO. 10GJ3793, No. 1:11-DM-3 No. 1:11-EC-3

...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of September, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]

NOTICE of (1) Motion for Sealing and (2) Motion for Immediate Unsealing by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of September, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]

Sealed Document (jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011) File Not available. (Source: web archive)

Sealed Motion by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011) File Not available. (Source: web archive)

Sealed Document in re 78 Sealed Motion filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum (jlan) (Entered: 09/21/2011) File Not available. (Source: web archive)

15 Department of State | In an interview with AsiaNet, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert O. Blake, Jr. says, the State Department is "in the process of prosecuting those who were responsible for this," and that WikiLeaks releases "have not had a major impact on our bilateral relations" with India.

Full Transcript

AsiaNet: There was a lot of discussion recently regarding the WikiLeaks cables in India. Has it embarrassed you or has it affected your foreign policy initiatives?

Assistant Secretary Blake: I can’t really comment on any of the WikiLeaks cables. We are in the process of prosecuting those who were responsible for this. We consider it a real breach of trust in our security. But our relations between the United States and India are very very strong and we’re certainly able to manage things like this that come up.

[Problem with recording.]

AsiaNet: There’s been a lot of discussion about the WikiLeaks cables in India. Has it embarrassed you? Has it affected your relations between the U.S. and countries mentioned in the leaks?

Assistant Secretary Blake: I can’t really comment on the specifics of WikiLeaks. We condemn those releases. We consider them very much a breach of security. But as a general matter, I can tell you that they have not had a major impact on our bilateral relations. Our relations are very strong and we consider that India has got to be one of our defining partnerships of the 21st Century.

(Source: Department of State)

15 Department of State | In an interview with NewsMax, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert O. Blake, Jr. says he cannot comment on WikiLeaks release of a cable concerning U.S. lack of commitment towards terrorism directed at India, specifically M.K. Narayanan being forced by Timothy Roemer not to seek extradition of Headley.

NewsX: A considerable section in India has begun to believe that U.S. is really not committed when it comes to terror and especially terror directed against India given the recent WikiLeaks cables. M.K. Narayanan being forced by Timothy Roemer not to seek extradition of Headley. And Narayanan saying in so many words, and I’m quoting him, “not to be seen making the effort, but the government is not seeking extradition at this time.”

Assistant Secretary Blake: We can never comment on the WikiLeaks cables, but as a general matter I’d like to say that first of all we take our counter-terrorism responsibilities very seriously and whenever we have any kind of information about a possible terrorist attack in India we share that immediately with our friends in India to be sure that those are stopped and prevented. And I would say that our cooperation on counter-terrorism is one of the very strongest aspects of our bilateral cooperation.

(Source: Department of State)

12 Senator Chambliss mentions his anger at WikiLeaks and Tamm leaks as reason for a retreat from the culture of information sharing within the intelligence community.

Senator Chambliss bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, Personnel Subcommittee, Airland Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Joint Committee on Printing

"Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, throughout this past week, Americans are observing the 10th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks on our Nation. As we have properly done so many times since that horrific day, we remember and honor the innocent who perished in the Twin Towers, at the Pentagon, and in Shanksville, PA. We remember and honor the many brave men and women who have sacrificed their lives to defend this great country, from the heroes of flight 93, to the first responders and members of our military and intelligence community. We share in the grief still endured by so many families whose lives were permanently changed by this attack, and we resolve that their sacrifices will not be in vain.

In the wake of 9/11, one question has been asked repeatedly, but has yet to be answered completely: how can we better protect our homeland from another attack? As with so many difficult questions, finding an answer must begin with the acknowledgment that something went terribly wrong. Many experts, within and outside the government, have studied the intelligence failures leading up to 9/11. Certainly, there were clear warnings that our national security was at risk, including the first World Trade Center attack, the East Africa Embassy bombings, and the attack on the USS Cole. We all know those warnings were not heeded, mistakes were made, intelligence was not connected as it should have been, and our policies simply did not reflect the serious threat we were, and indeed still are, facing.

We often hear that, as a government, we have made a lot of progress in preventing another attack. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden showcased the progress that our military and intelligence community have made in working together to neutralize terrorists. Just as the disruption of the plot to attack the New York subway system in 2009 demonstrated the continuing transformation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from a criminally-focused law enforcement agency to a full member of the intelligence community.

But, our record in preventing terrorist attacks here at home has not been perfect. In 2009, fourteen servicemembers were killed in attacks on military facilities in Little Rock, AR, and Fort Hood, TX. Christmas Day 2009 brought the attempted bombing of an airplane over the skies of Detroit, an attack that if successful would likely have killed, at a minimum, all 289 people on board. A few months later, disaster was averted in Times Square only because explosives inside a vehicle failed to ignite.

Our successes and failures since 9/11 can teach us a lot about what we are doing right and where we must do better. First and foremost, we must all remain vigilant. I have heard it repeated in recent months, especially since the death of Osama bin Laden, that al-Qaida has been marginalized and they are not the threat they once were. In certain respects, this is accurate, but as we saw just this past weekend with the heightened concern that al-Qaida operatives would attack New York City or Washington, DC, al-Qaida remains a threat. We must also remember that al-Qaida has many facets and none of them are benign. We know that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula today represents the biggest threat to our homeland and they are continually seeking new recruits, especially among our own citizens and former Guantanamo detainees. Their new status manifested itself with the Christmas Day bombing attempt, for which they immediately claimed responsibility.

Our country faces many different threats, from terrorism to hostile nation states to cyber attacks. We cannot afford to grow complacent or undo the progress we have made. I have heard too often that the intelligence community ``can live with'' changes to the PATRIOT Act, the FISA Amendments Act, or other classified authorities that are vital to preventing terrorist attacks. Prior to 9/11, we forced the intelligence community to ``live with'' many unnecessary restrictions and I believe that is a gamble we can no longer afford to take.

Second, we must ensure that the same mistakes that contributed to the September 11 attacks are not repeated. Following the failed Christmas Day attack, the Senate Intelligence Committee conducted an in-depth review to determine what intelligence there was leading up to the attack. The committee concluded that there were systemic breakdowns across the intelligence community that contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by the Christmas Day bomber. Senator Burrand I submitted additional views to the report noting that some of the very same intelligence failures identified by the committee were also cited as failures leading up to 9/11, including a lack of aggressive analysis and insufficient technology to facilitate sharing and analysis of information. Compounding our concerns was the fact that the National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC, created in response to 9/11, still did not seem to understand

[Page: S5492]  GPO's PDF
its statutory responsibility to integrate and analyze all terrorism-related intelligence. After so many years--and so much effort to reform the old ways of doing business--repeating the same mistakes is not an option. I am encouraged that, since the committee's report, NCTC has taken concrete steps towards meeting this responsibility and I am committed to ensuring they continue on this path.

I am also committed to ensuring that we do not retreat from the progress made in improving information sharing. Following 9/11 there were concerted efforts to remove stovepipes within the intelligence community and get the information to analysts who needed it. Unfortunately, some of the old tendencies to restrict intelligence are recurring, particularly amid concerns about Wikileaks . I share the anger about the many leaks of classified information that have jeopardized successful intelligence programs, such as the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the CIA's interrogation program. But we must be careful not to overreact by restricting access to information that analysts need to do their jobs.

Third, our policies and laws must promote effective intelligence collection, specifically with respect to detainees and foreign intelligence surveillance laws. Since the President ordered the closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in January 2009, our nation has been without a clear policy for detaining suspected terrorists. Without such a policy, including one that identifies a facility for holding terrorists captured outside Afghanistan, the intelligence community's ability to conduct intelligence interrogations is being severely limited. I recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for handling terrorists, but our detention policies must foster full intelligence collection, before any prosecution begins. Yet our default seems to be that terrorists, such as the Christmas Day bomber, should be treated like ordinary criminals, given their Miranda rights, and prosecuted in Federal court, with all the protections enjoyed by criminal defendants. This means the opportunity for any interrogation, much less one that allows for in-depth intelligence questions, may be very short lived.

The bottom line is that the intelligence community cannot conduct effective interrogations without an established policy that includes a place for those interrogations to occur. While the administration maintains its intent to close Guantanamo Bay, I believe the facility there which I have visited and found to be impressive remains the best option for holding terrorists, like Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, captured off the coast of Yemen and transferred for prosecution after only 60 days of interrogation. Many of my colleagues, as well as the American people, have made clear that bringing suspected terrorists into the United States is not a good solution. Moreover, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other terrorists housed at Guantanamo Bay are not likely to leave there any time soon, especially as the recidivism rate among former detainees continues to rise. But regardless of whether Guantanamo or another facility outside the United States is selected, it is well past time for the President to come up with a long-term detention policy that allows for full and effective intelligence collection. Many of my colleagues and I have been asking for this policy, with no success. Quite simply, our intelligence community cannot afford further delays. Congress must stand ready to pass legislation that ensures our intelligence interrogations of suspected terrorists are not cut short because of arbitrary time lines or potential criminal proceedings.

Congress must also make permanent the remaining provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that are subject to sunsets. Continually revisiting these laws because of arbitrary sunsets does not facilitate oversight, especially when we know that there have been no intentional abuses of these authorities. Moreover, each time we get into a public debate about how some of our most sensitive intelligence collection authorities are used, our enemies learn that much more about our methods. We know they pay attention to our laws and readjust their own communication methods in order to defeat our surveillance. This makes the intelligence community's job that much harder. We cannot expect intelligence analysts to put together vital pieces of information if we do not collect the information in the first place. It is time for Congress to give them permanent tools to do their jobs.

Our Nation, our families, and our communities have suffered tremendously because of the September 11 terrorist attacks. We must not forget that suffering, nor should we ever lose sight of the failures that prevented us from averting this tragedy in the first place. We must remain vigilant. Our Nation is fortunate to be blessed with outstanding men and women in the armed forces and our intelligence community who serve tirelessly to protect and defend us, wherever the threat. We owe them our thanks and our support. As we remember those who have sacrificed so much in this fight against terrorism, we must resolve to do all that is possible to protect and preserve our great Nation and our way of life." (Source: Congressional Record)

9 Rep Langevin remarks on Wikileaks 'both the damage of WikiLeaks and historical espionage cases' in his comments on the floor of Congress regarding the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012.

Rep James Langevin bio on lilsis.org

This bill passed the House and Senate and was signed by the President.

Rep James Langevin bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: House Homeland Security Committee and Chair of sub Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology and sub Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee and sub Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee and sub Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence and sub Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee

"Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me just say how proud I am to support the FY 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act. I appreciate the leadership of both Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger in crafting this bill. This has truly been a bipartisan effort of which I have been proud to be a part.

I am pleased that this bill includes funding to accelerate implementation of an insider threat detection program, and that's both on the cyber front but also in cases like the Hasan case that was tragically in the news and that occurred not long ago and cost many lives.

   This bill basically requires best practices implemented within the Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the intelligence community. That's referring to their insider threat detection program.

In addition, the bill supports critical resources needed for cybersecurity, the broader cybersecurity threat, a threat which demands the attention of our national security specialists and the entire country.

As the successful operation against Osama bin Laden showed us earlier this year, the intelligence community has made significant strides toward working together to counter the most complex threats facing our Nation. This productive cooperation and integration embodies the intent of Congressional intelligence reforms made after the tragic events of 9/11, and I'm encouraged to see this progress in the area of information-sharing.

   

[Time: 09:40]

Yet while the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep our country safe, unrestrained and unregulated access can put our country at great risk. As we have seen from both the damage of WikiLeaks and historical espionage cases, the threat from a malicious insider with the keys to the kingdom is very real. We are far beyond the risk of paper documents being copied and carried out. Today the question is how much information can a potential leaker or spy fit on to a USB drive or a CD.

Although technological advances have strengthened the efforts of our intelligence community, they have also increased the risk.


Now, with this serious concern in mind, I'm proud that this bill requires the DNI to review improvements made by the Army's insider threat regulations and consider implementation of these practices across the entire intelligence community.

In addition, the bill accelerates other technical initiatives within the insider threat program. I believe it's imperative that we ensure that our security officers and network administrators have the capabilities in place to protect our most sensitive information.

Now, in view of the enormous resources spent on security clearances, protecting classified information, and securing networks across the globe, it also makes fiscal sense to protect our investment by taking advantage of the auditing software already available today. The access to classified information bears with it significant responsibilities, one that I know that I and my colleagues on the committee take very seriously.

The other serious threats which this bill addresses are the risks posed to our broader cyber networks. Now, I'm proud that it strengthens resources and it furthers the administration's efforts to address the threats of our critical infrastructure. I know that that is something that is also shared by my colleague, Congressman Ruppersberger.

The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. LANGEVIN. While I applaud the administration's work, I think that we need to go further to raise awareness and work with both public and private sector partners to meet this threat. We cannot afford to continue operating with the massive digital vulnerabilities to not just our sensitive information but also our important intellectual property that makes up the foundation of our innovative economy. Addressing these threats must become a national priority, and we must work quickly to grow our current and future cyber workforce to fill the rising demand for cybersecurity information assurance.

This bill helps secure our sensitive information and vital networks to threats from malicious actors beyond our borders and on the inside because of these important provisions, along with the other merits cited by my colleagues today.

I thank again Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for the outstanding bipartisan cooperation we've seen in their leadership and also the other members of the committee. It's a committee that I'm proud to serve on. I thank them and the committee for their work.

I urge Members to support this bill."

(Source:Congressional Record)

8 Congressional Research Service publishes, "Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information" by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney

Link to document.

Excerpts:

"Leaks of classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it."

"This report discusses the statutory prohibitions that may be implicated, including the Espionage Act; the extraterritorial application of such statutes; and the First Amendment implications related to such prosecutions against domestic or foreign media organizations and associated individuals. The report provides a summary of recent legislation relevant to the issue (H.R. 703, S. 315, S. 355, H.R. 1823) as well as some previous efforts to criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information."

 

1 ORDER granting 73 Motion to Continue; ORDERED that the motions hearing currently scheduled for September 2, 2011 at 9:00 am is continued, and re-scheduled for September 16, 2011 at 10:00 am as to Jacob Appelbaum (1), Rop Gonggrijp (2), Birgitta Jonsdottir (3), Twitter, Inc. (4). Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 09/01/2011.

ORDER granting 73 Motion to Continue; ORDERED that the motions hearing currently scheduled for September 2, 2011 at 9:00 am is continued, and re-scheduled for September 16, 2011 at 10:00 am as to Jacob Appelbaum (1), Rop Gonggrijp (2), Birgitta Jonsdottir (3), Twitter, Inc. (4). Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 09/01/2011. No file available. (Source: web archive)

Sep Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-65A, September 2011,of the inspection of Embassy Berlin, Germany by the United States Department of States and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,Office of Inspections,"Both sections are still feeling the effects of Wikileaks, which resulted in the resignation of a senior German foreign policy official and has made contacts less willing to share information. Washington analysts and Berlin-based officers alike agree that the quality of reporting has fallen off since the Wikileaks disclosures. To protect information, the embassy has markedly increased its use of captions that restrict distribution—to the frustration of some Department officers who cannot readily retrieve them. Embassy reporting often omits the names of contacts in favor of generic descriptions like “a party official” or a “ministry contact.” This protects individual contacts but has decreased the credibility of some reporting and made it difficult for analysts to assess its importance."

From Report Number ISP-I-11-65A, September 2011,of the inspection of Embassy Berlin, Germany by the United States Department of States and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,Office of Inspections:

Led by a tireless Ambassador with excellent diplomatic skills, Mission Germany is strengthening U.S. relations with Germany across the board. The Ambassador, backed by officers with extensive experience and keen understanding of Germany, has capitalized on President Obama’s popularity among the German people. He has focused the embassy on a broad array of core diplomatic issues from increasing cooperation in Afghanistan and managing the negative fallout from Wikileaks to strengthening measures against terrorist financing and identifying common ground on contentious issues like Libya and data privacy. Embassy leadership has also identified and funded new areas of potential cooperation, including scientific collaboration on climate change and energy. Chancellor Merkel’s successful visit to Washington during the inspection was emblematic of the key role the embassy is playing to further bilateral relations.

...

Political and Economic Reporting and Advocacy

...

Both sections are still feeling the effects of Wikileaks, which resulted in the resignation of a senior German foreign policy official and has made contacts less willing to share information. Washington analysts and Berlin-based officers alike agree that the quality of reporting has fallen off since the Wikileaks disclosures. To protect information, the embassy has markedly increased its use of captions that restrict distribution—to the frustration of some Department officers who cannot readily retrieve them. Embassy reporting often omits the names of contacts in favor of generic descriptions like “a party official” or a “ministry contact.” This protects individual contacts but has decreased the credibility of some reporting and made it difficult for analysts to assess its importance.

...

Public Affairs Section

Outreach

The Ambassador leads the mission in pursuing active outreach campaigns. He is an effective public diplomacy engine and pursues a nonstop schedule of public speaking engagements. From June 2010 through June 2011, he made 288 appearances in which he presented a speech or delivered public remarks. The most frequent topics were Afghanistan, including Germany’s role; dealing with global economic challenges; the U.S.-German relationship; and the future of diplomacy, including the impact of Wikileaks.

...

Media Engagement

The public affairs section’s Mission Activity Tracker files are replete with successful press placements, whether interviews with the Ambassador, coverage of events and initiatives, or opinion pieces carried on editorial pages. All are evidence of strong media contacts by the public affairs sections throughout the country. The public affairs section also coordinated closely with the Ambassador and the DCM to respond quickly and effectively to the Wikileaks issue.

(Source: Department of State, Report Number ISP-I-11-65A, September 2011,of the inspection of Embassy Berlin, Germany by the United States Department of States and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,Office of Inspections)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Aug 2011

31 April 15, 2011 Sonic Secret Order Unsealed.

"The secret Sonic order is dated April 15 and directs Sonic to turn over the same type of information from Mr. [Jacob] Appelbaum's email account dating back to Nov. 1, 2009. On Aug. 31, the court agreed to lift the seal on the Sonic order to provide Mr. Appelbaum a copy of it. Sonic Chief Executive Mr. Jasper said the company also sought to unseal the rest of its legal filings but that request 'came back virtually entirely denied.'" (The Wall Street Journal)

"'Sonic said it fought the government's order and lost, and was forced to turn over information. Challenging the order was 'rather expensive, but we felt it was the right thing to do,' said Sonic's chief executive, Dane Jasper. The government's request included the email addresses of people Mr. Appelbaum corresponded with the past two years, but not the full emails." (The Wall Street Journal)

30

Department of State | At a daily press briefing State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, when asked about the password breach that lead to un-redacted cables being out on the Internet, "Well, it won’t surprise you that I’m not going to comment today on the authenticity of the documents released by WikiLeaks. But I would say, in the category of general comments, that the United States strongly condemns any illegal disclosure of classified information. In addition to damaging our diplomatic efforts, it puts individuals’ security at risk, threatens our national security, and undermines our effort to work with countries to solve shared problems."

Nuland adds that, " I would say that we have, over time, taken steps to help individuals. I’m not prepared to go into the details, for the safety of those individuals."

Full Transcript

Full Video

MS. NULAND: Mm-mm. Okay. Go ahead.

QUESTION: WikiLeaks – a new cache has come out. Apparently, it is quite large. There are reports that, due to some sort of a password breach, they’re out there on the internet un-redacted. And we remember the last time this happened, you were warning people around the world who might be included in those to be careful, or the implications of this.

Number one, how – do you have some general reaction? And are you now warning people in those documents to beware?

MS. NULAND: Well, it won’t surprise you that I’m not going to comment today on the authenticity of the documents released by WikiLeaks. But I would say, in the category of general comments, that the United States strongly condemns any illegal disclosure of classified information. In addition to damaging our diplomatic efforts, it puts individuals’ security at risk, threatens our national security, and undermines our effort to work with countries to solve shared problems.

We remain concerned about these illegal disclosures and about concerns and risks to individuals. We continue to carefully monitor what becomes public and to take steps to mitigate the damage to national security, and to assist those who may be harmed by these illegal disclosures, to the extent that we can.

QUESTION: So at this point, you have not necessarily helped anyone who might be in danger? You’re just monitoring?

MS. NULAND: I would say that we have, over time, taken steps to help individuals. I’m not prepared to go into the details, for the safety of those individuals.

(Source: Department of State)

29 MOTION to Continue Hearing by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc.

MOTION to Continue Hearing by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. No file available. (Source: web archive)

26 ORDER granting 71 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. as to Jacob Appelbaum (1), Rop Gonggrijp (2), Birgitta Jonsdottir (3), Twitter, Inc. (4). Upon consideration of the motion to withdraw appearance of Benjamin T. Siracusa Hillman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted. Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 8/26/2011.

ORDER granting 71 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. as to Jacob Appelbaum (1), Rop Gonggrijp (2), Birgitta Jonsdottir (3), Twitter, Inc. (4). Upon consideration of the motion to withdraw appearance of Benjamin T. Siracusa Hillman, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted. Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 8/26/2011. No file available. (Source: web archive)

18 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Benjamin T. Siracusa Hillman. by Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc.

MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Benjamin T. Siracusa Hillman. by Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. No file available. (Source: web archive)

15 Department of Justice | Hector Xavier Monsegur, also known as Sabu, pleads guilty in U.S. District Court to a 12-count information charging him with computer hacking conspiracies and other crimes. He starts working with the FBI.

HECTOR XAVIER MONSEGUR, a/k/a “Sabu,” a/k/a “Xavier DeLeon,” a/k/a “Leon,” who also identified himself as a member of Anonymous, Internet Feds and LulzSec, pled guilty on August 15, 2011 in U.S. District Court to a 12-count information charging him with computer hacking conspiracies and other crimes. MONSEGUR’S Information and guilty plea were unsealed today. The crimes to which MONSEGUR pled guilty include computer hacking conspiracy charges initially filed in the Southern District of New York. He also pled guilty to the following charges: a substantive hacking charge initially filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of California related to the hacks of HBGary, Inc. and HBGary Federal LLC; a substantive hacking charge initially filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California related to the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment and Fox Broadcasting Company; a substantive hacking charge initially filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of Georgia related to the hack of Infragard Members Alliance; a substantive hacking charge initially filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia related to the hack of PBS, all of which were transferred to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in coordination with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (“CCIPS”) in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.

(Source: Department of Justice March 6, 2012 Press Release)

8 Department of State | State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland will not comment on U.S. State Department cables related to Syria and Assad.

QUESTION: What’s the – what’s your latest understanding of the situation in Syria? Have you heard from the Turkish foreign minister about his trip?

MS. NULAND: As you know, the Secretary and Minister Davutoglu spoke the other day before he went in to Syria. We are expecting them to speak again when the foreign minister has finished his consultations, but we haven’t yet had that call. I think the meetings are ongoing on the ground in Syria now.

QUESTION: That’s not scheduled, then? It’s basically whenever he finishes?

MS. NULAND: Right.

QUESTION: Do you expect that today?

MS. NULAND: Unclear whether they will speak today, but they will speak as soon as he has completed his round.

QUESTION: In his conversations so far, apparently, President Asad has said that they will not relent in going after terrorists. What do – do you make anything of that?

MS. NULAND: We’ve seen the same press reports you have. It is deeply regrettable that President Asad does not seem to be hearing the increasingly loud voice of the international community, a voice of concern that is now growing in strength, in volume, and in number of countries making their views known. I would note in particular that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had a very strong statement yesterday abhorring the violence and calling on the regime for change. We’ve also seen the statement of the GCC and the Arab League. So the pressure on Asad is growing. The concern is that he is not listening.

QUESTION: Are you – you’re referring to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia?

MS. NULAND: Yes.

QUESTION: Which was, I think, Sunday.

MS. NULAND: That’s right.

QUESTION: Not yesterday.

MS. NULAND: That’s right.

QUESTION: Are you aware of King Abdullah – of the other King Abdullah has said anything? He’s a bit closer to the action.

MS. NULAND: I’m not aware. We’ll check for you what we’ve seen. But I was – just now I was referring to Saudi Arabia.

QUESTION: What do you think of the claim by the Syrian regime that there are militant elements that actually provoke these firefights and so on?

MS. NULAND: The kind of violence and use of armor and tanks against innocents that we’ve seen in Syria can’t be justified on any basis.

QUESTION: So, Toria, with the United – with these countries now, we’ve got the GCC, the Arab League, individual countries, what does the U.S. want to see them do? I mean, what’s the message from the United States other than, of course, calling for him to stop the violence? But how far does the U.S. want them to go? Should they – should the U.S. – be calling for him directly to step down?

MS. NULAND: As the Secretary said last week, our concern had been that we hadn’t had enough voices, particularly in the neighborhood, making clear that the path that he is on is unacceptable and is abhorrent. And that has changed radically, particularly given his horrible choices in Hama and in Deir al-Zour over the last week.

So to start with, the political condemnation is growing. As you know, the United States and many other countries have significant sanctions on Syria. We want to continue to work with our partners and particularly those with continuing economic interest in Syria to strengthen those sanctions. So those conversations are ongoing. We still believe that further action in the UN would be helpful, although the president’s statement last week began to set the table for that.

And clearly, the decision by Foreign Minister Davutoglu, one of Syria’s near neighbors, to go and give the message of the international community directly is significant, and we hope the regime is listening.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?

MS. NULAND: Please, Kirit.

QUESTION: I believe the UN is supposed to meet to follow up sometime this week. You said that you believe that the time is – or that you believe that further UN action could be warranted. Do you think there should be a push for sanctions at the UN this week?

MS. NULAND: I don’t want to speak to the timing. We had the president’s statement last week. But I think what’s significant in terms of what further UN action would represent is that the chorus and the community of nations who do not want to stand silent in the face of this kind of violence is growing. And that’s important, obviously, in a UN context if we’re going to take further steps there.

QUESTION: On the sanctions, do you expect these sanctions to include, one, gas and oil, and second, air transport, a boycott of giving access to Syrian airways, and vice versa?

MS. NULAND: Well, we have said in the past that we are particularly interested in further oil and gas sanctions. This is not something that would particularly apply in the United States context because our own economic contacts with Syria are limited. With regard to other things, we’re asking all countries with trade relations with Syria to look deeply at what they can do to continue to pressure the regime.

QUESTION: Quickly, and I’m sure you’ve seen the latest comments from Foreign Minister Lavrov, which appear to be more critical than Russia has been in the past. Do you sense that Russia has now turned and that, therefore, it may actually be possible to get action and a resolution at the UN Security Council when it was not previously?

MS. NULAND: The actions that Asad has taken in the last week, I think, have certainly caught the attention of those countries which were more reticent to criticize him publicly, and that’s why you’re beginning to see this stronger public condemnation. We continue to believe that that political condemnation needs to be followed by increasing action on the economic side to increase the pressure on Syria.

In the back.

QUESTION: Did you discuss those economic sanctions with Turkish officials yesterday? Fred Hof met with the chief advisor of prime minister yesterday. And could you give us some details on this meeting?

MS. NULAND: Fred Hof, as you know, was talking to Turkey, was talking to a number of European countries. He’s on a broad swing to look particularly at the issue of sanctions. I don’t want to get into the specifics of those discussions, but they were primarily designed to talk about how we can up the economic pressure.

QUESTION: Is it possible to put in sanctions, bilateral sanctions to – I mean, not United Nations Security Council only, but between Turkey and Syria like United States and Syria?

MS. NULAND: Well, certainly, any nation, it’s within their sovereign right to apply sanctions bilaterally. That’s the route that the United States has taken in the absence of stronger UN international action, so any of Turkey’s neighbors or other countries could certainly go that route --

QUESTION: The last --

MS. NULAND: -- if they made that sovereign decision to do so.

QUESTION: Turkish officials from foreign ministry said today – this morning, actually – that Davutoglu will not convey any international community or someone else messages to Syrian officials, but only Turkish Government message. What does it mean?

MS. NULAND: Well, it’s obviously appropriate that the Turkish foreign minister should convey the message of Turkey, Syria’s neighbor. Our interest is in staying closely coordinated with all of our allies, with all of Syria’s neighbors, as this diplomacy goes forward. And we’ve been very gratified in particular by the close coordination that the Secretary has had with Foreign Minister Davutoglu.

Please.

QUESTION: Why Foreign Minister Davutoglu was in Damascus today across Syria about (inaudible) people who were killed? And plus, the armored vehicles of Syria apparently was entering the city of Ibis, which is a very close Turkish quarter Would it be unfair to take this as an initial reaction of how the Syria sees Turkish reach out?

MS. NULAND: Sounds like that’s a question for the Syrians, not a question for us. But our hope and our expectation is that the Syrian regime will hear the message that Foreign Minister Davutoglu is bringing and will heed the increasing call from the international community, which is joining us in calling for an end to the violence, a withdrawal of forces, and a beginning of a true political democratic process.

Elise --

QUESTION: Is the buffer zone right now – is the buffer zone under active consideration by Turkish border at the moment, if the violence continues?

MS. NULAND: It sounds like that’s a question also for Turkish authorities rather than for us.

QUESTION: What is your level of understanding or belief of President Bashar al-Asad’s control of the regime and the government apparatus itself at this point?

MS. NULAND: I don’t think I want to characterize internal processes inside the Syrian Government. But again, he is head of a regime that is brutally cracking down on innocents and continues to do so whether it’s in Hama, whether it’s in Deir al-Zour, whether it’s in other suburbs of Damascus. So to absolve him of responsibility would seem absurd.

QUESTION: I’m wondering if you’ve seen this release by WikiLeaks of this cable from 2009 which basically, as the Obama Administration was considering engaging them – the Syrian regime – it kind of noted these potential for brutal tactics and brinksmanship and gamesmanship. And I’m wondering why – if you knew him to be this individual, why you would engage with him at that – knowing what you know about him? I mean, it doesn’t seem like anything that he’s doing really is much of a surprise, given what you knew about him in the beginning.

MS. NULAND: I think you won’t be surprised if I don’t pick up on any effort to draw us into something that comes from WikiLeaks.

Please.

QUESTION: Yeah. What kind of – you want to follow?

QUESTION: Well, I got – I just – forget about the WikiLeaks parts of it. I mean, it – the assessment – and it was not merely one that was provided in private cables. The Administration assessment for a while have been that Asad was not – was capable of doing – given – despite his background as an ophthalmologist, was capable of pretty much doing anything because he was essentially being run by his father’s cronies.

So just in general, forget about the WikiLeaks portion of it. Can you answer at least this question?

MS. NULAND: I think if the question goes to why did we choose a path of engagement in 2009 – is that where we’re going? I think –

QUESTION: Right. If there were concerns about what he was capable of.

MS. NULAND: I think in 2009 when the Administration came into office, you saw an effort to turn the page and have a fresh start in many places where relations had been difficult. And in some places, that paid off very well, and our partners joined us in turning the page. In the case of Syria, the message from 2009 was: If you are prepared to open Syria politically, if you are prepared to be a reformer, if you are prepared to work with us on Middle East peace and other issues we share, we can have a new and different kind of partnership. And that is not the path that Asad chose.

QUESTION: Do you agree with the assessment that Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father?

MS. NULAND: I’m not going to –

QUESTION: -- and that Syrian foreign policy or his actions play almost entirely to his vanity, that Syrian diplomats lie repeatedly even – and show no embarrassment at being caught at lying, and that they are so concerned with protocol issue that even –that they’re incredibly concerned with protocol issues, but don’t really understand what they are?

MS. NULAND: I think you’re asking me to psychoanalyze Asad and this – the Syrian Government.

QUESTION: I’m just asking you if you think these assessments from the field are accurate, if they generally – if people generally accept them?

MS. NULAND: This Administration, the United States, will judge Syria, has judged Syria based on the regime’s actions. And the regime’s actions are getting more and more abhorrent by the day.

QUESTION: So you don’t care to comment as to the – President Asad’s shrewdness or lack thereof or whether his speaking abilities are the same or different than his father’s?

MS. NULAND: How shrewd could he possibly be when he’s taking his country into a downward spiral of violence and oppression, rather than seizing the opportunity that the international community was willing to give him for reform and change?

Lachlan.

QUESTION: Yeah. Who has Ambassador Ford met with since he returned to his post in Damascus? And can you characterize the conversations he’s having there?

MS. NULAND: I’m going to take that one, Lachlan, because I haven’t had a chance to talk to him. I’ll take that one for tomorrow.

Please.

QUESTION: Yeah. On China?

MS. NULAND: Anything else on Syria before we leave Syria?

QUESTION: Syria.

MS. NULAND: Yeah. Please.

QUESTION: Why the U.S. not able to get a consensus on Syria at the United Nations, unlike in the case of Libya? Which are the countries which are assisting your efforts?

MS. NULAND: Again, as we said this morning, I think you see the chorus of condemnation growing not only geographically, but you see it growing in strength and in revulsion at what’s going on in Syria. So the question now is turning those political messages into common international action that will increase the pressure on the regime.

QUESTION: One last one on that.

MS. NULAND: Please.

QUESTION: Would you consider that the time has passed for any kind of reform, that he must go?

MS. NULAND: He clearly, for many, many weeks now, has not taken the opportunity that the President gave him so many months ago. So again, we’re going to judge him by his actions, and his actions are abhorrent and repulsive.

QUESTION: But what is he rehabilitate? So would he be rehabilitated into the community of nations?

MS. NULAND: Let’s start with some actual move to end the violence, none of which has happened.

Elise.

QUESTION: Can I – do you think it would be fair to say that any efforts by this Administration to engage this regime are over?

MS. NULAND: To the degree that the Syrian Government wants to meet with Ambassador Ford or wants to see us, we will continue to have those conversations and be open to a direct relay of our message. But our message is not going to change – that what he’s doing is disgusting, is abhorrent, is dangerous, and is taking his country in the wrong direction.

QUESTION: Well, but what I’m saying is – you were talking a few minutes ago about efforts to engage on 2009. And don’t forget, I mean, the President did say at the time, anyway, as a candidate, that engagement didn’t always mean having a relationship with countries that you agree with. So, I mean, given what you know now about this regime, aside from relaying your message of abhorrence or whatever, are the efforts to have a new relationship and a new partnership with this regime over?

MS. NULAND: You can’t have any kind of partnership with a regime that does this kind of thing to innocents. So I wouldn’t use the P-word with regard to where we are today at all. Where we are today is to do what we can with U.S. influence, whether it’s directly in Syria or with our allies and the neighbors of that country to end the bloodshed, first and foremost, so that we can help those in Syria who want to take their country in a more positive and democratic direction.

QUESTION: But just to broaden it out a little bit, I mean, we saw the same thing with Iran. I mean, there was this policy of engagement. They brutally cracked down on their people and engagement was kind of dead. And, I mean, it seems as if the same in Burma. You said you were going to engage the regime. In fact, it’s done the opposite.

I mean, do you think that – are you rethinking the whole idea of engagement? Because part of the reason that you don’t have good relationships with these countries is because of the way that you – they treat their people. And so it seems as if the idea of engagement, while idealistic, in reality, is not possible.

MS. NULAND: To say it again, I think the President and Secretary Clinton came to office believing that we should start fresh with countries around the world, including those where we’d had difficult or even bad relations, and there should be an offer of engagement. But the question of whether you can have a partnership requires two. So if you offer engagement, and rather than taking up engagement, your partner chooses to spend their time and energy repressing and violating the human rights of their own citizens, in any such situation, there are limits to what the U.S. can do with such a country. And I think you’ve seen that, obviously with Iran, and we’re seeing it in Syria now.

QUESTION: I’m sorry. What was the P-word that you mentioned?

MS. NULAND: Partnership.

QUESTION: Partnership.

MS. NULAND: Partnership.

Please.

(Source: )

8 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | NOTICE of Change of Address by Jacob Appelbaum (Sears, Stuart)

2 Major General Terry Wolff, former commanding general of the 1st Armored Division/U.S. Division - Center in Iraq and general court-martial convening authority of Bradley Manning in Iraq unit Manning's transfer to the jurisdiction of MDW at Quantico, is promoted to Lieutenant General.

Major General Terry Wolff, former general court-martial convening authority of Bradley Manning in Iraq. Major General Terry A. Wolff was promoted to Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff U.S. Army Europe on February 2, 2011, and promoted to Lt. General on August 2, 2011.

(Source: senate.gov)

"Maj. Gen. Terry Wolff, the general court-martial convening authority and commanding general of the 1st Armored Division/U.S. Division - Center in Iraq, requested the transfer to MDW due to a potentially lengthy pre-trial confinement because of the complexity of charges and an ongoing investigation. The field confinement facility in Kuwait is designed for short-term confinement." (Source: MDW Public Affairs)

 

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

... Tom Ridge, former Secretary of Homeland Security, at Chamber of Commerce event remarks on WikiLeaks, talks about throwing the book at unauthorized disclosure, and threat to information sharing environment, need for increasing "trust" and sharing", and the need for public private partnership in dealing with cyber threats, since 'private sector owns the infrastructure.'

Jul 2011

19

Inditement was unsealed in the Northern District of California in San Jose by Melinda Haag, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California and 14 individuals were arrested were arrested in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico and Ohio by FBI agents on charges related to their alleged involvement in a cyber attack on PayPal’s website as part of an action claimed by the group “Anonymous,” announced the Department of Justice and the FBI. Case #: United States v. Collins, et.al., No. CR 11-00471 DLJ

On that same day, the FBI executed an additional twenty-one search warrants in eleven states, also in connection with the DDoS attacks against PayPal. Investigation into the subjects of those searches is continuing. [Tags: Operation Payback, Paypal 14]

" *Image to the left is Melinda Haag, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California.

On January 27, 2011, the FBI executed twenty-seven search warrants in twelve states and the District of Columbia as part of the investigation of the DDoS attacks against PayPal. On July 13, 2010, a federal grand jury in San Jose, California, returned a fifteen-count indictment against Dennis Collins, Christopher Wayne Cooper, Joshua John Covelli, Keith Wilson Downey, Mercedes Renee Haefer, Donald Husband, Vincent Charles Kershaw, Ethan Miles, James C. Murphy, Drew Alan Phillips, Jeffrey Puglisi, Daniel Sullivan, Tracy Ann Valenzuela and Christopher Vo for conspiracy and causing intentional damage to PayPal's computer servers. The case, United States v. Dennis Collins, et.al., No. CR 11-00471 DLJ, is currently pending before the Honorable D. Lowell Jensen.

...

On that same day, the FBI executed an additional twenty-one search warrants in eleven states, also in connection with the DDoS attacks against PayPal. Investigation into the subjects of those searches is continuing." (Source: Department of Justice Press Release)

Below is from another Department of Justice Press Release.

WASHINGTON - Fourteen individuals were arrested today by FBI agents on charges related to their alleged involvement in a cyber attack on PayPal’s website as part of an action claimed by the group “Anonymous,” announced the Department of Justice and the FBI.   Two additional defendants were arrested today on cyber-related charges.

The 14 individuals were arrested in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico and Ohio on charges contained in an indictment unsealed today in the Northern District of California in San Jose.  In addition, two individuals were arrested on similar charges in two separate complaints filed in the Middle District of Florida and the District of New Jersey.  Also today, FBI agents executed more than 35 search warrants throughout the United States as part of an ongoing investigation into coordinated cyber attacks against major companies and organizations.  Finally, the United Kingdom’s Metropolitan Police Service arrested one person and the Dutch National Police Agency arrested four individuals today for alleged related cyber crimes.

According to the San Jose indictment, in late November 2010, WikiLeaks released a large amount of classified U.S. State Department cables on its website.  Citing violations of the PayPal terms of service, and in response to WikiLeaks’ release of the classified cables, PayPal suspended WikiLeaks’ accounts so that WikiLeaks could no longer receive donations via PayPal.  WikiLeaks’ website declared that PayPal’s action “tried to economically strangle WikiLeaks.”

The San Jose indictment alleges that in retribution for PayPal’s termination of WikiLeaks’ donation account, a group calling itself Anonymous coordinated and executed distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against PayPal’s computer servers using an open source computer program the group makes available for free download on the Internet.  DDoS attacks are attempts to render computers unavailable to users through a variety of means, including saturating the target computers or networks with external communications requests, thereby denying service to legitimate users.    According to the indictment, Anonymous referred to the DDoS attacks on PayPal as “Operation Avenge Assange.” 

The defendants charged in the San Jose indictment allegedly conspired with others to intentionally damage protected computers at PayPal from Dec. 6, 2010, to Dec. 10, 2010.

The individuals named in the San Jose indictment are: Christopher Wayne Cooper, 23, aka “Anthrophobic;” Joshua John Covelli, 26, aka “Absolem” and “Toxic;” Keith Wilson Downey, 26; Mercedes Renee Haefer, 20, aka “No” and “MMMM;” Donald Husband, 29, aka “Ananon;”  Vincent Charles Kershaw, 27, aka “Trivette,” “Triv” and “Reaper;” Ethan Miles, 33; James C. Murphy, 36; Drew Alan Phillips, 26, aka “Drew010;” Jeffrey Puglisi, 28, aka “Jeffer,” “Jefferp” and “Ji;” Daniel Sullivan, 22; Tracy Ann Valenzuela, 42; and Christopher Quang Vo, 22.  One individual’s name has been withheld by the court.

The defendants are charged with various counts of conspiracy and intentional damage to a protected computer.  They will make initial appearances throughout the day in the districts in which they were arrested.

In addition to the activities in San Jose, Scott Matthew Arciszewski, 21, was arrested today by FBI agents on charges of intentional damage to a protected computer.  Arciszewski is charged in a complaint filed in the Middle District of Florida and made his initial appearance this afternoon in federal court in Orlando, Fla.

According to the complaint, on June 21, 2011, Arciszewski allegedly accessed without authorization the Tampa Bay InfraGard website and uploaded three files.  The complaint alleges that Arciszewski then tweeted about the intrusion and directed visitors to a separate website containing links with instructions on how to exploit the Tampa InfraGard website.  InfraGard is a public-private partnership for critical infrastructure protection sponsored by the FBI with chapters in all 50 states.

Also today, a related complaint unsealed in the District of New Jersey charges Lance Moore, 21, of Las Cruces, N.M., with allegedly stealing confidential business information stored on AT&T’s servers and posting it on a public file sharing site.  Moore was arrested this morning at his residence by FBI agents and is expected to make an initial appearance this afternoon in Las Cruces federal court.  Moore is charged in with one count of accessing a protected computer without authorization. 

According to the New Jersey complaint, Moore, a customer support contractor, exceeded his authorized access to AT&T’s servers and downloaded thousands of documents, applications and other files that, on the same day, he allegedly posted on a public file hosting site that promises user anonymity. According to the complaint, on June 25, 2011, the computer hacking group LulzSec publicized that they had obtained confidential AT&T documents and made them publicly available on the Internet. The documents were the ones Moore had previously uploaded.

The charge of intentional damage to a protected computer carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.  Each count of conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. 

An indictment and a complaint merely contain allegations.  Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

To date, more than 75 searches have taken place in the United States as part of the ongoing investigations into these attacks.

These cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the Northern District of California, Middle District of Florida and the District of New Jersey.  The Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section also has provided assistance.

Today’s operational activities were done in coordination with the Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom and the Dutch National Police Agency. 

18 Bradley Manning's general court-martial convening authority since his confinement at Quantico, commanding general of the Military District of Washington, Maj. Gen. Karl R. Horst, is transferred to CENTCOM, where Horst is assumes the duties as Chief of Staff.

[Major General Karl R. Horst, former commanding general of MDW, and Bradley Manning's general court-martial convening authority from the time of Manning's transfer at Quantico until Horst transfer to CENTCOM as its Chief of Staff July 18, 2011, image to the left]

"With his [Bradley Manning] transfer to Quantico, Manning is now under the general court-martial convening authority of Maj. Gen. Karl R. Horst, MDW commanding general. Manning will remain in pre-trial confinement as the Army continues its investigation, officials said.

Maj. Gen. Terry Wolff, the general court-martial convening authority and commanding general of the 1st Armored Division/U.S. Division - Center in Iraq, requested the transfer to MDW due to a potentially lengthy pre-trial confinement because of the complexity of charges and an ongoing investigation. The field confinement facility in Kuwait is designed for short-term confinement." (Source: MDW Public Affairs

"Maj. Gen Karl R. Horst assumed duties as Chief of Staff U.S. Central Command on 18 July 2011

Maj. Gen. Horst reported to CENTCOM following a successful tour as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Military District of Washington and Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region on June 23, 2009." (Source: centcom.mil)

 

14 Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, USMC press conference, speak about cyber security and types of threats, i.e. insider and external threats. Lynn says external threat is a foreign service stole 24,000 computer files from a defense contractor developing systems for the US military in March and internal threat is a WikiLeaks type incident.

Full Transcript

 MR. WILLIAM LYNN:  Well, thanks for staying.  I think most of you -- all of you, I guess, were probably here for the presentation and the Q&A, so I think we ought to just go straight to questions.

                 Sure.  Start --

                 Q:  Sir, I wonder if you could tell us a little -- for Mr. Lynn, I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about the March intrusion to the defense contractor that stole the 24,000 files; a little bit more about the damage that was done or who might have perpetrated it; was it a nation or an individual, and if it was a nation, who it was.

                 And for General Cartwright, this morning at the Defense Writers Group, you talked -- answering our questions a lot about deterrence and moving toward deterrence.  Mr. Lynn, of course, talked a lot about how we need to make attacks ineffective by improving our defenses.  I wonder if you could react a little bit to that and flesh out your thoughts there.

                 MR. LYNN:  Well, let me start.  The intrusion that I mentioned in March is the -- you know, just the latest in a series.  We've been getting hit for, you know, the better half of five or six years in a serious way. 

                 This was significant, and it was a -- was a defense contractor.  It was a data related to systems that are being developed for the Department of Defense.  It was large, 24,000 files.  It was done, we think, by a foreign intelligence service.  In other words, a nation-state was behind it.  And we don't get into our understanding of exactly who that was.

                 GENERAL JAMES CARTWRIGHT:  To the issue of where we're going in the future and deterrence-type strategies associated with cyber and then how they're incorporated into larger deterrence strategies, today we have a network that is essentially constructed around point defenses.  In other words, you go buy a firewall and some sort of virus protection, you put it on your computer.  That's a point defense.  It tends to be the most inefficient defense there is, because you're static; in any attack on you, you're just always there.  You just keep repeating it as often as you want, and there's really no penalty for doing it.

                 As you start to build the system out to layers, it becomes more difficult to attack, and as you start to build that out globally and add in sensors so you know what the attacks are, or you see them coming -- if you know what type of an attack is, you recognize it -- that gets you to be more efficient.

                 So then the adversary has to think their way through how to do that.  The likelihood of being detected early, therefore preventing it in a larger area than just a single computer, goes up. 

                 Those types of activities tend to affect those who would attack us.  In other words, if they think they're going to be thwarted, if they think they're not going to be able to get the effect they desired to have, it changes their calculus. 

                 To the extent that you add other measures, whether they be offensive in nature, associated with cyber, or whether they be law enforcement, or whether they be just demarches and diplomatic activities, if we can start to introduce those into -- they also tend to raise the price, but they're only effective if they're credible, so we have to have a system that recognizes an attack, registers it, and then allows us to react in a way that's appropriate, proportional, et cetera. 

                 And so that's the discussion here, is, as we move to the future, fleshing out the command and control, fleshing out the sensor network and then building defenses that are more than point -- they have to be regional in nature, global in nature -- and then responses that are appropriate and proportional.

                 MR. LYNN:  Sure.

                 Q:  Eric Weiner, Tokyo Broadcasting System.  Thanks for doing this.

                 You talked about international partnerships.  Could you tell me whether or not you're coordinating with the Japanese at all, or plan to?  And a second question is, what kind of threats does China pose?

                 MR. LYNN:  We absolutely want to coordinate with the Japanese, and some steps have been taken, and we need certainly Japanese -- is a strong ally that we want to embrace in all aspects of our defense, including cyber.  So we are -- we are reaching out to our closest allies, and beyond.  This is -- this is beyond just your simple alliances.  This is a community of interest, as it were.

                 Q:  China?

                 MR. LYNN:  Oh.

                 Q:  (Off mic.)

                 MR. LYNN:  I mean, China is an enormously capable nation in almost every sphere.  Cyber is no exception. 

                 Q:  Bill Sweetman, Defense Technology International.  Following up on this, why is -- I think many people are aware of who -- which nation stands to benefit most from cyber espionage, because it's a nation's adversary and it's in a rapid technological improvement mode.  It needs that information.  Why the reluctance to name the panda in the living room, and wouldn't it help the defenders to understand that, and therefore to know what information is most likely to be targeted?

                 MR. LYNN:  With almost every nation, and certainly large nations, we have complex relationships that involve economic ties, military ties, and the -- and so you need to take account of all of those ties, and you need to think through how you want to interact with those nations and make your wishes known and make your displeasure known at any types of activities.  And so we work our way through the diplomatic approaches that need to be taken if we feel that we have been threatened in any way.

                 Q:  Amy McCullough, with Air Force Magazine.  You mentioned that the DOD networks have been hit for the last five or six years.  Can you -- can you quantify that at all on a monthly or annual basis? 

                 And also, does DOD have the authorities that they need to enforce this strategy?  I know that that's something that's come up repeatedly through congressional testimonies, and if not, what do you need, and where does that stand?

                 MR. LYNN:  It's hard to quantify -- first part of the question -- it's hard to quantify these things.  I mean, you know, the -- you know, networks are scanned literally millions of times a year, but the -- you know, does that amount to an attack?  That's probably, you know, a stretch to say that.  So you know, the number of significant intrusions is much, much smaller, but it's the scanning that leads to the information that feeds those intrusions.  So it's hard to quantify.  I guess the one thing I would tell you is it's on the increase and has been on the increase every year for the last five or six, and that's, I think, the troubling development.

                 In terms of authorities, you're -- we are in the area to protect our own military networks; I think we have the authorities that we -- that we need.  The -- I think in terms of critical infrastructure -- protecting critical infrastructure is an important part of this strategy.  The authorities really lie with the Department of Homeland Security, and DOD is the supporting agency in that regard. 

                 And then more broadly, the -- as we -- you know, cyber security is relatively new, and we are looking at what kinds of changes need to be made to the legal regime.  And the administration has a legislative proposal on the Hill, a significant part of it focused on giving us the kinds of authorities and developing the kinds of incentives in the commercial structure to improve defenses in critical infrastructure.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  And I would just add to that, particularly for the Department of Defense and given who you represent -- I mean, if an airman has to have a set of rules for everything except cyber and then a separate set of rules for cyber, it's really difficult.  So we're starting from the concept, use the laws that we have, understand the implications and where it applies and where it doesn't.  And then to the extent that we need something more, make it a deviation, but don't try to invent an entire set of rules, laws, policies that only apply to cyber because it's really difficult, then, for us to teach and to make -- and apply it in conflict.

                 MR. LYNN:  Why don't we go back there?

                 Q:  Hi, Ben Dalton from TV Tokyo.  I wanted to ask you gentlemen if you could articulate what scenario would justify the use of traditional military force.

                 MR. LYNN:  Cyber isn't different than other areas in that way.  If a -- if the effect of some sort of action reached the threshold that the nation and the president and the Congress considered it an act of war, we would feel we would have the response -- that we would have  military response as an option, although again, we always look at use of military force as a last resort.  We would try and exhaust other options before turning to that.

                 Why don't we go all the way back.

                 Q:  Thank you.  Tom Gjelten from NPR, for either of you.  The strategy is largely silent on the offensive capabilities in this area.  I'm wondering, one, if that reflects the unclassified nature of this document as opposed to the classified version, if that's where more of that might be detailed. 

                 And more broadly, how important, in your judgment, is it for the United States to develop -- to continue to develop its offensive military capabilities in this area?

                 MR. LYNN:  Let me take a shot and then ask Hoss to join in.  It is important in terms of all of our military capabilities -- cyber included -- to have a full spectrum of capabilities.  That said, the thrust of the strategy, as you correctly identified, is defensive, it is protecting the networks, because those networks undergird all of our capabilities, offensive and defense -- the ability to strike, the ability to navigate, the ability to communicate. 

                 All of our military capabilities are based on our utilization of information technology networks.  So the thrust of this is, how do we protect those advantages?

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  And I think this is a framework.  This starts us down the path of building out both our defenses but our awareness skills and our ability to command and control on those networks.  The command and control is not just for cyber.  And so, understanding how it all integrates together and then where it makes sense to have cyber offensive capabilities, where they actually add value, and then whether or not -- again, this is a lot of R&D at this stage of the game.  You know, where do we put our investments in that area are things that we're trying to understand.  But we can't understand that until we understand the environment we're working in.

                 MR. LYNN:  Here in the middle.

                 Q:  Molly Walker, Fierce Government IT.  Last week during congressional testimony, a DHS official cited problems in the cyber security supply chain.  I was wondering, given the strategy's focus on DOD networks and the DIBs networks, if this will have any implications for acquisition, changes, new certifications, and emphasis on indigenous technologies?

                 MR. LYNN:  Well, I mean, I think this strategy focuses on one particular aspect of the challenge, which is the threat across networks basically remotely, from other places.  There are two other types of threats that you need to be conscious of.  One is insider threats, and that's the whole WikiLeaks issue, and then there's supply chain, how do you protect the supply chain.  I think that's really what you're referring to. 

                 And we absolutely do need to think about how we protect our supply chain.  There's an active group in the interagency process led by the White House trying to develop policies for that.  It is difficult because -- you implied indigenous.  It is not, I think, conceivable, given the breadth of Internet technology, to think that we're going to build everything that we need inside a ring fence and that we can just examine it and protect it as we build it.  We're going to have to -- our supply chain is going to be global in the information technology area.  So we need to accommodate that, and we need to develop means to get assurance of the security of the components of the equipment that we buy.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  I think the other component to that is that not -- accepting the fact that you'll never have a purely perfect supply chain and that you'll always question, because you can't tell where your information flows throughout that supply chain, that we're going to have to have diversity in the supply chain.  We're going to have to be able to say, if this particular component can be attacked, there needs to be more than one of that kind of component so that we have an assured path through diversity also, and layering those opportunities to have the ability to get through, not having the same networks, components, having diversity also in how that information is passed, and then diversity in how the information is encrypted or protected.  We've got to be able to do it so that any one element gets compromised, we have an alternative path.

                 Q:  Yes, thank you.  Shaun Waterman from the Washington Times.  Firstly, deputy secretary, are you concerned that the United States is -- might -- is seen as an aggressor in cyberspace overseas; I mean abroad, by foreigners?  And is this -- is this strategy in any way designed to ameliorate that concern?

                 And secondly, do you see any possibility for the use of treaties to mitigate the threat, I mean, agreements with other countries about what kinds of weapons can be used?  Or, you know, given that the advantage at the moment lies so much with the attacker, is that a -- is that a sort of nonstarter?

                 MR. LYNN:  I mean, I think the thrust of the strategy here is to reinforce the defensive nature of our approach here.  In terms of treaties -- I mean, I think we do need to pursue international forums and see if it's possible to set up international norms.  I don't know whether those would take the form of treaties or other norm-setting vehicles, but I think, given the dependence that the United States has on information technology for both its military capabilities as well as its economic vitality, the higher the levels of security are on the Internet, the better it's going to be for us.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  I mean, I might go at it just to say that as we start to understand the threat side of this equation, it is likely that we're going to have increased regulation of some sort on a global scale, in order to have an assurance level that we can get -- use these networks safely.

                 Q:  Charlie Keyes, CNN.  Thanks, gentlemen.  I appreciate it.

                 From where you both sit, I was wondering whether the telephone hacking scandal in Britain raised any particular concerns, especially as the U.S. military experiments and tests and issues hand-held devices and smartphones for use in the field?

                 MR. LYNN:  Geez, that was the -- actually, you know, I get to worry about a lot of things every day.  (Laughs.)  Telephone hacking in the U.K. actually wasn't one of them.  (Laughter.)

                 I mean, I think beyond -- you know, obviously what -- the trend here is that the threat is moving up.  It is becoming -- as I had suggested in the talk, it's moving up in terms of the level of destructiveness it might have, and it's moving out in terms of the number of countries and ultimately organizations and even individuals who might possess those capabilities.  So those trends I think are worrisome.

                 And what I suggest is I think before those -- either of those dimensions gets too far, it's important for us to put in stronger protections in our military area and in our critical infrastructure area.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  I guess I would go in the direction that it did worry me, and it does worry me; more from the standpoint that, to date, industry, in the chip sets that we use in our displays, the chip sets that we use in our phones, our other endpoint devices, don't -- are not currently configured to encrypt.  And we're going to have to start to think our way through as a nation and as an industry, do we want to start to encrypt at the endpoint?  And what are the implications -- new chips, et cetera -- that allow us to do that?  And then, bring a level of security that can be graduated based on the threat but have a chip set in that that actually can respond to that.

                 We don't have that today.  It's something that we're going to have to start to think our way through, because I think now the average citizen is starting to look for more secure ways to communicate and wants the opportunity to do that.  And today, we pay a premium price to do that in the military.  It's likely that that's going to start to move to the commercial sector.

                 Q:  Hi.  Two questions, first.

                 MR. LYNN:  Where are you from?

                 Q:  Oh, Courtney Kube, NBC News.  Thank you for doing this.

                 Two questions.  Back to the March hacking, or intrusion, what -- was this the biggest intrusion in these five or six years that you keep mentioning?  And what was the U.S. response?  Did you -- did you inform this other nation that you were aware that they had intruded on the network, and did you -- were there any diplomatic response that you can tell us about?

                 And then also, back to the "act of war" question, can you just give us more of an idea?  I mean, in my mind, an act of war is something that leads to civilian death -- leads to deaths, or some sort of a major infrastructure breakdown or -- I mean, can you give us a better idea, some sort of an example of what an act of war would mean in a cyber realm?          

        MR. LYNN:  Well, I mean, fortunately, we haven't seen it yet, so, I mean, it's -- and there is some value in keeping it somewhat ambiguous, as a -- as a deterrent.  But it's ultimately that the damage, either human or economic, is such that the president and the Congress would treat it as an act of war and respond accordingly.  And I can't give you precise dimensions.

                 In terms of the event, I actually don't think that the -- it was 24,000 files, which is a lot, but I actually -- I'd have to double-check, but I do not think that's actually the largest.  It's very large, but I don't think it's the largest we've seen.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  On the -- the act of war is a judgment.  It's subjective.  It's in the eyes of the beholder.  A nation may determine, based on what it values, that an act of war or aggression has occurred.

                 The Law of Armed Conflict, however, is very precise, or much more precise.  So in your earlier questions, when we were talking about a hospital, if you take down the patient records and therefore they can't be treated, that is a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict.  And that's very clear.  And then you have proportional responses that can be initiated against it.

                 So trying to understand in the area that you're talking about, an act of war, is one of these dialogues and debates you get into, and they really don't lead you anyplace, because at the end of the day, it's in the eyes of the beholder.

                 Q:  And the diplomatic response, if there was one, to the March -- anything you can tell us?

                 MR. LYNN:  There isn't.

                 Here.

                 Q:  Thanks.  Hi.  I'm Dan Sagalyn of the PBS "NewsHour."  Can you better define what constitutes a kind of attack that you guys would get involved in?  Obviously if the Pentagon networks were attacked, that's very clear, but if like my news organization's website gets hacked, you're not involved.  So in infrastructure there's a lot of -- what kind constitutes the kind of attacks that you guys would be most concerned about?  And where are there attacks that you're not concerned about?

                 MR. LYNN:  Well, I mean, concerned's probably the wrong word, but I mean, in terms of, you know, DOD, it -- criminal activity is -- I mean, we're not a law enforcement agency.  So you know, for the kinds of criminal activity, we might have some technical expertise that we'd support, the FBI or other law enforcement agencies, and we'd be happy to do that, but we wouldn't be the prime -- in terms of criminal infrastructure, again, Homeland Security would be the primary agency, and we would again be supporting.  It would only -- DOD would only take the lead if it got to where the -- some of the other questions were going -- if it got to a point where in the judgment of the leadership of the country, it required a military response.

                 Sure.

                 Q:  Hi.  Ellen Nakashima -- Ellen Nakashima with The Washington Post.  Third try is the charm.  Ellen Nakashima with The Washington Post.  To follow up again on the March 24th incident, as well as the act of war or use of armed force, was the theft of the 24,000 files related in any way to the secure ID token compromise?  And can you quantify, in terms of terabytes, how much data was taken or in monetary terms how much it was worth?  And how long had it been going on when it was detected?

                 And then I have an act of war question.

                 MR. LYNN:  The -- what was your first question?  (Inaudible) --

                 Q:  Was it related to the secure ID --

                 MR. LYNN:  Oh, was it the RSA?  Yeah, I don't believe it was related to RSA. 

                 In terms of the economic value, it's -- I mean, it's -- you know, information related to, you know, weapons systems and defense equipment's very hard to value in that way.  And it was 24,000 files, and I can't translate that into terabytes.

                 Q:  Any idea how much it set you all back in terms of development of that system?

                 MR. LYNN:  I don't think it necessarily -- it set us back in terms of the development of the system.  It more -- it compromised information relative to the design of military equipment.

                 Q:  So as a result of that, the company and DOD is now going to have to redesign parts of this?

                 MR. LYNN:  We're looking at that right now.

                 Q:  OK.  And what was the largest theft, cyber theft, in the last --

                 MR. LYNN:  I'm not sure.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  We'll go look it up for you.  (Chuckles.)

                 Q:  Will you?  Get back with me?  Thanks. 

                 To help on the act-of-war question, what if a Stuxnet-like intrusion occurred with us and, you know, we had a nuclear facility and centrifuges were damaged?  Do you think you would consider -- we would consider that an act of war or use of armed force that would justify a response?  And if so, what kind of response?  To both of you.

                        GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  You're in the hypotheticals, so it's really difficult.  But it's the output side of the equation, not the vehicle, that determines whether it's an act of aggression.  So in this case, a cyber-vehicle -- you used Stuxnet as an example.  But the question is --

                 Q:  Damaged centrifuges, though.

                 GEN. CARTWRIGHT:  So the question then becomes are those centrifuges critical to our national activities.  If in the judgment of the national leadership that's true, then it becomes an act.  If it is not, if it is ancillary and not considered that, is it law enforcement, is it something else, and then what are the appropriate tools and proportionality?

                 MR.    :  We have time for one more.  Let's -- (off mic).

                 MR. LYNN:  Sure.  Yeah.

                 Q:  OK.  Thank you.

                 MR. LYNN:  Right here.

                 Q:  Amanda Palleschi, Inside the Pentagon.  You had mentioned in the second pillar that you had worked on new sensors, software, engineering.  What programs in the FY '12 budget, in your budget request, do you feel most address or what are the most key programs that you put forth?  And how do you feel about the response you've gotten from members of Congress and the executive branch on those priorities and those programs so far?

                 MR. LYNN:  So far, Congress has been supporting the proposals we've made for improvements in cyber security.  I mean, the program underlying active defenses, one of them is called Tutelage.  It's a system of active defenses that's run through the Cyber Command.  So that is that program.

                 MR.     :  All right.  Thank you very much for your attendance today.

                 MR. LYNN:  Thank you.

13 On July 13, 2010, a federal grand jury in San Jose, California, returned a fifteen-count indictment against Dennis Collins, Christopher Wayne Cooper, Joshua John Covelli, Keith Wilson Downey, Mercedes Renee Haefer, Donald Husband, Vincent Charles Kershaw, Ethan Miles, James C. Murphy, Drew Alan Phillips, Jeffrey Puglisi, Daniel Sullivan, Tracy Ann Valenzuela and Christopher Vo for conspiracy and causing intentional damage to PayPal's computer servers. The case, United States v. Dennis Collins, et.al., No. CR 11-00471 DLJ, is currently before the Honorable D. Lowell Jensen. [Tags: Operation Payback, Paypal 14]

13 Notice of Hearing Date (amended) set for September 2, 10:00a.m. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11, 64 Objection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous ReliefObjection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir

Notice of Hearing Date (amended) set for September 2, 10:00a.m. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11, 64 Objection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous ReliefObjection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. No file available. (Source: web archive)

12-13 UK Hearing on Sweden v. Julian Assange [MORE SOURCES]

"2 November 2011 The U.K. High Court rejects Assange's appeal of Judge Riddle's ruling, based on a hearing conducted on 12-13 July." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

12 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform | In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform by Joseph R. Antos, Ph.D. Wilson H. Taylor Scholar in Health Care and Retirement Policy from the American Enterprise Institute, he cites two Congressional Service Report released by WikiLeaks.org domain.

8 Reply of Real Parties In Support Of Objections to Magistrate's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order

Reply by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 64 Objection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous ReliefObjection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief

"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of June, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Tracy D. McCormick
Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]"

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Jun 2011

30 RESPONSE by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 64 Objection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous ReliefObjection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Peterson, Andrew)

RESPONSE by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 64 Objection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous ReliefObjection re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Peterson, Andrew)


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

IN THE MATTER OF THE §2703(d) ORDER RELATING TO TWITTER ACCOUNTS WIKILEAKS; ROP_G; IOERROR; AND BIRGITTAJ

No. 1:11EC3 (Judge Buchanan)

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE BUCHANAN'S JUNE 1, 2011 ORDER ON PUBLIC DOCKETING

The United States of America, by Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, hereby responds to the Objections of the Real Parties in Interest (the"subscribers") to Magistrate Judge Buchanan's June 1, 2011 Order on the public docketing of judicial records in § 2703(d) matters.

...


Respectfully submitted,

Neil H. MacBride

United States Attorney

By: ______/s/__________________

Andrew Peterson
Tracy Doherty-McCormick
John S. Davis
Assistant United States Attorneys
United States Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-370

 

21 Notice of Hearing Date (amended) set for July 29, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11 by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir

Notice of Hearing Date (amended) set for July 29, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11 by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. File not available. (Source:web archive)

16 Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Hillman Declaration and Exhibits A-F)

Notice of Hearing Date July 29, 2011 10:00 AM re 64 Objection, by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir 

Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 61 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Hillman Declaration and Exhibits A-F) File Not available. (Source:web archive)

15 WikiLeaks Grand Jury | Meets in Alexandria, VA. David House is called to testify at the secret grand jury in Alexandria, VA. He says that he pleads 5th and refuses to testify.

  • David House Grand Jury Subpoena Letter concerning criminal activity and espionage, (PDF)

    "We advise you that the Grand Jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to conspiracy to communicate or transmit national defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(g) and conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 to wit; knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access and having obtained information protected from disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) and knowingly stealing or converting any record of thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641"

    Signed by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, and Tracy Doherty-McCormick

  • David House Directions to the Grand Jury, (PDF)

  • David House Grand Jury Subpoena, (PDF)

  • Account of David House receipt of Grand Jury Subpoena, FireDogLake

  • David House's statement on the WikiLeaks Grand Jury, bradleymanning.org

  • "House said he wasn't told whether he is a target of the investigation. He said he was questioned about Manning's time in Boston in 2010 and about the activities of Jacob Appelbaum, a WikiLeaks volunteer in Seattle." Bloomberg News

  • David House account of his Grand Jury Testimony on Dylan Ratigan Show

  • David House account on Democracy Now speaks about his experience before the "Secret WikiLeaks Grand Jury" and U.S. Government Surveillance, (VIDEO) and (TRANSCRIPT)

AMY GOODMAN: On the eve of the extradition hearing for WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Julian Assange in London, we will spend an exclusive hour with David House, who co-founded the Bradley Manning Support Network after U.S. Army Private Manning was arrested for allegedly releasing classified U.S. documents to WikiLeaks. David House helped publicize the oppressive conditions of Manning's solitary confinement at the Quantico Marine Corps Base after he was allowed inside the prison to visit Bradley Manning. Manning's conditions at Quantico were described as tantamount to torture, and it was being investigated by Juan Méndez, the United Nations special rapporteur on torture. Last month, David House refused to testify before a grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia. House cited his right against self-incrimination and said the Obama administration is using Nixonian fear tactics to dismantle WikiLeaks.

Well, Democracy Now! caught up with David House in London over the July 4th weekend, when we went to London to moderate a discussion with Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks editor-in-chief, and the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. Today, we spend the hour with David House as he discusses how he founded--co-founded the Bradley Manning Support Network, talks about the federal surveillance that he has come under, his experience before the grand jury, and his visits to Quantico Marine Base in Virginia, where Manning was held in maximum-security confinement before being transferred to the Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I spoke to David House at the Frontline Club in London, which was founded to honor journalists killed on the front lines of war.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I'm Amy Goodman. We're in London, England, and I'm joined by David House. He's the co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network.

Welcome to Democracy Now!

DAVID HOUSE: Thanks.

AMY GOODMAN: Why did you found this network? When did you do it?

DAVID HOUSE: Well, I knew Bradley Manning in Boston in January 2010. And when the news of his arrest broke in May 2010, I was one of several friends of his in the Boston area who decided to get together to ensure that Bradley's due process was not infringed upon in the course of the U.S. government's investigation into his alleged involvement in the WikiLeaks disclosures.

AMY GOODMAN: How did you know Bradley?

DAVID HOUSE: I met him at a computer science event in the Boston area in January, a free software event. He was in attendance with some other friends from Boston, and we met very briefly, at the end.

AMY GOODMAN: Was this before or after Iraq?

DAVID HOUSE: Before or after Iraq?

AMY GOODMAN: He served in Iraq?

DAVID HOUSE: I'm not sure. I think he was on leave when he came to the event in January.

AMY GOODMAN: How did you learn what happened to Bradley Manning?

DAVID HOUSE: I was in my Cambridge residence. One of my friends came over and said, "Have you seen the news?" I said, obviously, "What news?" And we went over to my laptop. He opened it up, pulled up the Wired article by Kevin Poulsen, and there was a headline, something similar to "Adrian Lamo Turns in U.S. Intelligence Analyst," and a picture of Adrian Lamo and a picture of Bradley Manning. And my first thought was, you know, "Oh, my god! I know both of these people." And my second thought was, "Well, we have to do something to make sure this guy's due process is not infringed upon." So, that was kind of the beginning of what would become the BMSN, at least in the Boston area.

AMY GOODMAN: How did you know Adrian Lamo?

DAVID HOUSE: Adrian Lamo is a pretty well-known figure in computer circles, at least online. He makes himself very accessible to individuals. I think I met him online two or three years ago through a mutual friend from Alabama, of all places. So he was someone that's always kind of been on the internet and communicating with people that were very public in the hacking community for quite some time.

AMY GOODMAN: So, tell us what happened, or at least how you came to understand what happened to Bradley Manning.

DAVID HOUSE: Sure. So, in Boston in May, right after we decided we needed to do something, there was a mailing list put together online, and several activists from around the country and around the world got together around this mailing list to toss around ideas about what they could do to best support Bradley Manning. And out of this, the Bradley Manning Defense Fund was founded. And the Defense Fund was founded and is currently hosted by Courage to Resist. And it's raised over $150,000 for Bradley Manning's defense.

While all this was going on, all the infrastructure was going up, a big federal presence descended upon Boston. So, I was working at MIT, living in Cambridge, and one day I got a knock on my door, and there were four agents.

AMY GOODMAN: What were you doing at MIT?

DAVID HOUSE: I was doing information economics research with the Center for Digital Business. So, I got a knock on my door one day, and there were these four agents. Two identified themselves as Army CID, and two identified themselves as State Department, which could have been anything. And my roommate at the time was a Palestinian filmmaker at MIT, and so I remember being quite nervous as the agents came in my house, because there was kafiyas hanging on the wall and books about Palestine everywhere, which the agents took particular note of. And during the course of our hour-long conversation, I came to the understanding that they were trying to find evidence about the WikiLeaks leak in the Boston area and other hackers they thought may be associated with the disclosure of information allegedly coming from Bradley Manning. At the very end of the conversation, they offered me a cash reward in order to, as I said, keep my ear to the ground about WikiLeaks and Bradley Manning.

AMY GOODMAN: How much did they offer you?

DAVID HOUSE: No dollar amount was given, just a cash reward. And that's the point at which I asked them to leave the apartment. Over the series of, I would say, three to four weeks after that, there was very obvious surveillance happening of myself and my friends in the Boston area. And this surveillance presence kind of only emboldened us and gave us more confidence, but it was very odd to walk out of your apartment and to see a black sedan sitting down the street, the same black sedan you would later see outside your place of work. Students in the Boston area were questioned on the street for weeks after this, after this interview.

And so, right when the Bradley Manning Support Network was ramping up and these activists were coming together to figure out how they could help Bradley Manning, as in my case, a friend of mine, we were also under this mass surveillance, and it was quite an interesting experience to have to go through.

AMY GOODMAN: Did the Army, did the State Department descend on others, question them?

DAVID HOUSE: Yes, there were other people in Boston questioned, as well, people I'm not comfortable giving their names because obviously they're not as public in this affair as I am right now. But there were, I believe, at least four people who were questioned in addition to myself.

AMY GOODMAN: And was it your understanding they said they would not cooperate?

DAVID HOUSE: I'm unsure. What do you mean by "cooperate"?

AMY GOODMAN: Well, they offered you a cash reward; you asked them to leave.

DAVID HOUSE: Like become informants. Ah, I have no guarantee that anyone else refused to become informant. If they did, they didn't talk about it, so...

AMY GOODMAN: And what was your communication with Adrian Lamo?

DAVID HOUSE: During this time? Adrian and I didn't talk, at all. I mean, after the Wired chat logs were released via Wired, it was pretty clear that Adrian and I were no longer friends. And this was--

AMY GOODMAN: For the people who aren't familiar with this case, explain what those chats were that were released by Wired magazine.

DAVID HOUSE: Right, so Wired magazine released the alleged chat logs of Bradley Manning, between Bradley Manning and Adrian Lamo.

AMY GOODMAN: Some of them.

DAVID HOUSE: Some of them, right. And these chat logs were purported to show Bradley Manning confessing to having released the WikiLeaks cables to WikiLeaks. But there's a lot of controversy about the validity of these logs, whether they're true or not, because the logs, the way they're made up, it's actually just like a text document, something anyone can type up. And these were released by Wired.com, partially, during the May 2010 story that broke all of this to the mainstream press. So, after that happened, Adrian lost a lot of friends in the hacking world--I would say most friends in the hacking world--and all of his credibility was completely shot. At the HOPE Conference, the Hackers on Planet Earth Conference, in New York--

AMY GOODMAN: Hackers on Planet Earth?

DAVID HOUSE: Yes, yes. In that July, I mean, people were wearing T-shirts that said, you know, "stop snitching" and things like that. So, I mean, it was a very big cultural backlash against Adrian. So the only real communication I had with him was via like a random Facebook message or something to try to gauge where he was at and get information from him around, I think, end of July. But aside from that, no one really was talking to this guy. It became apparent that he was working for the Feds, and that was a very big deal.

AMY GOODMAN: We continue our conversation with David House, co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network. He'll talk about being stopped at airports and other issues in a minute.

[break]

AMY GOODMAN: We return to my conversation with David House at the Frontline Club in London. David House, co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network, recently testified before a grand jury investigating WikiLeaks and invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. I asked him how he came to be on the visitors' list for Bradley Manning when he was imprisoned at Quantico Marine Base in Virginia.

DAVID HOUSE: Around August of 2010, I was in Boston, again working with MIT and doing what I could to help out the support network online. A friend of Bradley Manning's, who was visiting him in confinement, came to me and said, "Well, I'm going down there on the weekends to meet with him. I'm going Saturday and Sunday, and it's a three-hour meeting each day. And I have a very hard time keeping up conversation for that block of time. Do you want to come with me? Because you can talk the ear off anyone." And I said, "OK, fine, I'll go with you." And because I had met Bradley earlier that year, it was OK for me to be on the visitors list, something about you had to have met him prior, something like that. So I was put on, and then early September was my first visit to see Bradley Manning in confinement at Quantico.

After that first visit, the friend who had introduced me to the visitors list said, "OK, for legal reasons, I kind of need to halt my visits for now. Will you please keep visiting him?" And I said, "Of course." And then an arrangement was worked out for me to keep going down from Boston once every two weeks to visit Bradley and make sure he was doing all right. So, that's kind of how I fell into it.

At the time, there was no media attention surrounding Bradley Manning. I mean, this was September 2010. From September to December, all the media attention was surrounding Julian Assange or WikiLeaks. And so, it was very surprising to me, in December 2010, when all of a sudden the media attention scaled up, and then the question became, "Well, how did you get on the visitors list?" The answer for a time was anyone could be put on the list; it's just that, for some reason, no one was applying.

AMY GOODMAN: Explain exactly how Bradley Manning was arrested and where he was.

DAVID HOUSE: I have no idea how exactly he was arrested.

AMY GOODMAN: And where he was.

DAVID HOUSE: I believe he was in Iraq, and he was transported to Kuwait after his arrest, but I have no details about his arrest.

AMY GOODMAN: And in Kuwait, what happened to him? Did you talk about it with him?

DAVID HOUSE: I've talked to Bradley about his confinement in Kuwait, but it's something I've agreed not to disclose to the press.

AMY GOODMAN: How long was he held there?

DAVID HOUSE: In Kuwait, I believe he was held in Kuwait from late May until early August, at which point he was transferred to the Quantico confinement facility.

AMY GOODMAN: Now, he still hadn't been charged.

DAVID HOUSE: That's correct.

AMY GOODMAN: Describe what happened to him at Quantico. How many times did you visit him there?

DAVID HOUSE: I visited him 12 to 13 times at Quantico. And it was very interesting, actually, trying to compare his initial state, when I started visiting him in September, to how he was over time, eventually, in my last visit in February: very different people, actually. When I first started visiting him, I mean, he was still, I would say, normal, to a very high degree. He was someone you could have a very in-depth conversation with. He didn't seem exhausted. He seemed very vibrant, very alive. As time progressed, around December 2010, he had deteriorated to a state where it was very hard to have a conversation with him, where he seemed utterly exhausted, fatigued all the time. And then January 2011 was the point at which he was the worst. It was almost impossible to really talk to him at all, and he looked--he looked like someone who had been held in solitary confinement for some months, you can imagine. It was this odd emotional roller coaster for me, because not only is this my friend, right, who's being held in confinement, but also you're actually watching him undergo this deterioration over time, like watching your friend waste away. And I think that seeing him like that and seeing this being an ongoing process was my main motivation in continuing activism for him, going into early this year.

AMY GOODMAN: Did he explain to you what they were doing to him at Quantico?

DAVID HOUSE: To a degree. Our conversations were monitored to a very high degree. And, of course, he was very--

AMY GOODMAN: How did you know?

DAVID HOUSE: Well, when you go in the facility, they tell you, and you sign a paper that says you're being monitored, and there's a sign in the room that says you're being monitored, and there's a microphone in the ceiling. So, all these things. Also, you know, when I'm talking to him, we're talking through bulletproof glass. There's the little bitty hole cut to like kind of yell through. And there are three very large Marine guards standing not 10 feet behind him, just staring me in the eyes the whole time. So, I mean, it's very obvious that the eyes of the state are upon you when you're talking to him, so...

AMY GOODMAN: And so, the description of what was happening to him, being strip-searched.

DAVID HOUSE: Being strip-searched and all that, that description did not come from me. That came out via his attorney. What I related to the press in December was the fact that he was being--had his access to exercise limited, that he was undergoing this psychological and physical deterioration, that he was held for 23 hours a day, and that essentially he was denied access to newspapers and other forms of media that would be--that one would expect prisoners to have, I think, in confinement. Glenn Greenwald actually followed up with an article that was very good and kind of pushed this out to the mainstream press. And then the lawyer David Coombs began releasing documents, kind of verifying that Bradley Manning had been mistreated in confinement, had been strip-searched, and had been punished by his Marine captors, going into January and February of that year.

AMY GOODMAN: Did this surprise you, that he was strip-searched?

DAVID HOUSE: You mean that he was made to stand at attention nude every morning and things like that?

AMY GOODMAN: Yeah, explain what you came to understand, even if he didn't tell it to you himself.

DAVID HOUSE: Right. So, as I understand it, there was a protest outside the Quantico Marine Base in January 2011. And based on this protest, the Marine guards became very upset with Bradley Manning. They began to harass him more frequently, and there was an event that happened a few weeks later in which they decided to actually remove all clothing from him and make him stand at attention nude every morning, kind of this humiliation tactic. This is after he had been in solitary confinement for some six months.

So, I mean, that was very alarming for me to hear, obviously. I'm someone who grew up in Alabama. You know, I'm an Eagle Scout. I'm someone whose parents are, you would say, very conservative. I never thought the state would actually go to these ends to punish someone, like a political person, or I would hear about this and always think that it was just, you know, an insane antiwar activist making things up. To actually go through the process of watching a friend deteriorate in solitary confinement and actually witness firsthand what the state is capable of doing to someone that they want to punish politically has been a very eye-opening process for me. And yeah, I never would have expected it would come to this, but now that it's happened, I don't know how I could have been so blind beforehand.

AMY GOODMAN: And so, describe his deterioration in the meetings you had with him.

DAVID HOUSE: To do so, I would need to give an accurate assessment of his mental and physical capacity over time, something I've been asked not to do by his attorney. So, unfortunately...

AMY GOODMAN: Talk about what he was charged with, what he has been charged with and when he was charged.

DAVID HOUSE: Right. He was charged with--there was an initial charge sheet released upon his arrest, as I understand it, in May 2010. And then another charge sheet was released in February 2011 that levied a host--I believe 53 new charges against him, including a charge for aiding and abetting the enemy. This charge carries possibility of the death sentence, and while the prosecution has said they will not recommend the death sentence, it is actually up to the judge over his trial to determine whether or not he will actually receive the death penalty, if he's convicted of this charge.

So, it's very worrisome now, because you have this situation where a whistleblower, Bradley Manning, has been held in solitary confinement by the U.S. government--this alleged whistleblower--and if he is convicted, he faces the possibility of death for allegedly blowing the whistle on military crimes. So it's very worrisome actually to--even as someone like who's an American citizen to see someone held under these conditions and facing this punishment, you know, I thought this is something that China would do, maybe, but never my own government.

AMY GOODMAN: Talk about why he was moved from Quantico to Fort Leavenworth.

DAVID HOUSE: Bradley Manning's attorney, David Coombs, has stated that the move from Quantico to Leavenworth was made possible by political pressure from the United Kingdom--in particular, calls by a House of Commons member of Parliament named Ann Clwyd, who is from Wales. Of course, Bradley Manning is said to hold dual Welsh and U.S. citizenship. And this MP, Ann Clwyd, caused considerable pressure after bringing up in an adjournment debate in the House of Commons that Bradley Manning was indeed a Welsh citizen and deserved to have consular access while he was in confinement at Quantico. This after several months of news media about his conditions of confinement. So David Coombs said this pressure from the U.K. was fundamental in actually getting him moved to Fort Leavenworth.

AMY GOODMAN: Have you seen him in Fort Leavenworth?

DAVID HOUSE: I have not seen him in Fort Leavenworth. I don't know anyone that has, except for potentially one family member. And the attorney and that one family member aren't giving much information out about how he's doing, so of course I'm very worried about how he may be doing at Leavenworth.

AMY GOODMAN: So, let's backtrack and talk about what has happened to you with the government since the day they knocked on your door, the Army and the State Department at--

DAVID HOUSE: Sure.

AMY GOODMAN: --in Cambridge.

DAVID HOUSE: Sure. So, apart from the initial meeting where they knocked on my door and tried to get a sense of who I was--so, coming into the Chicago O'Hare Airport last November with my girlfriend Valerie, we were stopped immediately getting off the plane. Our passports were checked, and after our passports were checked, the people checking our passports ran ahead and kind of prepped the customs area. It was very obvious what was going on. When we arrived to the customs area, we went through customs just fine. We were admitted into the country, and then we went to the bag search area, where both of our belongings--all of our belongings were searched very thoroughly. They had picked up my computer, made note that it was warm, went through all of our books, found a copy of the book Hackers by Steven Levy and asked my girlfriend Valerie at length about the book Hackers, why she was reading it, etc.

So, I was leaving the border search area. I was approached by two individuals who identified themselves initially as Department of Homeland Security agents. These two individuals told me I was compelled to surrender all my belongings, including my electronic belongings, so my computer, flash drive, cell phone, video camera. After they took my belongings to the back, they led my girlfriend Valerie and I back through the customs area--so it's like white cubicles, only people have guns instead of office pens, things like that--took us back to an interrogation area, where we were interrogated for about an hour, I would say.

AMY GOODMAN: Separately?

DAVID HOUSE: At points, yes. Ended up missing our connecting flight. And I was asked, first and foremost, to surrender my password to my laptop computer, as well as password to an encrypted media they have on me, a request which I refused, obviously, as any American should when asked to do such things. But it was very odd, and the questions they asked me were primarily focused around the Bradley Manning Support Network, whether it was true I had built the website for the Support Network, whether it was true I had been to visit Manning in prison.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you build the website?

DAVID HOUSE: Yes, I did. At the point, I had helped build the website. They have a new one now.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you help build the new one?

DAVID HOUSE: No, I didn't, no. But it was very odd, because it seemed like I was being targeted just for my activism for Bradley Manning and like my computer was being seized not because it posed any real threat to national security, but because it may provide them some insight into the inner functionings of the Bradley Manning Support Network, a legal group in the States of legal advocates working for Bradley Manning's defense. So the ACLU filed a lawsuit recently, based on this computer seizure, in hopes of creating a policy that keeps the government from actually executing these warrantless search and seizures at our borders based on legal U.S. advocates. So, that's what happened with the computer seizure.

And that was very hard for me, because it--you know, I lost two weeks of code for MIT, so I was economically disfranchised. I didn't have my computer. It was taken from me. And they did not return it within the legal amount of time required for them to return it in. It took them 45 days, and they only returned it after they received a demand letter from the ACLU demanding its return. So, yeah, it was a very odd process to go through. But I'm not the only one who had my computer seized; there have been others, as well. I was just the only one who made it to the media.

AMY GOODMAN: What happened to Jacob Appelbaum?

DAVID HOUSE: Jake Appelbaum--

AMY GOODMAN: And do you know him?

DAVID HOUSE: I know of Jake. Jake Appelbaum is a public figure in the hacking world. He's a computer security expert, quite well known and quite well liked. And he gave a talk at the HOPE Hacker Conference in July 2010 in which he kind of came out as a WIkiLeaks volunteer and delivered the keynote address at HOPE for WikiLeaks in Julian Assange's stead.

AMY GOODMAN: Because Julian Assange was invited to the conference but didn't go?

DAVID HOUSE: Well, yeah, this was in the middle of all of the investigations going on, and as I understand it, from what Jake said at the talk, Julian couldn't be there because of the federal presence at the conference. And there was a huge federal presence. I mean, I was--where I was sitting in the conference, there was a Fed sitting next to me.

AMY GOODMAN: How did you know?

DAVID HOUSE: Well, he had a BlackBerry that was one of those old versions that has the little--has the screens that have the black film over it so you can't actually see it when you tilt it. He was texting the whole time. He had New Balance shoes on, white socks, khaki pants, and a hacking T-shirt. They all get the same email before the conference saying this is how a hacker dresses, and so they all wear the same, right, descript stuff. And he had his hair--his head shaven like an Air Force pilot or like a Navy pilot or something. Very obvious. And during the screening of the "Collateral Murder" video, you know, it was obvious he was a Fed. So I leaned over to him, and I said, "What you're doing supports this kind of activity." And he looked at me very surprised and said, "Why, yes, it does." And we had this kind of very brief interaction, so that's how I know.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you mean, "Yes, it does"?

DAVID HOUSE: Well, he said, "Yes, it does," in terms of, "Yes, what I'm doing, I work for the Army." He's probably Army CID or something. And, "Yes, what I do do--what I do supports the killing of these people."

AMY GOODMAN: And just explain for a moment the July 2007 video.

DAVID HOUSE: The "Collateral Murder" video is a video of two Reuters journalists, amongst other individuals, being gunned down by an Apache helicopter gunship in Iraq. This is a video that caused considerable controversy when it was released in April of 2010 by the WikiLeaks organization. The video itself had been requested by the Reuters news agency several years prior but was denied by the U.S. government. So WikiLeaks released the video in April 2010, and it caused quite a public outcry.

AMY GOODMAN: We'll come back to our conversation with David House, co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network, in a minute. We're speaking in London.

[break]

AMY GOODMAN: We return to our conversation with David House, co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network.

DAVID HOUSE: I am stopped. My electronics are usually--asked to power this up, make sure it works, etc., weird stuff like that. They haven't seized anything electrical since that November affair, but I am asked about my connections with people, where I've been traveling to, at points my views on the Iraq war, Afghanistan war, about my association with Bradley Manning, etc., etc. And these questions have gotten less and less over time, which is good. But it's--

AMY GOODMAN: Do you answer the questions?

DAVID HOUSE: It depends on what the question is.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you answer, then, when they ask you what are your views on the Iraq and Afghanistan war?

DAVID HOUSE: I tell them it's none of their business, usually. It's not any of their business. And when they ask me who I've been staying with or where I'm going, again, it's none of their business. I mean, these are questions that they're asking you to volunteer information at the border. And as a U.S. citizen, I don't believe we have the obligation to answer the questions of CBP at the border searches. I think that if they want information, they can obtain a subpoena or obtain a warrant, but they don't have either of those at the border, and this authority to actually question individuals about their legal associations, political associations, is claimed by the U.S. government. It was not granted to them. So I don't answer these questions.

AMY GOODMAN: Have the authorities ever seized your laptop again?

DAVID HOUSE: No, they have not.

AMY GOODMAN: They have never taken it out of your possession?

DAVID HOUSE: No, no. And I would know if they did. I maintain pretty much uninterrupted physical control of my computer at all times, to make sure that it's not compromised by the government in any way. So, yeah, they don't take it.

AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to ask you, David, about what Julian Assange said in the conversation I had with him this July 4th weekend in London. He talked about the grand jury.

JULIAN ASSANGE: That grand jury involves 19 to 23 people selected from that area. Now, why was it in Alexandria, Virginia, six kilometers to the center of Washington, that that grand jury was placed and those people drawn? Well, it has the highest density of government employees anywhere in the United States. The U.S. government was free to select the place, and they selected this place in order to bias the jury from the very beginning. This is, in fact, wrong to call a jury. This is a type of medieval star chamber. There are these 19 to 23 individuals from the population that are sworn to secrecy. They cannot consult with anyone else. There is no judge, there is no defense counsel, and there are four prosecutors. So, that is why people that are familiar with grand jury inquiries in the United States say that a grand jury would not only indict a ham sandwich, it would indict the ham and the sandwich. And that's a real threat to us.

AMY GOODMAN: That was Julian Assange critiquing the whole grand jury system. You went before the grand jury. Can you talk about it, David?

DAVID HOUSE: So, the grand jury, as I understand it, is investigating the associations between Julian Assange and Bradley Manning, the alleged associations between them. As I understand it, it was convened around November of last year and has been running ever since. Recently, subpoenas have been issued to members of the Bradley Manning Support Network and others in the Boston area. I, myself, have been among these people that had a subpoena issued. And so, I had to go to the grand jury on June 15, 2011, just a few weeks ago, because they--

AMY GOODMAN: In Alexandria?

DAVID HOUSE: Right. And I was commanded to testify before the grand jury everything I knew about Bradley Manning and WikiLeaks, even Jacob Appelbaum, people of that sort. During the grand jury, I refused to answer any questions aside from my name and address, pleading the Fifth Amendment--well, the Fifth, First and Fourth Amendments, to whichever the question that was asked during the grand jury. And it was quite a controversy, actually, because despite the fact that the six AUSAs, assistant U.S. attorneys, that were present were very upset by this, they were also very upset at my note taking and tried to get me to stop taking notes the entire time, saying things such as, "I would like to state for the record Mr. House is not answering the questions and is instead taking notes," and kind of ridiculing me openly for doing that, saying, you know, "Oh, did you get the last question? Did you get everything down?" da-da-da-da-da, right?

So, a very odd, very frantic atmosphere within the grand jury. And adding to the franticness was the fact that outside the windows of the grand jury you could see the WikiLeaks truck driving by every 15 minutes or so. This artistic van that had the giant WikiLeaks logo on the side and said, "WikiLeaks Mobile Information Collection Unit," would drive by, and the grand jury would kind of crack up a little bit. So, a very odd atmosphere, but I felt pretty good about it, because I had given no information away, and I had gotten a list of questions that they were trying to [inaudible].

AMY GOODMAN: What were the questions that they were asking you?

DAVID HOUSE The questions centered around Bradley Manning's time in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in January 2010, who he had associated with there. And then questions about Jacob Appelbaum, oddly enough, and other security researchers in the U.S. And I have worked with my attorney to provide these questions with the attorneys of other individuals being investigated in this case.

AMY GOODMAN: So you're not cooperating?

DAVID HOUSE Oh, of course not, no, no. It was unconscionable to cooperate with this grand jury. The grand jury is obviously politically motivated, and it's--I can't imagine a principled activist for Bradley Manning or for WikiLeaks cooperating with this investigation in any way. And it's been said by others in the Boston area that they will not cooperate, even if they are compelled to testify before the grand jury. So it seems to be this is like a commonly held belief in the Boston area.

In fact, the day that I was actually called to testify, there was a protest happening outside the Alexandria court house and also in Boston against the grand jury and the politically motivated investigation of WikiLeaks currently happening in the States. And in my mind, this kind of reeks of the Pentagon Papers investigation. I mean, Richard Nixon's DOJ 40 years ago attempted to kind of curtail the freedoms of the press and politically regulate the press through the use of policy created around the espionage investigation of the New York Times. I feel the WikiLeaks case we have going on now provides Obama's DOJ ample opportunity to kind of continue this attempt to politically regulate the U.S. media, and so I'm very worried about this happening. And I think this grand jury is a step in the process.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the Boston University tech center, BUILDS?

DAVID HOUSE BUILDS is a--what some call a "hacker space." It's really just a place for computer-savvy youth, or people who want to become computer-savvy, to gather and learn more about the computer trade in general. So it kind of operates on this open-door policy, where if you want to know how to solder electronics, and you don't know how, you can come into BUILDS, and we'll teach you. If you want to how to build a robot or program or even do something artistic, we'll teach you. So BUILDS is kind of one of these open spaces that we hope will help empower people through the use of technology. And it's very indicative, I feel, of the culture in Boston: people and youth who are empowered through their use of tech, both socially and otherwise. So, that was the kind of foundational aspect of BUILDS that was very important for me in the Boston area, and I think Bradley Manning was attracted to BUILDS for that very reason, as well.

AMY GOODMAN: So did you spend a lot of time with Bradley in--or was it a brief time?

DAVID HOUSE No, it was only very brief, actually, which is very odd as why I was targeted so much when the Army CID came to Boston in June. It was as if anyone who had had even infrequent contacts with Bradley Manning were being targeted. That's why it was very bizarre to me.

AMY GOODMAN: Has BUILDS come over--come under the government microscope completely?

DAVID HOUSE Oh, yes, yes, it sure has, and it's completely ridiculous. I mean, the government wants a very easy-to-digest media narrative about the whole WikiLeaks investigation out there. So, the FRONTLINE PBS piece, for example, tried to infer that the BUILDS hacker space had somehow helped Bradley Manning leak or traffic documents or something like that. Completely ridiculous, completely erroneous stuff, right? He was there for one night. But because it fit the predetermined narrative, because BUILDS has the word "hacker" associated with it in some way, it's kind of been spun out by the U.S. government as if this group is somehow responsible for what they would call espionage.

So it has been very hard, you know, dealing with a group of students in Boston who were interested primarily in learning and in exploration and in doing what they feel is best for student culture, not coming under attack by the U.S. government in a very ham-fisted investigation. It is very sad, very bizarre. And I think it shows really how frantic the U.S. government is to link Julian Assange and Bradley Manning. I mean, they will do anything and railroad over any organization they can in order to make this connection, and I think it's very unfortunate. And it's a sign of weakness on their part.

AMY GOODMAN: Have you come to know Bradley a good deal in these visits that you've had?

DAVID HOUSE Remarkably, yes. It's funny how--I mean, our conversations are limited, right, so we can't talk about WikiLeaks. We can't talk about things relating to the case, because we are being recorded. So we have to talk about philosophical ideals or things in the abstract or mathematics or computer science. And so, through this, we've developed quite a strong intellectual bond, and he's a very intelligent young man. I think that when and if he is released from prison, he may have a career as a professor or a career as a statesman ahead of him. He's that level of intelligence, and I'm glad to have known him.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you think is the possibility he will be released? And when is there going to be a trial?

DAVID HOUSE That's absolutely up to the amount of support he gets through the American public. If the American public stand up and demand his release and demand a fair trial for him and his due process, I feel he may actually get a fair trial, and he may not spend very long in prison at all. But if that does not happen, then people like Mike Huckabee, calling for his execution, those voices will speak louder, and he may well be executed, and that's what's very alarming.

AMY GOODMAN: Explain what happened with State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley. He came to MIT. Who was he addressing?

DAVID HOUSE As I understand it, P.J. Crowley was addressing a crowd of students at MIT during a semi-private event, and he was asked about Bradley Manning's conditions of confinement, and he said it was ridiculous, counterproductive and stupid. And when he was asked if this was on the record, he said yes. When this was reported by bloggers that were at the event, it took off in the media, U.S. and abroad. I was in London when I heard about it on Al Jazeera. And then, a few days later, P.J. Crowley was forced to resign by the Obama White House. So...

AMY GOODMAN: What do you think of what he said?

DAVID HOUSE Well, I think he was spot on. I think that P.J. Crowley, for that moment, was being very perceptive and was being very honest about his perceptions. And that kind of openness about policy in Washington is very rare these days. Very rare. If the WikiLeaks cables have taught us nothing, it's that deception is the currency used on Capitol Hill. And so, for Crowley to come out and say something that true and that honest, I think, was quite good to see and quite refreshing.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you think Bradley Manning was tortured in prison?

DAVID HOUSE I think that he was put under solitary confinement for some eight months, that he underwent sensory deprivation, and he was denied access to visitors and exercise. I think that I feel, as many do, that this constitutes torture, yes. John McCain, the U.S. senator, has said of his time in solitary confinement that it was worse than any form of physical torture he ever had to endure. The E.U. human rights court is currently considering banning extradition from the E.U. to the U.S., based on the fact that the U.S. does implement solitary confinement in prisons such as Quantico and at Leavenworth. So, yes, I feel you can make the case this is torture, and from what I saw of Bradley Manning and his deterioration, I would say definitely what he underwent was torture.

AMY GOODMAN: Does it make you afraid, for yourself?

DAVID HOUSE In what regard?

AMY GOODMAN: The possibility of you being imprisoned like this.

DAVID HOUSE Not really. I think that we're well past the point where people should be afraid. I think that everyone's kind of been living under this culture of fear in the States for some time now, been manifesting itself in different ways, most recently in--as citizens giving up our power, ceding our power, to a state that is growing very large and that is threatening to take away even more of our power, if we do not listen to it, if we do not kind of bow down and say, "OK, that's fine."

This culture of fear is something that must be combated against. And the only way to do that is to take a very firm, principled stand as a U.S. citizen and say, "No, as a democracy, the citizens have rights, and we will fight to defend those rights." I think that if what I'm doing is activism, I have nothing to worry about. And if what I'm doing is called civil disobedience, then I feel that civil disobedience actually does restore some measure of dignity to the people, and thus, in times like this, may be necessary. So, am I afraid? No, not at all. And if I am afraid, it takes managing that fear to move forward. And I would encourage every U.S. citizen to manage their fears and do what they can to take a firm, principled stand here, because everyone is an activist now.

AMY GOODMAN: What has most surprised you over this last year?

DAVID HOUSE How frantic and--what's the word I'm looking for?--incompetent the U.S. government has been in prosecuting this investigation. Julian Assange said yesterday during the event that silence from powerful institutions is a show of strength, so if you step over ants and you crush a few of them, and the ants protest, you don't feel the need to address the ants, you keep moving. In this circumstance, we've seen the U.S. government do everything it can to kind of tell the media, "No, no, no, we're the good guys," while at the same time, in the background, torturing Bradley Manning, seizing the computers of activists, and doing all manner of horrible atrocities, to try to cover up the disclosures from WikiLeaks. I think this shows that the institutions that are perpetrating these crimes are in fact weak and that we, as in the U.S. people, have the responsibility to put some pressure on these institutions to encourage them to change their policies and to take a firm stand, because the U.S. government's ham-fisted investigation shows that it is weak in its prosecution of this affair and that if we push hard enough, things will change.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you think WikiLeaks has changed the world?

DAVID HOUSE Oh, definitely. I mean, no one will say that we do not live in a post-WikiLeaks world. There was this realization last December, after all this stuff was released, that, you know, "Oh, my god, things are changed forever," for better or for worse. And I think that we are a world walking into a connected age. We are a people, as a species, who have never dealt with this degree of connectedness before in our society. And this is going to do very interesting things, not just to the economic sphere, which it already has, but also to the political sphere, as well. And WikiLeaks is one of the first steps in this process. So, I don't know. I think that, yes, WikiLeaks has changed the world, but it's more part of this organic process of changing the world. Technology is taking us to a level we've never been at before, and WikiLeaks is part of this. And our democracy will benefit from it.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you tell me anything about your family?

DAVID HOUSE Sure. So, my grandfather was a detective in Birmingham, Alabama, during the civil rights events happening in the 1960s, and he was one of the only King supporter on the department in the Birmingham Police Department. He was a detective his whole life. And he actually gave the notebooks to King that King used to write Letters from the Birmingham Jail. So my grandfather said that King initially was using the margins of his newspaper to write an essay, and my grandfather noticed this, went out to a drugstore and bought him a notebook, came back and gave it to him to use, that he would later use to write the Letters from Birmingham Jail. My grandfather's job on the police department was to essentially make sure that the Klan, the Ku Klux Klan, was not hurting King supporters in and around the Birmingham area and ensure that peace was being kept to a very large degree.

And I've read through my grandfather's journals, and it's very interesting, actually, seeing this principled man who grew up in the middle of Alabama during the civil rights era who actually undergoes this kind of mental transformation while he's on the department, saying that when King said, "Justice delayed is justice denied," that was very pivotal for him. It was a phrase that caught like fire amongst him and others in the department and really started their support for King in the civil rights era. So, I wear my grandfather's ring as a reminder to me what people can do when they take a very principled stand. I feel that my grandfather's actions in the police department were a symbol for others to be King supporters or to treat those more fairly that were imprisoned during the civil rights era. And I hope that I can live up to those principles in my everyday life as a U.S. citizen.

AMY GOODMAN: The Birmingham church bombing?

DAVID HOUSE Yes. My grandfather was the lead investigator in the Birmingham church bombing that killed the four young girls in Birmingham, Alabama. It was a racially motivated bombing. The Klan had planted dynamite under the steps of a Baptist church, and they had thought that they were going to blow up an empty church, but there were four young girls practicing for a choir inside the church that were killed. This was very--had a very huge impact on my grandfather and others in the department.

AMY GOODMAN: I mean, they couldn't have thought they weren't going to hurt anyone, because it went off Sunday morning.

DAVID HOUSE Oh, really? Interestingly enough. OK, interesting. The line that was in the U.S.--that was in the Alabama media at the time, as I understand it, was that they thought they wouldn't hurt anyone, right? But there again, the Klan had a very large influence in Alabama during this time. And reading through my grandfather's notes and all the papers about the case that our family has access to, it's very interesting actually seeing him go through this investigation. The way he talks about the affairs happening between the Klan and King supporters in the Birmingham area, you get the feeling that it was a city on the brink. It was a city on edge, almost like a war zone, and things ready to break out at any time. And it's interesting--I can't imagine what it would have been like to have been in his shoes during that time and actually be a King supporter in the middle of all this, behind enemy lines, as it were.

AMY GOODMAN: Did he have many friends in the Birmingham Police Department?

DAVID HOUSE Oh, he did. He was there for many, many years.

AMY GOODMAN: What was his name?

DAVID HOUSE Maurice House. Maurice House was his name. And I'm David Maurice House, named after him. But yeah, he was a very principled man. He died when I was very young. So I probably projected some of my idealism onto him, obviously, as people tend to do, but it's been very remarkable reading his stories and actually coming to know him and his principles just through that. It's been very nice.

AMY GOODMAN: I'm trying to turn this off.

DAVID HOUSE But he really gave me the--he was the one who instilled in me the idea that principles are very important for someone to live their life, you know, because you're--

AMY GOODMAN: How old were you when he--

DAVID HOUSE When he died? I was 12, I think. But, I mean, he really taught me that, without principles, you don't really have a leg to stand on, right? And in our government now, you see people--a complete abdication of principles, whatever those principles may be.

AMY GOODMAN: David House, co-founder of the Bradley Manning Support Network, speaking to us in London, England.

From the Time Line with Source Documents

  • January 10, 2010, Bradley Manning attends open software event in Boston, MA where David House was also in attendance.

  • Early June, soon after Bradley Manning is arrested in Baghdad, Iraq, David House is questioned both at his home and place of work in Cambridge, by investigators for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. House says agents interview 4 or 5 individuals in Boston area.

  • August 2010, Unidentified friend of Bradley Manning invites David House to join him on a visit to Bradley Manning at Quantico that occurs in early September.

  • September 2010, David House makes first visit to Bradley Manning at Quantico with unidentified friend.

  • Beginning in September 2010, David House is detained for questioning at the border on each of seven occasions he reenters the United States after foreign travel and is routinely questioned on those occasions about his work with the Support Network or his political beliefs and activities.

  • November 3, 2010, David House and his girlfriend are met and examined in the concourse of Chicago O'Hara by customs agents, who extensively search their bags. They are detained for questioning by two men, Marcial Santiago and Darin Louck, who identified themselves as Homeland Security Agents. House subsequently learned from Agent Santiago that although Agent Louck identified himself as a Homeland Security agent, he is, in fact, with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. House's electronic products were seized at a "border search" see image below. Acceptance/CHAIN of CUSTODY includes Special Agent, R. Hart,of Chicago, ICE.

  • December 21, 2010, ACLU faxes DHS, CBP, and ICE requesting David House's electronic devices be returned to him immediately. The letter also requests that House be provided with documentation of the chain of custody of any copies made of the information contained on his devices and documentation of their destruction

  • December 22, 2010, David House has his electronic devices returned to him by DHS CIS New York District, even though they were seized by R. Hart, SAC CHI ICE.

  • December 30, 2010, General counsel for ICE [WHO WAS THIS?] sends letter to David House noting his electronic devices have been returned but not indicating whether any information derived from those electronic devices had been copied, or what agencies or individuals were given copies, or whether such copies were destroyed.

  • November 3, 2011, David House sues government over Nov 3, 2010 laptop seizure.

  • June 15, 2011, US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA David House is called to testify at the secret grand jury in Alexandria, VA. According to his public account, he pleads 5th and refuses to testify.

David House WikiLeaks Grand Jury Subpoena & Testimony in the Press

  • "WikiLeaks grand jury witness David House refuses to testify," invokes Fifth Amendment, Raw Story

  • , Alyona Show, RT

  • "WikiLeaks Grand Jury investigation widens," Glenn Greenwald, Salon

  • "WikiLeaks Grand Jury Witness Says He Declined To Answer Queries On Manning," Bloomberg

  • "WikiLeaks witness takes the Fifth," CNN

  • "Boston Protest in Support of David House/Bradley Manning/Wikileaks Tomorrow," Jane Hamsher, FireDogLake

  • "Grand Jury Meets to Question WikiLeaks Supporters: 'Do You or Have You Ever Worked for WikiLeaks?'" Kevin Gosztola, FiredogLake

  • Time for Those Subpoenaed in WikiLeaks Grand Jury Investigation to Setup Support Committee?, Kevin Gosztola, FireDogLake

  • "US WikiLeaks probe gathers pace with new hearing,"AFP

  • "Protesters Blow Whistles Over Wikileaks Subpoenas," The Epoch Times

  • "More subpoenas in WikiLeaks probe," Politico

  • "Rallies planned to protest WikiLeaks Grand Jury subpoenas Wednesday," bradleymanning.org

  • "Lynndie England Testifying Before Grand Jury Today," Jane Hamsher, FireDogLake

  • "Manning's friend won't testify," RT News

  • "Civic Counsel Protests Grand Jury Investigation of Boston Supporters of WikiLeaks," openmediaboston.org

  • "FBI issues Grand Jury subpoena presumed to relate to Wikileaks, Espionage Act charges,"Boing Boing

  • "Supporter of Leak Suspect Is Called Before Grand Jury," New York Times

  • "Bradley Manning supporters rally at WikiLeaks federal grand jury," Raw Story

  • "US WikiLeaks witness and Bradley Manning supporter refuses to testify to grand jury," David Swanson warisacrime.org

  • "Supporters to rally as WikiLeaks grand jury meets," AP and AP Picture of David House leaving the Alexandria Court House

  • "Witness raps WikiLeaks grand jury proceedings, evokes Pentagon Papers," Government Security News

  • "WikiLeaks grand jury sparks protests," Government Security News

  • "WikiLeaks grand jury witness refuses to testify," AP

House says that many others from the Boston area are refusing to testify. (Source: democracynow.org)

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

13 US v PFC Bradley Manning | Asst. Sec. of Navy responds to Manning Article 138 Complaint.

"Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Juan M. Garcia [PICTURED TO THE LEFT. See Assistant Secretary of the Navy's bio.], apparently acting under a delegation of authority, determined that CWO4 James Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] did not exceed his authority or abuse his discretion when he kept PFC Manning isolated for 23 hours a day in Maximum Custody and under Prevention of Injury Watch...Mr. Garcia's [ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO THE NAVY] determination did not address PFC Manning's amended Article 138 complaint against the current commander of the Quantico Brig, Chief Warrant Officer Denise Barnes.  In the amended complaint, PFC Manning alleged that Chief Warrant Officer Barnes acted improperly when she ordered him to strip naked and surrender his clothing nightly." (Source: David Coombs, Official Response to Article 138 Complaint)

Special Note:

This determination was intended for the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, but he delegated authority to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Juan M. Garcia. See bio.

8 Reply of Real Parties In Support Of Objections to Magistrate's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order

Reply by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11 (Glenberg, Rebecca)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of June, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with

the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF)

to the following counsel of record:

Tracy D. McCormick
Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]

2 Government's Response to Objections to Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order

RESPONSE by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 58 MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11MOTION for Hearing for Objection re 57 Order dated 5/4/11 (Peterson, Andrew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN THE MATTER OF THE §2703(d) ORDER RELATING TO TWITTER ACCOUNTS: WIKILEAKS; ROP_G; IOERROR; AND BIRGITTAJ GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE BUCHANAN'S MAY 4, 2011 ORDER ON PUBLIC DOCKETING

The United States of America, by Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, hereby responds to the Objections of the Real Parties in Interest (the"subscribers") regarding Magistrate Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Order on the public docketing of judicial records in § 2703(d) matters.

No. 1:11EC3 (Judge Buchanan)

The United States of America, by Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, hereby responds to the Objections of the Real Parties in Interest (the "subscribers") regarding Magistrate Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Order on the public docketing of judicial records in § 2703(d) matters. Relying principally on the public's common law presumption of access to court records, the subscribers assert an unprecedented right to obtain an itemized public docket specifically identifying each document filed in any section 2703(d) matter in an ongoing criminal investigation – including matters that this Court has already ordered sealed. As demonstrated below, Judge Buchanan's Order, and the docket maintained in this matter by the Clerk of Court, provide the public with sufficient notice regarding any ongoing sealed proceedings or records. Footnote No. 1

Footnote No. 1:
The subscribers' objections presupposes that a right of access to the underlying documents exist. That issue is already before the Court, and fully briefed by the Parties. To the extent the Court finds that no public right of access to orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) exists, there is no basis for this request for public docketing

...

The challenges were assigned number 1:11-dm-0003 by the Clerk's office. A "dm" number is a type of miscellaneous number used by the Clerk's office for matters that are neither criminal nor civil cases but require some type of resolution through the judicial system. See District Clerk's Manual, § 4.03(a)(1) (2010). Litigation ensued. Footnote 2

Footnote 2: The descriptions and definitions of the Clerk's office's case numbering system are based on materials available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, discussions with the Clerk's office, and the experience of the United States Attorney's Office. To the extent the government's understanding is incomplete or incorrect, the Court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Fletcher v. United States, 174 F.2d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 1949).

...

An "ec" case number is a new designation used by the Clerk's office for pen registers and orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

...

The Clerk's office manages three types of "cases." See District Clerk's Manual § 4.03. These are civil, criminal, and magistrate judge cases, designated "cv," "cr," and "mj" respectively. Id. "Mj" numbers are used for proceedings before a magistrate judge which have not yet become a criminal case.

...

The Clerk's office also tracks some other ancillary and supplementary proceedings that do not fall within the three categories above. Id. § 4.03(a)(1). Such proceedings are assigned "miscellaneous numbers," and these matters are not considered "cases." Id. ("Miscellaneous numbers are assigned to a variety of matters filed with the court which are not properly considered civil or criminal cases."). Miscellaneous numbers are assigned to actions concerning "administrative matters that require resolution through the judicial system." Id. The District Clerk's Manual identifies numerous proceedings that may be assigned miscellaneous numbers, such as pen registers, wire interceptions, and grand jury matters. Id.

...

DM" Numbers A "DM" number is assigned by the Clerk's office in the Eastern District of Virginia to miscellaneous matters. Courts around the country use different numbering systems for miscellaneous matters, including "mc," "ms," and others. See Tim Reagan and George Cort, Sealed Cases in the Federal Courts ("Sealed Cases") 23 (Federal Judicial Center 2009). However, only the Eastern District of Virginia uses "dm" numbers. Id. (noting that only one district uses "dm" numbers for miscellaneous matters).

...

An "EC" number is a new numbering system used by the Clerk's office for pen registers and orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). All such pen registers and § 2703(d) orders are given an "ec" number and docketed at the time of issuance. A list of all such cases is available in the Clerk's office (the "running list"). Subscribers' Obj. Att. B. The "running list" 3 also contains a list of pleadings that have been unsealed in any "ec" matter, but not an itemized list of all the sealed documents in any "ec" matter.

...

A "GJ" number is assigned by the United States Attorney's Office, not the Clerk's office. GJ numbers are used by the United States Attorney's Office to identify documents related to a grand jury investigation. "GJ" numbers are created by U.S. Attorney's Office staff, and are used to ensure that subpoenas and other documents related to various investigations are appropriately handled and filed. An investigation assigned a "gj" number may become a criminal case, or it may not.

...

NB " The subscribers also reference the declaration of Stuart Sears, counsel for Jacob Appelbaum. An attorney is prohibited from serving as a witness in a case where the attorney also represents a party. See United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1155 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Media Gen. Operations v. Buchanan, 417 F.3d 424, 433 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005). In any event, the government does not contest Mr. Sears' descriptions of his interactions with the Clerk's office. " (Source: Government's Response to Objections to Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order)

...

"As demonstrated below, to the extent the parties request the docketing of "case" 10-gj- 3793, there is no "case" 10-gj-3793 opened in the Clerk's office. Consequently, there is no 10- gj-3793 docket to unseal. The subscribers are also not entitled to a docket that indicates every filing by any party that relates to a § 2703(d) order issued as part of the government's investigation. There is no common law right of access to § 2703(d) orders. Moreover, assuming such a right does exist, the docketing of any § 2703(d) orders on the "running list" provides adequate public notice to challenge the sealing of any such orders. " (Source: Government's Response to Objections to Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order)

...

" B. There Is No Case 10-GJ-3793, So There Is No Docket to Unseal. The subscribers state that they filed motions in case 10-gj-3793, and that they moved for the unsealing and public docketing "of all § 2703-related documents on the 10-gj-3793 docket." Subscribers' Obj. at 3. However, there is no case 10-gj-3793, and no corresponding docket maintained by the Clerk. Thus, the subscribers' request to the Court for the unsealing of the docket for case number 10-gj-3793 is misplaced. The Court cannot unseal a docket that does not exist. Nor does any law require this Court to create a docket listing documents filed according to a number assigned by the United States Attorney's Office, or to seek out matters docketed under other numbers and identify them on a docket specific to the subscribers. Thus, to the extent the subscribers' request that the Court order the creation of a docket relating to the ongoing investigation identified by 10-gj-3793, the request should be denied"

...

Although no right to public docketing of § 2703(d) orders exists, the Clerk does publicly docket § 2703(d) orders in accordance with Local Criminal Rule 49. When a sealed § 2703(d) order is filed, the Clerk's office assigns that order an "ec" number. Pen registers are also assigned "ec" numbers. The list of all matters given an "ec" number by the Clerk's office is available to the public (the "running list"). Footnote 8 Thus, the existence of any sealed § 2703(d) order or 8 pen register is made public, although details of the § 2703(d) orders or pen registers are not. As such, there is public notice that a § 2703(d) order has issued, thus allowing a challenge by any member of the public to the sealing of such order.

....


That the "running list" does not contain individual docket entries for each document file...

...

For the same reasons, to the extent that any § 2703(d) orders pre-date the Clerk's "ec" 12 numbering system, the subscribers are not entitled to a list of such orders that relate to the subscribers.

...

Respectfully submitted,

Neil H. MacBride

United States Attorney

By: ______/s/__________________

Andrew Peterson
Tracy Doherty-McCormick
John S. Davis
Assistant United States Attorneys
United States Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-3700

1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner's Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records 3 is DENIED as to this last remaining issue. An appropriate order will be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 6/1/2011.

ORDER granting 3 Motion as to Jacob Appelbaum ; Rop Gonggrijp ; Birgitta Jonsdottir. ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is DENIED as to the remaining issue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 6/1/2011.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner's Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records 3 is DENIED as to this last remaining issue. An appropriate order will be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 6/1/2011. This document is unavailable. (Source:web archive)

Motion Denying Defendant's Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records

Jun Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-46A, June 2011,of the Inspection of Embassy Dakar, Senegal by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General,Office of Inspections,"The recent WikiLeaks release of at least three reporting cables from Embassy Dakar has had an impact. The embassy reports Senegalese President Wade’s anger over a WikiLeaks newspaper article which, although a mischaracterization, reflected unfavorably on the President."

Dakar’s four-person political section produces frequent, well-regarded reporting on a range of issues of interest to Washington policymakers. The recent WikiLeaks release of at least three reporting cables from Embassy Dakar has had an impact. The embassy reports Senegalese President Wade’s anger over a WikiLeaks newspaper article which, although a mischaracterization, reflected unfavorably on the President. The section’s three American officers, who are assisted by one LE staff member, all arrived within the past 10 months. For long stretches during that period, only one officer was present. The arrival during the inspection of the third American officer, the Guinea-Bissau action officer, ended an 8-month gap in that position.

(Source: Department of State, Report Number ISP-I-11-46A, June 2011,of the Inspection of Embassy Dakar, Senegal by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General,Office of Inspections)

Jun Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-42A, June 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Pretoria, South Africa, and Constituent Posts by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections, "The recent, unauthorized release of sensitive diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks has had a chilling effect on access to South African contacts."

From Report Number ISP-I-11-42A, June 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Pretoria, South Africa, and Constituent Posts by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections:

Political and Economic Affairs

The political and economic sections have played crucial roles in expanding diplomatic dialogue with South Africa and implementing programs to support greater bilateral cooperation. Reporting is ample. Some officers feel under pressure to accentuate the positive, and downplay negative developments. The recent, unauthorized release of sensitive diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks has had a chilling effect on access to South African contacts.

...

WikiLeaks

The unauthorized release of Department documents by WikiLeaks and the major media coverage it engendered in late 2010 has had a chilling effect on the embassy’s ability to make and maintain contacts in South Africa. Several South Africa cables were released, and the fallout has left at least one key government contact refusing to meet with embassy officers. Others have become skittish or withdrawn. One reporting officer told of meeting a new political contact, who began the conversation: “This is not for a cable, is it?” As a result of the leaks, the political section no longer includes the names of contacts who are not essential to context or credibility. The embassy also has limited the number of cables it posts for wide distribution.

The embassy has worked diligently to contain damage from Wikileaks. When the leaks began in earnest in late 2010, the embassy’s political, economic, and public affairs sections compiled a list of potentially compromised cables, and the persons named in them. The public affairs staff contacted many of those persons, as Department guidance permitted. The section’s excellent working relationship with the media has proven crucial to managing this issue.

Embassy officers found initial Department guidance on the leaks to be slow and confusing, particularly with regard to whether missions could contact people who were named in documents that were likely to become public. The Department was also slow in compiling an accurate list of the documents at risk. Guidelines that prohibited officers from reading leaked (Source: Department of State, Report Number ISP-I-11-42A, June 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Pretoria, South Africa, and Constituent Posts by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections)

Jun Department of State | In report number ISP-I-11-41A, June 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Bogotá, Colombia by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections, "Political reporting may have suffered somewhat from the WikiLeaks scandal, especially in its immediate aftermath, when the post temporarily suspended its reporting. Formal reporting soon resumed, however, although at perhaps a slower pace than before. Since WikiLeaks, mission contacts have engaged with embassy officers in a more guarded fashion than in the past."

"The political section has a relevant reporting plan that generates products that receive praise from Washington consumers. Political reporting may have suffered somewhat from the WikiLeaks scandal, especially in its immediate aftermath, when the post temporarily suspended its reporting. Formal reporting soon resumed, however, although at perhaps a slower pace than before. Since WikiLeaks, mission contacts have engaged with embassy officers in a more guarded fashion than in the past." (Source: Department of State, Report Number ISP-I-11-41A, June 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Bogotá, Colombia by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections)

May
or
Jun

Department of State | State Department says it stops crisis mitigating of press coverage of the WikiLeaks release of U.S. State Department cables, what it calls "national security":

Nuland says that "the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world, " but she adds, "we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months." (So since May or June 2011)

[Tags: WikiLeaks 24/7 task Force; WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group; WikiLeaks Mitigation Team]

Full Video

Full Transcript

QUESTION: Bradley Manning’s trial begins tomorrow. I’m wondering if you have any thought – this building has any thoughts on that? Or, more broadly, just on the impact – the negative impact, how bad the impact was from the WikiLeaks disclosures.

MS. NULAND: Well, with regard to the trial, it’s now a law enforcement matter, so I’m obviously not going to comment on it when the issue’s in the courts. With regard to the impact of WikiLeaks, we were quite clear at the time, and we remain clear, that it was very – a very bad thing.

QUESTION: Can I ask, following that – at the time you – this building voiced some serious concerns about the effect it might have on sources and methods and, in particular, a number of human rights activists around the world who’ve spoken to embassy officials. Can you speak to the overall impact now, several months later, that you’ve seen from the disclosure of these documents?

MS. NULAND: Well, beyond saying, Kirit, that you know that we stood up a cell in this building to work with individuals who were concerned about their security and we’ve made good progress in trying to help some of these individuals, I think I won’t go into a broad, aggregate effort to, sort of, quantify this. But we were concerned and we have taken measures to try to help those who have been concerned about government --

QUESTION: And do you think those measures have been effective?

MS. NULAND: In a number of cases, we’ve been able to be quite effective.

QUESTION: And have there been any cases in which you feel that somebody’s still at risk?

MS. NULAND: Again, I think it won’t help the people involved for me to go any deeper on this issue.

QUESTION: Okay. And my last question will be just the diplomatic impact, just following on Matt’s question, if you could speak to that at all. I mean, that was a subject at the Secretary’s meetings for months after the initial release --

MS. NULAND: Absolutely.

QUESTION: -- I mean, have – are you guys still reeling from that, or is that kind of patched up for the most part?

MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world.

QUESTION: And you do feel that you’ve reached that point? In other words, where things have patched up?

MS. NULAND: Well, look, I’m not in a position to qualify/quantify, but I would say that we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months. So --

[*****]

QUESTION: But there have been some kind of tactical changes, I mean, right – of some diplomats not being able to take notes in certain meetings, or like meetings being restricted? I mean there have been practical effects since then, wouldn’t you say?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve obviously taken steps both on the strategic level and --

QUESTION: Well, and host governments also have on you, haven’t they?

MS. NULAND: I don’t think that you can necessarily make a direct link. I mean, in diplomatic conversations, sometimes it’s appropriate to have small meetings, and sometimes it’s appropriate to have bigger delegation meetings. Obviously, individual governments have made their own policy decisions, but more importantly, this building and this government, broadly, has taken steps to address some of the issues that allowed the WikiLeaks thing to happen in the first place.

QUESTION: Can you be a little bit more specific about when you say “It was a very bad thing”? Because it sounds as though from one of your answers to Kirit is that this has pretty much blown over now. And in the light of that, I wonder how difficult it’s going to be for the Administration to make the case that this was, in fact, as damaging as you claim it was – or as you claimed it was at the time.

MS. NULAND: Again, this is now a legal case. The case will be made by the lawyers, and I’m not going to get in the middle of it.

QUESTION: No, I understand. But can you be a little bit – I mean, “It was a very bad thing,” is not particularly enlightening.

MS. NULAND: Matt, we spoke extensively at the time about the damage to America’s reputation, about the damage to individual – individuals who had been open and honest with us, about the risks with regard to trust that are essential for diplomacy. And as I said, the Secretary, the President had to spend many months reassuring governments afterwards. I can’t quantify the residual impact standing here today. But what’s most important is that this case is now in the U.S. courts --

QUESTION: No. It’s in the military courts.

MS. NULAND: -- and that he will face justice. Yeah.

(Source: Department of State)

May 2011

26 Department of State | At a daily press briefing, State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner, answers a question about reports that U.S. aid to train Pakistani journalists to the U.S., are preaching ant-U.S. to officials back home. Toner responds, "I’m not going to comment on the substance of those cables."

QUESTION: Pakistan grants CIA permission to search bin Ladin compound – can you confirm that?

MR. TONER: No.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow an earlier question on U.S., Pakistan military. Also WikiLeaks, if you have seen reports in the last few days, they are saying that whatever money you’ve been spending on bringing Pakistani journalists to train in the U.S, they’ve been preaching, actually, to the officials back home in Pakistan anti-U.S.

MR. TONER: I’m not going to comment on the substance of those cables. Our exchange programs are above board and are reputable and are a wonderful opportunity for us to expose, for example, these journalists but other professions to the American system and how, for example in this case, journalism works. But I’m not going to speak to the contents of a Wiki cable.

(Source: Department of State)

26 Senator Feinstein remarks to a clause in the Intelligence Authorization Act for the FY 2011 to 'prevent another security disaster, such as the recent leaks of classified information to Wikileaks , through the implementation of automated information technology threat detection programs that must be fully operational by the end of 2013.'

The bill passed the House and Senate and was signed by the President.

Senator Feinsteins bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Subcommittee, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Joint Committee on Printing, Oversight of the Terrorist Surveillance Program Subcommittee, Joint Committee on the Library, United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control , Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Immigration, Border Security and Refugees Subcommittee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Crime and Drugs Subcommittee, Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee, The Constitution Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration...

"Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senate will be passing the fiscal year 2011 intelligence authorization bill today.

This is now the second year in a row that we have been able to pass an authorization bill, after 6 years without doing so.

The bill authorizes funding for fiscal year 2011 for the 16 different agencies across the U.S. Government that make up the intelligence community. Unlike the fiscal year 2010 bill, which was enacted last October, this bill also contains a classified annex, which is the main mechanism the Intelligence Committee has to set the level of intelligence spending and direct how it is used.

The bill adds hundreds of millions of dollars above the President's request for intelligence activities for fiscal year 2011. However, in anticipation of tighter future budgets, the bill also takes some initial steps to prepare the intelligence community for likely smaller budgets and personnel decreases in the coming years.

The bill includes a number of legislative provisions, including:

A section requiring the intelligence community to prevent another security disaster, such as the recent leaks of classified information to Wikileaks , through the implementation of automated information technology threat detection programs that must be fully operational by the end of 2013;

A provision improving the ability of government agencies to detail personnel to needed areas of the intelligence community;

A commendation of intelligence community personnel for their role in bringing Osama bin Laden to justice and reaffirming the commitment of the Congress to use the capabilities of the intelligence community to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and affiliated organizations.

With the passage of this legislation, I believe we have restored the committee's ability to do oversight, and we are now on track to pass intelligence authorization bills each year.

I very much appreciate the close collaboration of Senator Chambliss, the vice chairman of the committee, in this effort. We have worked closely together to craft this legislation, and to secure its passage.

I also thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their efforts on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We worked well together on the fiscal year 2011 legislation to bring forward coordinated bills to the House and the Senate, and I look forward to continue to work together to enact the fiscal year 2012 intelligence authorization bill." (Source: Congressional Record).

25

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform | At the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations “Cybersecurity: Assessing the Immediate Threat to the United States”:

James Lewis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies says, "The European leftists behind the Wikileaks episode intended to damage the United States and to hurt its credibility and influence internationally. The effect was to help our opponents – jihadis and authoritarian regimes. We do not want to overstate the risk from events like Wikileaks, but those hostile to the United States will take advantage of poor security of information and the global reach of the internet to damage the United States."

According to Representative Jason Chaffetz from Utah:

"Not all threats to Federal cybersecurity are external. In June 2010, Wikileaks released thousands of classified Department of State and Department of Defense documents. Immediately following the release of those documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal Department of Defense studies to evaluate any weaknesses in their systems. The studies found that the Department’s policies for dealing with an internal security threat were inadequate and that the Department had limited capability to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on its classified computer networks."

Dean Turner, Director, Global Intelligence Network Symantec Security Response uses WikiLeaks as an example of a data breach for Data Lost Prevention (DLP)

Full Transcript

According to Representative Jason Chaffetz from Utah:

"Not all threats to Federal cybersecurity are external. In June 2010, Wikileaks released thousands of classified Department of State and Department of Defense documents. Immediately following the release of those documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal Department of Defense studies to evaluate any weaknesses in their systems. The studies found that the Department’s policies for dealing with an internal security threat were inadequate and that the Department had limited capability to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on its classified computer networks."

Testimony of Sean McGurk Director, Control Systems Security Program, National Cyber Security Division Department of Homeland Security

Testimony of James Lewis Director of Technology and Public Policy Program Center for Strategic and International Studies:

"The European leftists behind the Wikileaks episode intended to damage the United States and to hurt its credibility and influence internationally. The effect was to help our opponents – jihadis and authoritarian regimes. We do not want to overstate the risk from events like Wikileaks, but those hostile to the United States will take advantage of poor security of information and the global reach of the internet to damage the United States."

Testimony of Phillip Bond, President & CEO, TechAmerica

Testimony of Dean Turner, Director, Global Intelligence Network Symantec Security Response:

"PROTECTING NETWORKS AGAINST THREATS & PREVENTING DATA LOSS

Deployment and management of an anti-malware solution is the first step in network protection. But this solution alone does not provision the entire security landscape.

You must also be constantly watching out for and monitoring vendor security notifications and alerts, and apply needed patches or workarounds as soon as possible. Ensuring that users are kept up to date through a security education and awareness program is vital to keeping networks secure. Last, but not least, know your assets, identify your perimeter of secure operations, and maintain a high level of situational awareness to ensure you are aware of, and can respond to, incidents in a timely manner for the sake of operational survival.

In light of the current key threat trends, and recent high-profile cases such as WikiLeaks and other data breaches, it has also become critical for all organizations to establish and implement a sustainable data loss prevention (DLP) program that effectively addresses evolving risk factors. A comprehensive, long- term, sustainable DLP program is based on the following principles:

 Threat coverage: Information must be protected wherever it resides, whether at-rest, in-motion or in-use. This requires control points at multiple tiers (i.e. endpoint, gateway, network, back-end databases). Further enhanced compatibility with a cloud environment and Web 2.0 sites provides a more transparent Web experience for end-users that seamlessly prevents data exposure.

 Data Insight: DLP should help enterprises identify their most critical information and enable simplified data clean-up and remediation through automated data owner identification. Besides continuous monitoring and auditing of data usage DLP needs to ensure adherence with corporate policies and regulatory compliance.

 Business Process Integration: DLP must be incorporated into an organization’s overall business process so that it is viewed as a business necessity, aligned with strategic goals, compliance requirements and risk management.

 Risk Reduction Measurement: Enterprises should define achievable and measurable goals and then regularly review progress against them and hold business leaders accountable for meeting them.

 Identify critical information and simplify remediation: Effective DLP solutions should include a unified platform that allows customers to create policies once, and enforce them everywhere to prevent confidential data loss across endpoint, network and storage systems. Integrated DLP technology helps enterprises align their information assets to business goals by simplifying the remediation of exposed critical data.

To reduce the risk of data breaches, organizations require a clear understanding about where their sensitive data resides and how it is being used. With this insight, organizations will be better placed to identify gaps in their strategy, better equipped to define their requirements, and better prepared to implement a data governance plan that will reduce their risk posture."

(Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform)

25

WikiLeaks Grand Jury | Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney and US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia requests a subpoenas of David House to appear June 15, 2011 at the WikiLeaks Grand Jury in Alexandria, VA,

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793

Subpoena 11-3 /10GJ3793 / 11 - 1685

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793

Date of Letter May 25, 2011

Signed by:

  • Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) (X)
  • Niel MacBride, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia

Subpoena 11-3 /10GJ3793 / 11 - 1685

Date of Subpoena May 25, 2011

Grand Jury Appearance June 15, 2011

Requested by:

  • Tracy McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS)

Signed by:

"We advise you that the Grand Jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to conspiracy to communicate or transmit national defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(g) and conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 to wit; knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access and having obtained information protected from disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) and knowingly stealing or converting any record of thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641"

May 25, 2011 Letter

June 15, 2011 Subpoena

Directions

(Source: FireDogLake)

See also David House, WikiLeaks Grand Jury Witness Page

24 Department of State | In an interview with the "Defense Writers Group", Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert O. Blake, Jr., says, "If there’s been any positive side to WikiLeaks it’s been that [India has] seen from all the cables that have been released that we actually do have quite a strong and sincere dialogue with the Pakistanis on a lot of these issues that are of concern to India."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BLAKE: Yeah. I think the Indians, first of all, are concerned sometimes about some of the kinds of equipment that we sell Pakistan, to help Pakistan meet its legitimate defense needs. They worry that some of that equipment could be used against India. We reassure them that we have quite strict end use requirements on these various platforms and equipment. So that’s something that again we have a regular and continuing conversation about.

But broadly speaking, as I said earlier, they like we understand that it’s in our interest to try to help Pakistan right now, and help Pakistan to confront the huge range of challenges that it faces. And it does them and it does us no good to sort of stand back and disengage. It’s very very important to try to help.

In the Indian’s case, of course they still have some quite important concerns about groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and others. But they’ve made the judgment it’s best to try to do that by talking to them rather than by lecturing them using megaphone diplomacy.

QUESTION: Do they see it as a conflict if the U.S. is still engaged with Pakistan?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BLAKE: They do. Very much so. If there’s been any positive side to WikiLeaks it’s been that they’ve seen from all the cables that have been released that we actually do have quite a strong and sincere dialogue with the Pakistanis on a lot of these issues that are of concern to India.

QUESTION: The Indian attitude towards the U.S. disengagement in Afghanistan?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BLAKE: They hope we don’t disengage.

(Source: Department of State)

24 Rep Roscoe Bartlett cites WikiLeaks in a speech about Peak Oil on the floor of Congress.

"The next chart kind of puts this problem in a global perspective. This is the world according to oil. It's what the world would look like if the size of the country was relative to how much oil it had. Now we've got to modify this a little because WikiLeaks just exposed some papers from Saudi Arabia that said they've been fibbing about how much oil they have, that they really have 40 percent less oil than they said they have. That's true I think of all of the OPEC countries, because back when they could produce enough oil to drive the price of oil down, they could produce a certain percentage of their reserves." (Source: Congressional Record)

19 Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 57 Order dated 5/4/11, Notice of Hearing Date June 24, 2011, 10 a.m. re 58 Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir. The motion was served to Tracy D. McCormick and Andrew Peterson, US Asst Attorneys

Objections of Real Parties to May 4, 2011 Docketing Order [Link broken on the EFF.org]

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

See: 2703d orders under seal in #WikiLeaks grand jury case

CASE ASSIGNMENT JUDGE SOURCE [WHAT IS THIS?]
1:11-ec-00001

Assigned: 05/02/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Buchanan Theresa Caroll
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 5
User: jlan
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00002

Assigned: 05/03/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Buchanan Theresa Caroll
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 6
User: jlan
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00003
U.S. v Under Seal;
12/14/10 Under Seal Application and Order;
1/5/11 Motion (granted)

Assigned: 05/03/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Buchanan Theresa Caroll
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 7
User: rban
Twitter Secret Order @brigittaj @rop_g @ioerror
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00004
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/05/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Buchanan Theresa Caroll
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 8
User: jcor
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00005
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/06/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Buchanan Theresa Caroll
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 18
User: jcor
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00006
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/11/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Jones, Thomas Rawles, Jr
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 13
User: jsch
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00007
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/12/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Jones, Thomas Rawles, Jr
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 14
User: jcor
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00008
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/12/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Jones, Thomas Rawles, Jr
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 15
User: jcor
 
Not Filed        
1:11-ec-00009
USA v Under Seal;

Assigned: 05/13/2011
Direct Assignment
(Other)

Presider: Jones, Thomas Rawles, Jr
Referral:
Pres. Deck: A-Criminal (EC Cases)
Instance No.: 1
Card No.: 16
User: jcor
 

 

...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 19th day of May, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Tracy D. McCormick
Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]"

NB " The subscribers also reference the declaration of Stuart Sears, counsel for Jacob Appelbaum. An attorney is prohibited from serving as a witness in a case where the attorney also represents a party. See United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1155 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Media Gen. Operations v. Buchanan, 417 F.3d 424, 433 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005). In any event, the government does not contest Mr. Sears' descriptions of his interactions with the Clerk's office. " (Source: Government's Response to Objections to Judge Buchanan's May 4, 2011 Docketing Order)

Notice of Hearing Date June 24, 2011, 10 a.m. re 58 Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir 

Excerpt:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 19th day of May, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such filing (NEF) to the following counsel of record:

Tracy D. McCormick
Andrew Peterson
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]

 

17 Stuart Sears, attorney for Jacob Appelbaum, contacts Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. He was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office at the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When Sears asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed Mr. Sears that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases.

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

16 Stuart Sears, attorney for Jacob Appelbaum goes to the Clerk's office at the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case [Misc. No. 10GJ3793, No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan), No. 1:11EC3 ]. He was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list Sears was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that he had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was that, for 1:11-ec-3, there were now two new notations directly under the case number: "12/14/10 Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. See jpegs. During this conversation, Sears was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When he inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, Sears was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

 

13 Manning Defense Files Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

13 David House sues government over Nov 3, 2010 laptop seizure.

PDF of lawsuit via boston.com

"Parties

6. Defendant Janet Napolitano is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") are agencies of the U.S. government within DHS. As head of DHS, Secretary Napolitano has authority over all DHS policies, procedures, and practices related to border searches. Defendant Napolitano is sued in her official capacity.

7. Defendant Alan Bersin is Commissioner of CBP, and as such has authority over all CBP policies, procedures, and practices related to border searches. Defendant Bersin is sued in his official capacity.

8. Defendant John T. Morton is the Director of ICE, and as such has authority over all ICE policies, procedures, and practices relating to border searches. Defendant Morton is sued in his official capacity." (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

"12. Plaintiff David House is a computer programmer and researcher who resides in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Following Manning's arrest, Plaintiff and others joined together in June 2010 to establish the Bradley Manning Support Network ("Support Network"). The Support Network is an unincorporated association of individuals and organizations which describes itself as an "international grassroots effort to help accused whistle blower Pfc. Bradley Manning.

...

Following the formation of the Support Network [June 2010], Plaintiff has been visited and questioned, both at his home and place of work in Cambridge, by investigators for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Plaintiff has been placed on a watch list which has resulted in his being stopped for questioning and searched each time that he enters the United States following foreign travel. Beginning in September 2010, Plaintiff has been detained for questioning at the border on each of seven occasions he has reentered the United States after foreign travel and is routinely questioned on those occasions about his work with the Support Network or his political beliefs and activities". (Source: David House v. JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; ALAN BERSIN, in his official capacity as Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; JOHN T. MORTON, in his official capacity as Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

See also:

"The cofounder of a group supporting an Army private accused of leaking classified information to WikiLeaks filed a federal lawsuit today accusing the Department of Homeland Security of violating his civil rights by seizing his laptop without a warrant when he passed through security at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.

David House, 24, a former MIT researcher from Cambridge, alleges in the suit filed in US District Court in Boston that federal agents seized his laptop, USB storage device, video camera, and cellphone when he arrived at the airport on Nov. 3 after a vacation in Mexico, then kept him from catching a connecting flight to Boston while they interrogated him about his association with Private First Class Bradley Manning.

The suit, filed on House's behalf by the American Civil Liberties Union, says House 'was asked no questions relating to border control, customs, trade, immigration, or terrorism,'' yet agents kept his laptop, USB device, and camera for 49 days while they reviewed personal and private information as part of an investigation into his work for the Bradley Manning Support Network. The electronics were returned to him Dec. 22, a day after the ACLU faxed a letter to government officials demanding their immediate return.

'If the government had legitimate reason for wanting to seize my laptop ... they could obtain a warrant,' House said during a telephone interview. 'Instead they wait for me to cross the border so they can claim this nebulous authority.'

He accused the government of launching a 'fishing expedition'' in an effort to find out who was supporting Manning and said it has had a chilling impact on his group's legal efforts to raise money for Manning because supporters fear they will also be targeted by the government. Manning, a former Army intelligence analyst, has been imprisoned by the military for a year on charges of leaking classified information about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were posted on WikiLeaks

Matthew Chandler, a spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security, declined to comment on the suit, saying, 'As a matter of policy, we do not comment on pending litigation.'

Federal agents routinely search lap tops of travelers entering and leaving the country at airports and other border crossings. The government maintains it's the same as searching suitcases and is done to protect national security.

The suit alleges that House was targeted by the government solely because of his association with the Bradley Manning Support Network, which raises funds for Manning's legal defense.

'Targeting people for searches and seizures based on their lawful associations is unconstitutional,'' said Carol Rose, executive director of the ACLU of Massachusetts.

The suit alleges that the government violated House's First Amendment right to freedom of association and Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. It seeks the return or destruction of any of House's personal data that is still being held by the government and urges the court to order the Department of Homeland Security to disclose whether it has shared the information with other agencies." (Source: boston.com)

12 Rep Ruppersberger mentions the "insider threat" program 'in response to WikiLeaks' in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2011 H.R. 754

This bill passed the House and Senate and was signed by the President.

Representative Dutch Ruppersbergers bio on lilsis.org

Committee Memberships: Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee, Legislative Branch Subcommittee, Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee, House Appropriations Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Intelligence Community Management Subcommittee

"The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2011 has thousands of civilian positions above the level enacted in FY 2010 and above the level of people currently on board. This includes counterterrorism positions at the CIA and a large increase in personnel at the National Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC. The bill also adds hundreds of millions of dollars for intelligence above current levels. In response to the Web site WikiLeaks, the bill includes an insider threat detection program that automatically monitors unauthorized access to classified information." (Source: Congressional Record)

12 Stuart Sears, attorney for Jacob Appelbaum, receives a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising him that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings attorneys for Jacob Appelbaum, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, and Rop Gonggrijp were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. Sears was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

11

WikiLeaks Grand Jury | Grand Jury Appearance for an Unnamed Cambridge Residence, requested by Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division of the Department of Justice.

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Date of Letter April 21, 2011

Signed by:

  • Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) (X)
  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division
  • Niel MacBride, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Date of Subpoena April 11, 2011

Grand Jury Appearance May 11, 2011

Requested by:

  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division

Signed by:

"We advise you that the Grand Jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to conspiracy to communicate or transmit national defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(g) and conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 to wit; knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access and having obtained information protected from disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) and knowingly stealing or converting any record of thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641"

April 11, 2011 Subpoena Request, April 21, 2011 Letter, and May 11, 2011 Subpoena Appearance

(Source: Glenn Greenwald)

11 Rep Langevin mentions language in the Defense Authorization Act FY 2012 related to 'cyber threats to critical infrastructure as well as from trusted insiders such as the recent WikiLeaks incident.'

11 On May 11, 2011, Stuart Sears, attorney for Jacob Appelbaum calls Mr. Banke, operations supervisor at the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, by telephone. He [Banke] confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised Mr. Sears that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

6 Stuart Sears, attorney for Jacob Appelbaum,went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case [Misc. No. 10GJ3793, No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan), No. 1:11EC3 ]. He was "originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case." He then "spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He [Banke] then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised Mr. Sears that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

Declaration of Stuart Sears:

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Misc. No. 10GJ3793

No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

No. 1:11EC3

I, STUART A. SEARS, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia and am a member of the law firm of Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C, counsel for one of the Real Parties in Interest, Jacob Appelbaum, in the above-captioned matter. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness I could and would competently testify to them under oath.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the May 4, 2011 Order issued by Magistrate Buchanan that is the subject of the Real Parties' Objections.

3. On May 6, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's Office and asked to see the running list for this case. I was originally informed that there was nothing for the public to view regarding this case. I then spoke to the operations supervisor for the Clerk's Office, Richard Banke. He told me that there was no running list for specific cases. He then showed me on a computer screen all that existed regarding this matter, which was a one-page computer entry listing four "EC" cases—EC 1, EC 2, EC 3, and EC 4. The entire screen only depicted a list of four cases, each entitled "USA v. Under Seal." The general heading of the page was "Case

Assignment History Report." The cases were listed in numerical order from 1:11-ec-1 through 1:11-ec-4. The only other relevant information available on the screen was when the case had been created and to which judge it had been assigned.

4. Upon questioning, Mr. Banke advised me that there was no other information or documents available to be viewed in connection with this case.

5. On May 11, 2011, I called Mr. Banke by telephone. He confirmed that there was no other running list other than the computer screen he had previously shown me that showed the existence of the 1:11-ec-1, ec-2, ec-3, and ec-4 cases. Mr. Banke also advised me that the Clerk's Office was not maintaining any other list of documents in connection with this case. Upon questioning, he advised that there was no book, ledger or any other list being kept regarding this case. He also stated that it was his understanding that what the Clerk's Office had done regarding the docketing was in compliance with Magistrate Buchanan's May 4 Order.

6. On May 12, 2011, I spoke via telephone with Magistrate Buchanan's chambers to inquire whether the Clerk's office had in fact done everything required by the May 4 Order. I advised Chambers that I interpreted the May 4 Order to direct the Clerk's office to keep a publicly docketed running list of all filings in this case, which would identify all filings including search warrants, subpoenas, etc. I further relayed to Chambers the information I had received from Mr. Banke that no other information was available or docketed apart from the one-page computer screen I had seen depicting the existence of the four 1:11-ec cases.

7. Later on May 12, 2011, I received a call from Magistrate Buchanan's chambers advising me that any confusion over the May 4 Order had now been straightened out and that the filings we were seeking to view would now be docketed on the running list. I was advised that the running list would not be available to be viewed until Monday, May 16, 2011.

8. On May 16, 2011, I personally went to the Clerk's office to view the running list reflecting the documents filed in this case. I was assisted again by the supervisor, Mr. Banke. The running list I was shown was almost identical to the previous case list that I had seen on May 6, which merely showed the existence of the four ec cases. The only change in the list was Under Seal Application and Order; 1/5/11 Motion and Order to unseal order of 12/14/10 (granted)." No notations were added to any of the other ec cases. In addition, the list now included the existence of additional 1:11-ec cases, running from 1:11-ec-5 through 1:11-ec-9. There were no notations or information regarding these additional cases. A true and correct copy of this running list that I viewed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

9. During this conversation, I was advised by Mr. Banke that there was no other running list being kept in connection with the case. When I inquired whether any search warrants connected with this case were being kept on a list to be tracked, I was informed that search warrants are not listed to a specific case number, but rather are kept separately on a list of all search warrants being filed, regardless of case number.

10. The next day, on May 17, 2011, I contacted Mr. Banke by telephone again in an attempt to confirm whether anything else was publicly available now or would be added to the public docket in response to the motion for public docketing. I was informed that there was no other public information for any of the other ec dockets, that there was not a sub-list within those docket numbers indicating which documents had been filed in those dockets, and that the Clerk's Office understood that it was now in compliance with the May 4 Order. When I asked if it was possible to see a list of any other electronic communications orders that were requested or issued in December 2010 or January 2011, which might not be reflected on this new "ec" running list, Mr. Banke informed me that the Clerk's Office had not previously kept a running list of electronic communications orders or requests and that it had just created this "ec" docketing system and this new "ec" running list for electronic communications cases. 18th day of May, 2011, at Alexandria, Virginia.

/s/
Stuart A. Sears"

EXHIBIT B:

4 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | ORDERED that case 10-GJ-3793 is hereby transferred to new case 1:11-ec-3, which remain under seal except as to the previously unsealed 2703(d) Order of 12/14/2010 ("Twitter Order"), and docketed on the running list in the usual manner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 5/4/2011.

(Source: web archive)

A copy of the order is found in the May 19,2011 Declaration of Stuart Sears. See below, Exhibit A:


May Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-40A of the Inspection of Embassy Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections, "The ECOPOL [Economic and Political] section has a relevant reporting plan that generates a good, timely, and steady flow of reporting. Reporting does not seem to have suffered from the WikiLeaks scandal."

"The ECOPOL section has a relevant reporting plan that generates a good, timely, and steady flow of reporting. Reporting does not seem to have suffered from the WikiLeaks scandal." (Source: Department of State, United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General Inspection of Embassy Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Report Number ISP-I-11-40A, May 2011 )

May

Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-49A, May 2011, of the Inspection of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

The 2010 Wikileaks disclosures of purported Department cables generated more information attributed to NEA posts than to any other region. The disclosures had an immediate impact on U.S. relations with all NEA countries, and a profound impact on some. The U.S. Ambassador in Tripoli was quickly recalled after a particularly strong reaction from the Libyan Government. The designated DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] ably led NEA’s response to the WikiLeaks publicity, which included a task force to review the damage, summarize reactions from all posts, and prepare the Secretary for potentially difficult conversations with foreign officials in the affected countries. The head of NEA’s task force participated in the Department’s Wikileaks task force. In coordination with the Bureau of Public Affairs, NEA’s public diplomacy staff developed an innovative initiative, in which former ambassadors were deployed to educate audiences about the role of cable traffic in the conduct of American foreign policy. The bureau also coordinated with senior DOD officials traveling to the region to reinforce with foreign partners the importance of continuing to work closely on issues of mutual concern. As Wikileaks cable disclosures continue, the regional affairs staff leads a bureau-wide effort to evaluate the risks of compromised cables, give advice to U.S. embassies, and maintain a log of Wikileaks actions. The inspection team heard numerous comments from NEA staff about how the WikiLeaks experience has inhibited communications by cable, as well as emails, between posts and the Department.

The [Near East Asian] bureau [of the U.S. State Department] was required to staff two 24/7 task forces and a number of “shadow task forces” through mid-March, in large part to make sure that the evacuations of the U.S. citizens from Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen proceeded smoothly, and to manage the effects of additional Wikileaks disclosures of purported embassy cables.

...

The U.S. Ambassador to Tripoli, withdrawn due to security concerns in the aftermath of the Wikileaks affair, continued to work on policy toward Libya and to lead U.S. interaction with the Libyan opposition. Ironically, the evacuations in Egypt and Libya provided the bureau with much-needed help, as evacuees from Embassy Cairo and Tripoli were available in Washington.

Domestically, NEA has 321 employees. Overseas, 1,346 U.S. direct-hire and 7,007 locally employed staff work in 17 U.S. missions in the region. The total FY 2010 budget resources (domestic and overseas) for NEA were $1.2 billion (excluding salaries for direct-hire Americans).

...

WikiLeaks

The 2010 Wikileaks disclosures of purported Department cables generated more information attributed to NEA posts than to any other region. The disclosures had an immediate impact on U.S. relations with all NEA countries, and a profound impact on some. The U.S. Ambassador in Tripoli was quickly recalled after a particularly strong reaction from the Libyan Government. The designated DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] ably led NEA’s response to the WikiLeaks publicity, which included a task force to review the damage, summarize reactions from all posts, and prepare the Secretary for potentially difficult conversations with foreign officials in the affected countries. The head of NEA’s task force participated in the Department’s Wikileaks task force. In coordination with the Bureau of Public Affairs, NEA’s public diplomacy staff developed an innovative initiative, in which former ambassadors were deployed to educate audiences about the role of cable traffic in the conduct of American foreign policy. The bureau also coordinated with senior DOD officials traveling to the region to reinforce with foreign partners the importance of continuing to work closely on issues of mutual concern. As Wikileaks cable disclosures continue, the regional affairs staff leads a bureau-wide effort to evaluate the risks of compromised cables, give advice to U.S. embassies, and maintain a log of Wikileaks actions. The inspection team heard numerous comments from NEA staff about how the WikiLeaks experience has inhibited communications by cable, as well as emails, between posts and the Department.

(Source: Department of State)

May Department of Justice | USA Journal for US DOJ Attorneys says US law enforcement will benefit from digital revolution, will depend on international collaboration to investigate and collect evidence overseas, and mentions WikiLeaks offering guidance on electronic discovery issues.

H. Security and privacy
In February 2011, national security experts warned that cyberattacks are the greatest future threat to the United States’ security. Because any Internet connection will suffice for criminal purposes, more defendants will reside and operate from outside the United States. As people increasingly rely on the Internet as a place to work, shop, and store valuable information, more emphasis will be placed on protecting computer systems from hackers, protecting on-line personal information, and defining electronic privacy. Law enforcement will depend on international collaboration to investigate and collect evidence overseas. Courts, legislators, and regulators in the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere are already grappling with questions concerning government investigators’ access to individuals’ digital communications and data to investigate law violations. The Wikileaks investigation is a recent example. Cross-border discovery of ESI is a hot issue before the European Commission’s Data Protection Working Party. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/working group/index_en.htm for more information.
(Source: "Flying Cars and Web Glasses: How the Digital Revolution is Changing Law Enforcement" By John Haried, Assistant National Criminal Discovery Coordinator, Department of Justice p. 28)

May
or
Jun

Department of State | State Department says it stops crisis mitigating of press coverage of the WikiLeaks release of U.S. State Department cables, what it calls "national security":

Nuland says that "the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world, " but she adds, "we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months." (So since May or June 2011)

[Tags: WikiLeaks 24/7 task Force; WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group; WikiLeaks Mitigation Team]

Full Video

Full Transcript

QUESTION: Bradley Manning’s trial begins tomorrow. I’m wondering if you have any thought – this building has any thoughts on that? Or, more broadly, just on the impact – the negative impact, how bad the impact was from the WikiLeaks disclosures.

MS. NULAND: Well, with regard to the trial, it’s now a law enforcement matter, so I’m obviously not going to comment on it when the issue’s in the courts. With regard to the impact of WikiLeaks, we were quite clear at the time, and we remain clear, that it was very – a very bad thing.

QUESTION: Can I ask, following that – at the time you – this building voiced some serious concerns about the effect it might have on sources and methods and, in particular, a number of human rights activists around the world who’ve spoken to embassy officials. Can you speak to the overall impact now, several months later, that you’ve seen from the disclosure of these documents?

MS. NULAND: Well, beyond saying, Kirit, that you know that we stood up a cell in this building to work with individuals who were concerned about their security and we’ve made good progress in trying to help some of these individuals, I think I won’t go into a broad, aggregate effort to, sort of, quantify this. But we were concerned and we have taken measures to try to help those who have been concerned about government --

QUESTION: And do you think those measures have been effective?

MS. NULAND: In a number of cases, we’ve been able to be quite effective.

QUESTION: And have there been any cases in which you feel that somebody’s still at risk?

MS. NULAND: Again, I think it won’t help the people involved for me to go any deeper on this issue.

QUESTION: Okay. And my last question will be just the diplomatic impact, just following on Matt’s question, if you could speak to that at all. I mean, that was a subject at the Secretary’s meetings for months after the initial release --

MS. NULAND: Absolutely.

QUESTION: -- I mean, have – are you guys still reeling from that, or is that kind of patched up for the most part?

MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Secretary spent a good amount of time – I would argue months – working with and reassuring governments around the world and rebuilding trust. And her personal involvement in that, along with the President’s, was absolutely key to getting ourselves back to strong positions with some of our interlocutors around the world.

QUESTION: And you do feel that you’ve reached that point? In other words, where things have patched up?

MS. NULAND: Well, look, I’m not in a position to qualify/quantify, but I would say that we have not had continued representations about WikiLeaks over the past six, seven months. So --

[*****]

QUESTION: But there have been some kind of tactical changes, I mean, right – of some diplomats not being able to take notes in certain meetings, or like meetings being restricted? I mean there have been practical effects since then, wouldn’t you say?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’ve obviously taken steps both on the strategic level and --

QUESTION: Well, and host governments also have on you, haven’t they?

MS. NULAND: I don’t think that you can necessarily make a direct link. I mean, in diplomatic conversations, sometimes it’s appropriate to have small meetings, and sometimes it’s appropriate to have bigger delegation meetings. Obviously, individual governments have made their own policy decisions, but more importantly, this building and this government, broadly, has taken steps to address some of the issues that allowed the WikiLeaks thing to happen in the first place.

QUESTION: Can you be a little bit more specific about when you say “It was a very bad thing”? Because it sounds as though from one of your answers to Kirit is that this has pretty much blown over now. And in the light of that, I wonder how difficult it’s going to be for the Administration to make the case that this was, in fact, as damaging as you claim it was – or as you claimed it was at the time.

MS. NULAND: Again, this is now a legal case. The case will be made by the lawyers, and I’m not going to get in the middle of it.

QUESTION: No, I understand. But can you be a little bit – I mean, “It was a very bad thing,” is not particularly enlightening.

MS. NULAND: Matt, we spoke extensively at the time about the damage to America’s reputation, about the damage to individual – individuals who had been open and honest with us, about the risks with regard to trust that are essential for diplomacy. And as I said, the Secretary, the President had to spend many months reassuring governments afterwards. I can’t quantify the residual impact standing here today. But what’s most important is that this case is now in the U.S. courts --

QUESTION: No. It’s in the military courts.

MS. NULAND: -- and that he will face justice. Yeah.

(Source: Department of State)

Apr 2011

25 Department of Justice | Eric Holder, US Attorney General, Department of Justice says, "We have adapted our operations to identify and to disrupt national security threats, and we have prosecuted more terrorists than in any other two year period in this nation's history. Eric Holder April 25, 2011.

"We have strengthened the rule of law across our country and beyond our borders, and established the international partnerships necessary to combat global threats and 21st century crimes."

25

White House | At a press conference Press Secretary Jay Carney says of the WikiLeaks release of the Guantanamo (GTMO) files:

"[T]he release of classified information we condemn in the strongest possible terms. And we think it’s unfortunate that The New York Times and other news organizations have made the decision to publish numerous documents obtained illegally concerning the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay."

Carney goes on to say, "And you should not assume that the conclusions of that task force were the same as the conclusions in those briefs about individual detainees. I just think that’s an important point to make, because these are not -- a detainee assessment brief in 2006 may or may not be reflective of the administration or the government’s view of that particular detainee in 2011."

Full Transcript

Q With the disclosure of new material from WikiLeaks and other apparently -- as well as other sources about the situation following 9/11 when a lot of information was assembled about various actors, were there lessons learned from that, in terms of what we might have been able to do with the information that we had but didn’t accomplish, as in tracking down Obama bin Laden? Do you want to comment on the release of the documents? Do you want to comment on what we might have done?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I mean, the release of classified information we condemn in the strongest possible terms. And we think it’s unfortunate that The New York Times and other news organizations have made the decision to publish numerous documents obtained illegally concerning the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.

The issue in terms of the content of that material, obviously we had been aware of the detainee assessment briefs. The publication of them has not made them -- does not make them new to us. So I’m not sure in terms of the question about the substance of the --

Q Does it make them -- the fact that it’s now out there, does it offer an opportunity for reflection on what we didn’t do?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think what we’re focused on right now is what the President is committed to, which is working towards the ultimate closure of the detention facility, consistent with the good security practices and values that we have a nation; consistent with the previous President, George W. Bush, John McCain when he was a candidate, uniformed military leadership.

But on the --

Q Talking more about the intelligence developed on various --

MR. CARNEY: Well, I mean, I don’t have any comment on the specific intelligence. I would note that the assessment briefs were compiled by the Department of Defense between 2002 and early 2009, and obviously the President in early 2009 created his Guantanamo review task force, which took into account those assessment briefs but also other sources of information. And you should not assume that the conclusions of that task force were the same as the conclusions in those briefs about individual detainees. I just think that’s an important point to make, because these are not -- a detainee assessment brief in 2006 may or may not be reflective of the administration or the government’s view of that particular detainee in 2011.

(Source: White House)

25 WikiLeaks publishes the GTMO files.

"In thousands of pages of documents dating from 2002 to 2008 and never seen before by members of the public or the media, the cases of the majority of the prisoners held at Guantánamo — 765 out of 779 in total — are described in detail in memoranda from JTF-GTMO, the Joint Task Force at Guantánamo Bay, to US Southern Command in Miami, Florida.

These memoranda, known as Detainee Assessment Briefs (DABs), contain JTF-GTMO’s recommendations about whether the prisoners in question should continue to be held, or should be released (transferred to their home governments, or to other governments). They consist of a wealth of important and previously undisclosed information, including health assessments, for example, and, in the cases of the majority of the 172 prisoners who are still held, photos (mostly for the first time ever).

They also include information on the first 201 prisoners released from the prison, between 2002 and 2004, which, unlike information on the rest of the prisoners (summaries of evidence and tribunal transcripts, released as the result of a lawsuit filed by media groups in 2006), has never been made public before. Most of these documents reveal accounts of incompetence familiar to those who have studied Guantánamo closely, with innocent men detained by mistake (or because the US was offering substantial bounties to its allies for al-Qaeda or Taliban suspects), and numerous insignificant Taliban conscripts from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Beyond these previously unknown cases, the documents also reveal stories of the 399 other prisoners released from September 2004 to the present day, and of the seven men who have died at the prison." (Source: wikileaks.org)

24 Department of Defense | Department of Defense Statement, Press Secretary Geoff Morrell and Special Envoy for Closure of the Guantanamo Detention Facility Ambassador Daniel Fried on WikiLeaks publishing the GTMO memoranda saying they were "illegally obtained"

Full Transcript

 "It is unfortunate that several news organizations have made the decision to publish numerous documents obtained illegally by Wikileaks concerning the Guantanamo (GTMO) detention facility.  These documents contain classified information about current and former GTMO detainees, and we strongly condemn the leaking of this sensitive information.

                 "The Wikileaks releases include Detainee Assessment Briefs (DABs) written by the Department of Defense between 2002 and early 2009.  These DABs were written based on a range of information available then.

                 "The Guantanamo Review Task Force, established in January 2009, considered the DABs during its review of detainee information.  In some cases, the task force came to the same conclusions as the DABs.  In other instances the review task force came to different conclusions, based on updated or other available information.  The assessments of the Guantanamo Review Task Force have not been compromised to Wikileaks.  Thus, any given DAB illegally obtained and released by Wikileaks may or may not represent the current view of a given detainee.

                 "Both the previous and the current administrations have made every effort to act with the utmost care and diligence in transferring detainees from Guantanamo.  The previous administration transferred 537 detainees; to date, the current administration has transferred 67.  Both administrations have made the protection of American citizens the top priority and we are concerned that the disclosure of these documents could be damaging to those efforts.  That said, we will continue to work with allies and partners around the world to mitigate threats to the United States and other countries and to work toward the ultimate closure of the Guantanamo detention facility, consistent with good security practices and our values as a nation."

b/w
24-30
Defense tours Fort Leavenworth and meets with Manning.

"[David Coombs] was able to tour the facility and meet with PFC Manning last week.  PFC Manning is now being held in Medium Custody.  He is no longer under Prevention of Injury watch and is no longer subjected to harsh pretrial confinement conditions. (Source: David Coombs, A Typical Day For PFC Bradley Manning at Fort Leavenworth)

21 At a $35,800 dollar San Francisco Democratic Party fund-raiser President Barrack Obama, Commander and Chief, declares Bradley Manning is guilty before trial. "We're a nation of laws. We don't let individuals make their own decisions about how the laws operate. He [PFC Manning] broke the law."

(Source: Huffington Post, Singing DNC Donors Disrupt Obama At Their Own Fund-raiser, Relay Anger Over Bradley Manning)

From Manning's Defense Article 32 Witness List:

XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] The defense requests the presence of XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] in order to discuss the issue of Unlawful Command Influence (UCI). Under Rule for Courts-Martial 405(e), the defense is entitled to explore the issue of UCI. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a superior officer in the chain of command is prohibited from saying or doing anything that could influence any decision by u subordinate in how to handle a military justice matter. As the XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] made improper comments on 21 April 2011, when he decided to comment on PFC Manning and his case. On that date, he responded to questions regarding PFC Manning's alleged actions by concluding that "We're a nation of laws. We don't let individuals make their own decisions about how the laws operate. He [PFC Manning] broke the law." The comments by XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] are UCI. The defense intends to question XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] on the nature of his discussions with members of the military regarding this case and whether he has made any other statements that would either influence the prosecution of this case or PFC Manning's right to obtain a fair trial. In additional to the UCI issue, XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify about his views on the Afghanistan SIGACTs released by WikiLeaks. He will testify that the leak did not reveal any issues that had not already informed our public debate on Afghanistan. He will also testify that the Afghanistan SIGACTs point to the same challenges that led him to conduct an extensive review of the Afghanistan policy. XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will also testify about the problem of over-classification within the government. Specifically, that he supported and signed into law the Reducing Over-Classification Act on 7 October 2010. Additionally, he will testify, that on his first full day in office , 2l January 2009, he issued two memoranda for the head of Executive Departments and Agencies that were related to transparency in government. The first memorandum focused on the administration of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the second focused on transparency and open government. XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify that the transparency memorandum he wrote committed the administration to "an unprecedented level of openness" and to the establishment of "a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration" XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify that on 8 December 2009 his administration released a third memorandum - an Open Government Directive (OGD). The OGD included detailed instructions for departments and agencies on how they are to "implement the principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration." Finally, on 29 December 2009, XXXXXXXXXX [PRESIDENT BARRACK OBAMA] will testify, that he issued Executive Order 13526 in an attempt to improve the system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including the establishment of the National Declassification Center. (Source: Defense Article 32 Witness List)

21

WikiLeaks Grand Jury | Letter for Grand Jury appearance for an Unnamed Cambridge Residence, requested by Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division of the Department of Justice is drafted and sent by Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) of the Department of Justice.

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Date of Letter April 21, 2011

Signed by:

  • Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) (X)
  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division
  • Niel MacBride, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Date of Subpoena April 11, 2011

Grand Jury Appearance May 11, 2011

Requested by:

  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division

Signed by:

"We advise you that the Grand Jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to conspiracy to communicate or transmit national defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(g) and conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 to wit; knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access and having obtained information protected from disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) and knowingly stealing or converting any record of thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641"

April 11, 2011 Subpoena Request, April 21, 2011 Letter, and May 11, 2011 Subpoena Appearance

(Source: Glenn Greenwald)

20 Manning Transferred to Fort Leavenworth.

No longer confined under Maximum on suicide risk or POI watch. Medium security confinement facility. (Source: Need link.)

19 Jeh C. Johnson, the Defense Department's general counsel, announces that Bradley Manning will be transferred to Fort Leavenworth. Dawn Hilton, says, "Typically, pre-trial prisoners are not incarcerated at a level 1 facility [Quantico] for more than a couple months" Manning had been for nine months, from July 29, 2010 to April 20, 2011. Jeh Johnson, general counsel says, "There's no legal reason why it couldn't be transferred, but the case will reside here [MDW], and I believe that's the plan.  "

Press Release

Full transcript.

[Go to http://www.defense.gov/news/CorrectionalFacility.pdf to view the fact sheet associated with this transcript] 

MR. JOHNSON:  My name is Jeh Johnson.  I am the general counsel of the Department of Defense.  We are here today to provide an update on the status of Army Private First Class Bradley Manning.  

          The Army is transferring Private Manning from the pre-trial confinement facility at Quantico to the new Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  With me to answer questions about this matter are the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe Westphal, and Lieutenant Colonel Dawn Hilton, who is the commander of the Fort Leavenworth facility.  

          Before we take your questions, I want to spend a moment to explain the circumstances.  At the request of Private Manning's defense counsel, an assessment is under way to determine whether Private Manning is mentally competent in this case in the event it goes to trial.  On Saturday, April 9, the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed, and Private Manning's presence in the Washington, D.C. area is no longer necessary for that purpose.  

          However, we are told that the medical opinion concerning Private Manning's competence to stand trial may take additional time.  At this juncture of the case, we have decided that the new joint-regional correctional facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the most appropriate facility for Private Manning for continued pre-trial detention.  

          Army Corrections Command has reviewed the new facility and determined that it has the expertise and capability to provide continued long-term pre-trial confinement for Private Manning.  The facility, which opened in October and opened a pre-trial confinement capability in January, is a state-of-the-art complex with the best and widest range of support services available to pre-trial prisoners within the Department of Defense corrections system, to include resident medical and mental-health care staff.  

          This facility is appropriate to meet Private Manning's health and welfare needs, given the possibility that he will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that.  Colonel Hilton will be happy to answer questions about the facility.  And I believe you have a fact sheet that provides some additional detail.  

          Within appropriate limits that must be established by the command of the facility, the Army will make the pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth available to a tour by a limited number of the press.  It is also the case, like it was at Quantico, that Private Manning may receive a limited number of outside visitors, provided that Private Manning himself, as well as the command agrees that he can see them.  

          Private Manning will return to the Washington, D.C. area as needed for legal proceedings, as his case remains under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army's military district of Washington. 

          It is important to remember that while Private Manning is charged with very serious offenses involving classified information and national security, in our system of military justice, as in our system of civilian justice in this country, he is presumed innocent until proven guilty.  Pre-trial confinement, however, is common to both systems and has been determined to be appropriate in this case.  

          One final note.  Many will be tempted to interpret today's action as a criticism of the pre-trial facility at Quantico.  That is not the case.  We remain satisfied that Private Manning's pre-trial confinement at Quantico was in compliance with legal and regulatory standards in all respects, and we salute the military personnel there for the job they did in difficult circumstances.  

          At this juncture of the case, given the likely continued period of pre-trial confinement, we have determined that the new pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth is the most appropriate one for Private Manning going forward.  

          We're now happy to answer your questions.  Yes, ma'am.  

          Q:  Sir, you said that there could be criticism or that there could be interpretations that this -- the pre-trial confinement was inappropriate, but that everything was followed by the letter of the law.  At any point, do you think -- in your judgment, do you think that Private Manning, there was bad judgment used in the way that he was treated at Quantico; despite the fact whether it was by the letter of the law, that people who were running the facility at Quantico used bad judgment in the way he was treated?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  No, I do not believe that. 

                I also know that I am the lawyer for the Department of Defense.  I am not a corrections expert, and so I hesitate to second guess any of the judgments made by the personnel there in dealing with this particular confinee.  

          Q:  Colonel Hilton, could I -- could I ask you if -- I mean, what is your assessment based on what you've --   

          LT. COL. HILTON:  I don't know the specific details of Pfc. Manning's confinement.  But what I do -- what I can tell you is that when he's transported to the Joint Regional Correctional Facility, he will receive -- will receive support from an experienced, trained professional staff that have been doing this for well over 20 years, and he'll receive the mental health, physical health and emotional health that he needs to go through this judicial process.  

          Q:  When will he be transferred? 

          MR. JOHNSON:  It's imminent.  We don't normally provide precise details of the timing of such things, but it's imminent in the short term.  

          Q:  This week?  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  As a matter of policy, we don't discuss escort details.  Though we don't discuss the details, we do this on a routine basis.  This is what we do on a daily basis.  When we perform these missions, they are very similar to the way the U.S. Marshals perform escorts, as well as other state and federal agencies.  So this is what we do on a daily basis, and it will be formed --   

          MR. JOHNSON:  I think you can assume that we would not be announcing this this far -- very far in advance.  

          Q:  Wait, since this is -- I mean, this is pretty unusual to have a press conference late in the day announcing that you're moving a prisoner.  Will you make an announcement when he's actually been checked in or whatever the term is that -- (inaudible)?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  We don't have a plan to do that at the moment.  I suspect that you all will become aware of that at the point at which he arrives at Leavenworth.  

          Q:  When did it become apparent that Manning needed some special level of care that he wasn't getting at Quantico, and who made that recommendation or that decision?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way.    

          We've been thinking about this for a while.  We began to take a fairly comprehensive look at Quantico as well as other facilities that have pre-trial confinement capability, and we concluded, after spending a couple of weeks on this, that at this juncture of the case, now that the 706 inquiry process is over -- and the interview of him as part of that process took place Saturday before last -- and given the fact that he's been in pre-trial confinement for I think about 10 months now, and Quantico is a facility that normally does not have pre-trial confinees for that length of time, and then when you look forward at the likely time before this case goes to trial, if it goes to trial, the combination of those plus the facility at Leavenworth, a new facility which has a pre-trial confinee capability that opened in January, led us to the conclusion at this juncture of the case it was -- it was a good thing to transfer him even though the case is going to stay in Washington.  

          STAFF:  Secretary Westphal may have something to add to that.  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Well, I would just say that, you know, our responsibility -- you know, Private Manning is a -- is a soldier, and our responsibility as an Army is not only to adjudicate his case, but also to take care of him while he is in pre-trial confinement. 

          As the counsel mentioned, this particular facility -- there are two Army facilities at Leavenworth.  One is the old barracks, which is for individuals after trial.  This is a new facility built where it is to take care of pre-trial as well as post-trial.  But it's medium security, and it's designed in a way to provide, I think, a reasonable ability for a prisoner who is in pre-trial confinement to -- and likely to be in pre-trial confinement for a while -- to be there.  

          This is the right decision at the right time.  This [facility] became available in January for pre-trial [confinees].  We were looking at the situation where he would need an environment that was more conducive to a longer-term period, and this is why we made the decision to move him at this time.  

          Q:  May I follow? --  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  We needed to wait until the 706 and his participation in the 706 review process was over, and that just became over.  

          Q:  Why reduce him from a maximum-security detainee, which is what he was at Quantico, to medium-security, as you just described?  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Well, at -- I don't know exactly all of the details of Quantico, but the -- that is -- in my view, that is the -- that is the facility that's there.  That's what they have available there.  As you will see from the description that Colonel Hilton will give you, the facility at Leavenworth has a -- an accommodation for greater opportunity for the individual to have a better welfare, where -- better well-being, a greater quality of --   

          LT. COL. HILTON:  And Mr. Secretary, if I can, I'll kind of clarify some of the finer points in the correctional facilities.  The Quantico brig is a level 1 facility.  That is not intended for long- term incarceration either pre- or post-trial.  Typically, a prisoner will not be at a level 1 facility for more than one month -- for more than one year.  And specifically pre-trial prisoners are not incarcerated at a level 1 facility for typically more than a couple months. 

          However, my facility at the Joint Regional Correctional Facility in Kansas is somewhat different.  It's a level 2 facility.  

          So what that means is that I have the capacity to hold not only the pre-trial prisoners but post-trial prisoners with sentences up to five years.  And with that comes all the support staff that Pfc. Manning may need.  I have a state-of-the-art facility, and I have the experienced staff who not only work at the Joint Regional Correctional Facility but also at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth. 

          So it's more than just the facility.  It's the staff that comes with the facility.  And my facility is different than the [Quantico] brig.  I am -- I am developed, designed and staffed with the experienced staff to provide those services for long-term incarceration.  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, sir.  

          Q:  When was Bradley Manning's civilian attorney informed of this?  And did he make any objections to Bradley being moved?  Or did he support this move?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  He was informed today, recently.  I don't know -- I'm assuming he was informed.  We wanted to inform him today.  I'm assuming that connection was made.  I don't know what reaction his civilian attorney may have had to this.  

          Q:  Can I ask a question -- 

          MR. JOHNSON:  I would add that if it's not already evident to you, that a large part of the reasons for this are we have assessed that this is in Private Manning's own best interest, to move him at this juncture of the case.  

          Q:  Why is that?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  For all the reasons that I think the colonel has explained in terms of the capabilities at Leavenworth, the mental- health support infrastructure.  It is a new facility with a pre-trial confinement capability that opened in January.  I'll add to that that it's an Army facility and this is an Army case and an Army prosecution.  And given the length of time it appears he'll be in pre- trial confinement, we believe that at this point, this was an appropriate thing to do.  

          Q:  He could have been moved in January.  It opened in January --  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Yeah, but he was going through the 706 process at that time.           

Q:  This was a one-day thing?           

MR. WESTPHAL:  No, that went on for several --      

      MR. JOHNSON:  Well, the --  

        MR. WESTPHAL:  Several weeks and months -- 
   

          MR. JOHNSON:  -- the interview of him, so far as I'm aware, occurred on Saturday, April 9.  When you -- when you look at the combination of events and where we are in the case and where -- what the projected likely length of time of the pre-trial phase of this case, after conducting a fairly thorough assessment, we concluded that this was the point in time to do this, after the interview of him occurred.  

          Q:  While the 706 is actually in the -- I assume like the processing stage, do you -- do you have any better assessment for when there may actually be a hearing or when we actually see a trial for --  

          MR. JOHNSON:  I don't have a direct role in military justice, so I would hesitate to predict.  I think it's fair to say that this is a complex case.  It involves not only the current 706 process, but I expect that there will be some fairly complex issues concerning the classification of documents that will be used as evidence in the case. And my own experience as a lawyer and a litigator and a trial lawyer tells me that in cases of -- like this, things do take time in the pre-trial phase before the case goes to trial.  

          So from experience in federal criminal cases, a federal criminal case is very often a multi-month if not multi-year experience.  

          Q:  Bradley Manning has, in letters released by his lawyer, complained about certain ways that he was treated in Quantico; one, that he was in what they called solitary confinement, but he was living alone in his cell for 23 hours a day, that he was frequently sleeping in no clothes, and that he was sleeping without bedcovers and such.  

          Colonel, can you go into detail about how long he will be in his cell on a given day, a typical day; what kind of sleeping arrangements are there; how big is his cell?  Will he be allowed to do some personal exercises like sit-ups or pushups while he's in his cell?  Anything like that you can go into about what he will be allowed to do compared to what he was allowed to do in Quantico?  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  Absolutely.  I don't know what he was allowed to do at the -- at the Quantico brig.  But what I can tell you is when he first arrives into the facility, he'll receive an in-depth risk assessment, initial assessment.  And during this phase, anywhere from five to seven days, we try to make sure that he's assimilated into the population, and that we assess his internal and external risk.  After that, typically when he -- when we have finished assessing his risk, he will be housed with the other pre-trial inmates.  And a typical day is three square meals a day in a dining facility that the post-trials eat at.  He'll receive open recreational time for three hours during the day, both indoors and outdoors.  And he'll have the capability to interact with other pre-trial inmates on a routine basis.  

          Q:  So you're saying this is not about criticism about how he was treated, but potentially everything about how he's treated could change completely.  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  It's all based upon the initial assessment when he comes into the facility and environment and how he assimilates into the environment.  My facility is not the same as the brig, and so we need to make sure we understand, you know, how he's going to react to this new environment.  

          Q:  This risk assessment, will it be done by mental health professionals in --  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  Absolutely.  It's more than just mental health. It's physical health.  It's emotional.  It's spiritual.  We do a comprehensive picture of all prisoners.  

          Q:  And as they do that assessment, who makes the final decision about how many -- 

          LT. COL. HILTON:  I do.  But I don't do it independently. 

          What I do is, I take a panel of experts who have been doing this for well over 20 years, we look at him as a comprehensive prisoner, and we make the right decision.  I have -- I've been in corrections since 2003.  I have a master's degree in corrections.  I'm certified through the American Corrections Association, and I've been doing this business for well over eight years now in confinement facilities.  

          Q:  One of the complaints about Quantico -- you may or may not know about this -- was that the person making the decision had no mental health or emotional health training.    

          Do you have that, or do you have to rely on people with that training to help shape your judgment when you make the final decision?  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  I have the most highly trained and expert staff on my -- in my facility.  I have psychiatrists -- licensed psychiatrists, I have a licensed social worker, I have a licensed psychologist on staff 24/7 to help all of the prisoner population -- not just Pfc. Manning.  But they're in the facility, resident and available at all times.  

          Q:  What about the sleeping conditions?  Will he have a normal sheet, a normal pillow?  Sleep in --   

          LT. COL. HILTON:  Again, it's based upon his initial risk assessment. If he's not a harm to himself or others, yes.  And you'll see a lot of those facts in your facts sheet.  And I encourage you to go to the URL [www.army.mil/jrcf] that we have video of what the facility looks like, and we also have additional photos so you can see.  

          And like Mr. Johnson has said, we are going to open the facility for a media tour.  I encourage you to come out and see how wonderful our facility is and how expertly trained and professional our staff are. 

          Q:  Secretary Westphal, what's the regulation for his family visiting him?  I know he has one aunt who's nearby.  Will the military pay for her to go down and visit, or how does that work?  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  I'll let her talk about the regulation there.  But I -- as I understand it, there are -- there is no reimbursement or support for visitation.  But you can talk to --  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  Visitation is really for the well being of the prisoners.  So of course we want to encourage and foster those -- continuing those relationships, because it's very paramount in an incarcerated environment.    

          The visitation process is really quite simple.  It's in accordance with the Department of Defense instruction and Army policy. Pfc. Manning requests that visit, and we evaluate the relationship prior to incarceration, and then, absolutely.  I see no reason at this point that his aunt wouldn't be able to visit him in Kansas.  

          Q:  How many inmates do you have in the facility right now?  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  Currently at the joint regional correctional facility we have about 150 inmates.  Of those 150 inmates, eight of them are pre-trial prisoners.  

          Q:  I just want to add as a follow-up, just before I'm asking my other question, is it possible that he could have a roommate in his cell at all?  

          LT. COL. HILTON:  No.  Currently all pre-trials are in one-man cells.  

          Q:  And then my other question that I wanted to ask was, all three of you have spoken about the presence of mental health professionals at this new facility.  Was that one of the driving reasons why you're transferring him to this facility?  Is there -- was there a concern about his mental stability or condition at that facility? 

          MR. JOHNSON:  Without commenting on Private Manning's particular situation, mental health support, mental health infrastructure was a consideration in looking at Leavenworth and other facilities.  

          Yes, sir. 

          Q:  Specifically because there are concerns?  Can you say that much?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  It was a factor that we took a careful look at in evaluating Leavenworth.  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Yeah, I would say the Army as a whole, we just wanted to get him to a place -- now that this 706 is completed, to get him to a place where his well-being and his care and his pre-trial confinement could be the very best that we could provide.  He is a soldier, he is our soldier, and we felt we needed to take care of that.  

          And it is the only facility -- it's the closest facility to the East Coast, as, due to some BRAC decisions that were made earlier, facilities at Fort Knox and -- were closed.  

          And so this is -- this is the closest that we could have.  And it's also the best – (off mic). 

          MR. JOHNSON:  You have a question.  

          Q:  This -- the 706 -- when did that begin?  You said it was -- it just involved one -- 

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, it's a -- it's a -- it's a fairly lengthy process that began at the request of the defense [counsel] that involves assessing a bunch of things that include an interview of the -- of the pre-trial confinee.  But it's an ongoing process, and the medical opinion of this board, it looks as if it won't be out for a little while.  I'm not exactly sure.  It could be a matter of weeks or so. And so -- but the -- the process, it involves his personal participation.  It was done -- it was done on April 9.  

          Q:  Given that that only involved one day, it doesn't seem like a very substantial reason to keep him here if there was compelling reason to move him to a better facility.  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, again, it was a combination of reasons.  We began to take a look at this a couple of weeks ago.  You know, is there an alternative facility that might be better for him given the length of time he's been in pre-trial confinement, given the length of time -- in the future it looks -- it looks as if he'll be in pre-trial confinement.  And we have this 706 interview of him coming up.  And we decided, well, why don't we let that happen first and then he should be transferred, so that -- so that the group that interviews him, who as I understand are in the Washington area, don't need to go out to Kansas.  So we'll do that, and then we'll move him after that.  

          Q:  You said -- I think you said that that -- I think a couple of weeks ago that  (inaudible) -- 

          MR. JOHNSON:  Yes.  

          Q:  -- what triggered that?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, you know, this issue has been obviously in the media.  

          Under normal circumstances, I'd like to believe that we -- if there were issues about whether another facility is more suitable for one of our pre-trial confinees, we would -- we would take a look at that in a comprehensive joint fashion.  Because this has been in the newspapers, people at our level have been involved in taking a look at that as well.  And so that's the process that began several weeks ago.  

          Q:  So it is fair to say that media criticism about his treatment did play some role in his transfer here. 

          MR. JOHNSON:  I wouldn't characterize it that way.  I think it is fair to say that because this case has been in the media, people at Dr. Westphal's level and my level have been involved in this process, and that's fair to say.  

          Yes, ma'am -- 

          Q:  Can I --   

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Well, could I just add to that?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  I'm sorry.  Go ahead.  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  Let me just add to that.    

          I think the issue there is, we began discussing the fact that Private Manning had been at this facility now at Quantico for -- at this time, over eight months, and that this is a facility really designed for -- and the average stay for pre-trial is maybe two months. I don't have all the details, but it's a short stay.  It's not designed for these long-term situations.    

          And so at that point we began to think about the fact that the 706 was going to be done.  We -- you know, we weren't involved in the details of that process -- that is, us as the Under Secretary of the Army -- but in concerns about his well-being and where is the best place for him to be.  And that's when we began discussing the possibilities of moving him to Leavenworth.  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Yes, ma'am.  

          Q:  You keep talking about your concerns for his well-being, whether his pre-trial confinement at Quantico was the right place, putting him in the best place possible.  

          So having said that, I'm puzzled how you can say his conditions at Quantico had nothing to do with this, number one, because I don't understand how you can say that if you're by definition looking for a better place for him to be.  And number two, what does it say about the U.S. military making sure that everyone who is accused -- before they're convicted, they're assumed to be innocent -- is actually in the best, most suitable place they can and should be?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, I -- first of all, I won't say that his conditions at Quantico had nothing to do with this.  What we are saying is that, given the length of time he's been in pre-trial confinement at Quantico, given the point at which we are with the 706 process, and given what the likely period of pre-trial confinement in the future will be, we decided to take a look at whether there is another facility suitable for him at this juncture of the case.  And there is a new facility, opened in January in terms of its pre-trial confinement capacity, that happens to be an Army facility and it's got a lot of mental health support, so we reached the judgment that this is the right facility for him going forward. 

          Q:  But let's go back a minute, then.  The conditions in which he was held at Quantico did play a role in your decision, if I -- you said, I won't say that conditions had nothing to do with it.  Flat out, what -- both of you -- Colonel, I assume you weren't involved in Quantico, so for both you gentlemen, what concerned you the most about what you saw in terms of his conditions at Quantico?  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  I would not characterize it as conditions. I would characterize it as the facility itself and what it's designed to do.  

          Q:  I just wanted to see about what you saw there. 

          MR. WESTPHAL:  It's designed to hold someone for pre-trial for a very short period of time.  And so if you're in a place for what we expect will be a longer period of pre-trial confinement, just because of the complexity -- these are serious charges, very complex process that's going to take place -- that facility is not designed for that. And --   

          Q:  (Off mic) -- circumstances there, for both of you gentlemen, concerned you the most that led you to believe this would be a better decision for him?  

          MR. WESTPHAL:  I would say -- I would say -- and I'll shift it back to Colonel Hilton, but I would say the openness in the facility. If you -- when you look at the URL [www.army.mil/jrcf] and you look at the differences in the place where he will reside, it's more open.  He's got more space, more ability to interact with other prisoners.  He will eat with them. It will depend a lot on the evaluation that they will do at the very beginning.  But it is a place where if you're going to be confined for a longer period of time, you have the ability to interact.  You have the ability to exercise, to move around.  And that is just a -- the nature of the facility itself.  

          Q:  Mr. Johnson, whether you have anything to add on that I'm not sure, but what does it say about the U.S. military, whether it is truly holding everyone in the most appropriate place?  Is -- was his lawyer right, that this was not the place for him? 

          MR. JOHNSON:  Well, the fact that -- the fact that we have made a decision to transfer this particular pre-trial confinee, as I said at the outset, should not be interpreted as a criticism of the place he was before.  And I don't think that there's a simple answer like the one I think you're searching for.    

          This was a combination of events, and I think that you reach a point in the life of a case when you say, well, something may have been most suitable six months ago; should we continue to go down that road; should we stick to that; or should we reassess, given what is likely to happen in the future, to see whether there is some other more suitable facility?  

          Q:  What was no longer suitable at Quantico?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  As Dr. Westphal said, Quantico is a place where pre-trial confinees reside for one month, two months, three months.  It is rare if not unprecedented that somebody is there for as long as nine or 10 months.  

          And then you look, in addition, at the fact that the 706 process is still not complete, that this is a complex case, and we are probably months off from the trial of this case.  We ask ourselves, is this, going forward, the most suitable facility for Private Manning?  And we reached a conclusion that we've got this new facility, it's an Army facility, it's not in the -- it's not in the district of Washington, it's not in the Washington area, so it has that downside, but all things considered, we concluded that going forward, this was the best facility for him.  

          STAFF:  I think CNN's had more than enough questions.  One more?  Anything -- anybody else?  Okay, you. 

          Q:  Do you have a thought on the location, ultimate location of the trial?  Has that been determined?  Is there an --  

          MR. JOHNSON:  That is up to the judge advocate general of the Army, the military justice system We consulted the judge advocate general about this move.  As I mentioned at the outset, the case will reside here.  There's no legal reason why it couldn't be transferred, but the case will reside here, and I believe that's the plan.  

          Q:  It would be in D.C., right, the trial?  

          MR. JOHNSON:  Yes.  Yes. 

          STAFF:  Thank you all.  Appreciate it. 

19 Defense reports recently finding out about a incriminating secret high-level Quantico meeting on January 13, 2011 about Manning's illegal and punitive pre-trial confinement.

[IMAGE TO LEFT, COL. ROBERT G. OLTMAN] The defense recently received reliable reports of a private meeting held on 13 January 2011, involving high-level Quantico officials where it was ordered that PFC Manning would remain in maximum custody and under prevention of injury watch indefinitely.  The order to keep PFC Manning under these unduly harsh conditions was issued by a senior Quantico official [COL. ROBERT G. OLTMAN FORMER SECURITY BATTALION COMMANDER] who stated he would not risk anything happening "on his watch."  When challenged by a Brig psychiatrist present at the meeting that there was no mental health justification for the decision, the senior Quantico official [COL. ROBERT G. OLTMAN FORMER SECURITY BATTALION COMMANDER] issuing the order responded, "We will do whatever we want to do."  Based upon these statements and others, the defense was in the process of filing a writ of habeas corpus seeking a court ruling that the Quantico Brig violated PFC Manning's constitutional right to due process.  See United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 74 S.Ct. 499 (1954) (violation of due process where result of board proceeding was predetermined); United States v. Anderson, 49 M.J. 575 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (illegal punishment where Marine Corps had an unwritten policy automatically placing certain detainees in MAX custody).  The facts surrounding PFC Manning's pretrial confinement at Quantico make it clear that his detention was not "in compliance with legal and regulatory standards in all respects" as maintained at the Pentagon press briefing. (Source: David Coombs, Why Was PFC Manning Moved to Fort Leavenworth?)

(For sourced name see Defense Request to Compel the Production of the Witnesses)

18 Department of Defense | Pentagon press release announces "assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs, spoke about Wikileaks and social media issues with interviewer Vago Muradian on 'This Week in Defense News'" The release goes on to say, "WikiLeaks episode underscores the need for government-wide laws and policies that address the unintended consequences of “technology at the intersection of national security,” Douglas B. Wilson, the Pentagon’s lead communicator said yesterday."

Press Release

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 18, 2011 – The WikiLeaks episode underscores the need for government-wide laws and policies that address the unintended consequences of “technology at the intersection of national security,” Douglas B. Wilson, the Pentagon’s lead communicator said yesterday.

WikiLeaks.org group posted more than 90,000 documents, many that detailed field reports from Afghanistan as well as Pakistan’s relationships with the Taliban.

Wilson, assistant secretary of defense for Public Affairs, spoke about Wikileaks and social media issues with interviewer Vago Muradian on “This Week in Defense News.”

“I think the most significant lesson to come out of this is that technology -- and particularly technology at the intersection of national security -- has outpaced the policy and the law necessary to address the unintended consequences,” Wilson said. 

“Classified information is classified information, and releasing that information is illegal,” he said. “But I think that we have a lot to do in government to understand that we need to be focusing much more on policy and much more on the laws that we need to think about to address what have been very unintended consequences of technological advance.”

Even as social media revolutionizes information-sharing, the Defense Department’s communications strategy boils down to the responsibility of being transparent and timely without jeopardizing the safety and privacy of service members and their families, Wilson said

“The issues that we face every day at the Pentagon involve two factors,” he said. “One, how do you deal with the press and public openly, credibly, in a timely manner and honestly? How do you provide facts and the truth, by the same token understanding that we’re responsible for our men and women in uniform who are in harm’s way in many places? How do you make sure that there is not unintended consequences of information which can put them further in harm’s way and affect their safety and the privacy of their families?

“Those are the issues that frame everything that we do,” Wilson said.

These enduring principles apply regardless of the communications format, and whether it’s through traditional or evolving media, he said.

Wilson said he recognizes how the advent of social media revolutionized the way people around the world -- including those in the Defense Department -- communicate.

Social media “provides instantaneous, real-time ability to reach broad numbers of people and to communicate quickly and effectively,” he said. “When everybody is equipped with the social media tools, it’s a very effective means of communication.”

Wilson noted the use of social media as an organizing and messaging tool in the Middle East in recent months.

“We’ve seen that in terms of sectors of societies in the Arab world which had not had that kind of communications across those sectors before being able to mobilize very quickly,” he said.

Unlike in that past, where a finite number of elites around the world defined messages, social media provide a voice to anyone, regardless of what they have to say and whether they are friend or foe.

“You can have religious extremists from Florida to Yemen say things and do things that are going to have international impact,” Wilson said.

That makes it an imperative, he said, for communicators at the Defense Department -- and across government as a whole -- to be able to explain policies in ways that people find credible.

Twitter, Facebook and other social media, Wilson said, are among the many communication tools that DOD employs, including print and broadcast media, the Internet and personal communication.

Social media “is not an end in itself. It is a tool of communications,” Wilson said. “It’s a way to communicate, and you need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each of the tools of communications in order to be effective … I don’t believe that there is any panacea in communications.”

18

White House | At a press conference, Press Secretary Jay Carney responds to questions about the WikiLeaks release of information that the U.S. had aided an "anti-Syrian" government broadcast group and whether or not those individuals would be targeted.

Carney responds that he is not going to comment on "alleged leaks of classified material."

Full Transcript

Q Can you talk to me about this aid to an anti-Syrian government broadcast group, I guess, that was revealed in Wikileaks last week? There’s some reporting that administration officials are concerned that people who participate in this could be targeted by the Syrian government.

MR. CARNEY: Well, Wendell, you know we’re not going to comment on alleged leaks of classified material. As you know also, the U.S. government provides support to civil society, democracy and human rights activists around the world in line with our values, among them respecting the fundamental human rights of free speech, peaceful assembly and human dignity. U.S. outreach to Syrian civilian society is entirely consistent with those principles.

(Source: White House)

15 Secret Order directs Sonic to turn over the the IP address from which Mr. Appelbaum logged into his account and the email and IP addresses of the users with whom he communicated dating back to Nov. 1, 2009.

"The secret Sonic order is dated April 15 and directs Sonic to turn over the same type of information from Mr. Appelbaum's email account dating back to Nov. 1, 2009.

On Aug. 31, the court agreed to lift the seal on the Sonic order to provide Mr. Appelbaum a copy of it. Sonic Chief Executive Mr. Jasper said the company also sought to unseal the rest of its legal filings but that request 'came back virtually entirely denied.'" (The Wall Street Journal)

"Both Google and Sonic pressed for the right to inform Mr. Appelbaum of the secret court orders, according to people familiar with the investigation. Google declined to comment. Mr. Appelbaum, 28 years old, hasn't been charged with wrongdoing." (The Wall Street Journal)

"Sonic said it fought the government's order and lost, and was forced to turn over information. Challenging the order was "rather expensive, but we felt it was the right thing to do," said Sonic's chief executive, Dane Jasper. The government's request included the email addresses of people Mr. Appelbaum corresponded with the past two years, but not the full emails." (The Wall Street Journal)

14 Reply in support of objections by by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir re 39 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to Vacate...

Reply in support of objections

Excerpt:

"c. There is n reason to maintain the other 2703 Orders under seal.

The government doesn't explain why the 2703 orders to companies other than Twitter should remain sealed, nor does it dispute that the Magistrate's Order failed to articulate any reason for continues secrecy. Instead, the government simply asserts that unsealing those judicial orders would be "preposterous" and that the Magistrate did not err in failing to articulate why these core judicial documents should remain hidden from public view. Opp. at 29-30.

In fact, the public's right of access is at its apex when judicial orders like the 2703 orders here are at issue. See, e.g., In re Sealing and Non-Disclose of Pen/trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F Supp. 2d 876, 891 (S.D. Tex 2008) (rejecting permanent sealing of 2703(d) orders because "documents authored or generated by the court itself" are in the "top drawer of judicial records," a drawer that is "hardly ever close to the public."); United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 715-16 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("requiring a judge's rulings to be made in public deters partiality and bias…In short, justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done"). There is no claim that these other 2703 doers contain any of the "sensitive," "non public," or "investigatory" information allegedly justifying the sealing of the Twitter Application. The Magistrate erred by failing to explain how any claimed governmental interest heavily outweighs the public's right of access to the other 2703 orders. Stone v. Univ. of Md Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F 2nd 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1988) (courts must weigh interests 'with respects to each document sealed.")

That failure is especially troubling because the Twitter Order was unsealed - at the government's request - and the government and Magistrate stated that doing so was "in the best interest of the investigation." Jan. 5 Unsealing Order, Sears Decl. (Dkt.45), Ex. 3. Given that, it is unlikely that unsealing similar orders to other companies would seriously jeopardize the same investigation. To the extent the claim is that these other orders would reveal the names of "witnesses" order recipients), that was also the case with the Twitter Order. The government's failure to provide any explanation for continued secrecy - let alone a compelling one - demonstrates that the government has not met its burden.

The government's only response is to say that the Magistrate could not address the sealing of the other orders because even entertaining the challenges would confirm the order's existence. Opp. at 30. that circular argument would mean that sealed dockets could never be challenged, because ruling a motion to unseal a "secret" docket - where the existence of the matter has not been officially been confirmed - would reveal the docket's existence. That is not the law…

The government's argument also ignores the fact that the reason the existence of these other orders is not yet confirmed is because the Clerk's Office has improperly failed to publicly docket them. Courts must publicly docket even sealed judicial records to provide the public with notice and an opportunity to seek to unseal them…

Public docketing is required even for time-sensitive matters such as search warrant proceedings…Although the Magistrate has taken the issue "under consideration," … no ruling has yet been made. Were there public docketing of other orders, the entire premise of the government's argument would fail." (source: Reply in support of objections)

"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Tracy D. McCormick
U.S. Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: 703-299-3175
Email: [email protected]

...

Andrew Peterson
US Attorney's Office (Alexandria)
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
703-299-3700
[email protected]" (source: Reply in support of objections)

12

Senate Committee on the Judiciary | At the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism's hearing entitled "Cyber Security: Responding to the Threat of Cyber Crime and Terrorism", Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation talks about HBGary and calls Anonymous The “Not for Profit” Cyber Criminal.

Also testifying, Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice and Pablo Martinez, Deputy Special Agent In Charge, Criminal Investigation Division, Cyber Crime Operations, Secret Service

The Secret Service has two overseas Electronic Crime Task Force Offices, in London and Rome. And, the DOJ has prosecutors deployed overseas to investigate intrusion and lobby foreign Governments.

The “Not for Profit” Cyber Criminal

Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous undertake protests and commit computer crimes as a collective unit. Anonymous does not have a leader or a controlling party, but instead relies on the collective power of individual participants. Its members utilize the Internet to communicate, advertise, and coordinate their actions. Anonymous has initiated multiple criminal Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the Recording Industry Association of America, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Church of Scientology, and various businesses in support of WikiLeaks.

Just last month, Anonymous hacked into the website of a U.S. security firm with US government contracts and stole approximately 72,000 e-mails from the company and posted them online. This attack was in response to the claim that a researcher at the company had identified key members of Anonymous. (Source: Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism)

Testimony of Weinstein (PDF)

Testimony of Martinez (PDF)

See alsoSenate Judiciary Web Site for the Hearing

11

WikiLeaks Grand Jury | Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division of the Department of Justice is requests a subpoena of an Unnamed Cambridge Resident.

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Letter Re: 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-937

Date of Letter April 21, 2011

Signed by:

  • Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) (X)
  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division
  • Niel MacBride, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia

Subpoena 11-3/ 10GJ3793/ 11-1233

Date of Subpoena April 11, 2011

Grand Jury Appearance May 11, 2011

Requested by:

  • Andrew Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, National Security and Terrorism Division

Signed by:

"We advise you that the Grand Jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal law involving, but not necessarily limited to conspiracy to communicate or transmit national defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(g) and conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 to wit; knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access and having obtained information protected from disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) and knowingly stealing or converting any record of thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641"

April 11, 2011 Subpoena Request, April 21, 2011 Letter, and May 11, 2011 Subpoena Appearance

(Source: Glenn Greenwald)

9 706 Board interviews Bradley Manning. Jeh Johnson, general counsel Department of Defense, says "the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed" Jeh also says, Manning "will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that. "

"Before we take your questions, I want to spend a moment to explain the circumstances.  At the request of Private Manning's defense counsel, an assessment is under way to determine whether Private Manning is mentally competent in this case in the event it goes to trial.  On Saturday, April 9, the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed, and Private Manning's presence in the Washington, D.C. area is no longer necessary for that purpose.  

However, we are told that the medical opinion concerning Private Manning's competence to stand trial may take additional time.  At this juncture of the case, we have decided that the new joint-regional correctional facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the most appropriate facility for Private Manning for continued pre-trial detention."(Source: Department of Defense)

"He will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that." (Source: Department of Defense)

"[F]airly lengthy process that began at the request of the defense [counsel] that involves assessing a bunch of things that include an interview of the -- of the pre-trial confinee.  But it's an ongoing process, and the medical opinion of this board, it looks as if it won't be out for a little while.  I'm not exactly sure.  It could be a matter of weeks or so. And so -- but the -- the process, it involves his personal participation.  It was done -- it was done on April 9." (Source: Department of Defense)

 

8 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE Andrew Peterso, Asst US Attorney, appearing for USA. RESPONSE by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 43 Objection, (Peterson, Andrew) (Entered: 04/08/2011) submitted by Asst. US Attorneys John S. Davis, Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Andrew Peterson, and US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Neil MacBride

NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE Andrew Peterson appearing for USA. Not available (Source: web archive)

RESPONSE by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 43 Objection, (Peterson, Andrew) (Entered: 04/08/2011)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) )

MISC. NO. 10GJ3793
No. 1:11DM3

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS OF THREE TWITTERSUBSCRIBERS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MARCH 11, 2011, OPINION DENYING MOTION TO VACATE AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO UNSEAL

...

Respectfully submitted,

Neil H. MacBride

United States Attorney

By: ______/s/__________________

John S. Davis
Tracy Doherty-McCormick
Andrew Peterson
Assistant United States Attorneys
United States Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-3700

 

8

Department of State | The same Bureau at the Department of State responsible for the WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), also publishes the State Department's Human Rights Reports.

In the 2010 Human Rights Practices for Morocco they cite WikiLeaks censorship under "Freedom of Speech and Press", saying, "The government banned the importation of foreign media when they were considered to undermine the sanctity of the nation or public order. For example, throughout the week of December 14, the government blocked the distribution of leading international newspapers Al-Quds Al-Arabi, El Pais, and Le Monde for printing Wikileaks-related articles critical of the government."

[Tags: WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group]

The government banned the importation of foreign media when they were considered to undermine the sanctity of the nation or public order. For example, throughout the week of December 14, the government blocked the distribution of leading international newspapers Al-Quds Al-Arabi, El Pais, and Le Monde for printing Wikileaks-related articles critical of the government.

(Source: Department of State)

7 Quantico denies Bradley Manning official visits by US Congressman Dennis Kucinich, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Mendez, and rep from Amnesty International

"[D]efense has been working to facilitate an official visit for Congressman Dennis Kucinich, Mr. Juan Mendez (the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture), and a representative from Amnesty International.  Despite multiple inquires from the defense and the interested parties, the Quantico Brig and the Government have denied the requests for an "official visit...The Government's position is that the above individuals are not entitled to an official visit because none of these individuals are conducting "official government business." (Source: David Coombs, Brig Fails to Follow Its Own Rule)

6 Senate Judiciary Committee | At a hearing entitled “The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age” with Department of Justice, James A. Baker, Esq. cites Judge Buchanan's WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) order regarding the probably cause standard for early investigation.

(Source: Senate Judiciary Web Site)

Full Video

(Source: Congressional Record of the Hearing)

(3) Clarifying the standard for issuing 2703(d) orders A third potentially appropriate topic for legislation is to clarify the standard for issuance of a court order under § 2703(d) of ECPA. ECPA provides that the government can use a court order under § 2703(d) to compel the production of non-content data, such as email addresses, IP addresses, or historical location information stored by providers. These orders can also compel production of some stored content of communications, although compelling content generally requires notice to the subscriber. According to the statute, “[a] court order for disclosure... may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

Until recently, no court had questioned that the United States was entitled to a 2703(d) order when it made the “specific and articulable facts” showing specified by § 2703(d). However, the Third Circuit recently held that because the statute says that a 2703(d) order “may” be issued if the government makes the necessary showing, judges may choose not to sign an application even if it provides the statutory showing. See In re Application of the United States, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit’s approach thus makes the issuance of § 2703(d) orders unpredictable and potentially inconsistent; some judges may impose additional requirements, while others may not. For example, some judges will issue these orders based on the statutory “reasonable grounds” standard, while others will devise higher burdens.

In considering the standard for issuing 2703(d) orders, it is important to consider the role they play in early stages of criminal and national security investigations. In the Wikileaks investigation, for example, this point was recently emphasized by Magistrate Judge Buchanan in the Eastern District of Virginia. In denying a motion to vacate a 2703(d) order directed to Twitter, Judge Buchanan explained that “at an early stage, the requirement of a higher probable cause standard for non-content information voluntarily released to a third party would needlessly hamper an investigation.” In re 2703(d), 2011 WL 900120, at *4 (E.D. Va. March 11, 2011).

Other statutes and rules governing the issuance of legal process, such as search warrants and pen/trap orders, require a magistrate to issue legal process when it finds that the United States has made the required showing. The Third Circuit’s interpretation of § 2703(d), under which a court is free to reject the government’s application even when it meets the statutory standard, is at odds with this approach. Legislation could address this issue.

(Source: Statement by Department of Justice, James A. Baker, Esq., Associate Deputy Attorney General)

7 Ecuador | The Government of Ecuador declares the United States Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather M. Hodges, persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, citing alleged confidential cables released to the public by WikiLeaks.

The U.S. has suspended its dialogue with Ecuador and declared its Ambassador to the US as persona non grata in retaliation of a similar action by government of Ecuador.

“Assistant Secretary (of State, Arturo) Valenzuela called in Ambassador (Luis) Gallegos at 10:30 this morning and informed him of our decision to declare him persona non grata. I believe he’s required to depart the United States as soon as possible,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters.

“The unjustified action of the Ecuadorian Government in declaring (US) Ambassador (to Ecuador) Hodges persona non grata left us no other option than this reciprocal action. I believe we said when I announced Ambassador Hodges was declared persona non grata, I said we were considering actions, and this is one of those,” Mr. Toner said.

“We are also suspending the bilateral dialogue which had been scheduled for June,” the State Department spokesman said.

We are interested in a positive relationship with Ecuador, but the regrettable and unwarranted decision to declare Ambassador Hodges persona non grata is going to be taken into account as we move forward in the relationship, he added. (Source: The Hindu)

On April 5, 2011, the Government of Ecuador declared the United States Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather M. Hodges, persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, citing alleged confidential cables released to the public by WikiLeaks. On April 7, the U.S. Government took reciprocal action, informing Ecuador's Ambassador to the United States, Luis Benigno Gallegos Chiriboga, of the decision to declare him persona non grata under Article 9(1) of the Vienna Convention. Ecuador’s new Ambassador to the United States, Nathalie Cely, took office in December 2011. The U.S. Ambassador-designate to Ecuador, Adam Namm, awaits confirmation by the U.S. Senate. (Source: Department of State)

Ecuador’s government said Tuesday that it was expelling the United States ambassador, Heather M. Hodges, over comments made public in a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks in which Ms. Hodges referred to high-level police corruption in Ecuador and possible knowledge of it by the president.

Ms. Hodges recommended in a cable dated July 10, 2009 — and published Monday by the Spanish newspaper El Pais — that the United States revoke a visa for Jaime Aquilino Hurtado, the national police commander who served from April 2008 to June 2009.

In the cable, she discussed multiple reports of illegal activities by Mr. Aquilino Hurtado, including his possible involvement in schemes to extort bribes from a taxi union, steal public funds and ease trafficking of undocumented Chinese immigrants.

In a particularly sensitive part of the cable, Ms. Hodges noted that “some Embassy officials believe that President Correa must have been aware of them when he made the appointment” of Mr. Aquilino Hurtado.

“These observers believe that Correa may have wanted to have an ENP chief whom he could easily manipulate,” said Ms. Hodges, using the initials for the Ecuadorean National Police. (Source: New York Times

In a statement on Tuesday, Ecuador’s government said: “This affirmation, in addition to being unacceptable, is malicious and imprudent.”

U.S. State Department Cable SECRET QUITO 000572

5 Ecuador and U.S. Department of State | The Government of Ecuador declares the United States Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather M. Hodges, persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, citing alleged confidential cables released to the public by WikiLeaks.

On April 5, 2011, the Government of Ecuador declared the United States Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather M. Hodges, persona non grata under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, citing alleged confidential cables released to the public by WikiLeaks. On April 7, the U.S. Government took reciprocal action, informing Ecuador's Ambassador to the United States, Luis Benigno Gallegos Chiriboga, of the decision to declare him persona non grata under Article 9(1) of the Vienna Convention. Ecuador’s new Ambassador to the United States, Nathalie Cely, took office in December 2011. The U.S. Ambassador-designate to Ecuador, Adam Namm, awaits confirmation by the U.S. Senate. (Source: Department of State)

Ecuador’s government said Tuesday that it was expelling the United States ambassador, Heather M. Hodges, over comments made public in a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks in which Ms. Hodges referred to high-level police corruption in Ecuador and possible knowledge of it by the president.

Ms. Hodges recommended in a cable dated July 10, 2009 — and published Monday by the Spanish newspaper El Pais — that the United States revoke a visa for Jaime Aquilino Hurtado, the national police commander who served from April 2008 to June 2009.

In the cable, she discussed multiple reports of illegal activities by Mr. Aquilino Hurtado, including his possible involvement in schemes to extort bribes from a taxi union, steal public funds and ease trafficking of undocumented Chinese immigrants.

In a particularly sensitive part of the cable, Ms. Hodges noted that “some Embassy officials believe that President Correa must have been aware of them when he made the appointment” of Mr. Aquilino Hurtado.

“These observers believe that Correa may have wanted to have an ENP chief whom he could easily manipulate,” said Ms. Hodges, using the initials for the Ecuadorean National Police. (Source: New York Times

In a statement on Tuesday, Ecuador’s government said: “This affirmation, in addition to being unacceptable, is malicious and imprudent.”

U.S. State Department Cable SECRET QUITO 000572

Full Transcript of the U.S. State Department Press Briefing

Excerpt from the U.S. State Department Press Briefing:

MR. TONER: Just briefly at the top – I know some of you were asking me via email and others in the Press Office – our Embassy did today receive official communication through appropriate diplomatic channels that the Ecuadorian Government has declared Ambassador Heather Hodges persona non grata. Ambassador Hodges is one of our most experienced and talented diplomats and the Department considers her expulsion unjustified. And we deeply regret the Ecuadorian Government took it. The Department will examine its options to respond to this Ecuadorian action.

With that, I’ll take your questions.

QUESTION: What kind of options?

MR. TONER: You’re aware of the – I think well aware of some of the options. We’ve literally just received this news.

QUESTION: Well, enlighten me again.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Are all options on the table? (Laughter.)

MR. TONER: Okay. You’re – you’ve – we’ve been down this road in other cases and we’re all aware of some of the options. Again, I don’t want to get into details. We’re evaluating our options. We literally just received this news before coming – I did before coming down here, so --

QUESTION: All right. I did notice --

MR. TONER: -- it’s still very early.

QUESTION: -- that the Ecuadorian Government has recently either reopened or announced plans to open consulates in New Orleans, which I think has been reopened now after Katrina, and to open one in Phoenix. Is this the kind of thing that you would look at --

MR. TONER: I don’t – I really --

QUESTION: -- in terms of rescinding their permission? I mean, apparently, they’re eager to have branch offices in this country even at the same time as they’re expelling your ambassador. Is that the kind of thing that could be looked at and --

MR. TONER: Well --

QUESTION: -- as well as just the straight-out reciprocal action?

MR. TONER: Again, there’s a number of options we can take. We just received this news, so it’s really premature for me to be speculating on what actions we might take.

QUESTION: All right.

MR. TONER: She’s – again, Ambassador Hodges is one of our most experienced diplomats, and we deeply regret her expulsion.

QUESTION: Did the diplomatic note say why she was being PNGed?

MR. TONER: It did not. Actually, it did not specify.

QUESTION: All right. Without getting into the reasons that may or may not have been behind the expulsion, do you have concerns about corruption in Ecuador’s police force?

MR. TONER: I think that – well, Matt, it’s a fair question. I believe that we have corruption concerns in a number of countries. Corruption is never – is always a corrosive factor in many democracies. And we’re going to candidly assess that kind of corruption where we see it, but I don’t want to specifically address that issue.

QUESTION: Well, do you – is – I’m sorry, Ecuador, are you concerned about corruption in Ecuador’s police force?

MR. TONER: Again, this is something that we would talk about in our Human Rights Report. I don’t have specific information for you on that. I can look into it.

QUESTION: Mark, can you confirm that it was because of a WikiLeaks document?

MR. TONER: Again, we received no official reason for her PNG.

QUESTION: Did you get any official – I mean, it’s – surely, you will have asked. Do you get – did you get any unofficial explanation for it?

MR. TONER: Well, Arshad, again, we’ve seen various press reports and other public comments that did link it to that, but I can’t speculate.

QUESTION: And do you think – if it is linked to that, do you think this is a justified action?

MR. TONER: Well, again, I don’t want to talk about the contents of allegedly classified material, but speaking more broadly about the issue, our diplomats overseas conduct vital work in informing our policy decisions back in Washington. We believe that their assessments need to be candid and need to be classified in many cases. And it’s always difficult when we lose those kinds of channels.

QUESTION: Well, Mark --

MR. TONER: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: -- I’m just confused about one thing. After the sentence that says, “Ambassador Hodges is one of our finest,” whatever that line is, what’s the next sentence?

MR. TONER: “We consider her expulsion unjustified.”

QUESTION: Well, if they didn’t give you a reason, how do you know it’s unjustified?

MR. TONER: Well --

QUESTION: I mean, how can you come to a judgment that it’s unjustified if you don’t know what the reason for it is?

MR. TONER: Well, Matt, again, we believe she’s doing stellar work and that there is no reason for – or justification for her expulsion.

QUESTION: Well, yeah, but presumably, if you’re saying that it is unjustified, that there is some reason that you don’t accept for her – that they’ve made either publicly or privately to you?

MR. TONER: Well, again, I referred – what I answered to Arshad I referred to some of the public comments that we’ve seen. But certainly, we believe she’s doing good work and there’s no reason for her to be a persona non grata.

QUESTION: Change topic?

MR. TONER: Yeah, sure.

QUESTION: Just one more on this?

MR. TONER: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Up to now, how would you assess relations with Ecuador?

MR. TONER: I think they’re on good standing. It’s one of our key allies in the region and we want to take that relationship forward. And we deeply regret this incident and the impact it’s going to have (Source: Department of State).

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Mar 2011

31 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Memorandum in Support by Steven M. Bellovin, PhD., et al as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. re 48 MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae The Brief of Amici Curiae.MOTION for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae by Steven M. Bellovin, PhD., et al as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. Amicus brief from security experts. Granted by US District Judge Liam O'Grady.

Amicus brief from security experts

"ORDER granting 47 Motion for Leave to File as to Jacob Appelbaum (1), Rop Gonggrijp (2), Birgitta Jonsdottir (3), Twitter, Inc. (4). Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 4/1/2011. (rban, ) (Entered: 04/04/2011)" (Source: web archive)

"ORDER granting 48 Motion for Leave to File Brief as amici curiae. Signed by District Judge Liam O'Grady on 4/5/2011." (Source: web archive)

28 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Notice of Hearing Date for April 22, 2011. Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir re 39 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to Vacate..., Affidavit Bringola Declaration and Exhibits 1-3, Affidavit Sears Declaration and Exhibits 1-5, MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae by Christopher Soghoian

Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir re 39 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to Vacate is not available. (Source: web archive)

Affidavit Bringola Declaration and Exhibits 1-3

Affidavit Sears Declaration and Exhibits 1-5 Not available. (Source: web archive)

Notice of Hearing Date April 22, 2011 @ 10:00 a.m. re 45 Objection. Not available. (Source: web archive)

Amicus brief from privacy researchers

MOTION for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae by Christopher Soghoian

25 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | Objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir re 39 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to Vacate..., Affidavit Bringola Declaration and Exhibits, Affidavit Sears Declaration and Exhibits, and Notice of Hearing Date.

The objection by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir re 39 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion to Vacate... is not available, (Source: web archive)

but the affidavits and declarations are:

Affidavit Bringola Declaration and Exhibits.

Affidavit Sears Declaration and Exhibits.

Notice of Hearing Date set for April 22, 2011 @ 10:00 a.m. re 43 Objection.

21 Department of State | State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner, says that U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, communicated that he was resigning on March 19, 2011, and that the WikiLeak release of U.S. State Department cables is "going to make our work more difficult. But at the same time, we demand or we ask that our embassies rather provide us with candid assessments, and that’s going to continue."

Full Transcript

QUESTION: Can we switch to Mexico?

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Ambassador Carlos Pascual. You have announced that the Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, have resigned. Is he another victim, high-profile victim of WikiLeaks?

MR. TONER: He made a personal decision. He, I believe, said in his statement that he didn’t want to be a distraction to what is one of our most important bilateral relationships. He enjoyed all along the support of the Secretary and, obviously, the President. We feel he accomplished a great deal in his role, but he made the decision that he didn’t want to impede this important relationship. I’m not going to characterize it in any way whatsoever. It’s really his decision.

QUESTION: Is he going to be doing something else at the State Department? According to the press release, he was going to come and perform some other duties within the State Department. Can you share something about --

MR. TONER: I believe that’s what the statement said. I don't have any more details at this time.

QUESTION: And do you expect any other – maybe other governments to complain because the ambassador – because of the reports of WikiLeaks and perhaps face similar situations?

MR. TONER: We’ve said all along that it’s a difficult time for us. It’s going to make our work more difficult. But at the same time, we demand or we ask that our embassies rather provide us with candid assessments, and that’s going to continue.

Go ahead. And then --

QUESTION: Did (inaudible) dissuade him from resigning?

MR. TONER: I would just say that he enjoyed the support of the Secretary and the President all along during his tenure.

Go ahead, in the back.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, do you have an idea when he made official, transmitted his decision to Secretary Clinton?

MR. TONER: The first part of your question again?

QUESTION: Can you tell us when he made official or transmitted his decision to Secretary Clinton?

MR. TONER: On March 19th.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Let’s say – have you taken us steps --

MR. TONER: Can we just – (laughter.) That’s okay.

QUESTION: -- for the future? I mean, what are you telling the other governments now for the future, that WikiLeaks-like things will not happen?

MR. TONER: I’m not sure I know how to answer that, Goyal.

QUESTION: I mean --

MR. TONER: I’m sorry. WikiLeaks --

QUESTION: That WikiLeaks took place, now what are you telling to the governments now, that no more in the future something like this will happen? Or how are you protecting the information?

MR. TONER: That’s a broader topic for discussion. And we’re obviously taking measures that – to protect our classified information in light of WikiLeaks.

...

QUESTION: -- the Hindu newspaper in India is coming out with a WikiLeaks publication, the last one week. Has there been any high-level contact between the U.S. and India after that on those issues?

MR. TONER: Not that I’m aware of.

(Source: Department of State)

19 Department of State | U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, communicated that he was resigning on March 19, 2011 to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

Full Transcript

QUESTION: Can we switch to Mexico?

MR. TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Ambassador Carlos Pascual. You have announced that the Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, have resigned. Is he another victim, high-profile victim of WikiLeaks?

MR. TONER: He made a personal decision. He, I believe, said in his statement that he didn’t want to be a distraction to what is one of our most important bilateral relationships. He enjoyed all along the support of the Secretary and, obviously, the President. We feel he accomplished a great deal in his role, but he made the decision that he didn’t want to impede this important relationship. I’m not going to characterize it in any way whatsoever. It’s really his decision.

QUESTION: Is he going to be doing something else at the State Department? According to the press release, he was going to come and perform some other duties within the State Department. Can you share something about --

MR. TONER: I believe that’s what the statement said. I don't have any more details at this time.

QUESTION: And do you expect any other – maybe other governments to complain because the ambassador – because of the reports of WikiLeaks and perhaps face similar situations?

MR. TONER: We’ve said all along that it’s a difficult time for us. It’s going to make our work more difficult. But at the same time, we demand or we ask that our embassies rather provide us with candid assessments, and that’s going to continue.

Go ahead. And then --

QUESTION: Did (inaudible) dissuade him from resigning?

MR. TONER: I would just say that he enjoyed the support of the Secretary and the President all along during his tenure.

Go ahead, in the back.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, do you have an idea when he made official, transmitted his decision to Secretary Clinton?

MR. TONER: The first part of your question again?

QUESTION: Can you tell us when he made official or transmitted his decision to Secretary Clinton?

MR. TONER: On March 19th.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Let’s say – have you taken us steps --

MR. TONER: Can we just – (laughter.) That’s okay.

QUESTION: -- for the future? I mean, what are you telling the other governments now for the future, that WikiLeaks-like things will not happen?

MR. TONER: I’m not sure I know how to answer that, Goyal.

QUESTION: I mean --

MR. TONER: I’m sorry. WikiLeaks --

QUESTION: That WikiLeaks took place, now what are you telling to the governments now, that no more in the future something like this will happen? Or how are you protecting the information?

MR. TONER: That’s a broader topic for discussion. And we’re obviously taking measures that – to protect our classified information in light of WikiLeaks.

...

QUESTION: -- the Hindu newspaper in India is coming out with a WikiLeaks publication, the last one week. Has there been any high-level contact between the U.S. and India after that on those issues?

MR. TONER: Not that I’m aware of.

(Source: Department of State)

18

Department of State | Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, appearing on several Spanish television stations comments on U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual. On Univision, Clinton says, "I deeply regret the WikiLeaks situation, and I’ve told President Calderon that. But I do really appreciate what Ambassador Pascual has done in his time as our ambassador because he’s worked closely with many parts of the Mexican Government. We are close friends and partners with Mexico but we don’t always agree on everything, as no two countries do. And so I’m going to continue to really support the important work that’s being done, and it will be up to the ambassador to determine how effective he can be going forward."

Interview With Lourdes Meluza of Univision

QUESTION: Does the U.S. ambassador in Mexico, Carlos Pascual, does he still have your confidence after the WikiLeaks scandals?

(In Spanish.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I deeply regret the WikiLeaks situation, and I’ve told President Calderon that. But I do really appreciate what Ambassador Pascual has done in his time as our ambassador because he’s worked closely with many parts of the Mexican Government. We are close friends and partners with Mexico but we don’t always agree on everything, as no two countries do. And so I’m going to continue to really support the important work that’s being done, and it will be up to the ambassador to determine how effective he can be going forward (Source: Department of State).

Interview With Jose Diaz-Balart of Telemundo

QUESTION: You know there’s been a flare-up on the WikiLeaks issue because the president has expressed very little confidence in the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. Is he going to be there? Do you have confidence in the U.S. Ambassador? (Speaking in Spanish.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this was a very unfortunate situation. I spoke personally with President Calderon about it and expressed our regret. But at the same time, the Ambassador has been very instrumental in working to make sure that the United States Government responded to the Mexican needs. I think the Ambassador will make an assessment as to whether or not he can continue to be as helpful as he has been in the past (Source: Department of State).

18 Department of Justice | Jesse William McGraw, a former contract security guard at the North Central Medical Plaza on North Central Expressway in Dallas, who admitted hacking into that hospital’s computer systems, was sentenced late yesterday afternoon by U.S. District Judge Jane J. Boyle to 110 months on each of two counts, to be served concurrently, announced U.S. Attorney James T. Jacks of the Northern District of Texas. The Department of Justice press release states, "In this case, McGraw admitted that he intended to use the bots and the compromised computers to launch DDoS attacks on the websites of rival hacker groups. “Electronik Tribulation Army” (ETA) rival hacker groups included “Anonymous,” the hacker group currently claiming responsibility for attacks against PayPal and others in support of Wikileaks."

17

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform | At the "The Freedom of Information Act: Crowd-Sourcing Government Oversight":

Angela Canterbury, Director of Public Policy, Project on Government Oversight testifies:

Too often, overt secrecy has not only impaired the promise of FOIA but also has put the American people at risk. The tension between secrecy and openness in government continues to be extremely high. Abuse of FOIA, over-classification, quasi-classification, and suppression of whistleblowers are the most common tools of secrecy. POGO urges the Committee to closely monitor the administration in each of these areas, especially as new policies are promulgated on so-called controlled but unclassified information (CUI) and in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures of classified information.

Additionally, this Committee also must ensure the free speech for those who warn us of waste, fraud, and abuse. We urge you to waste no time in ensuring all federal whistleblowers have safe, legal channels and protections to hold the government accountable to taxpayers by enacting the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.

Part One:

Part Two:

Full Transcript

Testimony of Miriam Nisbet, Director, Office of Government, Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration

Testimony of Daniel Metcalfe, Executive Director, Collaboration on Government Secrecy Retired Founding Director, Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice

Testimony of Tom Fitton, President, Judicial Watch

Testimony of Rick Blum, Coordinator, Sunshine in Government

Testimony of Angela Canterbury, Director of Public Policy, Project on Government Oversight:

Too often, overt secrecy has not only impaired the promise of FOIA but also has put the American people at risk. The tension between secrecy and openness in government continues to be extremely high. Abuse of FOIA, over-classification, quasi-classification, and suppression of whistleblowers are the most common tools of secrecy. POGO urges the Committee to closely monitor the administration in each of these areas, especially as new policies are promulgated on so-called controlled but unclassified information (CUI) and in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures of classified information.

Additionally, this Committee also must ensure the free speech for those who warn us of waste, fraud, and abuse. We urge you to waste no time in ensuring all federal whistleblowers have safe, legal channels and protections to hold the government accountable to taxpayers by enacting the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.

(Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform)

17

Department of State | State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner refuses to comment on the details of WikiLeaks cable concerning a U.S. diplomat to India who was aware of alleged bribery operations ahead of a key confidence vote in the Indian parliament, because, as Toner says, the "purported cable" is "allegedly classified".

QUESTION: India and WikiLeaks.

MR. TONER: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Apparently, well, the Indian media is in an uproar over a WikiLeaks cable from July 2008 in which it details that a U.S. diplomat was aware of alleged bribery operations ahead of a key confidence vote in the Indian parliament. Does the U.S. condone such open corruption in other governments?

MR. TONER: Okay, specifically about WikiLeaks --

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. TONER: Our policy throughout has been not to comment on the substance of allegedly classified material. And --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) classified (inaudible) leaked?

MR. TONER: Well, it’s allegedly classified. We don’t – we’re not – I’m not going to say it’s classified or not. But it certainly – if it is classified, we wouldn’t speak about it, and we’re not going to speak about it in any way, shape, or form.

To your broader question about corruption in government, of course the United States is always for greater transparency in governments throughout the world because transparency in governments leads to better political systems that are able to help the people that they represent. So, I mean, more broadly, we deal with corruption issues throughout – in many countries throughout the world. And that’s an important part of our assistance efforts to many countries in the world. But specifically, what pertains to India, I really can’t speak to that.

(Source: Department of State)

17 Rep Kucinich in a speech on the floor of Congress About the Afghanistan War Powers Resolution H. Con. Res. 28.

This bill failed passage in the House.

"As the WikiLeaks war diary comprised of more than 91,000 secret reports on the Afghanistan War makes clear, any sense of American and allied progress in the conflict has been undermined by revelations that many more civilian deaths have occurred than have been officially acknowledged as the result of U.S. and allied strike accidents. The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence continued to provide logistics and financial support to the Afghan Taliban even as U.S. soldiers were fighting these units. It is clear that Karzai government affiliates and appointees in rural Afghanistan have often proven to be more corrupt and ruthless than the Taliban." (Source: Congressional Record)

17

White House | White House Press Secretary Jay Carney is asked if the President still believes that the treatment of Bradley Manning is appropriate.

On March 11, 2011, President Obama said, "With respect to Private Manning, I have actually asked the Pentagon whether or not the procedures that have been taken in terms of his confinement are appropriate and are meeting our basic standards. They assure me that they are. I can’t go into details about some of their concerns, but some of this has to do with Private Manning’s safety as well."

Carney responds, "I would not expand beyond what the President said in terms of his personal reaction to the question."

Full Transcript

Full Video

"Q    A quick question.  Is the President going to take any questions in the Rose Garden today?

MR. CARNEY:  I believe it’s -- he will be just issuing a statement today.

Q    And given -- a quick follow-up -- since he won’t be -- I won’t have or anyone won’t have an opportunity to ask him, he said that he’d asked the Pentagon last week whether the treatment of Bradley Manning was appropriate.  I’m just wondering if he believes personally that the treatment of Bradley Manning is appropriate, and what we can read from the fact that just a day later they changed the conditions under which he was being held.

MR. CARNEY:  I would refer you -- I would not expand beyond what the President said in terms of his personal reaction to the question.  And I would point you to the statements the State Department and the Defense Department have made on that.

Yes."

(Source: White House)

See also President's Comments about Manning's treatment by Pentagon on March 11, 2011

16 Department of State | U.S. State Department Public Schedules notes that Under Secretary For Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale gives brief remarks at the Public Affairs Task Force Awards Ceremony, at the Department of State. The event honors those who served as the Public Affairs representative on task forces in 2010 and 2011, including WikiLeaks [Task Forces]

[Tag: WikiLeaks 24/7 Task Force]

11

White House | President Obama says concerning Bradley Manning's treatment by the Pentagon at Quantico, "With respect to Private Manning, I have actually asked the Pentagon whether or not the procedures that have been taken in terms of his confinement are appropriate and are meeting our basic standards. They assure me that they are. I can’t go into details about some of their concerns, but some of this has to do with Private Manning’s safety as well."

Q Thanks, Mr. President. Experts say they can’t recall a time when the U.S. ever had to rush assistance to a nuclear power plant in another country before. What can you tell us about how serious this is with the U.S. rushing coolant to Japan because of the nuclear plant there?

And then, a second question -- the State Department spokesman, PJ Crowley, said the treatment of Bradley Manning by the Pentagon is ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid. And I’m wondering if you agree with that. Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: On point number one, when I spoke to Prime Minister Kan, I specifically asked him about the nuclear plants and their potential vulnerability as a consequence of the earthquake. He indicated that they are monitoring the situation very closely. So far, they have not seen evidence of radiation leaks. But, obviously, you’ve got to take all potential precautions. And I’ve asked Steve Chu, our Energy Secretary, to be in close contact with their personnel to provide any assistance that’s necessary, but also to make sure that if, in fact, there have been breaches in the safety system on these nuclear plants, that they’re dealt with right away.

With respect to Private Manning, I have actually asked the Pentagon whether or not the procedures that have been taken in terms of his confinement are appropriate and are meeting our basic standards. They assure me that they are. I can’t go into details about some of their concerns, but some of this has to do with Private Manning’s safety as well.

Q Do you disagree with PJ Crowley?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I gave you an answer to the substantive issue.

(Source: White House)

11 Department of Defense releases a press release on Takai's testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Information Sharing and WikiLeaks, saying, "Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately called for two internal studies to review the department’s information security policy and to unveil how classified information is handled in forward-deployed areas. The results showed that forward-deployed units had an “over-reliance” on using removable electronic storage media, Takai said."

Department of Defense Press Release

By Terri Moon Cronk
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 11, 2011 – The Defense Department has taken steps to prevent another massive leak of its classified information, a senior official told a Senate committee yesterday.

Thousands of classified military documents were leaked and distributed into the Internet’s public forum last summer, prompting an immediate investigation from the top down.

Officials since have singled out the weakest link in the department’s security chain, and began a checks-and-balances system to stem the flood of the critical defense data, Teresa M. Takai, chief information officer and acting assistant secretary of defense for networks and information integration, told the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee yesterday.

“The department immediately began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure,” she said.

Takai told Senate members that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately called for two internal studies to review the department’s information security policy and to unveil how classified information is handled in forward-deployed areas. The results showed that forward-deployed units had an “over-reliance” on using removable electronic storage media, Takai said.

Responsibilities needed to be better defined to detect and handle insider threats, she said, and methods to monitor user behavior on classified computer networks were limited.

To get control of the vulnerabilities, the department has disabled the ability to copy data from nearly 90 percent of its classified computers, Takai said. The rest of the classified computers were left intact to write removable media for operational reasons, she explained, but only under strict controls.

Takai told the committee that more work is coming to prevent stolen data, and a project is under way with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive to add an information technology insider detection capability and insider threat program.

The Defense Department is working on a Web-enabled information security training to accompany the department’s mandatory annual information assurance training, she said, and plans also exist for an oversight program for inspections in forward-deployed areas.

“We will strive to implement the mechanisms necessary to protect the intelligence information without reverting back to pre-9/11 stovepipes,” Takai said.

“The department continues to work toward a resilient information-sharing environment,” she added, “that is secured through both technological solutions and comprehensive policies.”

11 WikiLeaks Grand Jury 2703(d) | U.S. Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan denies Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp and Jacob Appelbaum, motion to vacate the Twitter Secret Order as well as US Government's docket in the WikiLeaks Investigation (Grand Jury docket no. 10-GJ-3793), but does grant unsealing of the docket (1:11-dm-00003) matter of the Twitter Secret Order . Request for a public docket of material in case number 10-gj-3793 shall be taken under further consideration. ORDERED that Twitter, Inc.'s Motion for Clarification is DENIED as moot. 

"On March 11, U.S. Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan denied the WikiLeaks supporters' motion. They have appealed." (Source: The Wall Street Journal)

"ORDERED that petitioners' Motion to Vacate 1 is DENIED; that petitioners' Motion to Unseal is DENIED as to docket 10-gj-3793 and GRANTED as to docket 1:11-dm-00003 with only the redaction of the government attorney's email address in document 24; ORDERED that petitioners' request for a public docket of material in case number 10-gj-3793 shall be taken under further consideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan" (Source: web archive)

Memorandum opinion

"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

In Re: §2703(d) Order; 10GJ3793 ) Miscellaneous No. 1:11dm00003

...

THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

March 11, 2011

Alexandria, Virginia" (Source: Memorandum opinion)

Order

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

In Re: §2703(d) Order; 10GJ3793
Miscellaneous No. 1:11dm0000

ORDER

THIS MATTER came before the Court on petitioners' Motion of Real Parties in Interest Jacob Appelbaum, Birgitta Jonsdottir, and Rop Gonggrijp to Vacate December 14, 2010 Order ("Motion to Vacate", Dkt. 1) and Motion of Real Parties in Interest Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records. ("Motion to Unseal", Dkt. 3). UPON CONSIDERATION of the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioners' Motion to Vacate (Dkt. 1) is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that petitioners' Motion to Unseal (Dkt. 3) is DENIED as to docket 10-gj-3793 and GRANTED as to docket 1:11-dm- 00003 with only the redaction of the government attorney's email address in document 24. It is further ORDERED that petitioners' request for a public docket of material in case number 10-gj-3793 shall be taken under further consideration. ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2011.

/s/ THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDERED that Twitter, Inc.'s Motion for Clarification is DENIED as moot. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 3/1/2011. (rban, ) (Entered: 03/11/2011)

"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

In Re: §2703(d) Order; 10GJ3793 ) Miscellaneous No. 1:11dm00003

ORDER

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Twitter, Inc.'s Motion for Clarification. (Dkt. 24). It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is DENIED as moot.ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2011.

/s/

THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Alexandria, Virginia" (Source: cryptome.org)

10

Senate Armed Services | Senate Armed Services Committee testimony on the current and future worldwide threats to the national security of the United States with James R. Clapper, Jr. Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Clappers says IP theft is a national security threat, and remarks on WikiLeaks disclosures as damaging from an intelligence perspective, "chilling effect" on future sources.

[Tags: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Senate Armed Services Committee]

Hearing Transcript

Prepared Statements:

Clapper's Testimony Excerpts:

Intelligence Threats and Threats to US Technological & Economic Leadership

The spectrum of threats includes espionage, cyber intrusions, organized crime and the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive and classified US Government information, a notable recent example being the unlawful release of classified US documents by WikiLeaks. While the impacts of the WikiLeaks disclosures are still being assessed, we are moving aggressively to respond by protecting our information networks with improved CI analysis of audit and access controls, improving our ability to detect and respond to insider threats - while balancing the need to share information - and increase awareness across the US Government to the persistent and wide-ranging nature of foreign intelligence threats.

Clapper on WikiLeaks personal Threat Assessment:

Burgess's Testimony Excerpts:

 

Department of Defense Press Release (March 11, 2011)

By Terri Moon Cronk
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 11, 2011 – Two high-level intelligence chiefs described their top concerns for U.S. national security during their testimony on Capitol Hill yesterday.

Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, Defense Intelligence Agency director, and James R. Clapper Jr., National Intelligence director, cited dangers ranging from terrorism, cyber-threats, weapons of mass destruction, and the release of sensitive data by sources such as WikiLeaks.

Clapper told the committee that covering the scope of such threats couldn’t be presented in a brief manner, so he presented four categories of great concern to the intelligence community.

Terrorism, Clapper said, is the first and foremost threat.

“Counterterrorism is our top priority because [job No. 1] for the intelligence community is to keep Americans safe and the homeland secure,” he said.

The intelligence community has helped thwart many potentially devastating attacks, Clapper said, apprehending numerous “bad actors” throughout the world and “greatly” weakening much of al-Qaida's operations, training and propaganda.

Al-Qaida's resolve to recruit Americans and to spawn affiliate groups is concerning, Clapper said, most notably on the Arabian Peninsula.

“We also see disturbing instances of self-radicalization among our own citizens,” he added.

Homegrown terrorists might comprise a small portion of the global threat, Clapper said, but such activity can have a “disproportionate impact” because such terrorists understand the United States and have easier access to U.S. facilities.

Overseas counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere continue to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations, Clapper said.

Also “we have seen and will continue to see success in governance, security and economic development that will erode the willingness of the Afghan people to support the Taliban and their al-Qaida allies,” he added.

Though U.S. combat operations are over in Iraq, terrorist bombings -– some al-Qaida engineered -- continue there, Clapper said.

“[That] means that our work to help solidify the security gains we've made thus far remains a high priority,” he said.

Clapper told the committee he’s also concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

“The proliferation threat environment is a fluid, borderless arena that reflects the broader global reality of an increasingly free movement of people, goods and information,” he said. “While this environment is critical for peaceful scientific and economic advances, it allows the materials, technologies and know-how related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons … and missile delivery systems, to be shared with ease and speed.”

Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat, Clapper said, as do North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.

Another challenge for the intelligence community “is that we are in an interconnected, interdependent world and instability can arise and spread quickly beyond borders,” Clapper said, citing the recent civil unrest that erupted in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other Middle East and North Africa countries.

Another threat to U.S. national security is foreign counterintelligence activity, Clapper said, where the United States faces a wide range of threats to its economic, political and military interests at home and abroad.

And, the unauthorized disclosures of classified documents through sources such as WikiLeaks also poses “substantial challenges” to national security, Clapper said.

“From an intelligence perspective, these disclosures have been very damaging,” he said, noting the intelligence community is working to better protect its information networks.

“We can and will respond to the problems of intrusions and leaks,” Clapper added, “but we must do so without degrading essential intelligence integration and information sharing.”

Burgess then addressed specific threats and challenges as viewed by defense intelligence, starting with trans-national terrorism.

“The [Defense Intelligence Agency] assesses that al-Qaida continues to adapt in response to our counterterrorism efforts,” Burgess said. “While core al-Qaida is forced to focus more on survivability, it remains resilient, continues attack planning, and provides operational guidance to regional affiliates.”

In Afghanistan, Burgess said, higher levels of violence could occur through the year, partly because of increased International Security Assistance Force presence and operations.

“ISAF has constrained insurgents in some areas,” he said. “The Taliban in the south have shown resilience and still influence much of the population … in the east, the Taliban and Haqqani network have suffered numerous tactical and leadership losses with no apparent degradation in their capacity to fight.”

In North Korea, Burgess said decision making could be critical as it relates to “the apparent leadership succession under way” and its “implications for additional deliberate provocations against the south. Miscalculation could lead to escalation.”

China seems intent on expanding the capabilities of its military, Burgess said, as its leaders apparently are “allocating resources to pursue broad-based military transformation.

“While remaining focused on Taiwan as a primary mission, China will, by 2020, [have laid] the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader and regional global objectives,” he said.

Yet, China’s People’s Liberation Army continues to face deficiencies in interservice cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises, Burgess said, adding because of the shortcomings, China's leaders “continue to stress asymmetric strategies to leverage its advantage while exploiting potential opponents' perceived vulnerabilities.”

Turning back to Iran, Burgess told the committee that while Iran probably would not launch a pre-emptive attack, in the event of hostilities it could try to block the Strait of Hormuz temporarily, threaten U.S. forces and regional allies with missiles, and employ terrorist surrogates worldwide.

Iran's space launch missile program, he noted, demonstrates progress toward technology that could eventually be used for an intercontinental ballistic missile.

10

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs | Paul Kshemendra, Program Manager Office of National Intelligence; Corin Stone, Executive Office of National Intelligence; Teresa Takai, Chief Information Officer Department of Defense; Thomas Ferguson, Principal Deputy Undersecretary, Department of Defense; and Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management US State Dept. (aka Witness 44 on Defense Pretrial Witness List) testify before Senate Committee Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, on Information Sharing and WikiLeaks.

[Tags: Patrick Kennedy, US State Department 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Information Review Task Force; Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs]

NOTA BENE: Statements are not a Transcription of the Video Statements, Do not include Q&A
Full Video

[TRANSCRIBE Q&A]

Summary and Important Points:

  • Breakdown in the chain of command over info sec. DoD was responsible for info sec on DoS content based on current info-sharing model. See Q&A

  • "Source and Methods" as "National Security"

    • Central to US National Security prosecution line to do with alleged threat of disclosure to US 'Information Sharing Environment.' 

      • See Program Manager Office of Nat Intelligence Statements in March 2011 more info on Info Sharing Enviro' (PDF)

    • Inter-agency info sharing.

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Hearing Web Site for Hearing

Full Statements:

Official Written Excerpts:

Statement of Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management US Sate Dept.

...We consider this reporting from posts around the world to be one of our most valuable contributions to every facet of national security, and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic dissemination to over 65 agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies provide to the Department. Recent events have not changed our commitment to sharing this vital information.

WikiLeaks Disclosures and State Department Mitigation Actions

July 2010

When DoD material was leaked in July 2010, we worked with DoD to identify any alleged State Department material that was in WikiLeaks’ possession. We immediately asked Chiefs of Mission at affected posts to review any purported State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well as a summary of the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host country.

Following the completion of the review in August, when it was believed that purported State cables might be released, the State Department instructed all Chiefs of Missions to familiarize themselves with the content in the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database should a release actually occur. (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

November 2010

When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).

The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks’ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010). (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

Ongoing Mitigation Efforts

State continues its thorough review of policies and procedures related to information security to ensure that they fully meet the current challenges. Efforts are being coordinated throughout the Department, as well as with the interagency, to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner with those who need it in their work to advance our national security.

While the Department already had strong safeguards in place, we have further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit the downloading of classified information to removable media (e.g., thumb drives, CDs/DVDs) on the Department’s classified network. The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and monitors the Department’s classified network to detect anomalies that would not otherwise be apparent. This capability is backed up by professional staff who promptly analyze detected anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.

The NCD database of diplomatic reporting and the State Department’s classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNet, remains available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Throughout, the State Department has continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through its traditional system of cable dissemination.

To heighten awareness of what is and is not permitted when working on the Department’s classified network and on classified systems, user awareness reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified network, in addition to the standard in-person briefings about handling classified material and a soon-to-be-released computer-based course on identifying and marking classified and sensitive information.

In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share and protect information with those who are not direct recipients of our telegrams. One such solution would involve the creation of a website with a searchable database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word searches to discover relevant State cables; the search would reveal cable metadata, such as the subject line, but would not provide the full text of the cables in a potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are aware of cables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared personnel from other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for their work functions through their own organization’s internal distribution system. The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to disseminate information to its internal personnel.

The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information management issues by participating in meetings of the new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and Access IPC. (Source: Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary Department of State)

...

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to create teams to address security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues. We believe that the State Department’s Mitigation Team serves as a model for broad, cross-discipline coordination, or governance, because it brings together various subject matter experts from different fields to address information sharing and security issues in a coordinated manner. Many information sharing and security issues can be resolved at the agency level as long as there are standards in place for agencies to execute. For the most part, standards have been created by existing interagency bodies, but there are some areas where further coordination is needed.

Statement of Ms. Teresa Takai Chief Information Officer and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and Mr. Thomas Ferguson Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.

Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:

• Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.
• Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
• Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement. • Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.

Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented.

The full impact of the WikiLeaks disclosures may not be evident for some time. It is clear, however, that the unauthorized release of U.S. information by WikiLeaks has adversely affected our global engagement and national security and endangered the lives of individuals who have sought to cooperate with the United States.

(Source: Teresa Takai, Chief Information Officer Department of Defense and Thomas Ferguson, Principal Deputy Undersecretary Department of Defense)

Statement by Corin Stone, Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

As the IC Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE), my main focus today concerns classified information - and, in particular, information that is derived from intelligence sources and menthols, or information that is reflected in the analytic judgements and assessments that the IC produces. I want to be clear, though, that our concern for the protection of information is not restricted to the fragility of sources and methods, but extends as well to broader aspects of national security. We recognize, and will hear today, that the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other federal agencies, themselves originate classified national security information that is vital to the protection of our nation and conduct of our foreign relations,a and this information, widely distributed, and used throughout the government to achieve these objectives. As we have seen recently, the unauthorized disclosure of any form of classified national security information has serious implications for the policy and operational aspects of national security.(Source; Corin Stone, Executive Office of National Intelligence)

Statement from Paul Kshemendra Program Manager for the Information Environment, Office of National Intelligence:

…In the five years since Congress directed the creation of the Information Sharing environment, significant steps have been taken towards establishing a string foundations. Important mission initiatives, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and core capabilities and enablers, such as the National Network of Fusion Centers and the National Information Exchange Model, have produced results and show ongoing promise…

The WikiLeaks breach is not principally an information sharing problem; at its root a bad actor allegedly violated the trust placed in him.

(Source: Paul Kshemendra Program Manager Office of National Intelligence)

"INFORMATION SHARING IN THE ERA OF WIKILEAKS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: Committee concluded a hearing to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks , focusing on balancing security and collaboration, after receiving testimony from Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management; Teresa Takai, Chief Information Officer, and Acting Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration, and Thomas Ferguson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence, both of the Department of Defense; and Corin R. Stone, Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive, and Kshemendra Paul, Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, both of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence." (Source: Congressional Record)

"March 10, Full Committee, to hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks , focusing on balancing security and collaboration, 3 p.m., SD-342. " (Source: Congressional Record)

"Full Committee, to hold hearings to examine information sharing in the era of WikiLeaks , focusing on balancing security and collaboration, 3 p.m., SD-342. " (Source: Congressional Record)

10 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs | Senator Sanders asks for unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 10, 2011, at 3 p.m. to conduct a hearing entitled 'Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration.'

Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Membership includes: Joseph I. Lieberman Chairman (ID) (CT) Susan M. Collins Ranking Member (ME) Carl Levin (MI) Tom Coburn (OK) Daniel K. Akaka (HI) Scott Brown (MA) Thomas R. Carper (DE) John McCain (AZ) Mark L. Pryor (AR) Ron Johnson (WI) Mary L. Landrieu (LA) Rob Portman (OH) Claire McCaskill (MO) Rand Paul (KY) Jon Tester (MT) Jerry Moran (KS) Mark Begich (AK)

"Mr. SANDERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 10, 2011, at 3 p.m. to conduct a hearing entitled ``Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks : Balancing Security and Collaboration.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered." (Source: Congressional Record)

10 US v PFC Bradley Manning | Manning defense files Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal of Quantico Base Commander, Colonel Daniel J. Choike denial of original Article 138 Request

[IMAGE TO LEFT, COL. DANIEL J. CHOIKE, FORMER QUANTICO BASE COMMANDER ]"Colonel Choike [FORMER QUANTICO BASE COMMANDER] will now complete his action on the Article 138 complaint, and then forward the proceedings to the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, for his final review. If Secretary Mabus denies PFC Manning's requested relief, the defense will file a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Army Court of Criminal Appeals." (Source: David Coombs, Article 138 Complaint)

Excerpts from the Manning's Article 138 Rebuttal:

2.) First, my allegations of improper treatment were not correctly noted by you in your 1 March 2011 memorandum. Additionally, I am making new allegations of wrongdoing based upon recent decisions by the Pretrial Confinement Facility ("PFC") Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART]. I request that you consider the following specific allegations:

a. That the decision to retain my classification as a Maximum Custody ("MAX") detainee and to retain me under Prevention of Injury (POI") status after 27 August 2010 was improper.

[IMAGE TO LEFT, CWO4 JAMES AVERHART, FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] [The reason are contained in the original Article 138 Complaint: "Due to my improvement and adjustment to confinement, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended on 27 August 2010 that I be taken off of POI watch and that my confinement classification be changed from MAX to Medium Custody In (MDI)...Over the course of the following three months, Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the Brig forensic psychiatrist, COL Ricky Malone, consistently recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be taken off POI watch. The only exception to this was on 10 December 2010 when Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended that I remain under POI watch for one week. The following week, he once again recommended to CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] that I be removed from POI watch. Despite Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and COL Malone's [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] consistent recommendations, I remained on POI watch and in MAX custody." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint)]

b. That the decision to place me on Suicide Risk on 18 January 2011 was improper [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART, QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] .

c. That the decision to strip me of all my clothing at night since 2 March 2011 was and continues to be improper.

3.) Addressing each of the allegation, I would like to offer the following in rebuttal to your response:

a. That the decision to retain my classification as a MAX custody detainee and to retain me under POI Status after 27 August 2010 was improper.

(1) While it may have been understandable to classify me as a MAX detainee initially, I should have been downgraded to Medium Custody-In (MDI) after 27 August 2010. As you noted, my initial evaluation by the duty brig supervisor ("DBS") [WHO IS THIS?] gave me a score of "5" after reviewing the DD Form 2710, inmate background summary, and completing the DD Form 2711, initial custody classification. A score of "5" was significantly lower than the "12" or higher score normally required for MAX custody. Despite my low score, the DBS overrode the score, and indicated that he considered my previous classification in Kuwait as the primary factor in his decision.

(2) The decision to maintain me in MAX Custody after 27 August 2010 has been an abuse of discretion. Although the ultimate decision regarding my classification rests with the PCF [PRE TRIAL CONFINEMENT FACILITY] [FORMER] Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART], this decision cannot be an arbitrary one. In the instant case, the PCF Classification and Assignment Board ("C&A Board") [WHO IS ON THIS] and the [FORMER] PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART], failed to properly review my status and take into account all relevant factors. Instead, the C&A Board's [WHO IS ON THIS] recommendations and the [FORMER] PCF Commander's [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] decision have been perfunctory in nature.

(3) The PCF C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS] failed to always document its recommendation concerning my custody classification and status on the required Brig Form 4200. This failure is indicative of how the C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS] viewed its task. It is clear that the C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS] and the [FORMER] PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] unduly weighted my behavior in Kuwait, prior to receiving adequate treatment, and the nature of the charges alleged against me in determining my custody classification and status. A straightforward review of the Brig's own observation record attached as Enclosure 2 of the [FORMER] PCF Commander's [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] response proved the arbitrariness of my custody classification and status. The following are excerpts from the Brig's observation records:

i.) 3 August 2010 Entry: "SND (PFC Bradley Manning) did not receive and disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received average work and training report." The entry also notes, "SNDs conduct has been average and has presented no problems to staff or inmates. During the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND stated that he was doing well and was not having suicidal or homicidal feelings.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

ii) 12 August 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND stated that he would like a job in the facility library if it became possible. To this point in confinement SND's conduct has been average and has presented no problems to staff or inmates. During the interview SND was quiet, but courteous and respectful. SND answers questions but speaks very little unless responding to a question. Currently SND appears to be trying to adjust to the daily routine and observing what is going on around him. During the interview SND was well spoken, neat in appearance and maintained eye contact. SND stated that he have any suicidal feelings at this time.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

iii.) 16 August 2010 Entry: "SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychologist [WHO IS THIS? NOTE PSYCHOLOGIST, AS OPPOSED TO PSYCHIATRIST] and found not to be a threat to himself. It is recommended that SND be removed from SR, and be placed on POI (sic) remain MAX custody." [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

iv.) 17 August 2010 Entry: "The Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] found SND to be a reduced threat to himself on 6 August 2010."

v.) 24 August 2010 Entry: "SND did not receive an average work and training report." The entry also notes “[t]o this point in confinement, SND has presented no problems and has been courteous and respectful to staff. SND's conduct has been excellent, so much so that is it apparent that he is extremely cautious about what he says or how he acts. During the interview SND was well spoken, groomed and neat in appearance.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

vi) 27 August 2010 Entry: “SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 20 August 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

vii) 31 August 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry also notes “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [CAPT. HOCTER, See Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint] on 27 August and was recommended to be removed from POI status. The C&A Board [WHO IS ON THIS?] reviewed SND on the same date and recommended that he still remain POI. SND remains courteous and respectful to staff and has presented no problems toward staff or inmates thus far. During the interview SND was well spoken, groomed and neat in appearance.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

viii) 3 September 2010 Entry: “SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 27 August 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

ix) 8 September 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 3 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.” Additionally it states, “SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

x) 10 September 2010 Entry: “SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 3 SEPT 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xi) 14 September 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 10 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status.” Finally, the entry notes, “SND has been cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. When observed in his cell, SND is always sitting quietly on his rack and appears to be content with doing nothing else. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xii) 28 September 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 September and was recommended to be removed from POI status. Later, the entry notes, “SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was well spoken and neat in appearance. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xiii) 4 October 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 24 Sep 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xiv) 6 October 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry notes, “SND appears to be content with his situation and goes through the motions of the Brig's plan of the day without incident. SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 1 October and was recommended to be removed from POI status.” The entry also notes, “SND continues to be cooperative with Brig staff and has presented no disciplinary or behavioral problems. During the interview SND was respectful, neat in appearance and maintained eye contact. SND's mood and appearance were consistent with normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal." [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xv) 12 October 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xvi) 14 October 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on (no date given) and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review ...” The entry also notes “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xvii) 22 October 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] this past week and found fit from (sic) removal of prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.” The entry also notes, “SND was respectful and courteous and well spoken. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xviii) 28 October 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 15 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 8 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” Another entry on this date notes that “SND was evaluated by the the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 22 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 15 October and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xix) 2 November 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 22 October 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xx) 5 November 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 29 October 2010 and found fit to be removed from prevention of injury classification from a psychiatric standpoint.” Finally, the entry notes, “During the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND appears to be in high spirits and have a positive attitude. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and he continues to state that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxi) 15 November 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 13 November 2010 and recommended to ... [be removed from] POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on 5 NOV 2010 and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxii) 17 November 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry also noted that “during the interview SND was respectful and courteous and was well spoken. SND's attitude and demeanor were consistent with his normal character and stated that he is not suicidal.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxiii) 23 November 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 19 November 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxiv) 3 December 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxv) 6 December 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 2 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review on [no date given] and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxvi) 7 December 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry also noted, “[d]uring the interview SND was courteous and well spoken and he maintained good eye contact. SND's mood and character were consistent with his normal character.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxvii) 14 December 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 10 December 2010 and recommended to remain on POI. (The Brig noted that this was the first time since 27 August 2010 that Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] recommended PFC Manning remain on POI. His main criteria was that it seemed PFC Manning was not doing well). SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxviii) 17 December 2010 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 17 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxix) 22 December 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an above average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “overall, SND was respectful and cooperative during the interview.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxx) 29 December 2010 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” The entry also stated, “SND was evaluated by Capt Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] on 23 December 2010, and although further mental evaluation was deemed necessary, SND was recommended to be removed from POI classification from a psychiatric standpoint.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxxi) 6 January 2011 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] on 30 December 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since last review and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxxii) 7 January 2011 Entry: “SND was evaluated by the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 7 January 2011 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.” The entry also notes that “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and received an average work and training report.” Finally, the entry notes that PFC Manning “is respectful and courteous to staff. During the interview SND was well spoken, maintained eye contact and his demeanor was consistent with his normal character. [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxxiii) 11 January 2011 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or spot evaluations and received an above average working and training report.”

xxxiv) 14 January 2011 Entry: “SND was evaluated the Brig Psychiatrist[WHO IS THIS?] on 14 January 2010 and recommended to be removed from POI. SND has not presented any problems since his last review and has been an overall average detainee.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

xxxv) 18 January 2011 Entry: This is the first entry where any negative conduct is noted. I will explain this entry in greater detail in paragraph 4 below when I address my allegation that the decision to place me on Suicide Risk by the [FORMER] PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] on 18 January 2011 was improper.

xxxvi) 28 January 2011 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and receive(d) an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, “SND was evaluated by Col Malone[BRIG PSYCHIATRIST] on 21 January 2011 and, although further mental evaluation was deemed necessary, SND was recommended to be removed from POI classification from a psychiatric standpoint.” [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?]

(4) The above observation reports were provided to me and my defense counsel, David E. Coombs, on 4 February 2011. The reports cover my conduct since my arrival on 29 July 2010 through 28 January 2011. Although, I do not have the observation reports from 29 January to present, I am confident that they would indicate I have been an exemplary detainee. I am also confident that the reports would reflect the Brig Psychiatrists‟ consistent recommendation that I am a “low risk” of self-harm and should be removed from MAX Custody and POI Status.

5) I am being treated differently from any other detainee at the Quantico Brig. While the [FORMER] PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] follows the recommendation of the Brig Psychiatrist in dealing with other detainees, this does not happen in my case. Other detainees usually remain on MAX custody or in POI Status for about two weeks before they are downgraded. I, however, have been left to languish under the unduly harsh conditions of MAX Custody and POI Status since my arrival on 29 July 2010. In fact, I am currently the only detainee being held under MAX Custody and the only detainee being held in POI status by the Brig. Any objective person looking at the above facts would have to conclude that this treatment is unjustified. The determination to retain me in MAX Custody and under POI Status after 27 August 2010 was improper and constitutes unlawful pretrial punishment.

b. That the decision to place me on Suicide Risk on 18 January 2011 was improper.

(1) On 18 January 2011, over the recommendation of Capt. Hocter [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE BRIG] and the defense forensic psychiatrist, Capt. Moore, CWO4 Averhart [FORMER] [QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] placed me under Suicide Risk. The Suicide Risk assignment resulted in me being required to remain in my cell for 24 hours a day. I was stripped of all clothing with the exception of my underwear. My prescription eyeglasses were taken away from me and I was forced to sit in essential blindness.

(2) The basis for the above treatment was due to my alleged erratic behavior on 18 January 2011. On that date, I was pulled out of my cell for my one hour of recreation call. When the guards came to my cell I noticed a change in their usual demeanor. Instead of being calm and respectful, they seemed agitated and confrontational. Also, instead of the usual two to three guards, there were four guards [WHO ARE THESE GUARDS?]. Almost immediately, the guards started harassing me. The first guard told me to “turn left.” When I complied, the second guard yelled “don‟t turn left.” When I attempted to comply with the demands of the second guard, I was told by the first, “I said turn left.” I responded “yes, Corporal” to the first guard. At this point, the third guard chimed in by telling me that “in the Marines we reply with „aye‟ and not „yes.‟” He then asked me if I understood. I made the mistake of replying “yes, Sergeant.” At this point the forth guard yelled, “you mean „aye,‟ Sergeant.”

(3) The harassment by the guards continued as I was escorted to my one hour of recreation. When I arrived at the recreation room, I was told to stand still so they could remove my leg restraints. As I stood still, one of the guards yelled “I told you to stand still.” I replied “yes Corporal, I am standing still.” Another guard then said, “you mean „aye‟ Corporal.” Next, the same guard said “I thought we covered this, you say „aye‟ and not „yes,‟ do you understand?” I responded “aye Sergeant.” Right after I replied, I was once again yelled at to “stand still.” Due to being yelled at and the intensity of the guards, I mistakenly replied, “yes Corporal, I am standing still.” As soon as I said this, I attempted to correct myself by saying “aye” instead of “yes,” but it was too late. One of the guards starting yelling at me again, “what don‟t you understand” and “are we going to have a problem?”

(4) Once the leg restraints were taken off of me, I took a step back from the guards. My heart was pounding in my chest, and I could feel myself getting dizzy. I sat down to avoid falling. When I did this, the guards took a step towards me. I instinctively backed away from them. As soon as I backed away, I could tell by their faces that they were getting ready to restrain me. I immediately put my hands up in the air, and said “I am not doing anything, I am just trying to follow your orders.” The guards then told me to start walking. I complied with their order by saying “eye” instead of “yes.”

(5) I was allowed to complete my hour of recreation. During the hour, the guards did not harass me further. The guards also did not harass me when I was escorted back to my cell. Only later did I learn that there had been a protest outside the gates of Quantico the previous day. (See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4eNzokgRIw).

The rally was intended to bring attention to the conditions of my confinement. It is my belief that my treatment on 18 January 2010 by the guards [WHO ARE THESE GUARDS?] and later by the [FORMER] PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART] was related to this protest and my earlier complaints.

(6) After being returned to my cell, I started to read a book. About 30 minutes later, the [FORMER] PCF Commander, CWO4 James Averhart, came to my cell. He asked me what had happened during my recreation call. As I tried to explain to him what had occurred, CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] stopped me and said “I am the commander” and that “no one could tell him what to do.” He also said that he was, for all practical purposes, “God.” I responded by saying “you still have to follow Brig procedures.” I also said “everyone has a boss that they have to answer to.” As soon as I said this, CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] ordered that I be placed in Suicide Risk Status.

(7) Admittedly, once I heard that I would be placed under Suicide Risk, I became upset. Out of frustration, I placed my hands to my head and clenched my hair with my fingers. I did yell “why are you doing this to me?” I also yelled “why am I being punished?” and “I have done nothing wrong.” I then asked CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER]“what have I done to deserve this type of treatment?”

(8) CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] did not answer any of my questions. He instructed the guards to enter my cell and take all my clothing. At first I tried to reason with CWO4 Averhart [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] by telling him that I had been a model detainee and by asking him to just tell me what he wanted me to do and that I would do it. However, I gave up trying to reason with him once the guards [WHO ARE THESE GUARDS?] entered my cell and ordered me to strip. Instead, I lowered my head and starting taking off my clothes.

(9) [FORMER QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] CWO4 Averhart placed me on Suicide Risk, over the recommendation of Capt. Hocter [BRIG PSYCHIATRIST] and the defense forensic psychiatrist, Capt. Moore. His decision was also in violation of Secretary of Navy Instruction (“SECNAVINST”) 1649.9C Paragraph 4205.5d. As a result of being placed on Suicide Risk, I was confined to my cell for 24 hours a day. I was also stripped of all clothing with the exception of my underwear. Additionally, my prescription eyeglasses were taken away from me. Due to not having my glasses, I was forced to sit in essential blindness during the day. I remained on Suicide Risk until 21 January 2010. The determination to place me on Suicide Risk was without justification and therefore constitutes unlawful pretrial punishment.

c. That the decision to strip me of all my clothing at night since 2 March 2011 was and continues to be improper.

(1) On March 2, I was informed of your decision regarding my Article 138 complaint. Understandably frustrated by this decision after enduring over seven months of unduly harsh confinement conditions, I asked the Brig Operations Officer, MSG [MARINES SECURITY GUARD] Papakie, what I needed to do in order to be downgraded from Maximum Custody and POI Status. MSG [MARINES SECURITY GUARD] Papakie [BRIG OPERATIONS OFFICER] responded by telling me that there was nothing I could do to downgrade my detainee status and that the Brig simply considered me a risk of self-harm. Out of frustration, I responded that the POI restrictions were absurd and sarcastically told him if I really wanted to harm myself, that I could conceivably do so with the elastic waistband of my underwear or with my flip-flops.

(2) Later that same day, I was approached by GYSGT [GUNNERY SERGEANT] Blenis. He asked me what I had done wrong. I told him that I did not know what he was talking about. He said that I would be stripped naked at night due to something that I had said to MSG [MARINES SECURITY GUARD] Papakie [BRIG OPERATIONS OFFICER]. Shocked, I told him that I hadn't said anything. I told GYSGT [GUNNERY SERGEANT] Blenis that I just pointed out the absurdity of my current confinement conditions.

(3) Without consulting any Brig mental health provider, [QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] Chief Warrant Officer Denise Barnes used my sarcastic comment as justification to increase the restrictions imposed upon me under the guise of being concerned that I was a suicide risk. I was not, however, placed under the designation of Suicide Risk. This is because Suicide Risk would have required a Brig mental health provider's recommendation in order for the added restrictions to continue. While the PCF Commander [CWO4 JAMES AVERHART OR CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER DENISE BARNES See Jan 26, 2011 "Brig welcomes new commanding officer" ] needed the Brig Psychiatrist's recommendation to keep me under Suicide Risk, no such recommendation was needed in order to increase my restrictions under POI Status. The conditions of POI Status require only psychiatric input, but ultimately remain the decision of the PCF Commander.

(4) In response to this specific incident, the Brig Psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] met with me. After speaking to me, he assessed me as a "low risk and requiring only routine outpatient follow-up [with] no need for ... closer clinical observation." In particular, he indicated that my statement about the waist band of my underwear was in no way prompted by “a psychiatric condition.”

(5) Since 2 March 2011, I have been stripped of all my clothing at night. I have been told that the PCF Commander [CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER DENISE BARNES] intends on continuing this practice indefinitely. Initially, after surrendering my clothing to the Brig guards [WHO IS THIS (PLURAL)?] , I had no choice but to lay naked in my cold jail cell until the following morning. The next morning I was told to get out of my bed for the morning Duty Brig Supervisor (DBS) inspection. [WHO WAS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] I was not given any of my clothing back. I got out of the bed and immediately started to shiver because of how cold it was in my cell. I walked towards the front of my cell with my hands covering my genitals. The guard [WHO IS THIS GUARD?] told me to stand a parade rest, which required me to stand with my hands behind my back and my legs spaced shoulder width apart. I stood at “parade rest” for about three minutes until the DBS[WHO IS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] arrived. Once the DBS [WHO IS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] arrived, everyone was called to attention. The DBS [WHO IS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] and the other guards [WHO ARE THE OTHER GUARDS? ] walked past my cell. Thaddeus [WHO IS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] looked at me, paused for a moment, and then continued to the next detainee‟s cell. I was incredibly embarrassed at having all these people stare at me naked. After Thaddeus [WHO IS THE DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR?] completed his inspection, I was told to go sit on my bed. About ten minutes later I was given my clothes and allowed to get dressed.

(6) After apparent outside pressure on the Brig due to my mistreatment, I was given a suicide prevention article of clothing called a “smock” by the guards [WHO ARE THESE GUARDS?]. Although I am still required to strip naked in my cell at night, I am now given the “smock” to wear. At first, I did not want to wear this item of clothing due to how coarse it was and how uncomfortable it felt. However, the Brig now orders me to wear the “smock” at night.

(7) Given the above circumstances, the decision to strip me of my clothing every night for an indefinite period of time is clearly punitive in nature. There is no mental health justification for the decision. I am under 24 hour surveillance, with guards never being more than a few feet away from my cell. I am permitted to have underwear and clothing during the day, with no apparent concern will harm myself during this time period. The determination to me of all my clothing every night since 2 March 2011 is without justification and therefore constitutes unlawful pretrial punishment.

4. I have, both by statute and the Eighth Amendment, the right to protection against cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 368 (CMA 1983); Article 55, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 855. The Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1649.9C details the procedures and safeguards for classification of inmates, evaluation of inmates and the limited use of special quarters. The Navy Instruction states “discipline is to be administered on a corrective rather than a punitive basis.” Additionally it states “no persons, while being held for trial may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon them be any more rigorous than the circumstances require.” My confinement classification and status are in clear contravention of the Navy Instruction.

5. Under my current restrictions, in addition to being stripped at night, I am essentially held in solitary confinement. For 23 hours per day, I sit alone in my cell. The guards checked on me every five minutes during the day by asking me if I am okay. I am required to respond in some affirmative manner. At night, if the guards can not see me clearly, because I have a blanket over my head or I am curled up towards the wall, they will wake me in order to ensure that I am okay. I receive each of my meals in my cell. I am not allowed to have a pillow or sheets. I am not allowed to have any personal items in my cell. I am only allowed to have one book or one magazine at any given time to read. The book or magazine is taken away from me at the end of the day before I go to sleep. I am prevented from exercising in my cell. If I attempt to do push-ups, sit-ups, or any other form of exercise I am forced to stop by the guards. Finally, I receive only one hour of exercise outside of my cell daily. My exercise is usually limited to me walking figure eights in an empty room.

6. My defense counsel, Mr. David Coombs (a reserve Lieutenant Colonel in the Army) and I have raised our objection to these confinement conditions on multiple occasions. Based on the above, I believe that the action of holding me under MAX Custody and POI Status from 27 August 2010 to present, placing me on Suicide Risk on 18 January 2011, and forcing me to strip naked at night since 2 March 2011 is wrong under Article 138, UCMJ. I do not believe that the PCF Commander has the discretion to keep me in confinement under these circumstances.

7. I believe my classification custody and POI Status is based upon inappropriate reasons and is therefore an abuse of the PCF Commander's discretion, and a wrong within the meaning of Article 138, UCMJ. As redress, I request that you order my removal from POI Status and that you order the reduction of my classification level from MAX to MDI." (Source: Rebuttal Article 138 Complaint)

8

Department of State | In the March 2011 issue of the State Department Magazine:

The task involves camaraderie. For instance, three reviewers in a State Department annex found themselves joking when the WikiLeaks documents hit the press. "These guys are trying to steal our jobs,” said one. But they evinced no defeatism. Instead there was a strong feeling of personal affront—and unanimity—that WikiLeaks demonstrated just how important their work is.

The task involves camaraderie. For instance, three reviewers in a State Department annex found themselves joking when the WikiLeaks documents hit the press. "These guys are trying to steal our jobs,” said one. But they evinced no defeatism. Instead there was a strong feeling of personal affront—and unanimity—that WikiLeaks demonstrated just how important their work is.

(Source: Department of State)

7

Department of State | State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley responds to questions about the impact of U.S. State Department cables released about the Kirshners in Argentina. Crowley says, "everyone in the diplomatic business has, in one way or the other, expressed regret to officials in many countries over the release of these cables. We’ve reminded countries that reporting at post to Washington about events, it’s what diplomats do. We do it; other countries do the same thing."

QUESTION: P.J., regarding the stance with Argentina, there is any news? But also, I want to consider that during the last days there were very – a lot of disturbing cables from WikiLeaks affecting officials of Argentina. And I want to know if there is an impression that this is adding into the problem. What’s the position of the Department of State of this? What kind of conciliatory talks are you thinking that you may enter with Argentina, considering all the impasse and all these cables and everything that’s going on?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, let’s separate out two issues. We understand that virtually every country on earth has at least a cable in the 251,000 cables. We’re not going to comment on any individual cable. We understand that the release of these cables may have created some discomfort in our relationship. We’re working hard to overcome any discomfort that has been created in any relationship that we have with our friends and allies around the world.

Regarding the situation with our stuff, we still want our stuff back and we’re still engaged with the Government of Argentina to try to resolve this.

QUESTION: But Argentina is requesting an apologize. Are you also maybe talking – you’re going to talk about --

MR. CROWLEY: Which one are we talking about now? (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Well, we have an apologize related about the plane that came with some stuff that Argentina request that --

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean --

QUESTION: But I am asking if you are going to do an apologize also because of all these new cables that are coming and touching directly all these officials, central bank president, the Kirchners –

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, Secretary Clinton, everyone in the diplomatic business has, in one way or the other, expressed regret to officials in many countries over the release of these cables. We’ve reminded countries that reporting at post to Washington about events, it’s what diplomats do. We do it; other countries do the same thing. But we reminded them that policy is made in Washington, and these cables represent a perspective but do not represent policy. So we’ve had many, many, many conversations in diplomatic circles since last November.

(Source: Department of State)

4

Department of State | At a daily press briefing, State Department spokesperson, P.J. Crowley says that Ambassador Gene Cretz was not recalled from Libya because of WikiLeaks revelations, but because of concerns for his safety.

Crowley says that the State Department is not recalling U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual despite President Calderon raising the issue of WikiLeaks, and the State department fully understanding that the "revelations of some of these cables have created tensions."

Full Transcript

Full Video

QUESTION: Mr. Crowley, on Mexico – different topic – The New York Times is reporting today that the status of Ambassador Carlos Pascual in Mexico was discussed in yesterday’s bilateral meeting at the White House. After that meeting, are there any plans to recall Ambassador Pascual, given – that if he could (inaudible) that President Calderon said, having a relationship with him?

MR. CROWLEY: I know of no plans. Ambassador Pascual and his mission have done and are doing tremendous work to advance U.S. national interest and to support our Mexican partners in addressing Mexico’s security challenges and issues within our bilateral relationship.

QUESTION: But Mr. Calderon mentioned yesterday in an interview with The Washington Post that the relations with the U.S., due to the status of Ambassador Pascual, were very strained. How can you say that relationships – that the relationship is just going naturally when the president of Mexico is saying that the relationship is not particularly good because of the ambassador?

MR. CROWLEY: Look, we understand the challenges that we have with Mexico are difficult. It is putting stress on Mexico and on the United States. We are working hard with Mexico on security issues that are of great concern to both of us. We recognize the extraordinary burden that this has placed on Mexican institutions. That’s why we have the Merida Initiative to help Mexico in every way we can.

As the President said yesterday, we have – we are doing more on our side of the border. We have to keep up the pressure on these international criminal organizations on our side of the border as well as helping Mexico and others in the region. We are doing that. These are hard, difficult challenges. And Ambassador Pascual is working effectively under difficult conditions to manage the – our bilateral relationship and to help deliver the kind of assistance to Mexico that we have pledged.

QUESTION: But can you confirm if it was an issue in the meeting --

MR. CROWLEY: I don't know.

QUESTION: It doesn’t sound, though, as if it’s an issue of that the Mexicans have a problem with U.S. policy or things like that. It sounds like it’s specifically personal to Ambassador Pascual. And you’ve always said that you have relationships with countries, not with individuals. So is that the case in terms of ambassadors? I mean, if a country doesn’t like or doesn’t get along with or doesn’t feel that a particular ambassador has a feel for their country, are you going to let the relationship suffer at the expense of standing by your nominee?

MR. CROWLEY: Well that’s a hypothetical – I mean, that’s a hypothetical question.

QUESTION: It doesn’t sound like it’s a hypothetical question.

MR. CROWLEY: No, but Ambassador Pascual is, in our view, doing tremendous work on behalf of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship, and I know of no plans to adjust his status.

QUESTION: But do you have the idea that maybe this can have damage in the relationship with President Calderon? You have reached an amazing level of cooperation between both countries. Is it possible that maybe due to this lack of confidence of President Calderon in Ambassador Pascual you can start seeing some problems –

MR. CROWLEY: Look, I’ve given you the U.S. perspective. I can’t speak for President Calderon, and I do not know that he was the subject of any discussion yesterday.

QUESTION: But is this wise, P.J.? Is this wise to maintain the ambassador even when the president – he has any good relationship with President Calderon?

MR. CROWLEY: But we have ambassadors around the world to serve our interests. And in doing so, we believe that that serves the interest of the country and the region to which they are assigned. But – and we – as I read that story yesterday, I believe President Calderon raised the issue of WikiLeaks, and we fully understand that the revelations of some of these cables have created tensions. And whether or not that exists in Mexico and other countries as well, we are determined to work with whatever tensions have been created by the emergence of these cables.

That said, without speaking about any cable, what these cables show broadly speaking is U.S. diplomats serving in difficult circumstances all around the world, addressing the common challenges that we have with our partners around the world, and solving problems. That is what Ambassador Pascual and his team is doing in Mexico City. That is what other ambassadors at our embassies are doing every single day, and he and his team are absolutely serving the United States’s interests and, we think, the interests of Mexico and the region as well.

QUESTION: But you withdrew Ambassador Gene Cretz from Libya. Before this whole thing with Libya happened, you withdrew Ambassador Cretz because of the WikiLeaks revelations. He was considered to not be able to do his job in the country. So what’s the standard?

MR. CROWLEY: That’s not the reason we removed –

QUESTION: Well, what is the reason then?

MR. CROWLEY: That’s not the reason we removed – (laughter).

QUESTION: You sure about that? (Laughter.)

MR. CROWLEY: No, I am sure about that. We brought back Ambassador Cretz [See January 4, 2011] for consultations because we had genuine concerns about his security.

QUESTION: By the way, does the State Department have full –

QUESTION: But it was related to the WikiLeaks cables.

MR. CROWLEY: I’m just saying – I mean, I’m just saying that – and right now, Ambassador Cretz is on the job working hard to understand fully what’s happening in Libya and to see what we can do to help the people of Libya see a better tomorrow.

QUESTION: By the way –

QUESTION: Do you have any concern –

QUESTION: -- does the Secretary have full confidence –

QUESTION: -- P.J. –

QUESTION: -- in Ambassador Pascual and the job he’s doing?

MR. CROWLEY: Yes. Yes.

QUESTION: Do you have any concern that maybe this can be taken by the Mexican Government as a challenge to impose somebody whom they do not like and refuse to work?

MR. CROWLEY: Again, I’ve given you our perspective.

(Source: Department of State)

4

Department of State | McClatchy reports that State Department officials said that U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz, who authored several "cables to Washington that speculated on long-time Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's health, and described his personal proclivities, including his reliance on a "voluptuous" Ukrainian nurse" has returned to Washington and is likely to leave his post.

McClatchy reports: "An [anonymous] senior State Department official said that the WikiLeaks revelations were not the only reason for Cretz's return, noting the frustrations of U.S.-Libyan ties. "It's a complicated relationship, and WikiLeaks just added to that complication," said the official, who requested anonymity because no announcement has been made on Cretz's status.

(Source: McClatchy, "WikiLeaks: 'Voluptuous' nurse cable costs diplomat his job"

4

Department of State | State Department participates in a panel in Switzerland hosted entitled, "Internet Freedom: Promoting Human Rights in the Digital Age" at the U.N. Conference on Internet Freedom in Geneva, Switzerland.

State Department representatives include, Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (which is the bureau responsible for the WikiLeaks Person's at Risk Group and the State Department Human Rights Reports)

Posner says, "the relationship of Internet freedom and WikiLeaks. I think they’re separate things. The U.S. government’s position has been from the beginning that there was a violation of our law by a U.S. former military person, Private Manning, who took classified private information and he’s being prosecuted under U.S. military law."

Posner goes on to say:

The reason information is kept classified is partly national security. It’s also partly to protect the well-being of people we communicate with. One of my many difficult jobs is to assess the various risks that we put before people. There are literally hundreds of cases of people who have been identified in those 250,000 cables who are not happy about the fact that they’ve been publicly identified as talking to the U.S. government. Some of them have had to be moved, some of them we’re in the process of trying to communicate with in a range of countries around the world.

Posner concludes, "I think one of the salutary aspects is it does reveal the inner workings of a government that’s actually paying attention to human rights every day.

"

[Tags: WikiLeaks Persons at Risk Group]

QUESTION: ...Also for Mike Posner, to ask a bit about the U.S. government’s response on WikiLeaks which has given rise to concerns within the community about your commitment to freedom of expression and whether or not that may in some cases trump the principles that you’ve announced here and that we feel are so important. Thank you.

...

ASSISTANT SECRETARY POSNER: I want to answer if I can also very quickly the question on the relationship of Internet freedom and WikiLeaks. I think they’re separate things. The U.S. government’s position has been from the beginning that there was a violation of our law by a U.S. former military person, Private Manning, who took classified private information and he’s being prosecuted under U.S. military law.

The reason information is kept classified is partly national security. It’s also partly to protect the well-being of people we communicate with. One of my many difficult jobs is to assess the various risks that we put before people. There are literally hundreds of cases of people who have been identified in those 250,000 cables who are not happy about the fact that they’ve been publicly identified as talking to the U.S. government. Some of them have had to be moved, some of them we’re in the process of trying to communicate with in a range of countries around the world.

The second thing to say is, some have drawn the conclusion from this that WikiLeaks somehow demonstrate government wrongdoing. I think if you read a lot of the cables as I have, they I think represent more right-doing. There’s an awful lot of content there showing that across the world U.S. diplomats are very involved in day-to-day conversations about how to protect people at risk.

So it’s caused us a lot of heartache, the process, but I think one of the salutary aspects is it does reveal the inner workings of a government that’s actually paying attention to human rights every day.

Finally we are absolutely committed to Internet freedom. This is for us a challenge because of the things I’ve identified, but it doesn’t in any sense diminish our commitment to having an open Internet and we’ll continue to fight for that.

(Source: Department of State)

3 (Evening) Manning Forced to Strip Naked Again.

PFC Manning was forced to strip naked in his cell..As with the previous evening, Quantico Brig guards required him to surrender all of his clothing.  PFC Manning then walked back to his bed, and spent the next seven hours in humiliation. The decision to require him to be stripped of all clothing was made by the Brig commander, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Denise Barnes.  According to First Lieutenant Brian Villard, a Marine spokesman, the decision was "not punitive" and done in accordance with Brig rules." (Source: David Coombs, PFC Manning Stripped Naked Again)  Villiard is reported to also state that "[I]t would be 'inappropriate' to explain what prompted these actions 'because to discuss the details would be a violation of PFC Manning's privacy.'" (Source, David Coombs, The Truth Behind Quantico Brig's Decision to Strip PFC Manning)

3 (Morning) Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell speaks to media in attempt to spin concerns over PFC Manning's pretrial confinement.

Bradley Manning's defense respond to Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell 's claims he saw Bradley Manning, the Bradley Manning is not being held in solitary confinement, and that PFC Manning is not being treated any differently than other detainees at the Brig. (Source: David Coombs, Response to Pentagon Press Secretary's Inaccurate Statements)

3 (Early Morning) Manning forced to stand at attention naked.

"At 5:00 a.m., the Brig sounded the wake-up call for the detainees.  At this point, PFC Manning was forced to stand naked at the front of his cell.  The Duty Brig Supervisor (DBS) [WHO IS THIS?] arrived shortly after 5:00 a.m.  When he arrived, PFC Manning was called to attention.  The DBS [DUTY BRIG SUPERVISOR] [WHO IS THIS?]walked through the facility to conduct his detainee count.  Afterwards, PFC Manning was told to sit on his bed.  About ten minutes later, a guard [WHO IS THIS?] came to his cell to return his clothing...PFC Manning has been told that the same thing will happen to him again tonight.  No other detainee at the Brig is forced to endure this type of isolation and humiliation." (Source: David Coombs, PFC Manning Forced to Strip Naked)

2 (Evening) Manning forced to strip naked.

"PFC Manning was inexplicably stripped of all clothing by the Quantico Brig.  He remained in his cell, naked, for the next seven hours. (Source: David Coombs, PFC Manning Forced to Strip Naked)

"2 (c.) That the decision to strip me of all my clothing at night since 2 March 2011 was and continues to be improper." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Rebuttal)

2 Army News Service press release about their Charge Sheet, released March 1, 2011

Press Release

ORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, D.C. (Army News Service, March 2, 2011) -- After seven months of additional investigation, the U.S. Army has charged Pfc. Bradley E. Manning with 22 additional charges. 

The charges allege that as a military intelligence analyst, Manning aided the enemy by unlawfully downloading classified information from government computers, improperly storing it, and transmitting it for public release and use by the enemy. 

Manning was assigned to a support battalion with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, based at Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq. There he allegedly downloaded thousands of classified military and State Department documents and sent them to Wiki Leaks.

He was originally charged July 5 with violations of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, Articles 92 and 134 for "transferring classified data onto his personal computer and adding unauthorized software to a classified computer system." He was also charged with "communicating, transmitting and delivering national defense information to an unauthorized source and disclosing classified information."

Over the last several months, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and other agencies have been involved in his investigation, and officials said it is still ongoing.

"The new charges more accurately reflect the broad scope of the crimes that Private First Class Manning is accused of committing," said Capt. John Haberland, a legal spokesperson for U.S. Army Military District of Washington. "The new charges will not affect Private First Class Manning's right to a speedy trial or his pretrial confinement," he added. 

On March 1, the commander, U.S. Army Headquarters Command Battalion, preferred the following specific charges: 

- Aiding the enemy in violation of Article 104, Uniformed Code of Military Justice 
- 16 specifications under Article 134, UCMJ.
- Wrongfully causing intelligence to be published on the Internet, knowing that it is accessible to the enemy (one specification)
- Theft of public property or records, in violation of 18 United States Code 641 (five specifications) 
- Transmitting Defense information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(e) (eight specifications)
- Fraud and related activity in connection with computers in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1) (two specifications)
- Five specifications in violation of Article 92, UCMJ, for violating Army Regulations 25-2 "Information Assurance" and 380-5 "Department of the Army Information Security Program." 

The charge of aiding the enemy under Article 104 is a capital offense; however, the prosecution team for the United States has notified the defense that the prosecution will not recommend the death penalty to the convening authority, Maj. Gen. Karl R. Horst, commanding general, U.S. Army Military District of Washington. 

Under the UCMJ, the convening authority ultimately decides what charges to refer to court-martial, and whether to seek the death penalty if Article 104 is referred. Therefore, if convicted of all charges, Manning would face a maximum punishment of reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade, E-1; total forfeiture of all pay and allowances; confinement for life; and a dishonorable discharge. 

At the request of Manning's defense attorneys, the trial proceedings have been delayed since July 12, 2010, pending the results of a defense-requested inquiry into Manning's mental capacity and responsibility pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial 706. 

Depending on the results of the R.C.M. 706 board, an Article 32 hearing may follow. An Article 32 hearing is the civilian equivalent of a grand jury, with additional rights afforded to the accused. 

Manning remains confined in the Marine Corps Base Quantico Brig in Quantico, Va. He was notified of the additional charges in person during a command visit today. Despite his pretrial confinement, Manning is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and officials said the Army is committed to ensuring the continued safety and well-being of Manning while in pretrial confinement.

2 (Day) Manning is told Quantico commander Daniel J. Choike denies his Article 138 request.

[IMAGE TO LEFT, COL. DANIEL J. CHOIKE, QUANTICO BASE COMMANDER ] "On Wednesday March 2, 2011, PFC Manning was told that his Article 138 complaint requesting that he be removed from Maximum custody and Prevention of Injury (POI) Watch had been denied by the Quantico commander, Colonel Daniel J. Choike.  Understandably frustrated by this decision after enduring over seven months of unduly harsh confinement conditions, PFC Manning inquired of the Brig operations officer what he needed to do in order to be downgraded from Maximum custody and POI.  As even Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell has stated, PFC Manning has been nothing short of "exemplary" as a detainee.  Additionally, Brig forensic psychiatrists [CAPT HOCTER and COL RICKY MALONE] have consistently maintained that there is no mental health justification for the POI Watch imposed on PFC Manning.  In response to PFC Manning's question, he was told that there was nothing he could do to downgrade his detainee status and that the Brig simply considered him a risk of self-harm.  PFC Manning then remarked that the POI restrictions were "absurd" and sarcastically stated that if he wanted to harm himself, he could conceivably do so with the elastic waistband of his underwear or with his flip-flops.  Without consulting any Brig mental health provider, Chief Warrant Officer Denise Barnes [QUANTICO BRIG COMMANDER] used PFC's Manning's sarcastic quip as justification to increase the restrictions imposed upon him under the guise of being concerned that PFC Manning was a suicide risk.  PFC Manning was not, however, placed under the designation of Suicide Risk Watch.  This is because Suicide Risk Watch would have required a Brig mental health provider's recommendation, which the Brig commander did not have.  In response to this specific incident, the Brig psychiatrist [WHO IS THIS?] assessed PFC Manning as "low risk and requiring only routine outpatient follow up [with] no need for ... closer clinical observation."  In particular, he indicated that PFC Manning's statement about the waist band of his underwear was in no way prompted by "a psychiatric condition". While the commander needed the Brig psychiatrist's recommendation to place PFC Manning on Suicide Risk Watch, no such recommendation was needed in order to increase his restrictions under POI Watch.  The conditions of POI Watch require only psychiatric input, but ultimately remain the decision of the commander." (Source, David Coombs, The Truth Behind Quantico Brig's Decision to Strip PFC Manning)

See also: "1.) ...On 2 March 2011, I received your response to my Article 138 Complaint filed on 19 January 2011. I have elected to file the following rebuttal to your response." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Rebuttal)

1 Defense reports "The Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 706 board is continuing its work." [WHO IS ON THIS?]

(Source: David Coombs, Manning Case Update)

1 Government denies Manning Article 138 request. Defense files response March 10, 2010.

[IMAGE TO LEFT , COL. DANIEL J. CHOIKE, QUANTICO BASE COMMANDER ] "The government filed its response to the defense's Article 138 complaint concerning PFC Manning's confinement conditions.  The preliminary decision made by the government was to deny PFC Manning's request to be removed from Maximum custody and from Prevention of Injury (POI) watch.  The defense now has ten days to file a rebuttal to this determination.  After submitting the rebuttal, the matter will go back to the Quantico Base Commander, Colonel Daniel J. Choike, for his review.  Once complete, he will forward the report to the Secretary of the Navy [RAY MABUS] for final review." (Source, David Coombs, PFC Manning Stripped Naked Again)

See also: "3 (a)(1) While it may have been understandable to classify me as a MAX detainee initially, I should have been downgraded to Medium Custody-In (MDI) after 27 August 2010. As you noted, my initial evaluation by the duty brig supervisor (“DBS”) [WHO IS THIS?] gave me a score of “5” after reviewing the DD Form 2710, inmate background summary, and completing the DD Form 2711, initial custody classification. A score of “5” was significantly lower than the “12” or higher score normally required for MAX custody. Despite my low score, the DBS overrode the score, and indicated that he considered my previous classification in Kuwait as the primary factor in his decision." (Source: Bradley Manning, Article 138 Rebuttal)

1 March 1, 2011 Manning Charge Sheet.

(Source: PDF)

Government files 22 additional charges, including "aiding the enemy" a capital offense against Manning. (Source: democracynow.org)

SUMMARY IN ORDER OF CHARGES BOTH CHARGE SHEETS:

01 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [GIVE INTELLIGENCE TO ENEMY BY INDIRECT MEANS] (Article 104, SPEC)
01 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [CAUSE THE PUBLISHING OF US INTELLIGENCE ON INTERNET, KNOWING ACCESSIBLE TO ENEMY ON INTERNET] (Article 134, SPEC 1)
01 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [WRONGFULLY STORING CLASSIFIED INFO] (Article 92, SPEC 4)
01 Nov 2009 and 08 Mar 2010 [BYPASS SECURITY MECHANISMS] (Article 92, SPEC 1)

01 Nov 2009 and 08 Jan 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT GARANI AIRSTRIKE VIDEO] (Article 134, SPEC 11)

31 Dec 2009 and 05 Jan 2010 [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER 380, 000 CIDNE IRAQ DATABASE] (Article 134, SPEC 4)
31 Dec 2009 and 09 Feb 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT MORE THAN 20 RECORDS CIDNE IRAQ DATABASE] (Article 134, SPEC 7)

31 Dec 2009 and 08 Jan 2010 [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER, 90,000 CIDNE AFGHANISTAN DATABASE] (Article 134, SPEC 6)
31 Dec 2009 and 09 Feb 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT MORE THAN 20 RECORDS CIDNE AFGHANISTAN DATABASE] (Article 134, SPEC 5)
11 Feb 2010 and 03 Apr 2010 [ADD UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE TO SIPRNET] (Article 92 SPEC 2)

15 Feb 2010 and 05 Apr 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIR STRIKE] (Article 134, SPEC 2)
19 Nov 2009 and 05 Apr 2010 [WL PUB BATE] [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET OBTAIN 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIRSTRIKE] (Article 134, SPEC 5)
19 Nov 2009 and 05 Apr 2010 [WL PUB DATE] [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET OBTAIN TRANSMIT 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIRSTRIKE] (Article 134, SPEC 2)
19 Nov 2009 and 05 Apr 2010 [WL PUB DATE] [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION TRANSMIT COLLATERAL MURDER 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIRSTRIKE ] (Article 134, SPEC 1)
19 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: INTRODUCED 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIR STRIKE ONTO PERSONAL COMPUTER] (Article 92, SPEC 1)

15 Feb 2010 and 18 Feb 2010 [EXCEED AUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, TRANSMIT REYKJAVIK 13 CABLE] (Article 134, SPEC 14)
13 Jan 2010 [DOC PUB DATE] and 19 Feb 2010 [WL PUB DATE] [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET OBTAIN TRANSMIT REYKJAVIK 13] (Article 134, SPEC 3)
13 Jan 2010 [DOC PUB DATE] and 19 Feb 2010 [WL PUB DATE] [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET ONTAIN REYKJAVIK 13] (Article 134 SPEC 6)

15 Feb 2010 and 15 Mar 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, AND TRANSMIT DOD US COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WIKILEAKS] (Article 134, SPEC 15)

08 Mar 2010 [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER MORE THAN 700 RECORDS GTMO FILES] (Article 134, SPEC 8)
08 Mar 2010 and 27 May 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION MORE THAN 3 GTMO FILES] (Article 134, SPEC 9)

22 Mar 2010 and 26 Mar 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT CLASSIFIED MEMO BY US INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, [CIA RED CELL SPECIAL MEMO "Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led Mission- Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough"] (Article 134, SPEC 3)
19 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: INTRODUCE CLASSIFIED DOD PPT ONTO PERSONAL COMPUTER] [WHAT IS THIS?] (Article 92, SPEC 3)
19 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET OBTAIN CLASSIFIED DOD PPT] [WHAT IS THIS?] (Article 134, SPEC 8)

28 Mar 2010 and 04 May 2010 [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE BY SELF OR ANOTHER 250,000 STATE DEPT CABLES NET CENTRIC DATABASE] (Article 134, SPEC 12)
28 Mar 2010 and 27 May 2010 [EXCEED AUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, TRANSMIT MORE THAN 75 US STATE DEPT CABLES] (Article 134, SPEC 13)

19 Nov 2009 and 24 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OBTAIN TRANSMIT 50 STATE DEPARTMENT CABLES] (Article 134, SPEC 4)
19 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ON SIPRNET OBTAIN 150,000 STATE DEPT CABLES] (Article 134, SPEC 7)
19 Nov 2009 and 27 May 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: INTRODUCE 50 STATE DEPT CABLES ONTO PERSONAL COMPUTER] (Article 92, SPEC 2)

11 Apr 2010 and 27 May 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMIT MORE THAN FIVE CLASSIFIED RECORDS RELATING TO FARAH PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN] (Article 134, SPEC 10)

04 May 2010 [ADD UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE TO SIPRNET] (Article 92, SPEC 3)
19 Nov 2009 and 03 Apr 2010 [ORIGINAL CHARGE SHEET JULY 5, 2010: ADDING UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE TO SIPRNET] (Article 92, SPEC 4)

11 May 2010 and 27 May 2010 [UNAUTHORIZED USE OF INFORMATION SYSTEM] (Article 92, SPEC 4)
11 May 2010 and 27 May 2010 [STEAL AND COVERT TO USE BY SELF OR ANOTHER, GLOBAL ADDRESS LIST IRAQ MICROSOFT OUTLOOK GLOBAL ADDRESS LIST] (Article 134, SPEC 16)


Charge Sheet, dated March 1, 2011:

ADDITIONAL CHARGE I : VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 104.


THE SPECIFICATION: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority, knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means. [AIDING ENEMY BY INDIRECT MEANS]

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II : VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, wrongfully and wantonly cause to be published on the internet intelligence belonging to the United States government, having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is accessible to the enemy, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [CAUSE THE PUBLISHING OF US INTELLIGENCE ON INTERNET, KNOWING ACCESSIBLE TO ENEMY ON INTERNET]

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: a video file named "12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.avi", with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION, COLLATERAL MURDER, 12 JULY BAGHDAD AIR STRIKE]

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 22 March 2010 and on or about 26 March 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than one classified memorandum produced by a United States government intelligence agency [WHAT IS THIS?], with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION, CLASSIFIED MEMO BY US INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, [CIA RED CELL SPECIAL MEMO "Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led Mission- Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough"]

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert to his use or the use of another, a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database containing more than 380,000 records belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.[STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER, 380, 000 CIDNE IRAQ DATABASE]

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION< TRANSMISSION, MORE THAN 20 RECORDS, CIDNE IRAQ DATABASE]

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S . Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert to his use or the use of another, a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 records belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER, 90,000 records from CIDNE AFGHANISTAN DATABASE]

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit : more than twenty classified records from the Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or -cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces . [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION OF MORE THAN 20 RECORDS CIDNE AFGHANISTAN DATABASE]

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on or about 8 March 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert to his use or the use of another, a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: a United States Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [STEAL AND CONVERT TO USE FOR SELF OR ANOTHER, MORE THAN 700 RECORDS GTMO FILES]

SPECIFICATION 9: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 8 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than three classified records from a United States Southern Command database, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces . [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION MORE THAN 3 GTMO FILES]

SPECIFICATION 10: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 April 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than five classified records relating to a military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or about 4 May 2009, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION MORE THAN FIVE CLASSIFIED RECORDS RELATING TO FARAH PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN]

SPECIFICATION 11: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit : a file named "BE22 PAX. zip" containing a video named "BE22 PAX.wmv", with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 US Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION AND TRANSMISSION OF GARANI AIRSTRIKE VIDEO]

SPECIFICATION 12: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert to his use or the use of another, a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: the Department of State Net-Centric Diplomacy database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18 US Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [STEAL OR CONVERT TO USE BY SELF OR ANOTHER,250,000 STATE DEPT CABLES DATABASE]

SPECIFICATION 13: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United States government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-five classified United States Department of State cables, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a) (1), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [EXCEED AUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, TRANSMIT MORE THAN 75 CLASSIFIED US STATE DEPT CABLES]

SPECIFICATION 14: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010, having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United States government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classified Department of State cable titled "Reykjavik-13", willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a) (1), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.[EXCEED AUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, TRANSMIT REYKJAVIK 13 CABLE]

SPECIFICATION 15: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010, having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, to wit: a classified record produced by a United States Army intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 US Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, OBTAIN ON SIPRNET, AND TRANSMIT OF 32 PAGE DoD DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROGRAM US COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WIKILEAKS]

SPECIFICATION 16: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert to his use or the use of another, a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: the United States Forces - Iraq Microsoft Outlook / Share Point Exchange Server global address list belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18 US Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. [STEAL AND COVERT TO USE BY SELF OR ANOTHER, GLOBAL ADDRESS LIST IRAQ MICROSOFT OUTLOOK GLOBAL ADDRESS LIST]

ADDITIONAL CHARGE III: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 4-5(a) (4), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by attempting to bypass network or information system security mechanisms. [BYPASS SECURITY MECHANISMS]

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 4-5(a) (3), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer.[ADD UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE TO SIPRNET]

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on or about 4 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 4-5(a) (3), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer. [ADD UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE TO SIPRNET]

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 4-5(a) (3), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by using an information system in a manner other than its intended purpose. [UNAUTHORIZED USE OF INFORMATION SYSTEM]

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph 7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, by wrongfully storing classified information.[WRONGFULLY STORING CLASSIFIED INFO]

Original Charge Sheet, dated July 5, 2010:

(Source: PDF from fas.org via court-martial.com and bradleymanning.org)

CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: Paragraph 4-6(k), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by wrongfully introducing a classified video of a military operation filmed at or near Baghdad, Iraq, on or about 12 July 2007, onto his personal computer, a non-secure information system.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: Paragraph 4-6(k), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by wrongfully introducing more than 50 classified United States Department of State cables onto his personal computer, a non-secure information system.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: Paragraph 4-6(k), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by wrongfully introducing a classified Microsoft Office PowerPoint presentation onto his personal computer, a non-secure information system.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 3 April 2010, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: Paragraph 4-5(a)(3), Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by wrongfully adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer.

CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 5 April 2010, have unauthorized possession of photographs relating to the national defense, to wit: a classified video of a military operation filmed at or near Baghdad, Iraq, on or about 12 July 2007, and did willfully communicate, deliver and transmit the video, or cause the video to be communicated, delivered, and transmitted, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 US Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 5 April 2010, knowingly exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense, to wit: a classified video of a military operation filmed at or near Baghdad, Iraq, on or about 12 July 2007, and did willfully communicate, deliver and transmit the video, or cause the video to be communicated, delivered and transmitted, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe that such information could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 13 January 2010 and on or about 19 February 2010, knowingly exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of foreign relations, to wit: a classified United States Department of State cable titled “Reykjavik 13,” and did willfully communicate, deliver and transmit the cable, or cause the cable to be communicated, delivered, and transmitted, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe that such information could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 24 May 2010, knowingly exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of foreign relations, to wit: more than 50 classified United States Department of State cables, and did willfully communicate, deliver and transmit the cables, or cause the cables to be communicated, delivered, and transmitted, to a person not entitled to receive them, with reason to believe that such information could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 5 April 2010, intentionally exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information from the United States Department of Defense, to wit: a classified video of a military operation filmed at or near Baghdad, Iraq, on or about 12 July 2007, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(2), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 13 January 2010 and on or about 19 February 2010, intentionally exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information from the United States Department of State, to wit: a classified cable titled “Reykjavik 13,” in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(2), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on divers occasions, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, intentionally exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information from an the United States Department of State, to wit: more than 150,000 diplomatic cables, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(2), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, US Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on divers occasions, between on or about 19 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, intentionally exceed his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router network computer and obtain information from the United States Department of Defense, to wit: a classified Microsoft Office PowerPoint presentation, in violation of 18 US Code Section 1030(a)(2), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. (Source: bradleymanning.org)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Feb 2011

24 Sweden v. Assange | UK judge Howard Riddle rejects Julian Assange's appeal against the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and extradition to Sweden.

"24 February 2011 Howard Riddle, a hostile judge, rejects Assange's appeal against the European Arrest Warrant and extradition to Sweden. It was Judge Riddle who had jailed Assange the previous December." (Source: Nordic News Service, Suspicious Behavior,The strange case of the WikiLeaks editor and the Swedish prosecutor)

More sources.

24 White House | At a press conference, when White House Press Secretary Jay Carney is asked for a comment about extradition of Julian Assange to Sweden, Carney responds, " I have no comment on that because it’s an ongoing investigation."

Q Another international story, is there any comment from the White House about the extradition of Julian Assange to Sweden?

MR. CARNEY: I have no comment on that because it’s an ongoing investigation.

(Source: White House)

20 Louis Susman interviewed on BBC by Andrew Marr speak about the shield act and Mr. Assange. Susman says, "But at this point in time, we have brought no action against Mr Assange and we'll have to see how it plays out in the British courts."

ANDREW MARR:

Another security issue, I suppose, is the case of Mr Assange. We're going to be hearing this week as to whether he goes to Sweden or not. You have a new piece of legislation - SHIELD, so-called - to crack down on people who leak American secrets. Would you like to see him on American soil standing trial for what he's done?

AMBASSADOR SUSMAN:

Well that's an interesting question because I have a personal view and I'm sure we have a governmental view.

ANDREW MARR:

Give us your personal view then on that.

AMBASSADOR SUSMAN:

My personal view is that we have someone who has received stolen material, has used it in a way that could be detrimental to our country, and you balance that with the freedom of press and freedom of transparency. I know that we have this proposed legislation - it's not been enacted - and we'll have to see how that comes out. But at this point in time, we have brought no action against Mr Assange and we'll have to see how it plays out in the British courts.

ANDREW MARR:

Alright. Ambassador, thank you very much indeed for joining us.

AMBASSADOR SUSMAN:

It's always a pleasure.

18 Rep Weiner cites a WikiLeaks released US State Department Cable in a speech on the floor of Congress regarding his Amendment No. 126 barring funding to Saudi Arabia in light of the country's own support of terrorists for the Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011.

Amendment 126:

"At the end of the bill (before the short title), insert the following:

SEC. __. None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to provide assistance to Saudi Arabia.

SEC. __. None of the funds made available by this Act for ``International Military Education and Training'' may be used for assistance to Saudi Arabia.

SEC. __. None of the funds made available by this Act for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs'' may be used for assistance to Saudi Arabia. "

"Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman, to the great relief, I'm sure, of all those assembled, I don't intend to take the full 5 minutes.

The amendment I propose is one that I think that both sides of the aisle will rally around. It's very simple. It limits any aid in this bill going to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Why we would be providing any aid to Saudi Arabia at all has been an eternal mystery to me, given their propensity to exporting terrorists, given that they had exported 15 of the 19 homicide bombers on September 11, given that just in December when the WikiLeaks came out, it was learned in a quote from the Secretary of State, ``It has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist funding as an important priority.'' Given that the Saudis have textbooks that say things like this in them. This is what they teach to their children:

`The Prophet said, The hour of judgment will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. O Muslim. O Servant of God. There is a Jew behind me. Come and kill him.' They have textbooks that also lash out at Christians.

It is also important to note that in this House year after year, we've eliminated aid to the Saudis, only to have it come back. As you see on this chart, 2005--it was actually defeated that year--but every subsequent year, this House voted to ban aid to Saudi Arabia, and it comes rising back up like a Shakespearean specter. This language strikes the Presidential waiver, and says no more aid to Saudi Arabia.

I reserve the balance of my time." (Source: Congressional Record)

16 Manning Defense files a Discovery Request.

"2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous discovery requests of 29 October2010, 15 November2010, 8 December2010, 10 January 2011, 19 January2011, 16 February2011, 13 May 2011, 13 October 2011, 15 November2011, and 16 November 2011 and to also respond to the following additional discovery" (Source: David Coombs, Defense Discovery Request)

15 Rep Roscoe Bartlett cites WikiLeaks release of US State Department cables in his speech about Peak Oil on the floor of Congress.

"Mr. BARTLETT. Last week, there was WikiLeaks activity that pointed out a huge problem that we in the world face. WikiLeaks released some confidential emails that indicated that the Saudis had only 60 percent of the oil that they had advertised they had. I think this is probably true of most of the OPEC countries that were incentivize to exaggerate their oil reserves when they were permitted to pump a percentage of the oil reserves." (Source: Congressional Record)

15 Hearing held before Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan: re 1 MOTION to Vacate filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum, 3 MOTION for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records filed by Birgitta Jonsdottir, Rop Gonggrijp, Jacob Appelbaum. Oral Argument heard. Matter taken under advisement. Order to follow. In attendance for US government, Assistant US Attorneys, Andrew Peterson and John S. Davis

"John Davis, an assistant US attorney in Alexandria, said in court today that the government’s request from Twitter was routine.

“This is a standard -- as this court knows well -- investigative measure used in criminal investigations every day of the year all over the country,” Davis said.

Assistant US Attorney Andy Peterson told Buchanan the government is still in the preliminary stages of its WikiLeaks investigation and that publicly releasing information would damage its probe.

Carolyn Penner, a Twitter spokeswoman, didn’t return e-mail and phone messages seeking comment." (Source: bloomberg.com)

"A justice department spokesman said the terms of the request had since been narrowed to data from 15 November, 2009, to 1 June, 2010, and to four accounts - those belonging to Mr Appelbaum, Mr Gonggrijp and Ms Jonsdottir and the official Wikileaks account." (Source: bbc)

""Appearing at the hearing on Tuesday, Assistant US Attorney John Davis said the government was seeking routine data, no different to phone records or credit card bills.

"This is an investigative measure used in criminal investigations all over the country, every day," Mr Davis said." (Source: bbc)

 

Transcript of the hearing:

TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 2-15-2011 before Mag. Judge Buchanan. Court Reporter/Transcriber Norman Linnell, telephone number 703-549-4626. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER Redaction Request due 4/13/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/16/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/13/2011.(linnell, norman) (Entered: 03/14/2011) (Source: web archive)

Notice of Filing of Official Transcript re 41 Transcript (jlan) (Entered: 03/14/2011) (Source: web archive)

14 Department of Justice FY2012 Budget requests a $128.6 million increase, including 170 new positions (71 agents and 5 attorneys) for national security and counterterrorism. The requested national security resources include $122.5 million in program increases for the FBI. This figure includes $48.9 million for the FBI to expand national security related surveillance and enhance its Data Integration and Visualization System.

(Source: Department of Justice Press Release and National Security Division Budget Request PDF)

The FY 2012 budget requests a $128.6 million increase, including 170 new positions (71 agents and 5 attorneys), to strengthen national security and counter the threat of terrorism. With national security threats constantly evolving and adapting, additional resources are required to counteract new national security challenges. Likewise, increasing global access to technological advancements has also resulted in new vulnerabilities that must be addressed. The requested FY 2012 budget program increases provide essential technological and human capital to detect, disrupt and deter threats to our national security.

The administration supports critical national security programs within the department, including the FBI and the National Security Division (NSD). The requested national security resources include $122.5 million in program increases for the FBI. This figure includes $48.9 million for the FBI to expand national security related surveillance and enhance its Data Integration and Visualization System; $40.0 million for the FBI’s Operational Enablers program and Weapons of Mass Destruction/Render Safe capabilities to deploy render safe assets throughout the country to diffuse, disrupt or destroy weapons of mass destruction; and $18.6 million for the FBI’s Computer Intrusion Initiative to increase coverage in detecting cyber intrusions.

To address the growing technological gap between law enforcement’s electronic surveillance capabilities and the number and variety of communications devices available to the public, $17.0 million in program increases are being requested to bolster the department’s electronic surveillance capabilities.

14 Position on Unsealing of Records by USA as to Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir, Twitter, Inc. Also, Statement and Supporting Memorandum or Real Parties in interest in response to the Court's Order of 2/9/2011 concerning unsealing of this docket by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir.

Position on Unsealing of Records by USA as to Appelbaum, et al.

"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, Alexandria Division

IN THE MATTER OF THE §2703(d) ORDER RELATING TO TWITTER ACCOUNTS WIKILEAKS, ROP_G; IOERROR; AND BIRGITTAJ

MISC. NO. 10GJ3793
No. 1:11DM3 (Judge Buchanan) )

UNDER SEAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON UNSEALING OF RECORDS FILED UNDER DOCKET NUMBER l : l l -DM-0003

The United States of America, by and through Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, and John S. Davis and Andrew Peterson, Assistant United States Attorneys, hereby responds to the Court's Order that the Parties identify pleadings that have been filed under docket number 1:11 -DM-0003 that should remain under seal.

Respectfully submitted.

Neil H. MacBride
United States Attorney

By: /s/
Andrew Peterson
John S. Davis
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-3700

Position on Unsealing of Records by Appelbaum, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 USC 2703d

MISC. NO. 10GJ3793, 1:11-DM-003

FILED UNDER SEAL

STATEMENT AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF FEBRUARY 9, 2011 CONCERNING UNSEALING THIS DOCKET

...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was sent via email this 14th day of February, 2011, to:

Andrew Peterson, Esq.
John S. Davis, Esq.
Assistant United States Attorney
600 East Main Street
Suite 1800
Richmond, VA 23219-2447
Ph: (804) 819-7413
[email protected]
[email protected]

10 Chairman of the House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Mike Rogers, Ranking Member's Opening C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, and James R. Clapper Director of National Intelligence remarks on WikiLeaks at the Open Hearing on the Worldwide Threat Assessment House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rogers in the context of information sharing environment, Ruppersberger mentions WikiLeaks in the context of Anonymous's Operation Payback and hackers and cyber security, and James Clapper says both WikiLeaks disclosure still being assessed and 'very damaging'

Mike Rogers bio on lilsis.

Committees that Mike Rogers is on: Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence Subcommittee; Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee; House Energy and Commerce Committee; Environment and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee; House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee; House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee; Unmanned Systems Caucus U.S. House caucus for drones & other unmanned

Committees that C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger is on: Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee Legislative Branch Subcommittee Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee House Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee House Appropriations Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Intelligence Community Management Subcommittee

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing Web site

Full Testimony by James Clapper
Chairman Mike Rogers Opening Statement
Ranking Member's Opening C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger Statement

Witnesses

  • James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
  • Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
  • Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Lieutenant
  • General Ronald L. Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense
  • Robert S. Mueller, III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
  • Thomas A. Ferguson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Department of Defense
  • Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Excerpts from Mike Rogers Speech:

Wikileaks

The Wikileaks fiasco should lead to an increased focus on our information sharing within the U.S. government. We missed critical opportunities to prevent the 9/11 attacks because of failures to share information between government agencies. The Intelligence Community has made tremendous progress since 9/11 in improving information sharing, and we cannot allow the Wikileaks disaster to be an excuse to halt or reverse that progress. We need to make sure we learn the right lessons from Wikileaks.

The right lesson is to redouble our efforts to promote information sharing while protecting security – what I like to call "smart access." Smart access is an identity based information security management system that improves our ability to detect and deter the few bad actors, and not unnecessarily punish responsible actors by denying them access to the sensitive information they need to get their work done.

In response to the Wikileaks fiasco, the Intelligence Community and Defense Department have put together a good plan to implement smart access tools like auditing controls to detect the misuse of our sensitive data, similar to the systems credit card companies use to detect fraud. 6 These long overdue smart access fixes will not be cheap, but I believe they are well worth the price. This committee will monitor the implementation of these fixes and will work to identify any additional steps that are necessary to ensure that our sensitive data is secure

Experts from C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger Statement:

Last week it was reported the NASDAQ was hacked. Trades were not affected, but hackers apparently penetrated certain internal software. The website Wikileaks disclosed tens of thousands of classified documents that could put sensitive diplomacy in jeopardy and could risk national security. When MasterCard, Paypal and Amazon prevented their supporters from making donations, a group calling themselves "Operation Payback" attacked these websites and shut them down for a period of time. The threat from cyber attacks is real and must be addressed. America must beef up its cybersecurity efforts.

Excerpts from James Clapper's Statement:

Intelligence

Threats It is difficult to overstate the importance of counterintelligence to U.S. national security. The United States remains the highest priority intelligence target for many foreign intelligence services, and we continue to face a wide-range of foreign intelligence threats to our political, military, economic, and diplomatic interests at home and abroad.

In addition to the threat posed by state intelligence services, the intelligence capabilities and activities of non-state actors are increasing in scope and sophistication. And, the cyber environment provides unprecedented opportunities for adversaries to target the US due to our reliance on information systems.

The spectrum of threats includes espionage, cyber intrusions, organized crime, and the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive and classified US Government information, a notable recent example being the unlawful release of classified US documents by WikiLeaks. While the impacts of the WikiLeaks disclosures are still being assessed, we are moving aggressively to respond by protecting our information networks with improved CI analysis of audit and access controls, improving our ability to detect and respond to insider threats—while balancing the need to share information—and increasing awareness across the U.S. Government to the persistent and wide-ranging nature of foreign intelligence threats.

Q&A:

"Perhaps the most blatant example, of course, is the unauthorized downloading of classified documents subsequently released by WikiLeaks," he said. "From an intelligence perspective, these disclosures have clearly been very damaging." (James Clapper)

10 Rep Kucinich brings up Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas of Twitter concerning WikiLeaks on the floor of Congress during discussion on the H.R. 514: FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011.

Bill was passed by House and Senate and signed by the President.

"Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to get back to first principles here. The First Amendment, `Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.'

This Patriot Act represents a wholesale abandonment of the right to assemble peaceably, of the right of freedom of association. This Patriot Act is a square violation of the Fourth Amendment, 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.''

Now, I can trust my friends on the other side of the aisle. They are decent people. This isn't about Democrat versus Republican. It's not about a Democratic President. It's not about if there was a Republican President or if we will have one in the future. This is about something actually much more important than all of us and then whoever might be an executive. It's about the Constitution of the United States.

Congress made a mistake when it passed the Patriot Act. Instead of sun setting it and being done with it, we kept the provisions going. Some of them were made permanent. This law today, we seek to reauthorize certain sections of the Patriot Act. What I maintain is that what we have here is a destructive undermining of constitutional principles. We can't just say, well, let's trust our friends to do the right thing. This is about the Constitution. This is beyond friendship. This is beyond party. This is beyond who is the President. So I disagree with President Obama on this.

It's interesting. At this very moment that our President is on television celebrating the tremendous movement towards the free will of the people of Egypt who have suffered real repression and suppression of their basic liberties, we can celebrate something happening thousands of miles away, but it would be much better for America if we celebrated our Constitution.

What we have done with the Patriot Act, we have given the government enormous power. We have given the government the authority to reach deeply into people's private lives, into their business affairs without a court order. We need to think about that. Some people say they don't want government involved in certain things. Well, government is involved in a way that is devastating when you come to the devastation of constitutional principles, you give the FBI the ability to reach into people's private lives without a court order.

   

[Time: 14:20]

   I'm telling you, whether you're a Democrat or Republican, this is a very dangerous thing that we're doing here.

   Stand up for the Constitution.

[From the New York Times, Jan. 9, 2011]

   Twitter Shines a Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas

(By Noam Cohen)

The news that federal prosecutors have demanded that the micro blogging site Twitter provide the account details of people connected to the WikiLeaks easel including its founder, Julian Assange, isn't noteworthy because the government's request was unusual or intrusive. It is noteworthy because it became public.

Even as Web sites, social networking services and telephone companies amass more and more information about their users, the government--in the course of conducting inquiries--has been able to look through much of the information without the knowledge of the people being investigated.

For the Twitter request, the government obtained a secret subpoena from a federal court. Twitter challenged the secrecy, not the subpoena itself, and won the right to inform the people whose records the government was seeking. WikiLeaks says it suspects that other large sites like Google and Facebook have received similar requests and simply went along with the government.

This kind of order is far more common than one may think, and in the case of terrorism and espionage investigations the government can issue them without a court order. The government says more than 50,000 of these requests, known as national security letters, are sent each year, but they come with gag orders that prevent those contacted from revealing what the agency has been seeking or even the existence of the gag orders.

``It's a perfect example of how the government can use its broad powers to silence people,'' said Nicholas Merrill, who was the first person to file a constitutional challenge against the use of national security letters, authorized by the USA Patriot Act. Until August, he was forbidden to acknowledge the existence of a 2004 letter that the company he founded, the Calyx Internet Access Corporation, received from the F.B.I.

Mr. Merrill is now free to speak about the request, but part of the gag order remains in place, and he is still barred from discussing what information he had been asked to provide. As a result, he said, before he gives a talk he consults a six-page guide prepared by his lawyers at the American Civil Liberties Union to be sure that he complies with the order to avoid risking a punishment of five years in prison.

The government cites national security as the reason the contents of the letters--even their existence--are kept secret. The F.B.I. is trying to prevent plots as they are being hatched, according to Valerie Caproni, the general counsel of the agency, and thus needs stealth.

In the case of a small Internet service provider like Calyx, which was located in downtown Manhattan and had hundreds of customers, even mentioning that the F.B.I. had been sniffing around could harm an investigation, she said, especially if ``the target is antsy anyway.''

Mr. Merrill, a 38-year-old from Brooklyn who studied computer science and philosophy, said he created Calyx in 1994 when it was ``really pretty easy, there wasn't really any competition.'' His clients included ``dozens of nonprofit organizations and alternative media outlets.''

Mr. Merrill challenged the constitutionality of the letter he received in 2004, saying the request raised ``red flags'' of being politically motivated. As a result of his suit and two later ones, the law governing the letters has been overturned and then revised by Congress.

In 2007, the F.B.I.'s inspector general found that the agency had abused its own guidelines by including too many peripheral people in its searches. The letters now receive the ``individualized scrutiny'' of the agents who are filing them, Ms. Caproni said.

All sides agree that it has become significantly easier to challenge the letters' requests as well as their secrecy. At the moment, there are no new challenges in the court system, the government and the A.C.L.U. say.

The program, whose use has ``ticked up'' a bit in recent years, Ms. Caproni said, is humming along. She added, however, that the government had become more selective about the types of companies to which it sent letters. ``All other things being the same, one of the things investigators think about is, `Who are we serving this? Are they comfortable with this?' '' she said. ``Most of these N.S.L.'s are filed on large companies. Why would they want to disclose that? Most companies view it as good corporate citizenry.''

One critic of the law, former Senator Russ Feingold, said in a statement that it was long past time for Congress ``to rein in the use of national security letters.''

``This is not a partisan issue,'' Mr. Feingold said, ``it is about the legislative branch providing an adequate check on the executive branch. Republicans advocating limited government should take a close look at these statutes and consider supporting changes.''

Mr. Merrill argues that the blanket gag orders have prevented a full public debate on the subject. He himself largely left the I.S.P. business in 2004, independent of his legal case, and only now has returned to hosting a couple of clients as part of a nonprofit project, the Calyx Institute, which aims to study how to protect consumers' privacy.

Regarding the news about Twitter, he wrote in an e-mail: ``I commend Twitter's policy of notifying their customers of government requests for their private data and for their challenging and subsequently removing the gag order. This is a great example of the government's misuse of secrecy provisions and of exemplary privacy ethics on behalf of Twitter.''

Ms. Caproni, who has testified before Congress about the program, said that it had been more than amply debated. ``People at the A.C.L.U. and the press'' think the letters are ``a bigger deal than the companies.''

To one of Mr. Merrill's A.C.L.U. lawyers, Jameel Jaffer, the smooth operation of the system is a sign that it is not working. The privacy rights at stake are not those of the companies who hold the information, Mr. Jaffer said, but ``about people whose records are held.'' And those people should be told, he said.

``People used to be the custodians of their own records, their own diaries. Now third parties are custodians of all that,'' he said. ``Everything you do online is entrusted to someone else--unless you want to go completely off the grid, and I'm not even sure that is possible.''

--
[From the New York Times, Mar. 13, 2008]

F.B.I. Made `Blanket' Demands for Phone Records

(By Eric Lichtblau)

Washington.--Senior officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation repeatedly approved the use of ``blanket'' records demands to justify the improper collection of thousands of phone records, according to officials briefed on the practice.

The bureau appears to have used the blanket records demands at least 11 times in 2006 alone as a quick way to clean up mistakes made over several years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, according to a letter provided to Congress by a lawyer for an F.B.I. agent who witnessed the missteps.

The F.B.I. has come under fire for its use of so-called national security letters to inappropriately gather records on Americans in terrorism investigations, but details have not previously been disclosed about its use of ``blanket'' warrants, a one-step operation used to justify the collection of hundreds of phone and e-mail records at a time.

Under the USA Patriot Act, the F.B.I. received broadened authority to issue the national security letters on its own authority--without the approval of a judge--to gather records like phone bills or e-mail transactions that might be considered relevant to a particular terrorism investigation. The Justice Department inspector general found in March 2007 that the F.B.I. had routinely violated the standards for using the letters and that officials often cited ``exigent'' or emergency situations that did not really exist in issuing them to phone providers and other private companies.

In an updated report due out on Thursday, the inspector general is expected to report that the violations continued through 2006, when the F.B.I. instituted new internal procedures.

The inspector general's ongoing investigation is also said to be focusing on the F.B.I.'s use of the blanket letters as a way of justifying the collection of large amounts of records at one time. F.B.I. officials acknowledged the problem Wednesday, calling it inadvertent, and said officials had been instructed that they could no longer issue blanket orders. Instead, officials have to determine why particular records are considered relevant.

A letter sent last week to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, provides new details on the F.B.I.'s use of the national security letters, including the practice of issuing the blanket demands.

A copy of the letter was provided to The Times. It was written by Stephen M. Kohn, a Washington lawyer representing Bassem Youssef, an F.B.I. agent who reported what he thought were abuses in the use of national security letters and was interviewed for three days by the inspector general. In a separate matter, Mr. Youssef is suing the F.B.I. in a discrimination claim.

Mr. Grassley said Wednesday that he was concerned by the issues raised in Mr. Kohn's letter.

``In the past, the F.B.I. has shown a propensity to act as if it were above the law,'' he said. ``That attitude clearly needs to stop. Part of the way we can help the F.B.I. clean up its act is to pay close attention to information from whistle-blowers like Bassem Youssef. We need aggressive follow-up from the inspector general to ensure accountability and reform.''

By 2006, F.B.I. officials began learning that the bureau had issued thousands of ``exigent'' or emergency records demands to phone providers in situations where no life-threatening emergency existed, according to the account of Mr. Youssef, who worked with the phone companies in collecting records in terrorism investigations. In these situations, the F.B.I. had promised the private companies that the emergency records demands would be followed up with formal subpoenas or properly processed letters, but often, the follow-up material never came.

This created a backlog of records that the F.B.I. had obtained without going through proper procedures. In response, the letter said, the F.B.I. devised a plan: rather than

[Page: H627]
issuing national security letters retroactively for each individual investigation, it would issue the blanket letters to cover all the records obtained from a particular phone company.

`When Mr. Youssef was first informed of this concept, he was very uncomfortable with it,' his lawyer, Mr. Kohn, said in his letter to Senator Grassley. But the plan was ultimately approved in 2006 by three senior officials at highest levels of the F.B.I., and in the process, Mr. Kohn maintains, the solution may have worsened the problem.

`They made a mistake in cleaning up a mistake,'' Mr. Kohn said, ``because they didn't know the law.'

An F.B.I. official who asked for anonymity because the inspector general is still examining the blanket warrant issue said the practice was ``an attempt to fix a problem.''

'This was ham-handed but pure of heart,' the official said. 'This was nothing evil, but it was not the right way to do it.'" (Source: Congressional Record)

10 Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan ORDER that Court's Order of 2/7/2011 be unsealed. Reply in Support of 3 MOTION for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir. Reply in support of 1 MOTION to Vacate by Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, Birgitta Jonsdottir.

ORDERED that this Court's Order of 2/7/2011 23 shall be unsealed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan on 2/10/2011. (jcor) (rban, ). (Entered: 02/11/2011) (Source: web archive)

Reply ISO Motion to Vacate by Appelbaum, et al.

Excerpt:

United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 USC 2703d

MISC NO 10GJ3793, 1:11-DM-003

Footnote 11: "The Government claim that it has narrowed the scope of the Twitter Order, but that is of no moment to the analysis here because it continues to insist on disclosure of private IP address information and other records that the Parties do not share freely. Moreover, the Parties understand that the Government's "narrowing" is really just an agreement that Twitter need not produce records that it does not possess of that are overly burdensome to produce. The Government has reserved its right to seek additional information the future and refused to withdraw any portion of the records requests altogether…" (Source: Reply ISO Motion to Vacate by Appelbaum, et al.)

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was sent via e-mail this 10th day of February, 2011, to:

Andrew Peterson, Esq.
John S. Davis, Esq.
600 East Main Street
Suite 1800
Richmond, VA 23219-2447
Ph: 804-819-7413
[email protected]
[email protected]

 

 

Reply ISO Motion for Unsealing Court Records by Appelbaum, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, Alexandria Division

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO USC 2703d

MISC NO 10GJ3793
No. 1:11DM3 (Mag. Buchanan)

Hearing February 15, 2011
10:30 am

UNDER SEAL

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST JACOB Appelbaum, ROP GONGGRIJP, AND BRIGITTA JONSDOTTIR FOR UNSEALING OF SEALED COURT RECORDS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was sent via email this 10th day of February, 2011 to:

Andrew Peterson, Esq.
John S. Davis, Esq.
Assistant United States Attorney
600 East Main Street
Suite 1800
Richmond, VA 23219-2447
Ph: 804-819-7431
[email protected]
[email protected]

9 US Magistrate JUDGE, Theresa Buchanan, ORDERS that the parties shall each submit a statement and supporting memorandum by 2/14/2011 specifying which pleadings in the case numbered 1:11dm00003 should remain sealed. She also ORDERS that all pleadings previously or subsequently filed in this case, except those specifically unsealed by Court order on 2/7/2011 shall remain sealed until further order of the Court.

Order to Parties to Submit Memorandum Specifying Which Pleadings Should Remain Sealed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Virginia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff
v.
JACOB APPELBAUM, et al., Defendants

MISC. No. 1:11dm00003

ORDER

This matter is before the Court sua sponte. It is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall each submit a statement and supporting memorandum by February 14, 2011 specifying which pleadings in the case numbered 1:11dm00003 should remain sealed. The hearing on this matter shall take place on February 15, 2011.

ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2011.

/s/
THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Alexandria, Virginia

  • Order that all Pleadings Previously or Subsequently filed in this case, except those specifically unsealed by Court order on 2/7/2011 shall remain sealed. (Source: web archive)

8 MOTION for Clarification by Twitter, Inc. (jcor) (Additional attachment(s) added on 3/11/2011: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2) (rban, ). (Entered: 02/09/2011)

7 US Magistrate Judge, Theresa Buchanan orders the motions and hearing dated February 15, 2011 are unsealed. US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, and Assistant US Attorneys file a response to Buchanan's ORDER TO UNSEAL MOTIONS AND HEARING dated Feb 15, 2011

Order Unsealing Motions

United States District Court For the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division
United States, Plaintiff v. Jacob Appelbaum, et al., Defendants
Misc. No. 1:11dm0003

Order

THIS MATTER came before the Court on defendants' motion for Immediate Unsealing of Motions and Upcoming Hearing. (DKT. 17). UPON CONSIDERATION of the pleadings, it is hereby ORDERED that the following of defendants' motions shall be unsealed: Motion to Vacate (DKT. 1), Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records (DKT. 3), and Motion for Immediate Unsealing of Motions. (DKT. 17). It is further ORDERED that the February 15, 2011 hearing on defendants' motions shall be open to the public. It is further ORDERED that other party who wishes to file additional materials under seal must file an appropriate motion and notice of hearing.

ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2011.

/s/
THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Alexandria, Virginia









Government's Response to Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records

United States District Court For the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division
IN THE MATTER OF THE 2730d ORDER RELATING TO TWITTER ACCOUNTS: WikiLeaks; ROP_G; IOERROR; and BRIGITTAJ

Misc. No. 10gj3793
1:11dm0003
Hearing: February 15, 2011 10:30am

UNDER SEAL
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE REAL PARTIES' IN INTEREST MOTION FOR UNSEALING OF SEALED COURT RECORDS

Respectfully Submitted,

Neil H. MacBride
United States Attorney

By: /s/
Andrew Peterson
John S. Davis
Assistant United States Attorneys
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-3700



7 US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, and Assistant US Attorneys, John S. Davis and Andrew Peterson, Oppose Motion for Immediate Unsealing of Court Documents

Response in Opposition by USA and to Appelbaum, Gonggrijp and Jonsdottir Motion for Unsealing Court Records

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

IN APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO 18 USC 2703
MISC NO. 10GJ3793, 1:11-DM-003
DECISION REQUESTED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 15, 2011

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIOS OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST FOR THE IMMEDIATE UNSEALING OF MOTIONS AND UPCOMING HEARINGS RELATED TO THE UNSEALING COURT ORDER OF DECEMBER 14, 2010

...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was sent via e-mail this 7th of February, 2011 to:

Andrew Peterson, Esq.
John S. Davis, Esq.
Assistant United States Attorney
600 East Main Street
Suite 1800
Richmond, VA 23219-2447
Ph: 804-819-7413
[email protected]
[email protected]

 

4 DOD News Briefing Deputy Assistant Secretary Schulte from the Pentagon says he will not comment on WikiLeaks, even the disclosures that feature him talking to Mohamed ElBaradei.

Full Transcript  

Q:  (Inaudible) -- I've already gone through this thing and I'd just like to see if --

            MR. SCHULTE:  I would say I don't comment on WikiLeaks.  Even the ones that feature me talking to Mohamed ElBaradei I don't comment on.  So thank you very much.  Thank you all. 

            LT. COL. CUNNINGHAM:  Thank you for your time -- (inaudible) --

             MR. SCHULTE:  We're happy to continue this discussion at an appropriate time.  So --

            Q:  Thank you. 

            MR. SCHULTE:  -- thank you.

4 US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, and Assistant US Attorneys, John S. Davis and Andrew Peterson, Oppose Motion for Immediate Unsealing of Motions and Upcoming Hearings

Response in Opposition by USA to Motion for Immediate Unsealing of Motions and Upcoming Hearings

Excerpts:

MISC NO. 10GJ3793 [DOCKET NUMBER FOR THE WIKILEAKS GRAND JURY], 1:11-DM-003
Hon. Theresa M. Buchanan
Hearing Date: February 15, 2011
UNDER SEAL

The Attorney General publicly confirmed the existence of an investigation into disclosures of classified information by WikiLeaks on November 29, 2010

[SIGNED]

Neil H. MacBride
United States Attorney

By /s/
Andrew Peterson
John S. Davis
Assistant United States Attorney's Office
2100 Jamieson Ave
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 299-3700


2 White House | At a press conference Press Secretary Robert Gibbs is asked about authenticating WikiLeaks documents in reference to WikiLeaks and Julian Assange being nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Gibbs responds, "I'm not a document veracity person."

Full Transcript)

Q And second, if I may, WikiLeaks and Julian has been nominated for Nobel, and do you believe that WikiLeaks, all the leaks, are authentic, has not been altered?

MR. GIBBS: I'm sorry?

Q That all these WikiLeaks, all are authentic, has been not --

MR. GIBBS: I'm not a document veracity person.

(Source: White House)

2 Department of Defense | Major General Terry A. Wolff, former commanding general of the 1st Armored Division/U.S. Division - Center in Iraq and general court-martial convening authority of Bradley Manning in Iraq. Major General Terry A. Wolff was promoted to Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff U.S. Army Europe.

2 WikiLeaks posts 'The WikiLeaks Threat' outline of how Plantir Technologies, HBGary Federal, and Berico Technologies plan to attack WikiLeaks after a request from Hunton and Williams, a law firm that currently counts Bank of America as a client.

The WikiLeaks Threat (PDF)

"In a document titled "The WikiLeaks Threat" three data intelligence companies, Plantir Technologies, HBGary Federal and Berico Technologies, outline a plan to attack WikiLeaks They are acting upon request from Hunton and Williams, a law firm working for Bank of America. The Department of Justice recommended the law firm to Bank of America according to an article in The Tech Herald. The prosed attacks on WikiLeaks according to the slides include these actions:

  • Feed the fuel between the feuding groups. Disinformation. Create messages around actions of sabotage or discredit the opposing organizations. Submit fake documents and then call out the error. 
  • Create concern over the security of the infrastructure. Create exposure stories. If the process is believed not to be secure they are done. 
  • Cyber attacks against the infrastructure to get data on document submitters. This would kill the project. Since the servers are now in Sweden and France putting a team together to get access is more straightforward. 
  • Media campaign to push the radial and reckless nature of WikiLeaks activities. Sustain pressure. Does nothing for the fanatics, but creates concern and doubt among moderates.
  • Search for leaks. Use social media to profile and identify risky behavior of employees." (Source: wikileaks.org)

Feb

Department of State | In Report Number ISP-I-11-28A, February 2011 of the Inspection of Embassy Reykjavik, Iceland by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of the Inspector General:

The DCM [Deputy Chiefs of Missions] was in charge during a period of remarkable challenges. The WikiLeaks scandal, which drew the world’s attention to U.S. action in Iraq and Afghanistan, began with the telegram “Reykjavik 13.” Publication of this telegram caused Icelanders, both in and out of government, to question whether their confidential communications with the U.S. Government might appear on the Internet. Then, a month later, U.S. biographic information on Icelandic ministers was leaked via the same channel. The leaked bios, which included candid views on government ministers by some of their colleagues, were especially damaging to the bilateral relationship. The chargé’s steady diplomacy with the host government, buttressed by his earlier establishment of a climate of personal trust, helped get U.S.-Iceland relations through an extremely difficult period. The identification of the source of the leak (totally unconnected with Embassy Reykjavik) has relieved some of the bilateral stress for the moment. But there remains plenty of fodder for leftist and nationalist elements, especially important now that Iceland has, for the first time, a totally leftist coalition that does not rely on political alliance with centrists or rightists. It is a weak government and unlikely to cause major shifts in Iceland’s policies; however, its traditional “Iceland out of NATO” rhetoric will likely remain an irritant, even as other policy issues take center stage.

The Inspection Report concludes on WikiLeaks, "Over time, the harm caused by the WikiLeaks document release has faded in importance."

The DCM [Deputy Chiefs of Missions] was in charge during a period of remarkable challenges. The WikiLeaks scandal, which drew the world’s attention to U.S. action in Iraq and Afghanistan, began with the telegram “Reykjavik 13.” Publication of this telegram caused Icelanders, both in and out of government, to question whether their confidential communications with the U.S. Government might appear on the Internet. Then, a month later, U.S. biographic information on Icelandic ministers was leaked via the same channel. The leaked bios, which included candid views on government ministers by some of their colleagues, were especially damaging to the bilateral relationship. The chargé’s steady diplomacy with the host government, buttressed by his earlier establishment of a climate of personal trust, helped get U.S.-Iceland relations through an extremely difficult period. The identification of the source of the leak (totally unconnected with Embassy Reykjavik) has relieved some of the bilateral stress for the moment. But there remains plenty of fodder for leftist and nationalist elements, especially important now that Iceland has, for the first time, a totally leftist coalition that does not rely on political alliance with centrists or rightists. It is a weak government and unlikely to cause major shifts in Iceland’s policies; however, its traditional “Iceland out of NATO” rhetoric will likely remain an irritant, even as other policy issues take center stage.

...

High-level officials in Washington also praised Embassy Reykjavik’s efforts to cope with the WikiLeaks scandal in February 2010, in which U.S. military personnel in Iraq leaked some of the embassy’s reporting cables. The release of these cables embarrassed the local government and the embassy, angered local political parties, and called into question the U.S. Government’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of bilateral discussions. The document release presumably inhibited subsequent bilateral discussions with the embassy as well as the candidness of embassy officers in their reporting. Over time, the harm caused by the WikiLeaks document release has faded in importance.

(Source: Department of State)

? WikiLeaks Grand Jury | US Secret Grand Jury Investigation meets in Alexandria, VA [NEED OTHER SOURCES FOR THIS MONTH]

David House says it convened in November and WikiLeaks says September 2010.

"It is nearly certain that allegations regarding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange from the grand jury that has been meeting every month since September 2010 attempting to mount an espionage case will be disclosed in these proceedings." (Source: wikileaks.org)

"Secret Grand Jury investigating alleged associations between Assange and Manning is convened in Alexandria, VA". (Source: David House: democracynow.org)

Jan 2011

31 EFF and the ACLU file a Motion to unseal motions and the upcoming hearing, scheduled for Feb 15.

28 White House Executive Office of Management and Budget | Assessments due for Memo M-11-08 to executive departments and agencies concerning Initial Assessments of Safeguarding and Counterintelligence Postures for Classified National Security Information in Automated Systems in response to original OMB's November 28, 2010 Memo "WikiLeaks - Mishandling of Classified Information," and Executive Order 13526

On November 28, 2010, departments and agencies that handle classified national security information were directed to establish assessment teams to review their implementation of safeguarding procedures.

That memo contained memoranda from the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), William J. Bosanko, and the Information Security Oversight Office, National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), Robert M. Bryant - within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Their offices would – consistent with their respective responsibilities under Executive Order 13526 and Section 1102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), and in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget – evaluate and assist agencies to comply with the assessment requirement and provide assistance to agency assessment teams - including periodic on-site reviews of agency compliance where appropriate. The attached memorandum calls for agency teams to complete their internal assessments questionnaire (attached) by January 28, 2011.

The assessment includes questions such as, "Assess what your agency has done or plans to do to address any perceived vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or gaps on automated systems in the post-WikiLeaks environment," and "Do you capture evidence of pre-employment and/or post-employment activities or participation in on-line media data mining sites like WikiLeaks or Open Leaks?"

[Tags: Executive Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO); National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), William J. Bosanko; Robert M. Bryant, National Counterintelligence Executive; Jacob Lew, Director of the Executive Office of Management and Budget]

28 Quantico Brig Observation Record on Manning.

"xxxvi) 28 January 2011 Entry: “SND did not receive any disciplinary reports or adverse spot evaluations and receive(d) an average work and training report.” The entry also notes, 'SND was evaluated by Col Malone [BRIG PSYCHIATRIST] on 21 January 2011 and, although further mental evaluation was deemed necessary, SND was recommended to be removed from POI classification from a psychiatric standpoint.'" [WHO DRAFTED THIS REPORT?] (Bradley Manning, Article 138 Complaint Rebuttal)

27 Department of Justice and FBI difference over how many search warrants were executed on January 27, 2011. FBI says more than 40 including international; while DOJ says 27 search warrants in twelve states and the District of Columbia as part of the investigation of the DDoS attacks against PayPal. So there are 13 search warrants difference in the US. UK Met police served more search warrants and arrested 5 people. [Tags: Operation Payback, Paypal 14]

See Department of Justice Press Release versus FBI.

DOJ:

On January 27, 2011, the FBI executed twenty-seven search warrants in twelve states and the District of Columbia as part of the investigation of the DDoS attacks against PayPal. On July 13, 2010, a federal grand jury in San Jose, California, returned a fifteen-count indictment against Dennis Collins, Christopher Wayne Cooper, Joshua John Covelli, Keith Wilson Downey, Mercedes Renee Haefer, Donald Husband, Vincent Charles Kershaw, Ethan Miles, James C. Murphy, Drew Alan Phillips, Jeffrey Puglisi, Daniel Sullivan, Tracy Ann Valenzuela and Christopher Vo for conspiracy and causing intentional damage to PayPal's computer servers. The case, United States v. Dennis Collins, et.al., No. CR 11-00471 DLJ, is currently pending before the Honorable D. Lowell Jensen .

Archive of FBI Press Release:

FBI agents today executed more than 40 search warrants throughout the United States as part of an ongoing investigation into recent coordinated cyber attacks against major companies and organizations. Also today, the United Kingdom’s Metropolitan Police Service executed additional search warrants and arrested five people for their alleged role in the attacks.

These distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) are facilitated by software tools designed to damage a computer network’s ability to function by flooding it with useless commands and information, thus denying service to legitimate users. A group calling itself “Anonymous” has claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying they conducted them in protest of the companies’ and organizations’ actions. The attacks were facilitated by the software tools the group makes available for free download on the Internet. The victims included major U.S. companies across several industries.

The FBI also is reminding the public that facilitating or conducting a DDoS attack is illegal, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, as well as exposing participants to significant civil liability.

The FBI is working closely with its international law enforcement partners and others to mitigate these threats. Authorities in the Netherlands, Germany, and France have also taken their own investigative and enforcement actions. The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) also is providing assistance. The NCFTA is a public-private partnership that works to identify, mitigate, and neutralize cyber crime. The NCFTA has advised that software from any untrustworthy source represents a potential threat and should be removed. Major Internet security (anti-virus) software providers have instituted updates so they will detect the so-called “Low Orbit Ion Canon” tools used in these attacks.

26 Fred Burton, Stratfor’s Vice-President for Counterterrorism and Corporate Security, is a former Deputy Chief of the Department of State’s (DoS) counterterrorism division for the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), which is handling all of the forensic analysis for the US Joint Investigation team, says the US has a sealed inditement against Assange.

PRESS RELEASE - STRATFOR EMAILS: US HAS ISSUED SEALED INDICTMENT AGAINST JULIAN ASSANGE

Tuesday 28th February 2012 18:30 GMT

Confidential emails obtained from the US private intelligence firm Stratfor show that the United States Government has had a secret indictment against WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for more than 12 months.

Fred Burton, Stratfor’s Vice-President for Counterterrorism and Corporate Security, is a former Deputy Chief of the Department of State’s (DoS) counterterrorism division for the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).

In early 2011, Burton revealed in internal Stratfor correspondence that a secret Grand Jury had already issued a sealed indictment for Assange: "Not for Pub — We have a sealed indictment on Assange. Pls protect." (375123) According to Burton: "Assange is going to make a nice bride in prison. Screw the terrorist. He’ll be eating cat food forever." (1056988) A few weeks earlier, following Julian Assange’s release from a London jail, where he had been remanded as a result of a Swedish prosecutor’s arrest warrant, Fred Burton told SkyNews: "extradition [to the US is] more and more likely". (373862).

Emails from Fred Burton reveal that the US Government employs the same counterterrorism strategy against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks as against Al Qaeda: "Take down the money. Go after his infrastructure. The tools we are using to nail and de-construct Wiki are the same tools used to dismantle and track aQ [Al Qaeda]. Thank Cheney & 43 [former US President George W. Bush]. Big Brother owns his liberal terrorist arse." (1067796)

Ten days after the CIA reportedly assassinated Osama bin Laden, Burton writes in an email sent to Stratfor’s "Secure" mailing list that he "can get access to the materials seized from the OBL [Osama bin Laden] safe house." (1660854)

Burton states: "Ferreting out [Julian Assange’s] confederates is also key. Find out what other disgruntled rogues inside the tent or outside [sic]. Pile on. Move him from country to country to face various charges for the next 25 years. But, seize everything he and his family own, to include every person linked to Wiki." (1056763)

Along with the FBI, the Diplomatic Security Service and the Department of Defense (DoD) form a multi-agency US Government outfit seeking to criminally indict and prosecute WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. According to the Department of State, the DSS handles the investigation of all leads that involve the DoS and assists the DoD in forensic analysis of hard drives seized by the US Government in its ongoing criminal investigation.

Burton also says he "would pursue [c]onspiracy and [p]olitical [t]errorism charges and declassify the death of a source someone which [he] could link to Wiki" (1074383). Burton’s strategy is to: "[b]ankrupt the arsehole first," Burton states, "ruin his life. Give him 7-12 yrs for conspiracy." (1057220)

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said: "For over a year now, the US Attorney General Eric Holder has been conducting a "secret" Grand Jury investigation into WikiLeaks. This neo-McCarthyist witch hunt against WikiLeaks may be Mr Holder’s defining legacy. Any student of American history knows that secret justice is no justice at all. Justice must be seen to be done. Legitimate authority arises out of the informed consent of the governed, not Eric Holder’s press secretary. Secret Grand Juries with secret indictments are apparently Eric Holder’s preferred method of dealing with publishers who hold his administration to account. Eric Holder has betrayed the legacy of Madison and Jefferson. He should drop the case or resign. Should he continue, however, the Obama administration may not — Democrats and Republicans alike believe in the right to tell the truth."

As early as June 2010, after the release of the Collateral Murder video but prior to the Afghan War Diaries release, the emails talk of a sealed indictment. In an email conversation between Shane Harris, a National Security journalist, and Burton, Harris is surprised that Assange was reported to be attending a Las Vegas Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) conference. Burton remarks: "As a foreign national, we could revoke [Julian Assange’s] travel status and deport. Could also be taken into custody as a material witness. We COULD have a sealed indictment and lock him up. Depends upon how far along the military case is" (391504). Julian Assange cancelled his appearance at the IRE conference due to security concerns.

In another email to Stephen Feldhaus, Stratfor legal counsel, about Ronald Kessler, a "pro-FBI journalist", Burton remarks: “I look forward to Manning and Assange facing a bajillion-thousand counts [of espionage]." (1035283)

In July 2010 alleged WikiLeaks source Bradley Manning was moved from Camp Arifjan, Kuwait to the Quantico Brig in the Military District of Washington at the request of Maj. Gen. Terry Wolff, then Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division/US Division – Center in Iraq.

Wolff requested Manning’s move, the Pentagon reported, "due to a potentially lengthy pre-trial confinement because of the complexity of the charges and an ongoing investigation.” Three days before Manning arrived at Quantico Brig, Burton wrote to George Friedman, Stratfor CEO and founder:

“We probably asked the ASIS [Australian Secret Intelligence Service] to monitor Wiki coms and email, after the soldier from Potomac was nabbed. So, it’s reasonable to assume we probably already know who has done it. The delay could be figuring out how to declassify and use the Aussie intel on Wiki... The owner [Julian Assange] is a peacenik. He needs his head dunked in a full toilet bowl at Gitmo.” (402168)

(Source: WikiLeaks Global Intelligence Files and WikiLeaks Global Intelligence Files)

26 Jacob Appelbaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir file a motion to vacate the Twitter Secret Court Order. According to the US Government neither the owner of the WikiLeaks account or Twitter raised objection regarding the @WikiLeaks account.

"On Jan. 26, attorneys for Mr. Appelbaum, Mr. Gonggrijp and Ms. Jonsdottir jointly filed a motion to vacate the court order. They argued, among other things, that because IP addresses can be used to locate a person in 'specific geographic destinations,' it constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus required a warrant. (The Wall Street Journal)

"The government argued that IP addresses don't reveal precise location and are more akin to ph